CLA Memorandum

DATE: January 12, 2007

TO: Honorable Members of the City Council

FROM: Gerry F. Miller
Chief Legislative Analyst

Phase III Final Report: Citywide Gang Activity Reduction Strategy

Attached please find the Phase III Final Report as provided to the Contract Oversight Committee by Advancement Project, pursuant to Contract C-109696 with the City to develop a Citywide Gang Activity Reduction Strategy.

If you have any questions, please contact Meg Barclay of my office at (213) 473-5735.
Executive Summary

The City of Los Angeles has had a violence crisis for over 20 years. Beneath the relative citywide safety and tranquility, extraordinary violence rages in Los Angeles’ high crime zones. A former World Health Organization epidemiologist who studies violence as a public health problem concluded that, “Los Angeles is to violence what Bangladesh is to diarrhea, which means the crisis is at a dire level requiring a massive response.” Moreover, Los Angeles is the gang capital of the world. Although only a small percentage of the City’s 700 gangs and estimated 40,000 gang members engage in routine violence, the petri dish of Los Angeles’ high crime neighborhoods has spawned “a violent gang culture unlike any other….“ The violence from this subset is at epidemic levels: almost 75 percent of youth gang homicides in the state of California have occurred in Los Angeles County, creating what experts have concluded is a regional “long-term epidemic of youth gang homicide and violence,” to which the City is the major contributor.

This epidemic is largely immune to general declines in crime. And it is spreading to formerly safe middle class neighborhoods. Law enforcement officials now warn that they are arriving at the end of their ability to contain it to poor minority and immigrant hot zones.

After a quarter century of a multi-billion dollar war on gangs, there are six times as many gangs and at least double the number of gang members in the region. Suppression alone—and untargeted suppression in particular—cannot solve this problem. Law enforcement officials now agree that they cannot arrest their way out of the gang violence crisis and that their crime suppression efforts must be linked to competent prevention, intervention, and community-stabilizing investment strategies. This report is about those strategies.

The City’s small and isolated gang prevention programs cannot reverse an entrenched epidemic. Comprehensive, neighborhood-based, schools-centered strategies for effective prevention, intervention, and community development will be needed in order to substantially reduce gang activity and violence in high crime areas, keep “tipping point” areas from tipping into routine violence, pull “sliding communities” with emerging violence back to safety, and keep safe areas safe.

In short, Los Angeles needs a Marshall Plan to end gang violence.
The Critical Concepts

There are over 100 recommendations and action items in this report, but no City strategy will sustain reductions in gang activity or neighborhood violence without addressing the core issues at the heart of those recommendations:

1. Top political leaders must issue a strong, unanimous, and sustained political mandate to remove the drivers and conditions that spawn gangs and neighborhood violence.

2. City approaches must stop focusing on isolated, tiny programs that address less than five percent of the problem and must begin to confront the size and scope of the gang problem.

3. City approaches must address the conditions in neighborhoods and the unmet needs of children that allow gangs to take root, flourish, and expand.
   a. The strategies must focus on the ecology of neighborhood violence using the public health and healing, child development, job development and community development models that address the major underlying drivers of violence and gang proliferation. In order to achieve this, the City must develop comprehensive, coordinated, multi-jurisdictional, schools-centered, neighborhood-based saturation strategies that do not leave children to fend for themselves on the streets. These strategies must be linked to problem-solving community policing that is designed to dovetail with neighborhood efforts. Comprehensive strategies have to be carefully and skillfully implemented to have any chance of avoiding chaos and achieving measurable reductions in gang activity and violence.
   b. City approaches also must address the precursors to violence that may originate in the home, such as domestic violence, negative parenting, and tolerance of gang culture.
   c. The general approaches described above that are aimed at underlying community conditions will be insufficient to satisfy the specialized and carefully targeted strategies needed to focus on gangs. In addition to the general comprehensive neighborhood-based strategies, an entire repertoire of carefully defined programs designed to address the special circumstances of gangs—gang specific risk factors, structures, and group processes should be developed. Service programs targeting gang prone youth cannot be so badly designed that they inadvertently increase gang cohesion and validate gang identity. Programs also must be aimed at providing sufficient resources to those who want a safe exit and transition
from gang life and/or aimed at reducing the violence of hard core gang members who are unlikely to leave gang life before age 25.

4. The City must get documented results for current monies spent and generate new resources by ending unnecessary and costly City practices.

   a. Stop the dissipation and lack of impact with current funds by placing small and isolated programs into comprehensive and coordinated neighborhood violence reduction strategies that are efficient and generate results.

   b. Find and end practices that consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for relatively little benefit to the public—for example, the costs of subsidizing take-home City cars for hundreds of City workers, unnecessary round-the-clock staffing, wasteful overtime practices, and idle City owned properties—and redeploy those dollars into a gang activity and violence reduction strategy.

5. After eliminating wasteful and ineffective approaches, the City should obtain new streams of funding for general prevention, intervention, and suppression and gang specific prevention, intervention, and suppression.

   a. Additional funds will be needed but should not be sought until competent strategies, rigorous oversight, and accountability frameworks for expenditure of new funds are in place.

   b. The City should seek joint funding as well as joint action with the State and County government to solve the gang violence problem. The City’s gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over $2 billion a year, with many of those costs paid from State and County coffers. A joint investment among entities of the State, County, City and the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) will increase the pooled funding and effectiveness for all government agencies.

6. Create accountability for reducing gang violence through a powerful, centralizing, entrepreneurial City entity with the institutional and political clout needed to streamline bureaucracy; command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions, and LAUSD; and execute neighborhood-based violence prevention and reduction plans. If this new entity does not document substantial and sustained reductions in gang activity and violence in selected high crime neighborhoods within set time periods, the City should eliminate it and/or change strategies.

   a. This entity—whether it is a new entrepreneurial department or another structure—cannot succeed within the reactive culture and constraints of traditional bureaucracy. In order to execute the comprehensive, multifaceted strategies that comprehensive gang violence reduction will require,
the entity charged with accountability for doing so will have to be creative, agile, proactive, results-oriented, and freer to contract with specialists, use technology, experiment to find out what works, and hire specially skilled staff that civil service tests are unlikely to identify.¹

7. The leadership of the entrepreneurial entity will have to be bold, unafraid to take responsible risks or experiment, have extraordinary political skills, have credibility with sectors ranging from law enforcement to gang interventionists and academics, and possess working familiarity with areas of contention in the relevant disciplines ranging from gang culture and domestic violence to evaluation and program design.

8. Reap the “prevention dividend” by substantially increasing investment in gang focused prevention and intervention programs, and by creating gang focused prevention programs for two important groups: girls and young children who are trapped in high crime, gang dominated neighborhoods. (The City has only one gang prevention program involving elementary school age children now: the Gang Alternatives Program in the Harbor area.)

   a. Substantially increase investment in improved training and oversight for gang intervention programs, and link them to jobs and wraparound activities that create safe exit ramps out of gangs.

   b. Create specially targeted but carefully developed programs for elementary school children living in gang saturated communities and for the increasing numbers of girls involved in violence.


   a. The City must get competent data, evaluation and program design in order to accurately measure results. Accurate and regionally standardized definitions of gang, gang membership, and gang crime are essential. This Institute can be built through joint venture agreements with universities, foundations, and think tanks.

   b. The City must move from politically driven policy to research driven policy, and must build evaluation into all programs.

10. A regional strategy that is countywide will be essential to solving both the City’s and region’s gang activity and violence problems.

   a. Gangs and gang violence are a regional problem that requires a regional strategy.

b. Other government sectors including the County and State must meet City efforts with equivalent strategic commitment.

c. A regional entity that coordinates State, County, and City efforts will be needed once a new and robust funding stream is created.

11. Law enforcement, prosecution, and juvenile justice strategies must dovetail with comprehensive neighborhood-based prevention and intervention strategies.

a. As part of the citywide strategy and in collaboration with other City entities, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) should accelerate cultural reforms and expedite its transition toward problem solving community policing even without enough officers. LAPD should examine its gang suppression strategies for long term effectiveness and to determine if they are meeting emerging gang trends. LAPD should expand its targeted suppression that focuses on the most violent and develop ways to coordinate crime fighting with competent neighborhood violence reduction plans. Finally, LAPD should develop, with outside experts and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), competent regional gang data. Currently such definitions are not employed consistently across jurisdictions and are subject to interpretation of individual law enforcement agencies and personnel.

b. Prosecutors need help getting substantially increased funds for extensive witness protection and other retaliation reduction measures and should relax enforcement of injunctions where competent community strategies require it.

c. The County and City need to authorize an emergency task force to expedite and immediately implement comprehensive reforms of County probation services, youth detention facilities and juvenile adjudication processes.

12. LAUSD will be a key institution in any neighborhood based comprehensive strategy. The District will have to radically change its role to become a strategic asset in neighborhood violence reduction strategies. LAUSD facilities will be important centers for any neighborhood violence reduction strategy. LAUSD must develop strategies to prevent and interrupt campus violence, as Santee High School has done. LAUSD also must co-pilot the joint efforts of City, County, and neighborhood institutions to develop comprehensive neighborhood safety plans. The City and LAUSD must also vastly increase investment in after school resources and expand and replicate programs like LA’s Best.

13. Public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns involving broad sectors of Los Angeles will be important. The public’s sustained engagement will be pivotal in a region-wide strategy to end neighborhood violence.
a. Los Angeles’ civic and faith-based sectors should be funded to lead a public campaign against violence and against youth access to guns—a civic movement against the culture of destruction that is engulfing LA’s poorest areas will be essential to turning this problem around.

b. Los Angeles’ philanthropic sector should help fund the formation of the independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute, intervention training, and programs that develop neighborhood leadership and community organizations dedicated to creating violence-free, healthy neighborhoods.

c. The region’s universities, think tanks and academic experts should contribute policy and evaluation expertise for the City’s comprehensive strategy and policy, including the formation of the Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.

d. The Business sector can help provide jobs and technical assistance to the City as it moves to create a competent, entrepreneurial model of government.

e. The entertainment and media sector should offer substantial help in countering the glorification of gangs, violence and guns that fuels attraction to gang life, by helping to design and fund public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns.

These are the concepts that will have to be incorporated and addressed if the City is to develop competent approaches that have the capacity to sustain reductions in neighborhood gang activity and violence. How these ideas are achieved can be negotiated, but whether they are achieved has to be a given.

**Conclusion**

This is the third time that the Los Angeles City Council has officially asked the question, “Why are City gang reduction strategies failing?” And it is the third time that experts have recommended that smarter suppression be linked to comprehensive prevention and intervention and that—above all—the City end the conditions that spawn and sustain gangs and neighborhood violence. The City did not fully enact those prior recommendations and gang activity and violence continued unabated, forcing today’s City Council leaders to repeat the same question in 2005.

In the meantime, residents of Los Angeles’ most dangerous neighborhoods continue losing children to senseless violence, and residents of safe areas are beginning to see that the threat could spread to them. In over 20 community meetings conducted for this assessment, public anger over the City’s failure to find a competent approach to this problem came through loud and clear.
Angelenos do not want to hear about another study. They want to see the problem solved. Now.

Ultimately, it is a question of leadership’s will to overcome the inherent political aversion to confronting complex issues, and the inevitable bureaucratic, union and community based organizations’ resistance to the changes that will be needed for comprehensive, non-bureaucratic approaches. The solutions require cross-silo creativity, bold leadership, smart strategy, and sustained focus.

The challenge is not what to do, but finding the will to do it.
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Introduction

In November 2005, the Los Angeles City Council and its Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development released an RFQ for an outside consultant to develop a comprehensive citywide gang reduction strategy. The Advancement Project (AP) proposed, and the City accepted, a three phase Gang Activity Reduction Strategy Project to be carried out over a nine-month period, from March 29 to December 29, 2006.¹

In Phase I, the Advancement Project and its team of experts² assessed the City’s current efforts to reduce gang activity, and concluded that despite examples of gang intervention and prevention programs that have helped individuals and shown short term impact, the City’s gang reduction strategy had no capacity to address the size or nature of youth violence, had the wrong paradigm for the problem, and lacked the political will to solve it.

In Phase II, the Advancement Project researched best and promising violence prevention and reduction practices nationally and locally and found examples of programs that reduced youth and/or gang violence for short periods of time. This research confirmed elements of approaches that should be used to form the far more comprehensive and extensive strategy needed to address the LA region’s tenacious gang and youth violence problem.

This final report for Phase III builds upon the findings of Phases I and II, sets out the changes in paradigm, operation, and strategy needed to replace the City’s current efforts. If the City is serious about reversing the scale and severity of the gang violence problem, it will have to replace its current efforts with a comprehensive, multi-sectored, multi-disciplined, schools-centered and highly coordinated, carefully targeted neighborhood-based gang and violence reduction system for the Los Angeles region. It will have to use the public health,³ child development, and community development models—approaches designed to reverse the underlying driving conditions that spawn and fuel neighborhood violence problems, of which gangs are one factor.

¹ On March 7, 2006, City Council approved the selection of the Advancement Project as the contractor for a six-month period from March 29 to September 29, 2006. On July 21, 2006, City Council approved an amendment to the contract for a three-month extension for a total of nine months.
² Father Greg Boyle; Gila Bronner, The Bronner Group; Maria Casillas, Families in Schools; Way-Ting Chen and Jennifer Li Shen, Blue Garnet Associates; Patti Giggans and Cathy Friedman, Peace Over Violence; Megan Golden and Jena Siegel, Vera Institute of Justice; Peter Greenwood, Ph.D; Jorja Leap, Ph.D.; David Marquez, JHDM Consultants; Bill Martinez, MCRP; Cheryl Maxson, Ph.D.; Ali Modarres, Ph.D., The Pat Brown Institute, CSULA; Sgt. Wes McBride; Cecilia Sandoval, The Sandoval Group; Howard Uller; Billie Weiss, MPH, Southern California Injury Prevention Research Institute, UCLA.
³ The public health approach uses a four-level social-ecological model to better understand violence and the effect of potential prevention strategies. This model takes into consideration the complex interplay between individual, relationship, community, and societal factors. It allows us to address the factors that put people at risk for experiencing or perpetrating violence. For a more detailed description of the public health model, see “Violence: A Global Public Health Problem,” World Report on Violence and Health, World Health Organization, 2002.
The Context for This Report

This report explains the failure of the City’s current approach to preventing and reducing gang activity and violence and makes the case for a rapid transition to a comprehensive strategy that has the capacity to begin solving the problem. This report is not a formal evaluation of individual programs run by the City or its contractors; it is not a review of any individual’s job performance; and the solutions suggested in this report are not aimed at specific programs or individuals. There are many people who work tirelessly and with great courage to save children from “La Vida Loca,” and nothing in this report should be read as disparaging their efforts. There also are serious shortcomings in the City’s existing gang prevention and intervention programs that should be fixed, but until the City adopts a competent overall strategy that is capable of reducing gang activity and violence, it would be unproductive to focus extensively on problems in the few existing programs. The City’s approach to gang reduction is not competent; indeed, it is structured to fail.

Accordingly, this report focuses on that macro-strategic level—the big picture—which has to be correctly diagnosed and addressed before even the best program can begin to show impact on the ground—or the worst program can be properly replaced.

Los Angeles is Unique

Many other cities also have wrestled with the problem of preventing and reducing gang activity and neighborhood violence. This report discusses such efforts in four jurisdictions including New York, Boston, Chicago, and Alameda County, California. These examples provide promising practices that can inform LA’s strategy. However, Los Angeles is unique, in its diverse demographics, in its vast geography, and in the scale and entrenched culture of its violence. Indeed, it is the gang capital of the world. Therefore, no one city’s strategy can be transplanted here wholesale for implementation. Instead, Los Angeles must construct its own solutions, taking successes from other cities, from the best research, from effective local operations, and from the City’s own carefully designed experiments that it should develop to document what works.

Los Angeles Has a Crisis

Los Angeles has a violence crisis, and a youth gang homicide epidemic. For over 20 years, the City has tolerated in its high crime zones extraordinary levels of violence as normal for two reasons. First, until recently, the City’s long standing law enforcement strategy of suppression containment has been successful in keeping gang violence primarily located in poor, disorganized minority and/or immigrant neighborhoods. And second, because Los Angeles is so large, the violence crisis gets subsumed by both the vast geography and the larger citywide crime statistics that recently have shown steady declines in crime and overall increasing public safety. In other words, at the same time

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4 “La Vida Loca” or in English, The Crazy Life, refers to the chaotic destruction and violence of street gang existence. See, e.g., Always Running. La Vida Loca: Gang Days in L.A by Luis J. Rodriguez.

time that most middle class and all privileged Los Angeles communities are relatively safe, many poor areas endure persistently high crime rates and levels of violence that in some cases are extraordinary.

But law enforcement warns that the containment bargain is beginning to unravel. Gang crime in Los Angeles, particularly the youth gang homicide rate, often does not follow citywide declines. And after decades of fighting gangs, police estimate there are twice as many gang members, six times as many gangs, and an emerging increase of girls joining gangs. The problem is not receding.

The Political Will is the First Hurdle to a Solution

This is the third time that the Los Angeles City Council has officially asked the question, “Why are City gang reduction strategies failing?”6 It is the third time that experts have recommended far more strategic suppression linked to comprehensive approaches that focus on intense prevention, targeted gang intervention, and—above all—removing the conditions that spawn and sustain gangs, violence, and other threats to neighborhood safety. The City did not fully enact those prior recommendations and gang activity and violence continued unabated, prompting yet another group of City Council leaders to repeat the same question in 2005.

In the meantime, the residents of Los Angeles’ most dangerous neighborhoods continue losing children to senseless violence and those in safe areas are beginning to see that the threat could spread to them. In over 20 community meetings conducted for this assessment, public anger over the City’s failure to find a competent approach to this problem came through loudly and clearly. Angelenos do not want to hear about another study. They want to see the problem solved. Now.

Ultimately, it is a question of the leadership’s will to overcome the inherent political aversion to confronting complex issues and the inevitable bureaucratic and community based organizations’ resistance to moving from the current programmatic boxes to a comprehensive strategy and a new kind of governance model.

The challenge is not what to do, but finding the will to do it.

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6 This effort is the City’s third attempt to respond to escalating gang violence over the last 25 years. The first attempt was the creation of Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS) in 1982; the second was the 1996 Ad Hoc Committee on Gangs and Juvenile Justice. See “City of Los Angeles Gang Activity Reduction Strategy – Phase I Report,” July 2006, pp. 4-5.
The Critical Concepts

There are over 100 recommendations and action items in this report, but no City strategy will sustain reductions in gang activity or neighborhood violence without addressing the core issues at the heart of those recommendations:

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2. City approaches must stop focusing on isolated, tiny programs that address less than five percent of the problem and must begin to confront the size and scope of the gang problem.

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   c. The general approaches described above that are aimed at underlying community conditions will be insufficient to satisfy the specialized and carefully targeted strategies needed to focus on gangs. In addition to the general comprehensive neighborhood-based strategies, an entire repertoire of carefully defined programs designed to address the special circumstances of gangs—gang specific risk factors, structures, and group processes should be developed. Service programs targeting gang prone youth cannot be so badly designed that they inadvertently increase gang cohesion and validate gang identity. Programs also must be aimed at providing sufficient resources to those who want a safe exit and transition from gang life and/or aimed at reducing the violence of hard core gang members who are unlikely to leave gang life before age 25.
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   a. Stop the dissipation and lack of impact with current funds by placing small and isolated programs into comprehensive and coordinated neighborhood violence reduction strategies that are efficient and generate results.

   b. Find and end practices that consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for relatively little benefit to the public—for example, the costs of subsidizing take-home City cars for hundreds of City workers, unnecessary round-the-clock staffing, wasteful overtime practices, and idle City owned properties—and redeploy those dollars into a gang activity and violence reduction strategy.

5. After eliminating wasteful and ineffective approaches, the City should obtain new streams of funding for general prevention, intervention, and suppression and gang specific prevention, intervention, and suppression.

   a. Additional funds will be needed but should not be sought until competent strategies, rigorous oversight, and accountability frameworks for expenditure of new funds are in place.

   b. The City should seek joint funding as well as joint action with the State and County government to solve the gang violence problem. The City’s gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over $2 billion a year, with many of those costs paid from State and County coffers. A joint investment among entities of the State, County, City and the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) will increase the pooled funding and effectiveness for all government agencies.

6. Create accountability for reducing gang violence through a powerful, centralizing, entrepreneurial City entity with the institutional and political clout needed to streamline bureaucracy; command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions, and LAUSD; and execute neighborhood-based violence prevention and reduction plans. If this new entity does not document substantial and sustained reductions in gang activity and violence in selected high crime neighborhoods within set time periods, the City should eliminate it and/or change strategies.

   a. This entity—whether it is a new entrepreneurial department or another structure—cannot succeed within the reactive culture and constraints of traditional bureaucracy. In order to execute the comprehensive, multi-faceted strategies that comprehensive gang violence reduction will require, the entity charged with accountability for doing so will have to be creative, agile, proactive, results-oriented, and freer to contract with specialists, use technology, experiment to find out what works, and hire specially skilled staff that civil service tests are unlikely to identify.7

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7. The leadership of the entrepreneurial entity will have to be bold, unafraid to take responsible risks or experiment, have extraordinary political skills, have credibility with sectors ranging from law enforcement to gang interventionists and academics, and possess working familiarity with areas of contention in the relevant disciplines ranging from gang culture and domestic violence to evaluation and program design.

8. Reap the “prevention dividend” by substantially increasing investment in gang focused prevention and intervention programs, and by creating gang focused prevention programs for two important groups: girls and young children who are trapped in high crime, gang dominated neighborhoods. (The City has only one gang prevention program involving elementary school age children now: the Gang Alternatives Program in the Harbor area.)

   a. Substantially increase investment in improved training and oversight for gang intervention programs, and link them to jobs and wraparound activities that create safe exit ramps out of gangs.

   b. Create specially targeted but carefully developed programs for elementary school children living in gang saturated communities and for the increasing numbers of girls involved in violence.


   a. The City must get competent data, evaluation and program design in order to accurately measure results. Accurate and regionally standardized definitions of gang, gang membership, and gang crime are essential. This Institute can be built through joint venture agreements with universities, foundations, and think tanks.

   b. The City must move from politically driven policy to research driven policy, and must build evaluation into all programs.

10. A regional strategy that is countywide will be essential to solving both the City’s and region’s gang activity and violence problems.

   a. Gangs and gang violence are a regional problem that requires a regional strategy.

   b. Other government sectors including the County and State must meet City efforts with equivalent strategic commitment.

   c. A regional entity that coordinates State, County, and City efforts will be needed once a new and robust funding stream is created.

11. Law enforcement, prosecution, and juvenile justice strategies must dovetail with comprehensive neighborhood-based prevention and intervention strategies.
a. As part of the citywide strategy and in collaboration with other City entities, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) should accelerate cultural reforms and expedite its transition toward problem solving community policing even without enough officers. LAPD should examine its gang suppression strategies for long term effectiveness and to determine if they are meeting emerging gang trends. LAPD should expand its targeted suppression that focuses on the most violent and develop ways to coordinate crime fighting with competent neighborhood violence reduction plans. Finally, LAPD should develop, with outside experts and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), competent regional gang data. Currently such definitions are not employed consistently across jurisdictions and are subject to interpretation of individual law enforcement agencies and personnel.

b. Prosecutors need help getting substantially increased funds for extensive witness protection and other retaliation reduction measures and should relax enforcement of injunctions where competent community strategies require it.

c. The County and City need to authorize an emergency task force to expedite and immediately implement comprehensive reforms of County probation services, youth detention facilities and juvenile adjudication processes.

12. LAUSD will be a key institution in any neighborhood based comprehensive strategy. The District will have to radically change its role to become a strategic asset in neighborhood violence reduction strategies. LAUSD facilities will be important centers for any neighborhood violence reduction strategy. LAUSD must develop strategies to prevent and interrupt campus violence, as Santee High School has done. LAUSD also must co-pilot the joint efforts of City, County, and neighborhood institutions to develop comprehensive neighborhood safety plans. The City and LAUSD must also vastly increase investment in after school resources and expand and replicate programs like LA’s Best.

13. Public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns involving broad sectors of Los Angeles will be important. The public’s sustained engagement will be pivotal in a region-wide strategy to end neighborhood violence.

   a. Los Angeles’ civic and faith-based sectors should be funded to lead a public campaign against violence and against youth access to guns—a civic movement against the culture of destruction that is engulfing LA’s poorest areas will be essential to turning this problem around.

   b. Los Angeles’ philanthropic sector should help fund the formation of the independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute, intervention training, and programs that develop neighborhood leadership and community organizations dedicated to creating violence-free, healthy neighborhoods.

   c. The region’s universities, think tanks and academic experts should contribute policy and evaluation expertise for the City’s comprehensive strategy and policy, including the formation of the Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
d. The Business sector can help provide jobs and technical assistance to the City as it moves to create a competent, entrepreneurial model of government.

e. The entertainment and media sector should offer substantial help in countering the glorification of gangs, violence and guns that fuels attraction to gang life, by helping to design and fund public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns.

These are the concepts that will have to be incorporated and addressed if the City is to develop competent approaches that have the capacity to sustain reductions in neighborhood gang activity and violence. How these ideas are achieved can be negotiated, but whether they are achieved has to be a given.

Methodology

The team of consultants that produced this report includes experts in community conditions that spawn violence, violence as a public health epidemic, education strategies that reduce violence, job strategies that reduce gang violence, violence against women and girls, juvenile crime, gang intervention, gang prevention, anti-gang law enforcement, community development, effective government, demography, budget analysis, and crime costs. The team examined 45 City programs, 12 City departments as well as County, LAUSD, and other externally provided services related to youth development and gang violence reduction. The team conducted over 250 interviews of City, County and private sector experts, and visited three cities with nationally recognized gang reduction and violence prevention strategies. In addition to reviewing the volumes of City documents and materials on current and past gang programs and assessments, the team conducted a survey of research on gangs, juvenile crime, and violence reduction. In the nine months of this contract the team produced one preliminary report, http://www.advanceproj.com/doc/gang_phase1.pdf, an interim status report on best practices, and this final report. This is the final report. It sets out the recommended elements for a comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy.
I. Gang Gestalt: The Scope and Contours of the Problem

A. Surface Diagnosis of Declining Crime

On the surface, Los Angeles’ crime statistics tell a story of declining crime rates. In 2006, the fifth year of overall crime decline in the City continued with a further eight percent drop. Nationally, Los Angeles was one of the few large cities to escape a recent spike in violent crimes in the last 18 months. Despite the fear generated in the 1990s about anticipated surges of youth violence, the juvenile felony rate has plummeted 61 percent from 1970s levels.

If Crime is Declining, What’s the Problem?
So if general crime trends are down, why should the City even worry about gangs or gang violence?

Because gang crime does not follow general crime trends. In spite of recent declines in citywide crime rates; gang crime and violence in Los Angeles are up. It is a problem because it destroys the lives of thousands of children and the quality of life in hundreds of neighborhoods. It is also wasteful; Los Angeles gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over $2 billion every year. Finally, it is a problem because gang violence and crime are beginning to impact neighborhoods and schools that until recently have been gang free. The bottom line is that, while citywide, state and national declines for general crime rates are encouraging, LAPD statistics show consistently high levels of violence in high crime zones and LAPD gang officers report significant increases in gang crime in the San Fernando Valley and a few other areas of Los Angeles.

B. Beneath the Surface: Diagnosis of Danger

Neighborhood Conditions Have Created Entrenched Gang Dynamics

If these officers are correct, the conclusion to draw is disturbing: the neighborhood conditions that spawn LA’s most dangerous gangs are so formidable that LA gang crime is immune from overall declines. That’s the conclusion of the California Attorney General’s 20 year study of gang homicides in Los Angeles County: “[W]hat truly sets Los Angeles apart from the remainder of California is not a general propensity for violent behavior, but rather… a specific milieu that has fostered the development of a violent gang culture unlike any other

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11 Los Angeles Daily News, “‘State of Siege’ in Valley LAPD steps up war against gang violence, vowing to bring in FBI,” October 21, 2006. In a report to the Police Commission, Deputy Chief Michael Moore was quoted as saying, “While overall crime is down throughout the Valley for the fourth straight year, gang crime is up 40 percent.”
gang culture in the state.”

Indeed, for over 20 years, LA’s disproportionately high youth gang homicide rate has persisted regardless of the larger crime trends, establishing what the Attorney General describes as an “enduring…long term epidemic of youth gang homicide and violence” that will require “long-term strategies supported by community-wide planning, participation, data collection, and investment.” While the Attorney General’s analysis focused on LA County, the City can take credit for at least 50 percent of the trends described in this study. The most compelling reason to address the conditions that give rise to LA’s deadly gang culture is seen in the communities that suffer from it.

The City of Los Angeles should take no comfort in its overall crime declines that mask and subsume the alarming violence on the ground in scores of Los Angeles communities saddled with gangs, gang violence, and the neighborhood conditions that fuel them. Diminishing federal support, the current shortage of police officers, and the City’s “thin blue line” public safety model preclude providing safety in the poorest and most violent areas of Los Angeles; instead City strategies contain the violence and fail to stem its causes. In these areas of the City, violence is too frequent an experience to be ignored. In the Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) West LA Division, the risk of suffering a violent attack is 1 in 399; in Hollenbeck, it is an alarming 1 in 153; and in Southeast Division, it is an astonishing 1 in 51.

Families in these areas of the City cannot take solace from the surface diagnosis that overall citywide crime is declining. Gang dynamics in these areas also are beginning to reflect and exacerbate existing ethnic divides in the City, increasing the likelihood that innocent residents will suffer from racially motivated gang violence. Indeed, violent crime remains concentrated at such distressingly high levels in some areas of poor African American and Latino neighborhoods that officers refer to some of these high crime areas as “Kill Zones.”

C. Conditions in High Crime Zones Are No Longer Ignorable

Both statistics and anecdotes from neighborhoods beset by high levels of crime and violence further tell the story of the extraordinary conditions in LA’s high crime areas. Despite overall decreases in crime, for example in 2006, LAPD’s Newton division in South LA saw a five percent increase in violent crime, and Hollenbeck Division in Boyle Heights reported a five percent increase. According to the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), in 2005

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13 Ibid, 2.
14 The City has an estimated 50 percent of the County’s total gang members.
15 According to the LAPD’s Statistical Digest Summary (2004), 234,701 residents live within the West LA Division’s geographic boundaries. LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data report that 588 violent crimes occurred in West LA Division during 2005. To calculate the chance of being a victim of a violent crime in the West LA Division, we divided the population by the number of violent crimes.
16 Same source and methodology as Footnote #15. The Hollenbeck Division serves 214,812 residents and the number of reported violent crimes in the division in 2005 was 1,396.
17 The Southeast Division serves 139,229 residents and the number of reported violent crimes in the division in 2005 was 2,714.
18 LAPD COMPSTAT Newton Area and Hollenbeck Area Profile. <http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat>
there were over 1,400 shooting related 911 calls in South LA, over 200 calls in East LA, over 400 calls in Central LA and over 300 calls in the Valley.\footnote{2005 LAFD data shows that South LA had a total of 1,430 shooting related 911 calls (Battalions 3, 6, and 13); East LA had 222 calls (Battalions 2 and 7); the Valley had 381 calls (Battalions 10, 12, 14, 15, and 17); and Central LA had 430 calls (Battalions 1, 5, and 11).} In 2005, just one division in the South Bureau, the Southeast Division, had more murders than the total murder count in 15 states.\footnote{In 2005, the Southeast Division had 64 homicides. Across the country, fifteen states had 64 or less homicides. Those states were: Alaska (32), Delaware (37), Hawaii (24), Idaho (35), Iowa (38), Maine (19), Montana (18), Nebraska (44), New Hampshire (18), North Dakota (7), Rhode Island (34), South Dakota (18), Utah (56), Vermont (8), and Wyoming (14). State murder statistics are from the U.S. Department of Justice.} The South Bureau as a whole had more murders than ten states combined.\footnote{The four divisions in South Bureau had a total of 209 homicides in 2005 (77th Street, Southwest, Southeast, Harbor). Ten states—Alaska (32), Delaware (37), Hawaii (24), Maine (19), Montana (18), New Hampshire (18), North Dakota (7), South Dakota (18), Vermont (8) and Wyoming (14)—had a combined total of 195 murders in 2005. National murder statistics are from the U.S. Department of Justice.} In the last 30 years, more than 100,000 individuals were shooting victims in South Bureau.\footnote{AP interview with LAPD expert, November 16, 2006.} And there is no end in sight. LAPD statistics from 2006 show that the level of gun related violence may not be waning despite declining crime statistics, as a majority of LAPD divisions are reporting a spike in number of gun shootings and shooting related victims.\footnote{See LAPD COMPSTAT, West Valley Division shooting victims and shots fired 10/22/06 – 11/18/06 and Wilshire Division shots fired 10/22/06 – 11/18/06, and shooting victims 11/19/06 – 12/16/06.}

Young male residents of high crime areas in Los Angeles face especially high risks of homicide,\footnote{California Attorney General’s Office, “Gang Homicide in LA, 1981-2001,” February 2004.} but the conditions in these areas subject all residents to relatively higher risks of violence and murder. As the following chart shows, a resident in LAPD’s West LA Division faces a 1 in 78,000 chance of being murdered.\footnote{According to the LAPD’s Statistical Digest Summary (2004), 234,701 residents live within the West LA Division’s geographic boundaries. LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data report that 3 homicides occurred in the West LA Division during 2005. To calculate the chance of homicide in the West LA Division, we divided the population by the number of homicides.} In the Southeast Division of LAPD, the chances are 1 in 2,200 or almost nine times higher than the national average.\footnote{Same source and methodology as Footnote #25. Southeast Division serves 139,229 residents and 64 homicides occurred in 2005. According to Brian M. Jenkins, from the RAND Corporation, the average American has about a 1 in 18,000 chance of being murdered.} In the Hollenbeck Division of East Los Angeles, the chances are 1 in 6,100, nearly 12 times higher than relatively safer areas.\footnote{Same source and methodology as Footnote #25. Hollenbeck Division serves 214,912 residents and 35 homicides occurred in 2005.}
Figure 1: Chance of Homicide and Violent Crime in Los Angeles²⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAPD Division</th>
<th>Chance of Homicide</th>
<th>Chance of Violent Crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West LA</td>
<td>1 in 78,233</td>
<td>1 in 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Nuys</td>
<td>1 in 21,420</td>
<td>1 in 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollenbeck</td>
<td>1 in 6,137</td>
<td>1 in 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>1 in 2,175</td>
<td>1 in 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crime statistics and population from LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT.

In high crime areas, fear of violence grips all facets of life. Even in areas where there have been marked improvements, such as in the Rampart Division, a storeowner recently took matters into his own hands after being robbed ten times in a span of months. Even though he tracked down the robbers and gave the information to the police, he remained too afraid to allow his name or store location to be published.²⁹ When asked about the situation, the owner, speaking from behind bulletproof glass said, “We don’t just have to work here, we have to survive.”

1. Frequent Exposure to Violence Devastates Children

The largest impact of violence in highest crime areas is on the children and youth who live there. Many of these children do not play in their front yards, do not go to the library, do not go to the park, and too often, do not go to school because they are afraid. In the City of Los Angeles, approximately 850,000 children live in violent crime areas. Of these children, over 290,000 live in high gang crime areas.³⁰ Most of them never come close to joining a gang and try to steer clear of those who do, and of LA’s hundreds of gangs and thousands of gang members, most do not engage in the routine violence and killing done by a hard core subset. Nonetheless, the violence by that minority inflicts substantial damage on the health and quality of life for the hundreds of thousands of children living in high crime zones. A study by the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) that surveyed 4,000 children found that 90 percent of them living in high crime areas reported being exposed to violence either as a victim or witness. Of these exposed children, 27

²⁸ The chance of homicide and the chance of violent crime were calculated by dividing the division’s population by the number of homicides and violent crimes that occurred in 2005 according to the LAPD. Population figures are from the LAPD’s Statistical Digest Summary 2004.
³⁰ Calculated by population within zip codes that were 1 or more standard deviations above the mean in gang related violent crimes. Crime data is based on 2005 LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data where the mean was 7 and standard deviation was 8.1, and population data is from Census 2000.
percent showed symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), with 16 percent testing as clinically depressed. Violence in these neighborhoods is making children sick.

A few of these children will pay the ultimate price for joining a gang or simply for living in a high gang crime neighborhood. On September 24, 2006 in broad daylight, a gang member shot point blank into the chest of three-year old Kaitlyn Avila in a gang related shooting in Baldwin Village. Both the fact that the shooting was prompted by a misidentification of Kaitlyn’s father as a gang member and the fact that Kaitlyn seemed to have been intentionally shot in the chest fuels the fear in this community that gang violence is random and vicious. In December 2006, The Los Angeles Times reported that the number of at-risk children under County care who died of homicide more than doubled, with almost all of the killings attributed to gang activity. Other examples of children caught in cross fire, retaliation, initiation, or mistaken identity shootings, or other violence—showcase how families, civic organizations, schools, City, and County programs fail to prevent, intercept, or otherwise protect LA’s most vulnerable victims from its violence epidemic.

• Before he was murdered, Trevon was a good student and a rising star on his school’s baseball team. He showed promise as an athlete and looked forward to being recruited to play college baseball. Trevon had a brother who was convicted of a crime and sentenced to the California Youth Authority. Upon his brother’s release, his old gang began pressuring him to re-join their crews. Wanting to get a new start on life, he refused. Soon after, the gang shot and killed Trevon to send a message. Trevon’s brother subsequently re-joined the gang.

• Jordan Downs, along with three other housing complexes in the area, is one of LA’s most intense high crime gang zones. Children frequently do not go to school for fear of crossing gang boundaries. Gangs control many aspects of life including who may or may not use the gym which is owned and operated by the City’s Housing Authority. The Grape Street Crips confronted one 14 year old Jordan Downs resident and commanded him to join their crew. A few days after he refused, gang members handed him a videotape. It showed the gang rape of his 11 year old sister. He joined the gang the next day. The sister subsequently attempted suicide and the brother landed in prison.

• Mario, grew up in Hazards territory in East LA surrounded by multi-generational gangs. His grandfather, father, and uncles all belonged to the same gang; for Mario, not joining was unimaginable. He knew nothing else. So when he was 10, a cousin taught him to tag and how to be a look out; by 12 he had graduated to auto theft; and

by 13, they had taught him to shoot and kill. Mario died before his 14th birthday in a retaliation shooting. The principal at his junior high denied that gang recruiters operating on his campus were the school’s responsibility.

When we hear these tragic stories, our first response is to ask, “How did this happen?” and “Who is responsible?” The answer is that many entities and individuals failed to protect these children from violence. The families of these children failed to keep them safe or seek appropriate help; communities in which these children lived have failed to organize against the culture of violence; schools failed to be sufficiently engaged in the lives of these children to ensure that they are thriving and learning and provide campus services and after-school safety plans; law enforcement failed to stem gang dominance or earn the trust of the community needed for effective community policing; the City failed to coordinate its resources and programs with County services to create a safety net for the most vulnerable families; juvenile justice entities like CYA, Probation and the Courts failed to rehabilitate the youth they imprison or to provide safe community re-entry strategies; and child advocates and other civic groups, thus far, have failed to galvanize a competent response to the problems or a satisfactory answer to the question, “Why can’t we keep all children safe from gangs and violence?”

2. Gang Crime is Spreading to Previously “Safe” Areas

In addition to the unique attributes of the region’s persistently high youth gang homicide rates and the alarming levels of violence in high crime areas, there is another reason that citywide declines in crime do not negate the need for comprehensive attention to gangs and gang violence: gang crime and violence are now affecting previously safe areas. The City’s strategy of containing gangs and gang violence is no longer working.

As Chief William Bratton said, “No Los Angeles resident is safe as long as gang violence continues unabated. But too many in ‘safe’ neighborhoods close their eyes to the threat mistakenly believing it is a gang-on-gang problem that can be contained to certain sections of the City. But residents of the City areas once considered havens from violence are being attacked in increasing numbers as gangs and other violent criminals expand their territory…”

Data supports Chief Bratton’s observation. An examination of crime trends shows that areas with high gang crimes in 2005 experienced increases in gang crime from 2000 to 2005. Also notable in this analysis is that additional areas, such as Central Los Angeles, experienced the greatest increases in violent gang crimes.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Page 16: Map of Violent Gang Crimes Change, 2000 to 2005}

\textsuperscript{35} In 2005, LAPD changed its guidelines for reporting assaults of domestic violence nature to bring the Department’s reporting of Aggravated Assaults inline with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting guidelines. As a result, Spousal and Child Abuse Simple Assaults that had been categorized as Aggravated Assaults prior to 2005 are now categorized as Simple Assaults. Thus, it is likely that there would be more violent crimes in 2005 if LAPD had used the same guidelines as in 2000.
Violent Gang Crimes
Change from 2000 to 2005

- Green: Decreased by more than 10
- Light Green: Decreased by less than 10
- Yellow: No Change
- Orange: Increased by 5 or less
- Dark Orange: Increased by 6 to 10
- Red: Increased by more than 10
Reports of recent spikes in gang crimes in the San Fernando Valley that are attributable to tagging crews ramping up to more hardcore gang activity also support the conclusion that gang activity continues to evolve and expand into new areas. Easy access to guns means that youth violence easily escalates into homicides. Indications are beginning to emerge that some entrenched street gangs have graduated to more highly focused, organized criminal enterprises. Several LAPD gang experts have noted that a few street gangs have successfully transitioned to more sophisticated crimes such as identity theft and other on-line “white collar” crimes targeting middle and upper class families.36 Residents in areas that do not currently have high levels of visible gang violence will increasingly bear the risk of becoming the victims of the new “invisible” gang crimes.

II. The Problem

A. The Drivers of Youth and Gang Violence: Major Risk Factors37

The Petrie dish of conditions that cultivates gangs and neighborhood violence is rich. The following risk factors associated with gang membership and violence are not determinative that a child or youth will become a gang member or violent. However, analysis of risk factors and exposures helps define the sub populations that are more likely to need targeted prevention strategies and may identify populations of youth that have not been captured into law enforcements data banks.

1. Lack of Jobs for Youth

A major reoccurring theme throughout AP’s youth forums was the necessity for gainful alternatives to gang membership.38 The only major epidemiological study of factors that reduce gang violence in Los Angeles confirms the motto of Father Greg Boyle’s Homeboy Industries: “Nothing stops a bullet like a job.” This 1997 UCLA study of gang crime in Los Angeles and its relationship to various community level socio-economic factors found that the only two factors having a significant correlative relationship with the level of violence in an area were per capita income and proportion employed.39 In other words, areas with lower per capita incomes and higher youth unemployment rates exhibited higher levels of gang violence. Based on this finding, the

36 LAPD interviews, summer and fall of 2006.
37 According to Irving A. Spergel, while there have been case studies and theories on why young people join gangs, there have been few quantitative research studies. Spergel, Irving A., The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach, Oxford University Press, 1995. The studies that have been done conclude that some of the factors include known association with gang members, presence of neighborhood gangs, having a relative in a gang, failure at school, delinquency record, and drug abuse. According to Malcolm W. Klein and Cheryl L. Maxson, in addition to those listed above, another risk factor is a “youth’s experience of a series of negative life events”. Klein, Malcolm W., Maxson, Cheryl L., Street Gang Patterns and Policies (Studies in Crime and Public Policy), Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 148.
38 See Appendix 3, Community Engagement.
report recommended community based economic development and job creation programs as key elements of any effective gang prevention strategy.

Despite the pivotal role that youth employment plays in reducing gang involvement and gang violence, Los Angeles has no comprehensive, large scale youth jobs strategy. In the summer of 2005 the City arranged for only 3,000 summer jobs for youth and managed to double that in the summer of 2006.\(^{40}\) When the multi-track schedules of 16 senior high schools return to traditional calendars in 2008, there will be approximately 65,000 students with idle time in the summer. This group will join the already existing 93,000 16 to 24 year-olds who neither attend school nor work.\(^{41}\) Immediate attention to creating jobs and recreational activities will be necessary to counter a potential surge in gang or other destructive activity by unoccupied youth.

2. **Poverty Compounded by Social Isolation**

All major research literature on gangs and community structure has noted poverty and declining income levels as significant factors contributing to the concentration of gangs.\(^{42}\) Maps in the Phase I Report also documented the high correlation between the rate of poverty and low per capita income with the concentration of gang crime.

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40 <http://www.hirelayouth.com/summerprogramcomponents.htm>
42 Klein and Maxson, pp. 213-217. Ethnic composition and social stability as the other two important factors.
In the larger picture, changes in the regional economy between 1990 and 2004 resulted in an absolute decrease in manufacturing jobs, the jobs that could support a family with benefits that workers without advanced degrees could get. Some of these jobs have been replaced by service sector jobs, but service sector jobs often do not pay well. Regionally, six of the ten jobs with the highest growth rate in the next six years, pay less than $10 per hour, leaving many working families poor enough to qualify for government assistance. Slightly less than a quarter, 24 percent, of City residents, worked at jobs that did not pay a living wage.

Even with lower paying service jobs, growth in the total number of jobs never matched the growth in working age population. In 2003, the City’s unemployment rate was relatively high at eight percent with 136,000 people who wanted jobs unable to find one. This number does not account for the thousands of individuals who experience such chronic unemployment that they are no longer actively searching for jobs. This obscures the even more dire state of joblessness in underclass neighborhoods where multi-generational unemployment, low educational attainment, and felony records are formidable barriers to employment.

This chronic economic deprivation is disproportionately concentrated in South LA, Central LA, East LA, and the East San Fernando Valley. The average wage and salary incomes in the Central, East, South, and Harbor areas are less than the City’s average of $34,566. Workers in South LA are paid the lowest average wages in manufacturing jobs and lowest wages in the City overall. Regional inequity with the City is also mirrored ethnically. “Compared to European American families, African American families are 286 percent more likely to have an income under $15,000, Latino families are 230 percent more likely, and Asian American and Pacific Islander families are 169 percent more likely.” Similarly, compared to European Americans, African Americans are 153 percent more likely to be unemployed, Latinos 156 percent more likely, and Asian American and Pacific Islanders, 134 percent more likely. Chronic unemployment, lack of opportunities in the formal economy, and high incidence of poverty generate a sense of hopelessness in the community, destabilize the civic infrastructure, and undermine family cohesion.

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43 According to the 2006 Children’s Scorecard released by the LA County Children’s Planning Council, in 2005 a single parent with two children needs to earn $25.97 per hour to support the family’s basic needs. A two parent family must earn a combined hourly wage of $30.32. A four person family, according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is only at poverty level if their income is less than $23,000 per year (almost 2 ½ times less than the living wage in Los Angeles County of $63,000 per year).


3. Domestic Violence

A number of studies have identified clear links between childhood experiences of violence and later violence, antisocial behavior and gang membership. Domestic violence and child abuse, in addition to poverty, community violence, and a low degree of commitment to school, strongly correlate with violent behavior among juveniles. Children, who routinely are exposed to violence in the home, incorporate this behavior into their lives as an acceptable means of dealing with conflict. Domestic violence, therefore becomes a critical risk factor for developing youth. High proportions of adult male felons who are incarcerated have a history of family violence. Keeping in mind the systemic and likely high undercounting of reported child abuse and spousal abuse, LAPD made over 14,000 arrests for these family violence offenses in 2005.

4. Negative Peer Networks

A negative peer network—hanging out with the wrong crowd—is a strong risk factor for gang membership especially during adolescence because peer influence plays a critical role in shaping youth attitudes and behavior. Having delinquent friends increases the chance that a youth will join a gang by replacing socialization by a positive caretaker with street socialization that dictates how the youth spends time, with whom s/he associates and reorients his or her aspirations toward gang or other destructive activity. Certainly the likelihood that a youth would encounter and engage in a negative peer network is increased when gangs are a dominant aspect of a neighborhood culture. As one Probation youth put it, “Gangs are my family. They are part of the neighborhood. That’s all there is.”

5. Lack of Parental Supervision

Parents play a critical role in the lives of children and youth and lack of parent supervision, particularly in neighborhoods with few opportunities for constructive activities, increases the risk of gang membership. Even well-intentioned parents with good parenting skills, but who do not have the appropriate support systems to counter pervasive neighborhood gang problems, may not be able to prevent their children from becoming involved with gangs. Parental supervision may be lacking for a variety of reasons including long working hours, major crisis events, and unfamiliarity with local institutions. Many male gang members interviewed cite the absence of their fathers and lack of attention from positive father-figures and role models as a central deficit in their lives. In addition to neighborhood based activities that offer alternatives to gang and

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49 See LAPD COMPSTAT, Citywide Profile 11/19/06 - 12/26/06. <http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat>
50 Interview with probation youth at Camp Gonzales, December 13, 2006.
other destructive activity, parents need support and help in developing the skills needed to effectively engage their children and monitor their activities.

6. Nondelinquent Problem Behavior

Early intervention is important for children and youth who exhibit non-delinquent problem behavior which is a risk factor for gang membership. These behaviors include aggressiveness, impulsivity, and inappropriate reactivity. Assessment for these behaviors and enrollment in effective treatment programs would mitigate this risk factor. This risk factor highlights the overwhelming importance of mental health services as a prevention tool, not just as a post-violence recovery resource.

7. Early Academic Failure and Lack of School Attachment

Gang members and other troubled youth are typically behind in school or are drop-outs.51 Problematic school environments including overcrowding, school violence, lack of competent counseling, inadequate resources, and disengaged teaching push academically frustrated youth out of schools. Once out of school, youth are more prone to participate in delinquent activities and associate in negative peer networks that include gang membership. Using the proxy of high school graduation rates to indicate levels of school attachment, the significant numbers of youth in the City of Los Angeles who have dropped out and are not working—over 93,000, comprise a high risk group warranting special programs to divert them away from gangs and back to education and legal employment.52 It is encouraging to note that gang youth and other out of school youth often return to educational settings seeking to obtain their GED.53

![Figure 2: Risk Factors for Violence and At-Risk Population in Los Angeles](http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>294,029 children living in poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Violence</td>
<td>851,268 children living in violent crime areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>14,000 child and spousal abuse arrests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51 Spergel, pp. 118-119.
53 Spergel.
54 Calculated by population within zip codes that were 1 or more standard deviations above the mean in gang related violent crimes. Crime data is based on 2005 LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data where the mean was 7 and standard deviation was 8.1, and population data is from Census 2000. See also LAPD COMPSTAT, Citywide Profile 11/19/06 - 12/26/06. <http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat>
What Approaches and Strategies Counter These Risk Factors And Reduce Gangs?

III. Models in Violence Prevention

The State of the Research

The research reviewed for this report reveals many apparent paradoxes and unresolved debates that will require careful parsing and further analysis by a permanent body of experts who can help the City synthesize the best programmatic approaches and find the best balance of the risks inherent to the ongoing quest to find out what works. Examples abound of research problems with everything from basic definitions of “gang,” to what the few longitudinal studies of gang intervention show. Also common are examples of how failure to understand the complexities of gangs or the need for nuanced responses can backfire. For example, gang focused law enforcement strategies and intervention programs that fail to account for specific gang structures, culture and group processes, or that engage gangs in ways that unnecessarily validate gang identity and cohesion, can actually increase gang activity. Programs that fail to distinguish sufficiently between general delinquency and street gang involvement can increase both. And programs and suppression that allow crime control to obscure adolescent development and the need for mental health and safe environments that help traumatized youth to exit and heal from gang involvement also will fail in their goals.

Indeed, gang reduction strategies developed solely in response to the understandable fear of the minority who are responsible for the deadly violence have created a bias in favor of programs overly driven by crime control which undermines any possibility of successful alternation. This precarious “mixing of crime prevention motives and social service methods” turns into crime control that destroys the premises of universal access and success that make education and social investment programs work. And the risks of targeting at-risk or delinquent youth

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55 Calculated by population within zip codes that were 1 or more standard deviations above the mean in gang related violent crimes. Crime data is based on 2005 LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data where the mean was 7 and standard deviation was 8.1, and population data is from Census 2000. See also LAUSD. <http://search.lausd.k12.ca.us/cgi-bin/fccgi.exe?w3exec=spi3&info=8614>

56 For a more detailed description of alternation, see Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

for social programs require equally nuanced consideration: too much or the wrong kind of targeting can drive youth away or deeper into gang life. Yet gang involved youth must be identified and provided special efforts, or those who need and are ready for the most help will get none.

These are just a few examples of the vagaries, nuances and complexities that run throughout the research on gangs and youth violence. The City must develop the expertise needed to identify and distinguish among the needs of different youth cohorts and deliver developmentally appropriate programs and services to them without singling them out, increasing gang cohesion or counter productively casting the programs in the crime control mold.

In sum, despite decades of research into gangs and violence, there is no single, definitive formula for success in reducing either. Even federal authorities who have invested heavily into gang suppression strategies note, “Although thousands of programs have been implemented…, the ongoing difficulties with youth gangs make one lesson very clear: there are no quick fixes or easy solutions for the problems that youth gangs create or the problems that create youth gangs.” And leading gang researcher Malcolm Klein recently noted that the quest for how to end gang activity and violence remains largely unanswered.

Easy solutions do not exist, but that does not mean that no solutions exist or that some solutions do not carry more potential than others. The City of Los Angeles has never even tried to declare that in a specific neighborhood not another ten year old will join the local gang—and then organized the resources and strategies to make it happen. As the quotes above suggest, the most common approaches to gang activity reduction are deficient, but they fail for obvious reasons, including not even trying to set aggressive goals or pursue competent strategies. An expert review of 58 programs in multiple jurisdictions found the following:

- 62 percent of the programs were too narrow in scope and insufficiently comprehensive to deal with the complex factors contributing to formation of gangs.
- A majority of the programs targeted individual transformation without addressing the negative dynamics in the individual’s neighborhood.
- Very few programs addressed the community context of gangs and almost none address the group processes of gangs.
- The most widely used approach was suppression with little or no prevention and intervention.

59 Wyrick and Howell, 2004, p. 21 - PM
The solutions with the highest potential for reducing gang activity—comprehensive public health approaches that address the causative conditions, gang structures, group processes, and neighborhood contexts—require meticulous and careful implementation. There are only a few strategies that encompass the full spectrum of prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts necessary to reduce gangs and gang violence.

One approach that has gained support from experts and has shown success in places like Chicago, is the public health approach. The public health approach uses a four-level social-ecological model to better understand violence and the effect of potential prevention strategies. This model takes into consideration the complex interplay between individual, relationship, community and societal factors. It allows us to address the factors that put people at risk for experiencing or perpetrating violence.61

The one comprehensive model that addresses individual change as well as the ecology of violence and the social processes of gangs, and that has had multiple implementations across the country is the Spergel Model, named after Irving Spergel, a professor of Social Administration at the University of Chicago.

A. The Spergel Model: Comprehensive Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression

Ironically, this model largely resulted from the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) visit to Los Angeles in the mid 1980s and the observation of what came to be labeled the “LA Plan.” In contemplating replication of the “LA Plan” in other cities, however, OJJDP concluded that the “LA Plan” was less a coordinated strategy and more a series gang suppression efforts by law enforcement agencies with no involvement from the community and minimal impact. As a result, OJJDP contracted with Spergel to develop some alternative strategies for gang control. What resulted is the Spergel Model, technically known as the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression program.

After a pilot implementation in the Little Village section of Chicago, this model was implemented in five additional sites in 1995.62 Various versions of the Spergel model have

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61 Prevention strategies should include a continuum of activities that address multiple levels of the model. These activities should be developmentally appropriate and conducted across the lifespan. This approach is more likely to sustain prevention efforts over time than any single intervention. The following describes each level. **Individual:** The first level identifies biological and personal history factors that influence how individuals behave and increase their likelihood of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. Some examples include age, education, income, substance use, or prior experience with abuse. **Relationship:** The second level looks at close relationships such as those with family, friends, intimate partners and peers. It explores how these relationships increase the risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. **Community:** The third level explores the community contexts in which social relationships occur such as schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods. This level identifies the characteristics of these settings that increase the risk of violence. **Societal:** The fourth level looks at the broad societal factors that help create a climate in which violence is encouraged or inhibited. These include social and cultural norms. Other large societal factors include the health, economic, educational and social policies that help to maintain economic or social inequalities between groups in society. For a more detailed description of the public health model, see “Violence: A Global Public Health Problem,” World Report on Violence and Health, World Health Organization, 2002.

62 The sites were Mesa and Tucson, Arizona, Riverside, California, San Antonio, Texas and Bloomington, Illinois.
also been implemented at 31 additional sites with support from the U.S. Department of Justice and Bureau of Justice Assistance.

There are five major strategies under the Spergel Model:\textsuperscript{63}

1. **Community Mobilization:** Developing and maintaining an interacting set of public and private agencies, groups, and residents to organize a comprehensive program responsive specifically to the gang problem.

2. **Social Intervention:** Developing outreach contacts with gang members and those at higher risk of gang membership. Most typically, this refers to the use of street workers who both counsel targeted youth and provide useful bridges between them and the schools, social services, and criminal justice agencies. Outreach can also be provided by probation, police, and treatment workers.

3. **Opportunities Provision:** Providing gang members access to employment, job training, educational, and cultural opportunities as alternatives to gang activity.

4. **Organizational Change and Development:** Bringing about changes in the policies and practices of public and private agencies to reduce their tendency not to respond positively to gang youth, to help them adopt strategies that will enhance their responsiveness, and to increase interagency collaboration.

5. **Suppression:** The use primarily of police, probation, parole, and the courts to hold youth accountable for their criminal activities. This goes beyond the “normal” criminal justice operations to include special anti-gang practices, such as police gang units, the use of gang court injunctions, and specialized gang intelligence operations. Other agencies and outreach workers can also become involved in suppression activities.

The model places great emphasis on having direct, continuing involvement of community leaders; careful selection and targeting of gang and high-risk youth; and developing adequate gang data and case management systems useable across agencies. After ten years of implementing comprehensive strategies, preliminary results from three of the five original sites, as well as an additional site in St. Louis, have been disappointing. The interim reports document key obstacles that each of these programs encountered and failed to overcome:

1. Resistance of local agencies, particularly law enforcement and schools to participating in a coordinated strategy.

2. Unclear articulation of the model leading to different and conflicting understandings among participating partners.

3. Resistance to the use of gang intervention workers who were ex-gang members.

\textsuperscript{63} Klein and Maxson, pp. 120-121.
4. Technical difficulties associated with data collection and a common data system.

5. Divergent interests among the wide variety of collaborating partners including schools, employment agencies, grassroots organizations, community based youth agencies, community mobilization groups, law enforcement, prosecution, judiciary, probation, corrections, and parole.

6. Inability to clearly target gang and high-risk youth.

7. Devolution of the strategy into a series of services supported through a single stream of funding rather than a “well-integrated web of interventions in which information, decision making, and youth are shared in a seamless manner across programs.”

8. Tendency for suppression efforts to dominate.

These and other shortcomings resulted in limited impact on reducing the number of gangs or gang members and, in some cases, lack of significant improvement even for those enrolled in special programs. Given these preliminary results, some experts have warned against trying to manage the complexity of a comprehensive gang control effort and urge more cautious, limited approaches. But other experts note that if the mistakes documented can be remedied, and careful implementation can be carried out, the Spergel model could be made to work.64

1. Reasons to Implement a Comprehensive Community Model

There are several reasons why the Comprehensive Community approach should be pursued in Los Angeles.

a. Articulation of the Model: The model is much better articulated now than it ever was, particularly compared to those early sites that began in 1995. In 1998, the Spergel team and OJJDP staff drafted an official articulation of the model and then in 2000 issued a comprehensive explanation of how the five basic components work together. Evaluation and analysis models are also now available. Although the comprehensive Spergel model is complex, any new implementation efforts based on its framework can rely on these new resources and learn from the mistakes of prior implementation efforts.

b. Existing Elements: Many of the elements needed for the approach already in Los Angeles. For example, multi-jurisdictional suppression coordination already exists in several task forces, and a network of gang intervention street workers would not be difficult to create. Although both need to be expanded and the level of coordination between the two strengthened, the basic infrastructure and experience developed over the last ten years offer a solid base for further development. In addition, significant strides have been made in recent years to bridge the divergent interests of potential

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64 Klein and Maxson.
collaboration partners including LAPD, LASD, LAFD and other City departments—all of which have had to learn to cooperate on the board that oversees the City’s Emergency Preparedness Department.65

c. Cross Sector “Meeting of the Minds”: Joint efforts are increasingly viewed as necessary by all sectors. In the Advancement Project’s survey of City departments, County agencies, and community groups, AP found consensus that the task of reducing violence and ensuring safety and vitality of children and youth could not be achieved by any one group alone, and that achieving this goal would require all entities to work together. This “meeting of minds” again provides a solid basis to begin the hard work of forging coordinated, jointly developed gang and violence reduction plans.

d. Law Enforcement Support: Key changes in law enforcement are taking place that will make comprehensive strategies feasible. These include police leaders openly agreeing that the City needs a robust prevention system - that officers need to find productive ways to support that system and that law enforcement agencies need to increase public trust through community policing. In an important advancement of these trends, in January 2007 top LAPD officials publicly confirmed that the Department would participate in community strategies and work cooperatively with gang intervention workers.

e. Los Angeles Unified School District Support: During this assessment, LAUSD Superintendent Brewer expressed strong commitment to support comprehensive strategies that reduce gang activity and increase campus and neighborhood safety. Noting that children who do not feel safe cannot learn, Superintendent Brewer has indicated that he would support a gang reduction strategy for all schools as part of a public-private endeavor to support transformative leadership at school sites.

f. Public Will: Finally, but most importantly, the public wants effective prevention. The California Wellness Foundation’s “2004 Voters Survey Fact Sheet” reports that 8 out of 10 voters, including 70 percent of Republicans and 85 percent of Democrats, say that state spending on violence prevention and youth safety programs is as important as spending for law enforcement and prisons. Furthermore, the survey reports that, when given an explicit choice, 8 out of 10 Californians prefer investing in violence prevention and youth safety programs over building more prisons.66

2. Barriers to Implementation of a Comprehensive Model

a. Identifying High Risk Youth

One of the greatest barriers to effective implementation of a comprehensive model in Los Angeles will be the City’s difficulty in targeting services to gang and high-risk

65 <http://www.lacity.org/epd/epdeooeob1.htm>
youth. Three programs in the LA region have demonstrated success that is encouraging on this issue.

First, the efforts of the Orange County Probation Department in implementing their “8% model” provide a good example of how services may be organized to target a group of youth who are at the greatest risk of becoming chronic offenders. After several years of research validating the hypothesis that youth who commit multiple offenses have identifiable risk factors, the Orange County Probation Department found that eight percent of probation youth 15 ½ years or younger were at the greatest risk of becoming a repeat offender. The department isolated the 8 percent group by identifying those having at least three of the four risk factors which are problems in family, school, pre-delinquency, and substance abuse. This group then receives a multidisciplinary collaborative day treatment program at a single site known as a Youth and Family Resource Center. After five years of implementation, the program has found that the youth who participate in the “8% Early Intervention Program” have significantly fewer serious new offenses. While Los Angeles may not want to emulate the entire Orange County model, its success in developing a system-wide assessment strategy that effectively targets services to those most in need can be adapted for Los Angeles.67

Second, the launching of Targeted Community Action Planning (TCAP) in selected council districts, a result of coordination between the City and the U.S. Department of Justice presents an opportunity to test and refine current practices for targeting services to a high risk youth population.68

Third, new interactive data platforms like the Healthy City Project (www.healthycity.org) offer sophisticated mapping and data tools to locate high risk populations and understand their specific health, demographic, educational and other characteristics. Along with its comprehensive database of health and human services throughout the region, HealthyCity.org can also be used to identify what existing resources can be further leveraged or complemented to better serve these high risk populations.

b. Coordination and Community Mobilization

Perhaps the most difficult aspects of the Spergel model are the needs for high levels of coordination and community mobilization. This report addresses the issue of coordination in the next section under governance, but here points to four examples of successful community engagement used in comprehensive gang and youth violence reduction strategies.

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68 AP interview with Community Development Department and TCAP personnel, November 27, 2006.
B. Boston’s Operation Ceasefire

Boston’s now famous Operation Ceasefire or the Boston Gun Project achieved remarkable success in reducing youth homicide rates to nearly zero and keeping them there for several years. The strategy was coordinated by a working group consisting of representatives from the Boston Police Department, Probation, the District Attorney and U.S. Attorney’s office, many other criminal justice agencies, social service agencies, ministers from neighborhood churches (known as the “Boston TenPoint Coalition”), researchers from the Kennedy School of Government, a long standing coalition of local violence prevention practitioners, and the local public health community. The key elements of Operation Ceasefire included:

- Regular working group meetings that were used to analyze data on gang violence and develop plans for reducing it;
- Announcing and publicizing the Ceasefire, and plans to enforce it;
- Enhanced enforcement by all agencies against gangs found to have violated the Ceasefire;
- Mobilization of community support for the strategy, particularly by the TenPoint Coalition that regularly walked the neighborhoods;
- Mobilization of community services for youth who desired to give up their gang activities.

Despite on-going debate about how much of the reduction in violence was directly attributable to Operation Ceasefire, there is no question that the collaboration among the police department, the small faith based organizations and the public health community was an integral part of Boston’s success in reducing youth gang violence and crime. The effort, however, faltered after several years when the leadership of key institutions and community groups changed and when resources were pulled. Boston’s rates of youth violence once again began to climb. To counteract this reversal, Boston leaders recently reactivated the collaboration in 2006 and faith leaders reengaged by launching negotiations to stabilize the violence through a peace agreement between two warring gangs.\(^\text{69}\) As one TenPoint leader noted in an interview about why the effort faltered, no one built the program into the operations of the participating institutions, so it could not become permanent or sustainable and it relied too heavily on existing leadership without developing new leadership as replacements.

C. CeaseFire Chicago

The second example of demonstrated effectiveness in marshalling the community to reverse entrenched dynamics of violence is found in CeaseFire, a program based in Chicago where homicide is the number one cause of death of young people between the ages of 1 to 34.\(^\text{70}\)

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\(^\text{69}\) See Appendix 13, National Site Visits: Boston.

\(^\text{70}\) <http://www.ceasefireillinois.org>
CeaseFire is a public health intervention campaign against violence based on an epidemiological model of violence as a disease. This model was developed by Dr. Gary Slutkin, a former World Health Organization official. Just as public health initiatives seek to change the behavior that triggers a disease, interrupt transmission of the disease and inoculate against it, CeaseFire deploys ex-offenders and former gang members to interrupt the transmission of violence and alter the norms and expectations of the group dynamics that foster violent behavior in each of the several CeaseFire Zones within the City. Outreach workers work with clergy and police to turn the community against violence and conduct public communication campaigns against shootings and killing. By convincing gang members and others to refrain from retaliation violence in the wake of a killing or shooting, and by working to change the thinking of young people who practice a culture of violence, CeaseFire has reduced levels of neighborhood violence.

CeaseFire is metrics driven and has an evaluation component built into it to document how many conflicts are mediated, how many likely shootings are prevented and the impact of the program on crime trends. CeaseFire does not negotiate truces or use schools as a center of their strategies, nor does it go beyond violence interruption and reducing shootings and killings to include community development or to change the underlying conditions that permit violent lifestyles and dynamics to take root in a community. It nonetheless is an excellent enactment of the public health approach to violence reduction and offers several elements, particularly the metrics and public anti-violence campaign, that should be incorporated into Los Angeles’ strategies. This report recommends a CeaseFire Chicago-Los Angeles Collaborative for the two strategies in the cities with the most virulent violence problems to jointly learn from the experiences of the other and to forge advances in violence reduction strategies.

D. New York City’s Harlem Children’s Zone and Beacon Centers

In addition to violence prevention for its high crime and gang zones, Los Angeles needs to consider a wrap-around community saturation strategy—around the clock programs that will keep children and youth safe while offering them meaningful opportunities for enrichment and support. One of the best known comprehensive neighborhood transformation projects is New York’s Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ). NY HCZ is a comprehensive place-based continuum of services to develop healthy children and a healthy community at the same time. All programs are geared toward a 24-block area within Harlem and include preschool, parenting education, youth development, after school, health services, child welfare services, employment services, and physical revitalization of the area. By 2009, 10 years into program operation, HCZ is projected to have served 24,000 adults and children.

HCZ operates two of 80 Beacon Centers in New York. Beacon Centers are funded by a New York City initiative created to re-build communities of support for children and youth in urban neighborhoods. These Beacons are school-based community centers offering a wide range of services and activities during after school, evening and weekend hours, and during
summer and other school vacations for an average of 10-12 hours a day. Beacons focus on five core areas of programming:71

- Youth development including educational enrichment, cultural arts, sports and recreation, youth leadership, community service, and career education;
- Parent involvement and family support;
- School-community linkages to increase academic achievement;
- Building of safe and supportive neighborhoods for child and youth development; and
- Employment.

The mix of services vary from community to community and are approved by a community advisory board. Beacons also serve as the site for community meetings and social activities.

The geographically compact nature of New York makes a school-based community center such as a Beacon or a place based strategy such as HCZ particularly attractive because community access is relatively assured. In Los Angeles, where communities are defined by miles rather than blocks, thought must be given to transportation needs to ensure community access. Despite such challenges, the Advancement Project highlights these two models because they represent a “coherent youth and community development initiative” that sees community rebuilding as a key to not only reducing violent conditions but also developing healthy children with many positive options. The one caveat from NY’s HCZ is that program leaders did not have the capacity or community development plans needed to capitalize on the avalanche of resources that its tremendous success triggered. Nonetheless, it is one of the urban transformation success stories that offers rich lessons for LA.

E. Alameda County Blueprint for Violence Prevention

In July 2005, Alameda County adopted a comprehensive violence prevention plan, “A Lifetime Commitment to Violence Prevention: The Alameda County Blueprint.” The initiative began in 2003 and involved a variety of stakeholders including political leaders, public and private funders, cities, school districts, county agencies, law enforcement, faith based groups, businesses, and community based organizations. In the assessment phase, the need for unified leadership, increased accountability, a venue for coordination and greater understanding of effective violence prevention were identified as key areas of focus and accepted some key principles including the notion that violence prevention is a vital part of public safety. As the first set of steps, the County implemented a multi-jurisdictional, multi-sector leadership council that began working on the following several action areas:

- Implement a violence prevention curriculum in schools

• Build and strengthen reentry programs

• Implement a comprehensive and targeted services in five neighborhoods with high rates of violence

• Engage the business sector as stakeholders in prevention

• Compile and analyze data to determine needs and best practices

• Develop funds and other resources

Although different in its implementation strategy, it is encouraging to note that other jurisdictions have begun to act on a regional strategy involving key stakeholders to achieve the long-term goal of violence prevention and are investing resources into the effort.72

F. City and LAUSD Programs That Showcase Elements of the Comprehensive Community Model

Fortunately, several City initiatives and programs already use elements of the comprehensive model to one degree or another. Because of the problems with City gang reduction operations and approaches to the problem detailed in the Phase I Report, none have reached their potential for sustained, neighborhood level impact in reducing gangs or gang violence.

1. Summer of Success

In the summer of 2003, then-Councilmember Martin Ludlow launched a comprehensive, neighborhood wrap-around strategy called “Summer of Success” in a crime ridden neighborhood known as “The Jungle” that regularly accounted for half of all violent summer crime in the area. Summer of Success produced remarkable results in reducing neighborhood violence. The idea was relatively simple: violence would decline if youth who normally only had access to gangs were offered meaningful alternative activities scheduled round the clock. During nine weeks of that summer, local basketball courts stayed open past midnight for tournaments and games. Youth had paid internships to conduct outreach to the community. Gang intervention workers from the Amer-I-Can collaborative negotiated with local gangs for safe passage and no violence agreements. Safer Cities community police officers cooperated with the program (but unfortunately, other LAPD officers refused to cooperate with the effort). Neighborhood community groups collaborated to offer computer games, tutoring, and as many other program opportunities as possible during the 8 pm to 3 am hours when most of the violence was occurring. Also, a prominent radio station featured the program throughout the summer. The results were stunning. Compared to a similar period the year before where the neighborhood experienced numerous homicides, there were 0 homicides, a 20 percent

72 As a consultant for the Alameda Blueprint, a member of AP’s leadership team, Billie Weiss, helped incorporate the LA Violence Prevention Coalition (VPC) model into the Blueprint. Orange County’s VPC is based on LA’s model as well. <http://www.preventioninstitute.org/alameda.html>
reduction in aggravated assaults and a 17 percent reduction in all violent crimes.\textsuperscript{73} The Los Angeles Times’ editorial pages declared Summer of Success a success and a talk radio touted it as one of the few smart ideas to come out of City Hall in a long time. To make this happen, City departments, community based organizations, council offices, and many other entities worked together like they have never worked before or since. Unfortunately, when the program ended, so did the success.

2. Santee High School

Shortly after its opening, Santee High School experienced a two-day large scale violent eruption that resulted in 34 students being arrested and 10 being hospitalized.\textsuperscript{74} The school continued to be the number one campus for crime in LAUSD until a new leadership began its transformation. Principal Vince Carbino who became the sole leader of the school on July 1, 2006 conducted a thorough assessment of the student, teacher, administrator and community cultures. He then systematically developed action plans to address the factors contributing to the school’s culture of violence and ineffectiveness. It was not one single thing, but a combination of both simple and complex changes.

Principal Carbino canvassed the neighborhood and interviewed families, gang members, business owners and others to seek agreement to keep the school a neutral safe zone. He made a special effort to engage parents, giving every parent the number of at least one of his multiple and ever-ringing cell phones and hosting “Coffee with Carbino” in the evenings. He put together funding for a large team of mental health counselors, social workers and academic counselors who conduct thorough case conferences about individual students’ mental health and academic needs. Community partners were engaged and empowered to work with the school to provide enrichment opportunities and services. All 9\textsuperscript{th} graders were taken to California State University, Dominguez Hills for several days of off site orientation, leadership development, violence prevention, conflict resolution and academic achievement focus. Natural leaders among students were identified and a Peace Committee formed which was largely responsible for avoiding a student walk out during the immigration rallies. Focus shifted from the 10 percent of the students causing the problems to the 90 percent who wanted to learn—and most importantly, Principal Carbino singled out the troubled 10 percent not for punishment and targeting, but for affirmation, encouragement, diagnosis of learning disabilities, positive social interventions and mental health treatment. (Principal Carbino states that mental health treatment is by far the most important aspect of his turnaround platform.) The bell schedule was changed to minimize the number of students roaming the campus. In addition to parents, Principal Carbino gave out his cell phone number to every teacher and student. To improve instruction he consulted students and invested in teacher training.

\textsuperscript{73} Chief of Police William J. Bratton, “Request for City Expanding the ‘Summer of Success’ Youth Program,” June 6, 2005 (OCOP #2005-02-02A).

\textsuperscript{74} Los Angeles Times, “Fight Spoils New Campus’ Hopes,” December 11, 2005.
The results are stunning. Campus violence is almost non-existent on a campus that a year ago was one of the District’s most dangerous. Now the stage is set for the school to work on how to improve learning, not through a deficit model like most schools, but from a strength and assets model where every student is evaluated for their potential. Learning could not begin until safety was ensured. Most importantly, Principal Carbino sees the school as an institution that plays a central role for the revitalization of the entire community. “The community changes when students are prepared and part of the community - The capacities that we are building within the kids they take back into the community and empower from within... Ultimately what we want at Santee is that we are transforming a community through a school’s very existence.”

3. MacArthur Park Transformation

The transformation of MacArthur Park from a generator of local crime to a model park has been well documented and recognized for its success. LAPD officers of the Rampart Division used a community collaboration model to galvanize intra-departmental contributions, win corporate contributions of cameras for park security systems, community cooperation in park clean up, and consultation with schools and other civic organizations. Approaches to gangs in the area were professional and fair—even in the view of the gang members themselves and area gang intervention workers. Within six months, park crime plunged 45 percent and the park was clean to the point that families felt safe enough to dance to music in the dark under the new lights that awaited money to be turned on.75

4. Other Strategies Exhibiting Elements of Comprehensive Approaches

In addition to the transformative examples cited above, there are small programs within the City that successfully use elements of the comprehensive model that are not used in the majority of City programs. Some of the programs below are gang intervention programs that provoke mixed responses. This report acknowledges the complaints of some law enforcement officers and gang researchers who conclude that many gang intervention programs are ill-conceived and improperly monitored. The programs below are singled out as examples implementing aspects of the comprehensive strategy, and a few are noted for more comprehensive success.

a. Youth Opportunity Movement Watts Students for Higher Education Program

The Youth Opportunity (YO!) Movement has been a bright spot in the City’s youth employment effort for many years. With a grant from the Department of Labor, the City was able to build a network of Youth Opportunity centers to provide career, education, and supportive services to youth. There are currently three YO! centers in Watts, Boyle Heights and the San Fernando Valley. Of these, YO! Watts, in collaboration with the County Probation Department, County Office of Education, 75 Blue Ribbon Rampart Review Panel, Rampart Reconsidered: The Search for Real Reform Seven Years Later, July 2006, p. 10.
and Los Angeles Trade Technical College, is piloting the Students for Higher Education Program and stands out as a stellar effort at collaboration, meaningful intervention, and mission driven dedication.

While the collaboration among City, County, and higher education institutions is in and of itself to be applauded, the program works with a troubled population that others avoid—highest risk youth many of whom are already in gangs and all of whom are in a probation camp. As a pilot, the program currently operates at Camp Gonzalez with 50 youth who receive a mix of case management, mentoring, leadership development, access to college credit courses, vocational training, and intensive transition services. The stated goal is to reduce recidivism rates among these youth, but the program does much more. For many of these youth, the idea that they could even think about attending college, let alone secure up to seven college credits while they are at camp was unimaginable. Some of the youth participate in the culinary training program learning real-life vocational skills that can help them to secure jobs when they exit from the camp. The most important component of this program, however, is that there is intensive transition support for youth by YO! case managers who regularly visit them at the camp and follow up with them immediately after their release. After being released, YO! case managers take the youth to Los Angeles Trade Technical College to enroll them and provide financial support for basic necessities and school supplies. They continue to track the youth for the next 12 months by mentoring, giving support, and helping them solve problems.

The targeted services to high risk youth, mixing of opportunities with support services, intensive transition support from probation camp, and case management follow-up over a significant period of time are all part of a successful strategy that should be replicated elsewhere. The program is also a reminder to the City that while prevention is the best strategy for most youth, intervention strategies, even with those youth who are gang involved, are not only possible but already being implemented successfully.

b. Gang Intervention Programs

Homeboy Industries is an East LA based non-profit that “offers free support services to any individual seeking a way out of gang life.” Focusing on individuals who are ready to exit the gang life, it offers jobs, job placement, job preparation, education services, computer training, tattoo removal, counseling and case management, and help in “transitioning from detention to productive living.” Headed by Father Greg Boyle, the help offered includes addressing the spiritual and psychological needs of troubled adolescents and other young adults served by the programs. The industries run by this award winning enterprise include a bakery, clothing store, a silkscreen business, and a landscaping operation. Since gainful opportunities are one of the most important factors in reducing gang violence, Homeboy Industries’ success in creating jobs for gang involved and other troubled youth, particularly in light of many employers’ reluctance to higher these youth, is important to replicate citywide if serious gang activity and violence reduction is to be accomplished.
In addition to Homeboy Industries, there are several other important gang intervention efforts in Los Angeles employing promising practices. Both Toberman Settlement House and Communities in School offer a comprehensive array of gang prevention and intervention services targeting youth most at-risk of joining a gang. From school based prevention to crisis intervention, both agencies have a strong group of staff who demonstrate extraordinary dedication and expertise. Both organizations work collaboratively with a broad range of partners including law enforcement, other service providers, and schools.

Working with the incarcerated population and troubled residents of high crime neighborhoods, Amer-I-Can’s unique Life Skills Management curriculum has trained over 25,000 adult and juvenile inmates in over 30 correctional institutions in California and other states since 1989. Through a 60 to 90 hour engagement, the program helps individuals examine their past misconduct and to systematically develop the skills and outlook needed to reverse the negative thinking and attitudes that lead to violent, criminal, addictive, and other problematic behavior. A survey of the post-incarceration records of inmates who had graduated from the course offered at the County's Pitchess Detention Center showed that the program transformed troublesome prisoners into mediators and after they left, reduced their likelihood of resuming criminal behavior or returning to jail.

Finally, a key institution supporting the work of gang intervention workers is the Youth and Gang Violence Intervention Specialist Program at the Pat Brown Institute, California State University, Los Angeles. Building professional capacity among gang intervention workers not only strengthens their individual ability to perform but also builds a common base of knowledge and professional standards within the community of gang intervention workers. The program offers a solid basis upon which more advanced professional development activities can be added.

c. Gang Alternatives Program (GAP)

Only one gang prevention program focuses on keeping elementary school children trapped in gang dominated neighborhoods from succumbing to the inevitable pressures of joining “La Vida Loca”: Gang Alternatives Program (GAP). Through classroom based curriculum implementation, GAP directors reach every 4th grader in 43 elementary schools. The program is designed to counteract the strong acceptance of gangs as a social norm and to fortify young children against their overwhelmingly negative, gang permeated milieu. GAP is a unique effort to incorporate younger age children in the violence prevention strategy and has established effective collaboration with the schools.

d. Gang Reduction Program, Boyle Heights

The Mayor’s Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety began the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in Boyle Heights as one of four pilot sites funded by the
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in 2004. The extensive planning process undertaken involved a wide range of community stakeholders, schools, City departments, City Council offices, and law enforcement. In addition, the project also began with a good understanding of the assets and resources in the community through the creation of the Boyle Heights Community Resource Inventory.

Designed to coordinate the delivery of services addressing four strategic needs including primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention and gang suppression, the GRP model offers a framework for developing a data-driven, collaborative strategy on a targeted neighborhood. Although the planning was intensive and thorough, an implementation process that utilizes the best assets and resources in the community is equally important and essential. An effective implementation that shows positive impact and measurable outcomes will be needed to support the sustainability of the effort.

e. The Los Angeles Urban League’s Crenshaw Initiative

Another promising neighborhood and schools initiative aimed at reducing violence and crime, increasing academic achievement, and sparking community development is being launched by the Los Angeles Urban League with the LAPD, the LAUSD, the City Attorney’s Office and residents. This civic group’s joint venture with the school district and City law enforcement will initially offer wrap-around services and safe passages strategies to end violence and change conditions for students.

f. CLEAR

The Community Law Enforcement and Recovery Program (CLEAR) is a collaboration of seven suppression and criminal justice agencies across jurisdictional boundaries including the Los Angeles Mayor’s Office, District Attorney, LAPD, the Sheriff’s Department, Probation Department, City Attorney and California Department of Corrections Parole. This high level City-County-State collaboration model was unique in the Advancement Project’s survey of gang reduction programs. The co-location of representatives of the five City and County law enforcement agencies facilitates coordination, joint planning, and collaboration. The team also engages community stakeholders in identifying quality of life issues through the formation of Community Impact Teams. CLEAR is currently located in six targeted geographic areas with high concentrations of gang violence.

CLEAR presents the possibility that multi-jurisdictional collaboration can contribute to achieving neighborhood safety. Moreover, the role of law enforcement is even more enhanced when CLEAR’s model of coordinated suppression tactics is integrated into a comprehensive prevention and intervention strategy such as the Gang Reduction Program being implemented in Boyle Heights.
g. CLASS Parks

The Los Angeles City Department of Recreation and Parks created a program called Clean and Safe Spaces (CLASS) parks in the fall of 2000 as a part of a community revitalization effort. Initially, CLASS parks were focused on the relatively narrow and park-focused mission of providing a clean and safe outdoor gathering place for communities. Over time, however, CLASS parks evolved and expanded into a youth development centered mission that emphasizes asset building and creating linkages between youth and communities. CLASS parks operates in 47 of the 175 City parks.

This initiative is particularly important, because it shows how a traditional City department with a massive share of City resources re-deployed its facilities as strategic assets for building the City’s youth development infrastructure and contributing to community revitalization. This reorientation occurred because the department’s leadership became concerned about neighborhood conditions in high crime areas, and broadened Recreation and Parks’ mission to address the violence that interfered with public enjoyment of the department’s facilities. This kind of mission transformation will be necessary in other City departments. Every department will have to bring its resources to bear on the solutions to gangs and violence and on the mission of achieving better outcomes for the children and youth of our City. Although many in the Department of Recreation and Parks still would rather see their mission narrowly defined to the “brick and mortar” of maintaining parks facilities, CLASS parks has gained the support of the Department’s leadership and is leading the way in engaging public, private and research entities to promote the healthy development of youth.

These and other promising practices within the City offer examples of the engagement and collaboration with communities, multi-jurisdictional coordination, data driven planning, and mission alignment that research shows is necessary to keep safe areas safe, return slipping areas to safe conditions, keep tipping point communities from tipping and in high crime areas, aggressively counter the conditions that permit violence and gangs to flourish. Yet these localized and siloed efforts will not be able to adequately address what is a citywide and regional problem. Their effectiveness is limited because they address a small geographic area, as in the case of CLEAR and GRP, and may push violence into other areas that do not have the same infusion of resources, or because their efforts are not leveraged and coordinated with other resources, as in the case of CLASS parks. Sustainability is a challenge for transformative efforts at places like Rampart Division and Santee High School when the entrenched norms and culture of the broader institutions do not change. Finally and most importantly, these efforts by themselves are no match for the complexity and the scale of the problem of violence in our communities.
IV. From Elements to Completion: What’s Needed to Implement A Comprehensive Gang Activity Prevention and Reduction Strategy in LA

A. A Strong Political Mandate to Move from Small Scale Programs to the Comprehensive Model

The greatest failure of the City’s approach to gang reduction is that it fails to offer a comprehensive system with the capacity to reduce gang activity and violence. It does not work with neighborhoods and schools through highly coordinated, research-based programs that are jointly carried out by the residents, City, County, and school district to end the conditions that fuel gang membership and violence. As a result, the City has no ability to deliver timely prevention and intervention services to children most exposed to the dangers of violent neighborhood conditions, or any capacity to reverse gang expansion.

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

When confronted with a large, complex issue, the common City practice is to quickly respond with a small, non-research based program that fits existing budget constraints, instead of developing the systemic approach that will be needed to solve the problem. When confronted with a large, complex issue, the common City practice is to quickly respond with a small, non-research based program that fits existing budget constraints, instead of developing the systemic approach that will be needed to solve the problem.76 In addition, political imperatives dictate avoiding difficult issues that require changes in City operations, or taking on long term problems that cannot deliver short term credit.

B. Comprehensive Solutions Must Address the Scale of the Problem

In the Phase I Report, AP set out the consequences of the City’s failure to design gang prevention and intervention programs in reference to estimated numbers of youth in gangs, youth engaged in chronic delinquency, and other cohorts of troubled adolescents and children.77 If programs do not contemplate the scale of the problem, it is not possible to determine whether programs reduce gangs, abate violence or improve conditions for children.

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

Almost all programs operated and administered by the City to address gang activity reduction are too small and isolated to impact the scale of the problem.


77 Ibid, p. 5.
The only City program that directly targets gang members and gangs receives less than $4 million a year. This solitary City investment into hardcore gang intervention is the equivalent of spending 31 cents a day per gang member. The City spends more ($4.8 million) to provide care and shelter for animals. The sum total specifically budgeted for gang prevention and intervention programs is $25.8 million. That is less than $90 per year for each of the almost 300,000 children living in high gang crime areas—or about 24 cents a day. LAPD estimates that the City has 40,000 gang members. Yet, the City’s targeted efforts at reducing gang activity, only reach 8,800 youth. Of these, only 1,400 or so receive intensive case management towards exiting gangs. There are 720 gangs in the City. But there are only 61 gang intervention workers in the streets.

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78 City of Los Angeles, “Budget for the Fiscal Year 2006-07,” April 2006, p. 32. The $4.8 million figure represents Animal Services expenditures on Field Operations.
C. Comprehensive Solutions Must Address the Regional Nature of the Problem

Violence and the conditions that breed violence in Los Angeles are a regional problem. Crime, gangs, and violence do not stop at City or County jurisdictional boundaries. Neighborhoods that have rival gangs contesting territory routinely overlap both City and County boundaries, particularly in the East Los Angeles, Watts and Pacoima areas. Many school attendance areas straddle City/County boundaries. Children and youth are involved with multiple systems across cities, the County and school districts. For example, there are over 6,000 children in the City involved in foster care and over 2,000 City youth involved with County Probation, but few City programs prioritize or track how many foster and probation youth they serve even though these youth are often the highest risk cases for violence or gang membership.81

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

City programs are rarely planned or implemented in ways that account for these cross-jurisdictional dynamics. Employees from disparate systems are not rewarded for multi-jurisdictional planning or joint ventures with other entities.

D. An Effective Execution of a Comprehensive Strategy Will Require Centralized Accountability with Sufficient Power

The reason that City Councilmembers cannot get coherent answers to their questions about gang activity reduction is because no single City entity, employee or contractor is responsible for the leadership, design, and implementation of citywide gang reduction strategies or the coordination among all City efforts needed to combat gangs and gang violence. The scatter shot nature of City gang activity reduction efforts precludes accountability. And no current program or department has a strong enough political mandate, the requisite power, or command over resources to implement a citywide comprehensive gang activity reduction strategy. The City needs to create accountability for reducing gang violence through a powerful, entrepreneurial City entity with the institutional and political clout needed to streamline bureaucracy, command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions, and LAUSD, and execute neighborhood-based violence prevention and reduction plans. Without a sufficient robust political mandate, sustained institutional clout and resources, any new entity created to reduce gang activity and violence would become marginalized and isolated.

This entity also cannot be a traditional, risk averse bureaucracy. It will have to be entrepreneurial, meaning creative and agile, and it will need to be led by extraordinary talent with specialized expertise and broad political skills that the civil service system is unlikely to

81 Raw data from the Education Coordinating Council’s Data Match Results Los Angeles Unified School District, Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services, and Los Angeles County Probation Department, April 2006. See also Councilmember Jose Huizar’s motion (06-0824), April 12, 2006 and Report of the Chief Legislative Analyst, “Survey of City Departments That Service Youth In the Foster Care and Probation System,” August 4, 2006.
provide. While many City employees offer expertise that should be welcome in the new entity, broad latitude to hire specific experts will be needed. The mission of this entity or department should embrace the needs of all communities and should be able to:

1. Keep **Safe Areas** Safe;

2. Pull **Sliding Communities with Emerging Violence** Back to Safety;

3. Strategic Intervention in **Areas at Tipping Point** to Achieve Safety; and

4. Saturate **Violent Hot Zones** to Achieve Stabilization and Pave the Road to Revitalization.

**Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:**

Obstacles include bureaucratic aversion to change, opposition to streamlining the bureaucracy, and fear of losing programs if siloed programs are merged into a larger strategic initiative.

**E. Mandatory Citywide Mission for All Departments**

Along with cross-jurisdictional efforts, all City departments will have to contribute to the mission of reducing community violence, including gang activity, citywide. The only effective way to compel existing departments to realign their resources to serve a new mission is through the budgetary approval process. The City should form a robust oversight entity that monitors City departments to achieve the goals of the comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy.

**Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:**

Departments operate to achieve narrowly defined goals and currently do not see their resources and facilities as strategic assets in a citywide gang activity and violence reduction mission that leads to community revitalization. As a result, even when departments operate programs with the potential to improve conditions in the community, the efforts are siloed and ineffective.

**F. Streamlined Bureaucracy and Effective Intra-Departmental Coordination**

Under a coherent citywide strategy, coordinated programs should reduce bureaucratic duplication and conflict, and improve the results of gang activity and violence reduction strategies at the neighborhood level. Improved communication, and well established venues for collaboration and coordination should increase the impact of current dollars expended.

**Page 45: Diagram of City and County Programs**
Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

There is no consistent coordination between the programs shown in the diagram and it is common to find two programs working with the same target population not having joint strategic planning, let alone sustained communication. These programs often compete with each other for annual funding and turf issues undermine any sustained effort at coordination.

G. Develop Reliable Data, Good Research, and Evaluation through the Creation of an Independent “Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute”

The City must obtain good data, which currently, it does not have. Definitions of gang, gang membership, and gang crime are incompatible across the region and inconsistent with best research. Interventions and programs are repeatedly designed without reference to important research on trends and patterns in local communities, and often reflect commonly held notions of youth development or political needs rather than what research shows as best or promising practices. All efforts to reduce gang activity and neighborhood violence must have competent data collection, fair metrics, and appropriate evaluation built in, in order to accurately assess performance and impact. Reliable data, competent evaluation and expert research would also enable the City to produce cutting edge research of its own.

A regional body that provides expert data collection, protocols, database maintenance, research, evaluation and policy analysis, and that coordinates with City data personnel will greatly aid these goals and ensure reliable evaluation and real accountability.

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

The region’s various gang intervention and law enforcement agencies resist standardizing protocols for data collection, data definitions, metrics standards and joint analysis with outside experts. Most entities also resist discussing data problems or suggestions by research that current policies may be counter-productive.

H. Solutions Must Address Each Neighborhood’s Conditions

Somewhat counterintuitive to the notion that violence and gangs are a regional problem is the equally important need to conduct a neighborhood by neighborhood assessment, develop specific violence prevention plans with neighborhood leaders, County providers and school officials. Two factors necessitate this. First, it is the negative conditions in neighborhoods and families that fuel the formation and sustain the operations of street gangs. Gangs develop in a specific, local community context with specific ethnic, cultural and social norms, and develop symbiotic relationships with the community. In addition, traditional gangs not only identify themselves with certain neighborhoods but also vigorously defend “their turf.” Given the distinct make-up of neighborhoods throughout Los Angeles, any

82 Klein and Maxson, p. 237.
attempts to specifically target community factors contributing to gang formation will require a neighborhood level understanding and strategy. Second, the importance of community involvement, particularly in developing what experts have termed “collective efficacy,” or the capacity of a community to mobilize, organize and exercise control over what happens in the neighborhood, cannot be overstated. In this sense, it is critical for community stakeholders to be actively engaged in identifying the problem and community resources and in implementing a solution. Successful gang reduction requires focus on the local neighborhood conditions and dynamics that spawn and sustain gangs.

The challenge for each community with troubled youth in gangs is how to transform community conditions so that no child is forced into destructive lifestyles and to create alternatives so compelling that no child chooses to enter a gang.

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

City approaches to this problem focus primarily on suppression, injunctions, and arrests. Some law enforcement factions oppose investment in prevention and intervention on the grounds that gang members are not “redeemable.” Too little research on competent approaches to gangs informs City gang reduction strategies, so neighborhood conditions have never become the focus of City programs.

I. Bureaucratic Culture Must Be Transcended

The entity that is charged with the mission of preventing and reducing gang violence will have to be agile, creative, unafraid to find new answers, and unafraid to learn from its mistakes.

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

While traditional bureaucracy can help achieve higher levels of coordination among gang activity reduction programs, the constraints and incentive structures of traditional bureaucracies would prevent them from leading a comprehensive violence reduction strategy. In addition to the innate bureaucratic resistance to change and aversion to risk, missing from all bureaucracies are the regulatory freedom and the mission-driven, “can do” outlook. Current City programs are siloed and small, while problems are entrenched and big. Moreover, programs are designed to acknowledge but not solve the larger problem. Yet, political leaders and the public demand that the problems be solved with minimal investment into limited programs. With unstable funding, every program fights to retain its funding. The civil service system sometimes prevents the deployment of people with the most relevant expertise into leadership positions. Innovation and evaluation, except in a few cases, is not encouraged because failure, in the context of turf driven dynamics, means loss of funding. All of these dynamics have persisted in the City

over many administrations and now have become barriers to even thinking about doing things differently.

J. Reap the Prevention Dividend: Substantially Increase Investment in Gang Prevention Programs and Create a Prevention Network Reaching Children and Youth of All Ages

Comprehensive gang activity reduction approaches will require the City to substantially increase its investment in prevention programs. It is important to increase the impact of existing resources and programs that reduce violent conduct and other destructive behavior by strategically linking existing programs, networks and assets, and using best prevention practices in neighborhood-based strategies. Most current gang prevention programs focus on older children and adolescents, but in neighborhoods with entrenched, multi-generation gang cultures that have gang membership as a social norm, it is critical to reach very young children with focused gang prevention programs to counter that norm. In addition, most programs focus on males, which is important to do. But with the rapid increase in the rate at which girls are joining gangs, it is extremely important to develop a strong set of programs targeted and focused on the unique strategies needed to divert girls from destructive or violent choices.

Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:

The little investment that is made into violence prevention is heavily allocated toward suppression. As noted in the Phase I report, of the $82 million CAO and CLA identified as gang reduction spending in the City, $56 million or nearly 68 percent of the total investment was in suppression efforts. While increased law enforcement capacity is needed to achieve citywide public safety, the failure to invest as heavily in competent prevention programs precludes reaping the prevention dividend: for every dollar spent on prevention, seven dollars are saved in future violence related costs. In addition, current programs fail to focus on young children and girls in high gang activity areas.

K. Substantially Increase Investment in Improved, Hard Core Gang Intervention

While a larger focus on community conditions, delinquency and other destructive or violent youth behavior should be pursued to change community norms and remove the grist for gangs, the best research finds that reducing gang activity requires “very careful targeting of programs and clients” with specific focus on the unique culture of particular gangs. Effective gang prevention and reduction strategies also will require substantially increased investment in, and improved training and oversight for gang intervention programs that are linked to jobs and wrap-around activities that create safe exit ramps out of gangs. Important aspects of neighborhood gang activity reduction strategies and violence prevention strategies require dealing with hard core gang members. The only credible, authentic and effective interveners with hard core gang members are former members. After careful consideration

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86 See Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention: Cheryl Maxson.
of the research that documents how some hard core intervention tactics and some crime fighting strategies actually have increased the cohesion of traditional gangs and their activity, the City should invest in a well designed infrastructure to support productive gang intervention activity and intervention workers. The professionalization, education, compensation and support systems needed to further develop this cadre of former gang members and ex-offenders who will continue to be needed throughout the region. Rigorous protocols for oversight and fair evaluation of intervention activities need to be developed to ensure the integrity of the controls and checks needed to reduce the risks of this kind of work.

Current Practices that Block Achievement of this Element:

The current gang intervention effort is under funded and, therefore, can only reach 3 percent of gang members in the City and 25 percent of gangs. In addition, gang intervention programs are straddled with additional programmatic components that are not adequately compensated. Oversight, at times, appears lax and unable to provide adequate technical assistance.

L. New Funding and the Regional Strategy

Achieving the scale and the coordination required to carry out comprehensive neighborhood violence reduction plans is a daunting task in a region as large and as diverse as Los Angeles. Marshalling the resources necessary to match the scale of the problem will require time. The number of independent jurisdictions in the region, including the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, LAUSD, 100 other school districts, and 88 cities, means that a regional strategy will require replicating the coordination and cooperation of the joint task forces that the region’s various law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have already established. Therefore, initial steps toward a solution must begin with the City considering its role in this context and making the necessary changes to eventually become a part of a regional strategy that other entities will join.

In the following sections, this report sets out the framework needed to move toward neighborhood-based, comprehensive and integrated prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies.
V. Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence

In order to reduce gang activity and violence in high crime areas and inhibit the growth of these problems into new areas, this report recommends that the City move from a small scale gang prevention paradigm to a comprehensive neighborhood public health model. The comprehensive model will require a highly skilled team of experts in City operations, budgets, gang and violence prevention, and other areas to chart operations and implementation steps. The changes needed in the City’s systems and practices to achieve the transition must be implemented in phases because the level of transformation requires long term commitment.

If the City declines the recommended paradigm shift, there are other options that can at least improve the current limited programmatic model. The following matrix sets out a seven level spectrum of those options that offer escalating levels of response, impact, and scale.

Page 51: Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence
## Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach to Problem</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 4</th>
<th>Level 5</th>
<th>Level 6</th>
<th>Level 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let the problem fester.</td>
<td>Disconnected programs not designed to existing department not designed for violence prevention. Funding not to scale.</td>
<td>All of Level 2, plus a Gang Taskforce to increase intra and inter departmental coordination. Funding and programs are still not to scale.</td>
<td>End ad hoc approach and create a department designed to reduce gang and other violence through citywide neighborhood-based revitalization strategies. Implement strategy in hot zones.</td>
<td>All of Level 4, plus develop a regional strategy and entity that move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction. Create neighborhood action plans.</td>
<td>City entity works with regional entity and neighborhoods to achieve coordinated, funded programs and services that produce results that can be seen and felt in formerly violent neighborhoods.</td>
<td>Achieve citywide public safety.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals of Approach</td>
<td>No goals.</td>
<td>Reach a small percentage of youth with scattered prevention and intervention services without proof of results.</td>
<td>Attempting to coordinate existing programs to patch gaps in communication and collaboration by forming a Gang Taskforce. Higher quality of programs achieved through better coordination, but no increase in the number of youth reached.</td>
<td>Violence stabilization in hot zones. Restructure current resources into one City entity to coordinate services. A majority of children in hot zones will receive prevention services. Qualitative and quantitative evaluations of programs for constant improvement.</td>
<td>Improved school performance and reduced drop out rates. Move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction by creating jobs for young people and expanding intervention and prevention services. Close entrance ramps and create exit ramps for youth into and out of gangs. Creation of new entity to manage funding and regional coordination.</td>
<td>Significant reductions in violence in high crime zones, gang presence recedes. Increased programming reaches almost 100% of young people. Move to a standard that provides basic safety in most neighborhoods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of Approach</td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not fully to scale</td>
<td>Not all neighborhoods are 100% safe from violent gang crime</td>
<td>Completely to scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Not to scale.</td>
<td>Fewer than 5% of gang members reached for intervention. Less than 7% of the almost 300,000 children living in high gang crime areas receive prevention services.</td>
<td>Same scale reached as Level 2, but quality of programs is higher and more focused because of coordination.</td>
<td>Reach at least 40% of high risk youth for intervention services and 25% of at risk youth for prevention services.</td>
<td>Reach at least 75% of high risk youth for intervention services and 50% of at risk youth for prevention services.</td>
<td>Reach at least 90% of high risk youth for intervention services and 100% of at risk youth for prevention services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Only suppression. Insufficient and unbalanced.</td>
<td>Insufficient to need. Taskforce has no authority over funds.</td>
<td>Restructure existing resources. Insufficient funding for need.</td>
<td>Plan for dedicated stream of funding.</td>
<td>Dedicated funding stream.</td>
<td>Dedicated, stable funding stream.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>No evaluation, data collection, or database planning.</td>
<td>Improved data collection and evaluation.</td>
<td>Permanent research entity within regional body.</td>
<td>Permanent research entity within regional body.</td>
<td>Permanent research entity within regional body.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>No engagement. Hot zones are riddled with violent crime.</td>
<td>No change in community.</td>
<td>Stabilization of crime in hot zones</td>
<td>Reduction in gang violence and membership in hot zones.</td>
<td>Significant reduction in hot zone crime rates. Most neighborhoods have basic safety.</td>
<td>Hot zones’ crime levels at a Westside rate. Community in partnership with City and regional leaders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>No programs. Some unevaluated programs available to limited numbers of youth.</td>
<td>Slightly higher quality programs for limited numbers of youth.</td>
<td>Most young people in high crime areas have access to prevention programs.</td>
<td>High crime areas have access to coordinated intervention and prevention programs. Youth’s school performance improves and drop out rates lessen.</td>
<td>All children in hot zones have access to intervention and prevention programs.</td>
<td>All children have access to constructive and healthy alternatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the levels described, the Advancement Project places current City efforts at Level Two, where less than five percent of the estimated number of gang members receives any type of intervention services and less than seven percent of the almost 300,000 children living in high poverty, high gang crime zones receives prevention services. From this point to Level Seven, there are four options to consider. (At Level One, the City could opt to do nothing but suppression). We briefly discuss each of the option levels here and delve further into the detail of components of the options.

A. **Level Three: Improve Coordination within the City for Existing Programs. No Increase in Scale and Minimal Impact in Level of Neighborhood Violence.**

The third option, Level Three, contemplates the prospect of improved coordination within the existing programmatic and governance structure and does not envision matching the scale of the problem as outlined in this report. Under the leadership of a City “Gang Task Force,” the City would improve coordination among existing programs so that overt gaps in communication and failures to conduct easy and obvious collaboration end. One example of this may be how Bridges I programs coordinate with Youth Opportunities programs to ensure some continuity in service during the transition from middle to high school.

Coordination with non-City entities should also somewhat improve since it may be initiated by the Gang Task Force, but still diffused throughout the City programs. External evaluation and research would be incorporated to the extent possible with the limited data that is available. The number of children and youth served would not change a great deal, although more of those receiving services might benefit from improved quality. Impact on the levels of neighborhood violence would continue to be minimal to non-existent.

B. **Level Four: Beginning of the Paradigm Shift – Targeted at Hot Zones. Creation of City Entity with the Ability to Measure Impact by use of Quality Data and Strategic Research.**

Level Four envisions implementation of a comprehensive neighborhood level prevention, intervention, and suppression strategy in the hot zones with the goal of violence stabilization in those areas. To achieve this, existing resources would be restructured and pooled into a single City entity with the authority and the capacity to initiate a highly coordinated service delivery model that works with schools and a few other external institutions as needed. The significantly increased levels of program and strategy coordination with schools, and the planned joint action with the Department of Recreation and Parks that should occur at this level, should result in the majority of children in these hot zones having access to meaningful prevention opportunities. In addition to working closely with neighborhood schools, the City also would initiate and maintain neighborhood level coordination with County juvenile justice departments, child welfare and mental health agencies for high-risk youth and their families.

Strategic research, data collection, and evaluation would yield performance measures and an internal data tracking system. The goal would be to reach at least 40 percent of the high-risk
youth and 25 percent of the at-risk children and youth in the City resulting in some stabilization of violence and reductions in gang membership over time.87


Level Five would broaden the basic infrastructure established in Level Four to implement prevention and intervention citywide, and maintain the comprehensive model level of coordination in neighborhoods. The goal at this level is to move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction that leads to relatively low levels of gang presence, and then on to creating the infrastructure that will move the community and its residents to revitalization. At this level, the planning needed to create jobs as part of a regional economic development plan would be designed, so that even the most economically deprived and marginalized neighborhoods are set onto a path of physical revitalization, would be set in motion. Additionally, new streams of funding will be needed, such as a countywide measure to create a dedicated stream of funding for violence prevention and youth development. The initiative also should create a new regional entity that would administer the new stream of funding and manage multi-jurisdictional collaboration within the region. A permanent research entity would reside within the new regional entity to develop strategic partnerships with universities and other research institutions in the area around youth development and violence prevention.

The services would expand in capacity to reach 75 percent of highest risk youth and 50 percent of at-risk youth in the City. Reduction in gang violence and gang membership would result even in the hot spots, and communities should see improved school performances and reduced drop-out rates.


The City, as part of a regional strategy that proactively staunches emerging trends in violence and douses conditions that incubate threats, would move onto a standard that provides basic safety in most neighborhoods and provides drastically reduced levels of shootings and other violence in violent crime hot zones, such that they would look like today’s communities that have tagging crews and one or two low level gangs engaged in non-violent gang activity.

Level Six would achieve stability and significant reductions in violence in high crime zones, see citywide gang presence significantly recede, and would begin to document reductions in gang recruitment and violence even for the five percent of gangs that are the most virulent, violent and entrenched. Coordinated comprehensive prevention, intervention and suppression strategies would reach 90 percent of highest risk youth and 100 percent of at-risk and other children trapped in high crime zones.

87 These are suggested goals for the city to reach, but requires further research with improved data or variables.
E. Level Seven: Safety and Vitality Ensured for All Children. Citywide Public Safety.

The final option, Level Seven, would see today’s average City crime rates in all current low crime neighborhoods, and the City would no longer be the gang capital of the nation. All children and youth in the region would have access to constructive and healthy alternatives and no child in any neighborhood would face high risk of witnessing or experiencing violent attacks—in contrast to the 90 percent of children in high crime zones who face that risk today. Communities would be organized and capable of exercising control over youth violence and become full partners in community revitalization efforts. The City and the region would be able to accomplish these goals because there is a stable and dedicated stream of funding to ensure the safety and vitality of all children, youth, and families. In short, LA would no longer see today’s routinely high neighborhood violence levels, and the City’s long term gang homicide epidemic would be over.

The options from Level Three to Level Six should be viewed as steps in a process building toward stabilization and violence reduction, not as stand alone strategies. The limited measures in Level Three, for example, represent the first step to achieving Level Seven but should not be viewed as final goals. The general idea is to set clear, measurable goals for reducing violence, reducing gang activity, and increasing the application of effective prevention, early childhood prevention, youth development, and hard core gang intervention programs citywide. The options also present a strategy of getting the City reorganized and ready to engage the County and other regional entities in regional efforts that eventually will be needed to end the full scope of gang and neighborhood violence. The regional effort also will need leadership in developing new streams of funding and in sustaining the new coordinated way of doing business.

VI. The Governance and Accountability Structure

A. Leadership: The “Gang Czar”

Many are calling for a “Gang Czar.” In light of the sad demise of the real Czars, and the abject failure of every federal “Drug Czar,” we are reluctant to use that title. But the larger point is well taken: there is no doubt that the leadership of any effective gang and violence reduction enterprise will need to be high powered, have extraordinary political skills, and a Michael Jordan-like ability to transcend the drag of torpid bureaucracies. S/he will have to galvanize staff, other City departments, LAPD, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), LAUSD, foster care, Probation, County service agencies, LASD and dozens of other governmental agencies to jointly design with neighborhood residents the comprehensive, saturation strategies needed to prevent violence and gang activity from reaching safe areas, and to significantly reduce them in the hot zones.

In addition to forging this new King Arthur’s Roundtable joint venture method of doing business, the leadership of this new department or entity, along with the Mayor and City

88 It also perpetuates the sole focus on the gang, which the best research and programs show is a mistake.
Council, will have to rally participation and contributions from the civic, philanthropic, business, academic, celebrity, and media/entertainment sectors. These resources will be essential to launch a strategically framed, permanent, public campaign against violence and to create a civic anti-violence infrastructure that deploys the scores of great resources in this region—from its universities and think tanks to the Getty and Museum of Tolerance.

The leadership also will have to have a command of the evolving policy debates about data, evaluation, violence as a public health epidemic, hard core gang intervention, crime fighting theory, child development, community fortification and many other unsettled substantive areas that determine whether the right methods and metrics are used to document real results in reducing violence and gang activity.

In short, the director and top staff of this new entity are unlikely to be found on a civil service list.

Charismatic, mission-driven, results-oriented leadership will be required. However, transformative talent at the top will not be enough. Great leadership of an entity whose structure and position in the bureaucracy are too weak to execute the mission will guarantee continued failure.

B. Structure and Power: What Kind of Entity is Needed?

The power needed to carry out a mandate to end gang violence and execute multi-jurisdictional, interdisciplinary plans requires a governance structure that has enough muscle to command cooperation from other City departments and external entities. The entity created to achieve this mission will have to:

• **Streamline Bureaucracy:** The City must eliminate duplication and burdensome bureaucracy that hinders the development and implementation of a coordinated, effective, and efficient citywide strategy to violence prevention. Location of siloed efforts in multiple departments, often in competition with each other for funding, is unproductive and has minimal impact.

• **Show Results and Ensure Accountability:** The City must be able to show that competent plans are keeping safe areas safe and reducing violence, gang activity, and other destructive dynamics in areas that are not safe. The City must develop metrics systems that collect the right data and measure the right indicators of success.

• **Secure Cooperation and Participation from Other City Departments:** An effective citywide strategy to violence prevention requires the active participation of all City entities that are all striving to contribute to achieving the mission of ensuring safety and vitality of all children and youth.

• **Maximize Impact From Current Expenditures:** The City’s uncoordinated, unstrategic and small investments into dozens of disparate programs results in almost no neighborhood impact in sustained violence reduction. Given the prospect of the City’s $250 million
shortfall for 2007, this is a particularly good time to end the inefficient investment of taxpayer dollars into marginally effective, diffused efforts. Instead, the City’s multiple streams of funding towards violence prevention needs to be pooled and focused under a citywide strategy while also being leveraged to create a more stable and robust funding mechanism.

• **Find and Develop Internal and External Expertise:** Because programs are spread throughout the City’s multiple departments and entities, there has been no systematic effort to tap both internal and external expertise or to incorporate promising and best practices.

• **Collect and Use Good Data, Evaluation, and Performance Measures:** Related to the issue of accountability, the City must be able to demonstrate its impact in concrete measurable terms. This cannot be done without collecting uniform data and consistent utilization of such data to evaluate performance.

• **Centralize Coordination:** Timely, strategic and effective coordination among all City departments, neighborhood leaders and external offices will be a required way of operating.

1. **Governance and Structural Options for a New City Entity Charged with Neighborhood Safety**

There are several structural options to consider in thinking about a City entity that has sufficient clout and the right positioning within the bureaucratic line up to carry out these functions and meet the violence and gang activity reduction mandate.

• **Task Force or Committee:** A task force of representatives from the Mayor’s office, relevant departments and other entities could be formed. Although such a task force may adequately coordinate between existing programs across departments, it lacks the capacity and the authority to mobilize and leverage citywide resources scattered across departments. Accountability remains a problem as each participating department maintains vertical authority over their individual programs. A task force also could not effect coordination with and among non-City agencies, since they would still have to work through many different departments. A task force is an efficient structure for temporary initiatives, but less effective for long term problem solving. For example, a task force can lead the initial process to develop a more permanent structure, including the search for a leader. **However, a task force is not robust enough for an on-going, sustained transformation of how the City addresses a problem as entrenched as community violence and gangs.**

The limitations of a task force can be seen in Boston’s task force-like working group that launched their Operation Ceasefire campaign. This working group successfully launched and sustained its effort over several years during which juvenile violence and crime rates plunged. However, when police leaders left the Working Group, it disbanded, the trust that was key to the success disappeared, the City’s resources were diverted to other efforts, and the group lost its coordination capacity. The result was the resurgence of youth violence and homicide rates.
• **Non-Profit:** The City’s sole example of a fully networked entity is LA’s Best, which is an independent non-profit organization that provides after school enrichment programs. There are many merits to the non-profit approach. As an independent entity somewhat removed from the politics and bureaucratic structures of City government, a non-profit is nimble and flexible enough to implement innovative and experimental strategies. By its very nature, non-profits draw from multiple funding sources and envision an internal capacity to work with both the public and the private sector. As an entity somewhat independent of jurisdictional turf issues, a non-profit also can offer neutral ground where multiple governmental entities can work together.

However, its independence also is the non-profit’s Achilles heel. While a strong, effective leader can produce exemplary results from a non-profit-government venture, because it lies outside of the power structure of the City, ultimately, it lacks the authority and the institutional power to mobilize resources or mandate cooperation from the City and its departments. Non-profits like LA’s Best offer a compelling example of effective program delivery and innovative problem solving. But a non-profit agency does not have any ability to transform how the City performs from the inside. In addition, although the ability to garner private sector and philanthropic dollars is greater with a non-profit, a citywide strategy towards ensuring neighborhood safety will require public streams of funding already existing within the City.

• **Commission:** There are several commissions within the City, each with a different mission. Existing commissions are focused on a particular area of expertise and policy that would otherwise not be systematically addressed in other City departments such as the Commission on the Status of Women and the Human Relations Commission. The Commission of Children, Youth, and their Families, among all of the commissions, has the most expansive mission and oversees several venues, including the annual Children, Youth, and their Families Budget and the Interagency Taskforce for Kids (IT4K), for collaboration across City departments on issues related to children and youth. **While the commissions hold the potential to be a much more powerful structure, particularly with the integration of a broad sector of stakeholders as commissioners, commissions as they exist now lack the power and the authority to mobilize the cooperation of other departments.** This is partly attributable to the fact that the limited funding allocated to each commission supports only minimal capacity. In addition, there is no mechanism in place to hold other City departments accountable for the policy agendas of the commissions.  

89 See Appendix 12, Governance Structures, “Governance Categories for Analysis of Structures and Options for Gang Reduction Study.”

• **Traditional City Department:** Most of the City’s work occurs under traditional City departments that are managed by appointed officials and staffed by employees covered by the civil service system. Departments are either created by charter or by ordinance. Some are overseen by part-time, full-time, or advisory citizen commissions, in addition to reporting to the Mayor and the City Council. Within the culture of LA City
government, only departments command the joint attention of the Council and the Mayor’s office, receive the lion’s share of focus and money during the budgetary process, can seek responses from other City departments, and engage in intergovernmental activity at a high level. However, the traditional City department is saddled with unconnected silos, incentive structures and risk averse culture that are formidable barriers to carrying out a creative, comprehensive prevention and intervention based citywide neighborhood strategy.  

- **Proprietary City Department:** Citizen commissions oversee each of the three proprietary City departments: Airports, Water and Power, and Harbor. These entities are semi-autonomous both in governance and fiscal management. These entities operate critical assets in the City and are revenue generating. The proprietary department structure is inappropriate for youth development and gang violence reduction strategy as these are not money generating activities.

- **Entrepreneurial Department with Oversight and Advisory Board:** An entrepreneurial department represents a hybrid structure that would combine the power and institutional advantage of a department and the agility, creativity, results-orientated and mission-driven culture of effective non-profits and businesses. It would be created through ordinances that free it from unnecessary bureaucratic constraints and allow it to hire expert City and outside staff, and freely use technology in ways existing departments cannot. It would be monitored and overseen by a permanent oversight committee, and given policy guidance by an expert “Board of Advisors.” Most importantly, it would be given an expedited, emergency mission of substantially reducing gang violence through comprehensive neighborhood strategies. And it would be designed with rigorous evaluation frameworks that will determine strategy impact. This entrepreneurial department should have a “perform or end” sunset clause: if after ten years the entrepreneurial department fails to show results, it should be ended.

Because traditional bureaucracies are not designed for rapid response, innovative, and cross-jurisdictional enterprises or suited to solving large scale entrenched problems, alternative structures like the entrepreneurial department become necessary. A concrete example of these dynamics can be drawn from the experience of LAUSD and its need to mount a massive school construction enterprise to build schools for over 80,000 students without seats. For 20 years, the District, a traditional and ponderous bureaucracy, failed to develop the comprehensive strategy that was needed to mount the largest school construction enterprise in the country. The solution came when innovative leadership from outside of the District created a quasi-independent, agile, rapid-response, expertly designed construction authority that was freed of District red-tape, given its own dedicated legal administrative and oversight functions, and freed to interact with State, County, and City and Federal jurisdictions without micromanagement from the District. Indeed, the new Superintendent recruited military personnel, specifically nine retired Navy engineers, as the high-powered, expert leadership, and managers of the complex and vast construction enterprise. District got

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out of the way and competently executed its functions of eminent domain and oversight, but ceased the past, counterproductive micromanagement that produced the fiasco of the Belmont High School construction. As a result of creating an entrepreneurial, quasi-independent, and powerful entity, the LAUSD’s construction enterprise went from catastrophic failure to the best-rated construction authority in the country. Voters who saw the competence passed State and local bonds exceeding $21 billion dollars to fund the effort.

In summary, the task force, non-profit organization, and commission will not command sufficient influence to change internal City operations, sustain a long-term transformation of the City’s violence and gang reduction efforts or operate effectively within a broader regional strategy. The traditional City department will not be able to break the decades of inertia which led to the current uncoordinated, unstrategic approach, and the proprietary department structure is inappropriate for a non-revenue generating activity.

The final structure, an entrepreneurial department with special oversight is a new entity with the institutional stature of a department, the added clout of a special oversight body charged with getting a high level of response and cooperation from other departments, and a creative, mission-driven culture that is the antithesis of traditional bureaucracy. It is this new, hybrid structure that this report recommends.

Page 60: City Organizational Chart
a. Creating the Entrepreneurial Department with Oversight and an Advisory Board:

In order to install the entrepreneurial department, the following issues should be addressed. The following measures are suggested as initial implementation steps:

**Oversight:**

- Designation of a New Deputy Mayor on Neighborhood Safety
- Formation of a Permanent Oversight Committee with Sufficient Clout to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment

**Formation of the New City Department:**

- Measure Directing an Expert Action Committee Charged with Formation and Design of an Entrepreneurial Department for Neighborhood Safety
- Appointment of the Policy Advisory Board
- Appointment of Expert Teams to Develop a Research Institute, Gang Intervention Investment Plan and Public Campaign to End Violence
- Allocation of Resources to Support the Work of the Expert Action Committee and teams.
- Special Measures Creating the Exceptions and Waivers Needed for Entrepreneurial Operation
- Extension of Existing Service Contracts
- Evaluation Framework with Sunset Clause

**Policy Actions:**

- Policy Actions to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment
- Policy Action for Expedited Job Creation
- A Measure Directing All Community Violence and Youth Development Related Legislation through the Entrepreneurial Department
1) **Oversight**

**Designation of a New Deputy Mayor on Neighborhood Safety**

To ensure a clear line of accountability and sufficient attention to the mission, a Deputy Mayor or other equally or more powerful position needs to be created. Currently, public safety is a part of the Homeland Security portfolio. Public safety and homeland security obviously are related and should be closely linked at every level. However, each is a very demanding area. Homeland security—a job involving international, national, County, and City operations and millions of federal dollars waiting for programs—is an uncharted area still in formation, and needing 100 hours a week of attention from the Deputy Mayor of Homeland Security. Interviews with public safety and homeland security experts, City personnel, police officials and others establish that public safety has been overshadowed by the overwhelming effort to create new protocols, programs, policies and networks for homeland security. Similarly onerous hours will be required to meet the mandate of developing effective comprehensive strategies capable of drastically reducing neighborhood violence in hot spots and keeping safe communities safe. Assigning top leadership for each of the two missions would ensure that neighborhood safety will receive adequate attention and leadership in post 9/11 Los Angeles.91

**Formation of a Permanent Oversight Committee with Sufficient Clout to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment**

Both policy actions outlined above require a consistent and structured accountability structure. The Advancement Project recommends the establishment of a permanent Oversight Committee. The Committee would consist of representatives from:

- CAO;
- CLA;
- City Attorney Office;
- Deputy Mayor;
- Budget and Finance Committee;
- Public Safety Committee; and
- Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development.

This body would monitor and ensure that departments and City entities are complying with the policy actions set forth above. It is possible that the

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“Expert Action Committee,” which will develop the new City department, transitions into this role with the addition of other members.

2) Formation of the New City Department

Measure Directing an Expert Action Committee charged with Formation and Design of an Entrepreneurial Department for Gang Activity and Violence Reduction and Neighborhood Safety

In order to implement the recommendation for a new department, the Advancement Project recommends a temporary Expert Action Committee. The Committee would include representatives from the Mayor’s office, the City Attorney, CAO, CLA, Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development, and external experts. The main charge of the Committee would be to develop the structure of the new department including its budget and staffing, and including the provision of exempt staff in key management positions, operational scope, and an implementation plan. The Committee, with outside help, also should conduct a search for a highly respected expert to head the new department.

Although final estimates of cost impact of the new department on the City are not available at this point and the work needs to be finalized, the Advancement Project anticipates that there will be start-up investment required to reorganize and establish the new department. However, projections indicate that the pooling of resources from existing departments and eliminating duplicative administrative functions spread out across several departments will result in cost-savings to the City over time.

Formation strategies could start with existing programs and commissions with the most salient areas of expertise: Community Development Department’s gang reduction programs and community development programs, the Commission on the Status of Women, Human Relations Commission, Commission on Children, Youth and their Families, LAPD, City Attorney’s Office, and others.

If the City concurs with this report’s recommendation to centralize and streamline programs addressing youth development, gang prevention and intervention, and family support services, then those resources should be pooled, coordinated and/or reorganized to function in the new service delivery system focused on gang activity reduction and achieving neighborhood safety.\(^\text{92}\) At a second level, key departments and City-related entities with resources that more generally affect the neighborhood conditions that fuel

\(^{92}\) In some of the cases that are identified in the Department of Neighborhood Safety Funding Chart, the City will need to work with decision making bodies, such as the Workforce Investment Board and funding sources, to facilitate the streamlining of various funds.
gang activity, like the Department of Recreation and Parks and LA’s Best, need to form a three-way partnership with the new department to develop a seamless system of prevention services for children, youth and young adults.

Page 65: Department of Neighborhood Safety Organizational Chart

Page 66: Department of Neighborhood Safety Funding Chart
*Note, this chart does not include all administrative, clerical and fiscal staff
*Note, CVPCs will expand over time requiring additional Regional Directors and CVPC staff.
The new department will be headed by a General Manager and assisted by two Assistant General Managers, each in charge of a division:

- **Administrative Division:**

  This division is responsible for fiscal, personnel, compliance, and other operational elements of the department. This division would also oversee all contracting processes and ensure that there is consistency and adequate oversight over contract compliance across specific funding streams.

- **Program Division:**

  The Program Division will have two sections under its purview:

  a. **Strategic Research and Initiatives**

     This section would be responsible for coordinating uniform data elements and data collection procedures and tools that support targeted strategies to reduce gang activity and violence, more general strategies that use youth development activities to divert delinquent and other troubled youth away from gangs, and help develop early childhood gang prevention programs in neighborhoods with dominant gang cultures. This section also would convene a team of experts charged with conducting on-going analysis of data collected and annual evaluation of programs, and recommending programmatic improvements based on data. This section would interact with a regional independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.

     Research, data and evaluation must be an integral component of the overall program implementation strategy and incorporated in every step from planning to implementation to evaluation. Without this integration, the City will repeat its past mistakes of creating programs that cannot be accurately evaluated.

     In addition to surveying existing and developing research in the relevant fields, the department would also engage in research projects to develop innovative strategies toward gang activity and violence reduction, and removing neighborhood conditions that fuel both. A key element of the Strategic Research and Initiatives section would be to enhance internal City expertise on issues of human relations, child development, adolescent development, family violence prevention, prevention of violence against women and girls, reversing the levels of girls in gangs, as well as data collection strategies. The Strategic Research and Initiatives section would also collaborate with existing groups like the Violence Prevention Coalition of the UCLA Southern
California Injury Prevention Research Center and the current Youth and Gang Violence Intervention Specialist Training Program at the California State University, Los Angeles Pat Brown Institute to further professionalize gang intervention workers.

This section would also work on policy initiatives to enhance community health strategies that focus on the co-factors of violence and destructive behavior. Some appropriate areas of action include reducing access to guns, teen pregnancy prevention, education and prevention on AIDS/HIV and STDs.

b. Comprehensive Services

The specifics of a reorganized service delivery model are described below in greater detail. Structurally, the comprehensive services section would oversee several regional directors who in turn would oversee several geographic areas, identified along high school clusters. Within each high school cluster, the City will operate and manage a “Community Violence Prevention Center” (CVPC) where a comprehensive strategy for violence prevention and youth development will be developed with community leaders. The leadership of the Program Division will also manage coordination and collaboration with County agencies, school districts, and other relevant external entities.

Finally, two specialized offices will handle citywide policy issues. The “Office of Family Violence Prevention” would oversee specific violence prevention programs related to domestic violence, sexual assault, and girls in gangs or at-risk of joining gangs. The “Office of Legal Affairs” will offer public education on expungement of records, gang injunction related legal issues including procedures to properly remove names from injunctions and gang data bases, understanding and navigating the juvenile justice system for youth and their families, how to prevent youth from entering the criminal justice system, and existing laws applicable to youth offenders.

Appointment of the Policy Advisory Board

Instead of a traditional commission that makes policy decisions, the entrepreneurial department should consult with a “Policy Advisory Board” who have expertise in all relevant areas, including gang intervention, gang prevention, violence as a public health problem, youth development, mental health services, law enforcement, job creation, community development, evaluation, and data collection.
Appointment of Expert Teams to Develop a Research Institute, Gang Intervention Investment Plan and Public Campaign to End Violence

While the Expert Action Committee will be moving forward with work of determining the formation of a new structure for streamlining City’s existing programs, three other expert groups will need to be appointed to simultaneously develop plans for the three key elements of the strategy:

- **Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute:** Beyond the issue of structure, the City’s new strategy must be guided by the best data and research, and have the capacity to conduct reliable evaluation from the beginning. This element cannot be an after thought but must occur from the very onset of a new strategy.

- **Gang Intervention Investment Plan:** Any strategy that the City adopts must consider how best to expand and deploy gang intervention resources to minimize the impact of existing gangs and gang members. A gang intervention investment plan will include a realistic assessment of resources needed, program design and standardization, and evaluation strategies.

- **Public Campaign to End Violence:** Broader community engagement is a key piece in many of the successful violence prevention strategies mentioned above. As the City attempts to build momentum toward improving its current efforts, it will also need to contemplate how to bring forth support and participation from the diverse communities of Los Angeles.

Allocation of Resources to Support the Work of the Expert Action Committee

The Expert Action Committee and expert teams will require funds to engage external experts and to commission any additional research that must be conducted.

Special Measures Creating the Exceptions and Waivers Needed for Entrepreneurial Operation

The new department will need exemptions from operational regulations that can hinder its ability to utilize all of the resources and tools necessary to tackle the enormous issue of community violence and gangs. Some of these exemptions will include but not be limited to the department’s ability to hire civil service exempt staff, to hire professional services, to manage communication, and to build partnerships with non-City entities.
Extension of Existing Service Contracts

The Expert Action Committee will need time to research and develop the formation plan for the new City entity. During this time, which the Advancement Project anticipates will be between a six to nine month period, the City must avoid creating gaps in delivery of services by extending existing contracts with service providers. The most relevant program to be affected by this process will be LA Bridges I and II, but there may be others also similarly impacted.

Evaluation Framework with Sunset Clause

The entrepreneurial department’s efforts should be designed with a rigorous evaluation framework that reviews the effectiveness of its efforts four and six years after launch, with a final evaluation of its effectiveness after ten years. If the new department has not demonstrated significant reductions in violence and gang activity in neighborhoods selected for comprehensive strategies, the City should end it.

3) Policy Actions:

Policy Actions to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment

Although the reorganization of existing programs under a single City department and the appointment of a Deputy Mayor create more focus and coordination, the new department cannot house every effort in the City relevant to reducing gang activity and violence and ensuring safety and vitality of children, youth, and their families. For example, almost every department in the City has internship and skill development programs that could serve as opportunities for youth and young adults that seek a stable future away from gang life. Other departments seek to achieve physical revitalization, offer educational programs, enhance arts and culture, or build community civic infrastructure.

While the core missions of these departments will remain their main focus, ways to compel their participation in and contributions to a citywide mission of reducing gang activity and violence must be developed. In this regard, the Advancement Project recommends a policy action which will require all City departments to work with the new entrepreneurial department charged with gang activity reduction to develop resources and other contributions to the citywide mission of neighborhood violence reduction. The action would require each department to respond to the formulation of an “Annual Children, Youth, and Family Budget” with specific performance goals that are connected with the citywide comprehensive strategy. Allocation for those programs would then be reassessed on an annual basis depending on the
performance of achieving the goals set out during the previous year. Part of the performance measured would include the level of cooperation and coordination with the new City department.\(^{93}\)

**Policy Action for Expedited Job Creation**

The second policy action recommended revolves around the economic impact of the City’s hiring and contracting capacity. The Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development as well as other City Council offices have already begun to examine the issue through pending motions and hearings. In the most recent Ad Hoc Committee meeting, Councilman Reyes noted that the City spends approximately $1.4 billion on supplies, equipment and services, resulting in a $3.5 billion impact on the region. Of this amount, 32 percent of $1.1 billion flows to areas outside of Los Angeles County. Similarly, of the roughly 34,000 jobs created directly by the City’s spending, over 10,700 were outside of Los Angeles County.\(^{94}\)

The relationship between jobs and economic opportunities and violence reduction is clear. The City must do more to bring living wage jobs to those parts of the community where violence is rampant as is unemployment and poverty. The Advancement Project recommends diligent follow-up with the Ad Hoc Committee’s request for the City Attorney to present a draft ordinance achieving a citywide policy for contracting and hiring that would prioritize local hiring, community benefits packages and set-aside quotas for high-risk youth and young adults.

On a related point, the Advancement Project recommends that the City review the possibility of eliminating or narrowing the scope of the criminal background question on applications for selected City positions allowing for youth and young adults with criminal records to qualify. A similar measure should also apply to City contracted services where appropriate. Not only does such a measure open up more opportunities for youth who are most in need of a job, but also makes program sense in specific circumstances. For example, as the gang intervention programs expand, the City will need to expand pool of trained gang intervention workers. As current practitioners in LA and Chicago have both remarked, gang intervention workers are most effective when they themselves have been in gangs and can gain street credibility based on that experience.

\(^{93}\) Los Angeles County has adopted a similar effort in the form of its “Performance Counts!”<http://lacounty.info/Performance%20Counts.htm>

A Measure Directing All Community Violence and Youth Development Related Legislation through the Entrepreneurial Department

If the new department is developed as the accountable, central repository of the City’s leadership and expertise in comprehensive gang prevention and intervention, it will be the appropriate City entity to handle the City’s response to emerging incidents and concerns about violence prevention and intervention measures and to evaluate the usefulness of proposed measures from other entities. Centralizing the response coordination under the new entity will eliminate the current reactive responses that tend to produce short sighted and unstrategic actions, and it will increase efficiency.

C. Service Delivery Model

Considering the City’s existing array of programs and service delivery infrastructure, the literature and examples of promising and best practices locally and nationally, the Advancement Project proposes the following framework to implement a comprehensive neighborhood by neighborhood strategy. Necessarily, with the broad range of diverse communities represented in Los Angeles, the framework must be agile and flexible to adapt to specific neighborhood assets and needs. Failure to work effectively with competent neighborhood leaders, faith based institutions, community based organizations, groups, and facilities must be avoided. While the service components described in this report are important, many communities already have existing providers who deliver these services. These providers should be incorporated into the new strategy.

1. Defining Service Areas by High School Attendance Boundaries

To best allocate resources by need, the Advancement Project recommends defining priority areas through analysis of violence and risk factors in a defined area. The area can be defined in many ways such as council districts, planning areas, and neighborhood boundaries are defined. The Advancement Project recommends the use of high school attendance boundaries to define an area for several reasons.

First, high school clusters represent a likely pattern of progression from elementary to middle to high school for a group of children in a geographically defined area. Therefore, not only can services be targeted for a broad age group within a certain area, but the critical transition stages from elementary to middle to high school can also be targeted.

Second, schools can and should become the center of a community. Schools, especially the newly constructed schools, offer valuable multi-use facilities and recreational space that are lacking in most Los Angeles communities. More importantly, creating a

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95 See Phase I Report, pp. 60-63.
96 In addition to joint-use agreements with the schools, in many communities, community based organizations and faith based institutions will play a key role to provide services and programs that best use the available school facilities.
stronger linkage between schools and the community and promoting parent involvement at the schools improves academic performance. New York relied on this strategy when they created the network of Beacons. This strategy may also promote school attachment among children and youth, and potentially reduce high drop-out rates of the hot zones. Therefore, a school centered community strategy makes not only logistical sense but also addresses one of the key risk factors for youth violence and gang membership.

Youth who have dropped out of school, are on probation, or in foster care span multiple high school clusters and will need to be served through the Community Violence Prevention Centers structure described below. Prevention components should be adequately available as a means of positively affecting the majority of those youth who are out school and out of work. A difficult issue under the current system of bussing children out of their neighborhoods to schools in other areas of the City must be addressed by determining the pool of students impacted by this practice and strategies for serving them. Finally, although the high school cluster concept can help to define most of the prevention services for an area, some services, most notably gang intervention services, will require more flexibility in determining service areas.

Key factors to consider in identifying priority areas are:

- **School performance** as indicated by API score
- **School size** with bigger schools receiving priority for over crowded conditions that hinders school attachment
- **Number of probation and foster youth** in the school as an indicator for identifying high risk youth who evidence several risk factors such as violence in the home, lack of parental supervision, and/or previous criminal activity.
- **Level of gang violence** in the attendance boundary
- **Level of violent crimes** in the attendance boundary
- **Proportion of population with less than a high school degree** in the attendance boundary which is highly correlated with gang activity
- **Proportion of population living below the federal level of poverty** in the attendance boundary which also is highly correlated with gang activity

A similar analysis was conducted by Mayor’s Office to identify the lowest performing high schools in the City. Additional factors such as the ones listed above can create a more robust analysis about the level of need and risk in a particularly cluster area. To adequately capture the complexity of such an analysis, a sophisticated research methodology will need to be employed in collaboration with experts in the field of

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97 <http://www.lacity.org/mayor/myreduction/mayormyreduction246140753_09292006.pdf>
violence prevention, statistics and demographics. The Advancement Project highly recommends that the City conduct this research.98

a. Risk Level and Services

There are at least four risk levels of communities and four goals for the City to achieve through the new department:

- Keep Safe Areas Safe
- Pull Back Areas with Emerging Violence to Safety
- Strategic Intervention in Areas at a Tipping Point to Achieve Safety
- Saturate Violent Hot Zones to Achieve Stabilization and on the Road to Revitalization

Each will require a different level of engagement but none can be ignored. It is clear that the most violent communities of Los Angeles require saturation intervention to achieve even the most minimum level of stabilization. This will require the full force of all service and mobilization elements described below as well as strategic suppression measures. Communities where violence has reached a tipping point or those where violence is emerging as an issue will require a mix of prevention and intervention strategies to divert the community away from the trajectory of becoming a full-fledged hot zone. Even the safe communities, however, require attention to keep them safe. As Boston’s example shows us, even when communities reach “safe” levels where there are no youth homicides for a couple years, they can easily slide back into a crisis level of violence when resources are pulled back, coordination is dismantled, and leadership transplanted elsewhere.

2. Community Engagement and Mobilization: Community Action Teams

As in the case of GRP Boyle Heights and New York’s Beacon Centers, community stakeholders must be involved in assessing local service needs and determining the priorities. Such a process establishes the foundation for community ownership of the strategy and for the development of a permanent neighborhood entity, “Community Action Team” (CAT), that will exercise local leadership on issues of safety and vitality of children, youth, and their families. The process must include youth voices in such a way that youths are viewed as actors in their own future.

Any effort to organize the community must be representative of those who live and work in the area. Despite the fact that immigrants comprise 47 percent of the City’s population, they are often marginalized from key policy arenas. Despite the fact that youth are often the targets of City’s programs, their voices are usually absent in

98 See Appendix 9, Demographic Analysis and Phase 1 Report for further detailed descriptions of areas with high concentrations of gang related crime and gang violent crime. A scientifically sound methodology identifying highest risk areas will be complex and consider multiple data variables and factors including the ones mentioned above and a ground level understanding of the specific dynamics and assets of a community.
discussions about program design and implementation. In most areas of Los Angeles, conscientious, culturally competent, and linguistically accessible efforts to reach and incorporate immigrant communities must be made. In all areas, youth groups must also have a seat at the table. Without doing the hard work of truly pulling together all impacted groups, communities cannot be united against violence.

The essential functions of a CAT would be grassroots level planning, implementation/coordination, and evaluation of violence prevention and intervention strategies, which incorporates and integrates the reality and challenges in the community. By involving a broad spectrum of stakeholders including school representatives, parents, residents, business owners, faith based institutions, and service providers, information sharing, joint planning, and shared resources would help streamline disparate and sometimes smaller and isolated efforts that exist within the neighborhood “system.”

There are local examples of such structures within the City such as the Boyle Heights Learning Collaborative, Watts Gang Task Force, some Neighborhood Councils, and the San Pedro Safety Collaborative that perform the type of function described here and could become the basis for a broader community engagement infrastructure. In other areas where there are no existing structures or where existing structures cannot transform to fulfill this role, considerable effort must be made to organize, develop leadership, and sustain such a group.

Finally, the CAT would be the primary mechanism for engaging and mobilizing community members to become active participants in violence prevention rather than passive recipients of services. Communities must engineer from within a cultural transformation to reject violence, to work collectively towards a solution, and to overcome differences that fuel conflict. The “not-in-my-backyard” mentality that blocks community based youth rehabilitation facilities from locating in certain neighborhoods; the black-brown strife dividing some of the most underserved areas; the fear that keeps neighbors from talking to other neighbors; service providers locked into the “this is the way it’s always been done” mentality; the fear of gangs that prevents witnesses from cooperating with law enforcement---these symptoms of a disintegrating and distraught community must be addressed and resolved to wage effective public campaign against violence.

In the end, no amount of government services alone can achieve or sustain community safety and vitality. Only when communities take ownership over the issue of violence prevention in their own neighborhoods can violence reduction efforts succeed.

3. Centralized Coordination of Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Activities: Community Violence Prevention Centers

A critical piece to promoting community engagement and City coordination of services is a centralized locus for the community. Advancement Project recommends the establishment of “Community Violence Prevention Centers” (CVPC) in each of the high school cluster service areas. The centers would be staffed with both City employees as
well as service providers contracted for particular services such as case management or mental health services. There will be three main ways in which the centers respond to individual and group needs:

- **Area Coordinators and Cluster Coordinators** will be responsible for monitoring service access and coordination for school based services. They will maintain a database of students enrolled in school based programs and handle all school based referrals for services.

- **Crisis Intervention Teams** will respond to all calls requiring a 24 hour response time including maintaining a case load of high risk youth and families requiring wrap-around services.

- **Gang Intervention Teams** will work closely with the crisis intervention team in responding to high risk cases with gang involvement but will also handle referrals related specifically to gangs and gang members. Gang Intervention Teams will also be working directly with gangs on building peace. This work is outlined below.

Each CVPC will convene a weekly “**Interagency Intervention Team**” (IIT) consisting of CVPC staff as well as representatives from schools, County agencies, law enforcement, and juvenile justice agencies. These meetings will focus on case conferencing, service integration and coordination, and information sharing. In many areas of the City, there are tables where multiple entities engage each other around general policy issues as well as specific individual case conferences. Some examples of these may be the Service Planning Area Councils across the County, Child Abuse Councils, some Neighborhood Councils and Family Preservation Community Advisory Councils. Connecting with these existing venues is highly recommended where the function of the IIT as a problem solving entity addressing local service barriers and specific needs of individual children, youth and their families can effectively be incorporated. On the issue of information sharing, we recognize that there are multiple barriers to information sharing between the entities participating in the Interagency Intervention Team. In this regard, we note the important work of the Education Coordinating Council that is in progress to remove some of these barriers and highly recommend the City’s active participation in this effort.

CVCP will have dedicated staff who will work with the Community Action Teams. They will conduct on-going community engagement, mobilization and organizing, including youth organizing with other community based groups and organizations.

**Page 77: Community Violence Prevention Center Organizational Chart**

**Page 78: Community Violence Prevention Center Service Delivery Model**
Department of Neighborhood Safety:
Community Violence Prevention Center Organizational Chart

Community Violence Prevention Center Manager

Service Coordinator

Interagency Intervention Team

Gang Intervention

Crisis Intervention

Area Coordinator

Community Mobilization Coordinator

Area Coordinator

Cluster Coordinator

Cluster Coordinator

Cluster Coordinator

MOU Relationships

Schools

Probation

DMH

District Attorney

DCFS

Juvenile Courts

DHS/DPH

*Note, this chart does not include all administrative, clerical and fiscal staff
COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION: SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL

Community Violence Prevention Center

- **PRIMARY**
  - Case Management
  - Family Support Services
  - Information & Referral
  - School Based Prevention
  - Parks

- **SECONDARY**
  - Case Management
  - Family Support Services

- **TERTIARY**
  - Case Management
  - Family Support Services
  - Functional Family Therapy

- **GANG INTERVENTION**
  - Case Management
  - Hardcore Gang Intervention
  - Peace Building (Alternation)
  - Exit Ramps
  - Re-entry

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CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAM

COMMUNITY ADVISORY TEAM

MOU RELATIONSHIPS

- SCHOOLS
- JUVENILE COURTS
- PROBATION
- DHS/DPH
- DMH
- DCFS
- DISTRICT ATTORNEY

RESEARCH & EVALUATION ENTITY

Law Enforcement Coordination
a. Service Elements

In each community, there are three categories of services to provide in a comprehensive violence prevention strategy: Prevention, Gang Intervention, and General Intervention Services. In addition, there are employment programs that span these categories and law enforcement services that remain outside of CVPC but require coordination. The following is a list of the services color coded for category of services.

Page 80: Comprehensive Services
### COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES

#### SCHOOL BASED SERVICES
- After-school
- College-prep
- Parent involvement in school
- Needs assessment (learning disabilities, assets)
- Remedial education
- Safe passage
- Transitions Institute
- Violence prevention curriculum

#### COMMUNITY HEALTH
- Teen pregnancy prevention
- Education on AIDS/HIV, STDs
- Gun removal program

#### YOUTH ADVOCATES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recreation &amp; Diversion</th>
<th>Community Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
- Parks & sports leagues
- Drop-in centers
- Youth leadership development
- Mentoring
- Annual calendar of community service projects
- Mandated hours supervision
- Graffiti removal/ environmental projects
- Other misc. community service projects

#### CASE MANAGEMENT
- Need assessment of individual and family
- Coordination of services
- Information, referral and follow-up
- Family action plan and basic support services
- Differentiated protocol and expertise by referral source/risk of case
- Intensive transition services for youth

#### CHILD WELFARE
- Child abuse prevention, intervention and treatment
- Foster youth services
- Independent living program (emancipated youth)

#### MENTAL HEALTH
- Family counseling
- Individual counseling
- Parenting education
- MST/FFT for juvenile offenders

#### GANG INTERVENTION
- Peace Building
- Targeted case management for exit ramp
- Re-entry transition planning and case management
- Life skills development
- Graffiti removal

#### STRATEGIC SUPPRESSION
- Coordination with case management and gang intervention team
- Coordination with school police

#### LEGAL SERVICES
Public education on rights around arrest and children’s rights, including:
- Expungement of records
- Gang injunction related legal problems resolution
- Juvenile court liaison

#### COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION & ACTION TEAM
- Network and coalition building among community based organizations, faith based institutions and other civic groups to enhance "social efficacy" to ensure safety and vitality of community
- Safe passage
- Youth council

#### SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT

#### EMPLOYMENT
- Training and workforce readiness and entrepreneurship programs
- Coordination with schools for vocational training and higher education
- Placement for paid internships, apprentice programs, and jobs

#### WOMEN & GIRLS’ SERVICES
- Gender based violence prevention
- Domestic violence prevention
- Sexual assault prevention programs
- Shelters
Each type of service, like school based services, has a list of suggested activities to be included in that type of service. Not all of the types of services necessarily need to be provided directly by the City. For example, Child Welfare and Mental Health services are largely County driven services. Nor will every area require full investment into every service type. For example, in “safe” neighborhoods where there are relatively low numbers of high risk youth and families, the City may choose not to have crisis intervention teams or gang interventions teams. It is important, to note however, that each area would have the basic infrastructure in place to deliver a neighborhood based violence prevention strategy. At its core, this means that the City has the capacity to ensure that the children and youth needing such services within the cluster defined areas are in fact receiving the services in a timely manner. In addition, the City also needs to build the capacity to respond quickly and appropriately to crisis cases, marshalling not only City resources but also school and County resources.

There is significant agreement among experts about evidence based prevention and intervention programs that have proven results. Some of these programs, such as Nurse Family Partnership, Multisystemic Therapy, and Functional Family Therapy are currently in operation on a pilot level in the County. Within the basic infrastructure for service delivery described below, the Advancement Project strongly recommends that the City consider implementing these existing and proven models that have already demonstrated successful outcomes.99

Page 82: Evidence Based Prevention and Intervention Programs

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## Evidence Based Prevention and Intervention Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type:</th>
<th>Best Practice:</th>
<th>Program Description:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Childhood Prevention</td>
<td>Nurse-Family Partnership</td>
<td>Consists of intensive and comprehensive home visitation by nurses during a woman's pregnancy and the first two years after birth of the woman's first child. The program also depends upon a variety of other health and human services in order to achieve its positive effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Childhood Prevention</td>
<td>Perry Pre-School Program</td>
<td>Provides high-quality early childhood education to disadvantaged children in order to improve their later school and life performances. The intervention combats the relationship between childhood poverty and school failure by promoting young children's intellectual, social and physical development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Childhood and At-Risk Prevention</td>
<td>The Incredible Years Series</td>
<td>A set of three comprehensive, multi-faceted, and developmentally-based curriculums for parents, teachers and children designed to promote emotional and social competence and to prevent, reduce, and treat behavior and emotion problems in young children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Risk Prevention</td>
<td>Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS)</td>
<td>A comprehensive program for promoting emotional and social competencies and reducing aggression and behavior problems in elementary school-aged children while simultaneously enhancing the educational process in the classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Functional Family Therapy (FFT)</td>
<td>An outcome-driven prevention and intervention program for youth who have demonstrated the entire range of maladaptive, acting out behaviors and related syndromes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)</td>
<td>A cost effective alternative to group or residential treatment, incarceration, and hospitalization for adolescents who have problems with chronic antisocial behavior, emotional disturbance, and delinquency. Community families are recruited, trained, and closely supervised to provide MTFC-placed adolescents with treatment and intensive supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Multisystemic Therapy (MST)</td>
<td>An intensive family and community-based treatment that addresses the multiple determinants of serious antisocial behavior in juvenile offenders. This approach views individuals as being nested within a complex network of interconnected systems that encompass individual, family, and extrafamilial factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Juvenile Offender Interagency Coordination Programs</td>
<td>Programs for juvenile offenders where services in the community are coordinated among several agencies. Sometimes called “wraparound services,” this approach is intended to allow more individualized services, as well as more efficient resource allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Adolescent Diversion Project</td>
<td>Youth are diverted from juvenile court to prevent being labeled “delinquent.” Program mentors work with youth in their environment to provide community resources and initiate behavioral change. Mentors are trained in a behavioral model and to become advocates for community resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To meet the needs of the diverse communities of Los Angeles, the City must ensure that its services are culturally competent and linguistically accessible. In addition to staffing for bilingual and bicultural capacity, service providers contracting with the City should demonstrate their capacity to serve the diverse groups residing in their service area. Moreover, the City can tap into existing network of service delivery targeting specific ethnic and/or linguistic groups. A good example of such a network is the recently created Countywide Family Preservation service infrastructure that serves Asian Pacific Islander and American Indian communities.

It is important to distinguish among different kinds of prevention, intervention and youth development programs. A survey of expert research on gangs confirms that only programs specifically designed to address the combination of risk factors and group processes that are uniquely associated with street gang membership should be considered “gang prevention” or “gang intervention” programs. Accordingly, only programs specially developed to prevent at-risk young children and youth from joining a street gang should be designated as “gang prevention” programs, and only programs expertly designed to interrupt ongoing gang activity, reduce violent gang activity, help young people exit a street gang, or otherwise try to reduce hard core gang behavior should be called “gang intervention” programs. All other programs that are not based on the specialized research for reversing street gang involvement, but that address general youth development or the needs of troubled youth at risk of delinquent behavior, or that indirectly divert non-gang involved youth from negative lifestyles by offering alternative activities, should be designated or viewed as general prevention programs.

In this report, the Advancement Project uses the broader term “prevention” to capture all efforts geared toward keeping children safe from violence and all destructive lifestyles. But the report refers to the specific terms “gang prevention” and “gang intervention” for efforts needed to impact the special attributes of gang conduct and gang violence. In this sense, in selecting the particular programs for implementation, the City must consider not only the best practices mentioned above, but also the distinctions among general youth development, delinquency focused programs, gang focused programs, and the respective differences between gang violence and other violence problems like spousal abuse, child abuse, bullying, etc. In the areas where gang violence dominates the neighborhood dynamics, it is imperative that prevention efforts for all age groups, even the youngest population, be focused to prevent gang activity.

D. Services and Programs

1. Prevention

As noted in the Phase I Report, every dollar invested in prevention saves seven dollars in costs related to crime, yet the City invests far less in prevention than it does in

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100 Klein and Maxson.
suppression.\textsuperscript{101} As a core element in the citywide strategy, the Advancement Project recommends the creation of a \textit{seamless prevention network} in the highest risk communities first and eventually citywide. Prevention services largely target those children, youth and families who would benefit from expanded enrichment, after-school, recreational, and educational opportunities in the community but do not necessarily require on-going case management or specific support. The goal of all prevention services is to keep children and youth safe, help them to thrive at schools and at home, and keep them away from violence and high risk activities.

\textbf{a. School-Park Based Prevention Network}

As the examples of Summer of Success and Beacon Centers show, the City needs to achieve a true, seamless prevention network by utilizing community based organizations, faith based institutions, schools, and parks as strategic assets. This means that in the highest risk areas, every elementary and middle school must offer after school programming to cover the hours of 3 pm to 7 pm. The high school in the area would become a Beacon Center by operating from the hours of 3 pm to 10 pm with full community access to the facility. These services are to be City administered in collaboration with schools and community based organizations. Finally, the Department of Recreation and Parks would ensure that parks located in the area would function at full capacity with staffing until 12 am on weekdays and 2 am on the weekends, intersession, and summer.

\textbf{Page 85: Community Programmatic Coverage}

\textsuperscript{101} Karoly, Lynn A., et al.
## Elementary School (K-5) / Community Based Organization
8:00 AM – 3:00 PM
- Tutoring
- Enrichment
- Parenting classes
- Snack
- Transportation

## Middle School / Community Based Organization
AFTER SCHOOL
3:00 – 7:00 PM
- Tutoring
- Enrichment
- Parenting classes
- Community organizing
- Library
- Computers
- Cafeteria
- Transportation

## Beacon Center
3:00 – 10:00 PM
(Full Day on Saturday and during Summer)
- Tutoring
- Enrichment
- Career
- Community Organizing
- Library
- Computers
- Cafeteria
- Transportation

## CVP Center Hours: 8:00 AM – 8:00 PM
- Drop-in center
- Weekly zone team meeting; refer cases; monitor & follow-up
- Plan/coordinate community services
- Crisis Intervention Team

## Programs & Facilities:
**DEPARTMENT OF RECREATION & PARKS**
**Programs & Facilities:**
**M-Th**: 4:00 PM – Midnight
**Fri – Sun**: 4:00 PM – 2:00 AM
After school programs will have tutoring, enrichment, snack and parenting education components. The Beacon Center would expand on this basic level of services to include career counseling, employment services, and library and computer access. The prevention network is designed to work in coordination so that children transitioning from elementary to middle to high school are tracked by program staff and can receive appropriate support. In addition, prevention program staff would be trained to assess the risk levels of participants so that timely referrals can be made to the CVPC for more intensive case management and intervention services.

This prevention network calls for the Department of Recreation and Parks to operate its CLASS Parks model at a much higher capacity than it currently does. The additional hours of operation will mean not only a significant investment into personnel costs, but also a restructuring of existing programs to augment use by children, youth, and families in the area. At a minimum, there needs to be a mix of organized sport and support activities available during all hours of operation with the goal that no youth wanting to access services will be turned away.

The prevention network will only have impact if maximum utilization by the community occurs. To ensure community access and utilization, the City will initially have to conduct a public education campaign as well as continuous community outreach. As barriers to access are identified, concerted efforts must be made to eliminate them. One anticipated barrier is transportation due to the geographic spread of the City. Both the Department of Transportation and MTA need to actively assist to eliminate this barrier.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that children and youth do not go to school when they cannot be assured safety on the way to and from school. Programs like Safe Passages are critical to a school-centric prevention network that targets children and youth in the school. While maximizing community volunteers, Safe Passages must not be an after thought, but rather a program element with its own funding and staffing. A well functioning Safe Passages program would work in collaboration with other prevention aspects as well as with Community Action Team, gang intervention workers, MTA and LAPD.

2. Gang Intervention

The goal of the prevention network is to close “entry ramps” into gangs for children and youth. It makes common and economic sense for the City to invest heavily in prevention to stop gangs from proliferating and expanding. Although research points to the generalized fact that most gang members exit a gang in a year’s time, the City must deal with the fact that at any given point in time, there are more than 720 active gangs in the City with a tiny minority of gang members responsible for the majority of violence. The City needs to design a research based intervention model as a part of an effective comprehensive strategy to stem the violence resulting from gangs.
Gang intervention has been loosely defined as any activity designed to help an active gang member become a functional member of the larger society. This definition also incorporates efforts to keep gang members from degrading their communities through violent acts. Therefore gang intervention includes efforts directed at both the individual and the group. Gang intervention workers strive to replace anti-social values and behavior with those that are pro-social. This process is known as alternation. While gang intervention workers mentor and guide gang members and gangs through this process of alternation, helping them to take steps toward redirecting their lives toward positive life outcomes, they also work on alternating the neighborhoods where gang members live and operate. By building gang peace and youth development infrastructure through youth and adult organizing efforts, gang intervention contributes to the transformation of the socio-economic conditions that give rise to the formation and continued existence of gangs.

Los Angeles has been experimenting with gang intervention programs for at least the past 20 years. Much progress has been made during this time. For example, what was a hostile relationship between LAPD and gang intervention workers has evolved into a recognition among top leaders of LAPD that gang intervention workers are needed to quell emerging violence and reduce retaliation actions. This strategy is being effectively employed in multiple jurisdictions including Chicago and Boston. The gang intervention field is complicated and still developing with many different perspectives, particularly on the operational side of the work. Despite these differences, there is consensus on the core elements of a successful intervention targeted at gang violence.

a. **Emergency rapid response** to situations that can devolve into gang warfare is necessary because in highly tense situations where violence is imminent or ongoing, there is no possibility of developing strategies for individual gang members to eventually exit the gang. Typically this requires “putting out fires,” to limit retaliation to an act or to mediate an on-going feud. Intervention workers use shuttle diplomacy, going between various neighborhoods to resolve disagreements so that tensions are reduced. Often, the best that can be done is to create agreements on how two groups can effectively avoid each other. In some cases, however, intervention workers are able to create ‘understandings’ between groups that effectively help both sides understand that the other is the same in all aspects except in the turf they claim.

An advanced form of the group process is the peace process that has been used effectively in Los Angeles for over a decade. This approach relies on the formation of peace agreements or other formal or semi-formal relations between a number of gangs. The early 1990s saw several such opportunities, including the Watts Peace

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102 Alternation, or replacing existent realities and worldviews with alternative structures and perceptions, is derived from a branch of sociology known as Sociology of Knowledge or Phenomenology which explains how reality and/or knowledge is created. In gang intervention, 6 stages of alternation are recognized starting at the institutional level and moving to the individual level. These are: license to operate, preliminary reality challenging; preliminary alternation and mediation; mid-stage alternation; full group alternation and full individual alternation. For more detailed explanation, see Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

103 Additional recommendations and more detail are available in Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.
Treaty, Harbor Area Truce and Valley Unity Peace Treaty. Significant components of the latter two remain in effect today and are maintaining that same methodology.

b. **Effective exit strategies** for individual gang members who are ready and willing to seek another path need to offer sufficient resources for the former gang member to successfully and safely leave the gang. Individual reclamation includes getting a youth back into school or an alternative educational institution, helping with pending court cases, providing job readiness skills and job placement, counseling, therapy, family support and a myriad of other services. In many cases, intervention workers are also mentors to the adolescents with whom they work with regularly. These efforts can be directed to any ethnic group although specific approaches may vary. These varying approaches must be adaptable to the special issues that girls in gangs face.

c. **Training and professional development of gang intervention workers** needs to expand. It is widely recognized that only ex-gang members who have exited the gang life successfully have the “license to operate” and secure the trust and support of gang leaders and therefore, the members. Intervention workers act as mentors guiding the gang members through a process of change, or alternation and can be successful in doing so because they offer insights into the thinking and actions of gang members from their own experience. For these intervention workers to be successful, on-going training that builds on their basic skills and enhances their professional development to collaborate with other service providers, schools, City and County entities is necessary.

LA Bridges II, the City’s only gang intervention program, is woefully underfunded. As a result, the program reaches perhaps two to three percent of the number of gang members and 25 percent of gangs in the group processes described above. With the number and size of gangs in Los Angeles, the City cannot expect to invest enough resources to reach the kind of capacity available in other cities. For example, in Boston, there are 40 gang intervention workers for 1,400 gang members, a ratio of 1 to 35. For a similar ratio to be achieved in Los Angeles, there would have to be over 1,100 gang intervention workers. Nevertheless, the Advancement Project recommends the following to enhance the capacity of Los Angeles gang intervention efforts:

- Funding for gang intervention program should be increased to reach at least 75 percent of the gangs.
- The City should focus gang intervention resources specifically on hard core intervention. Each contracted program should follow the peace-building model but also incorporate best practices from other models including CeaseFire Chicago.
- Each funded intervention agency should be required to submit an annual workplan that identifies the gangs that they will be working with in the coming year.
• Gang intervention programs should have priority in directing the actions of graffiti removal programs. Also, the City should require that graffiti removal services be on-call to the LAPD and gang intervention programs seven days a week.

• All staff of City contracted hard-core gang intervention programs need to adhere to minimum levels of qualification and training requirements.

• The City should form a “Gang Intervention Advisory Board” who can work with the gang intervention programs in establishing annual outcome targets. This board should include a representative from each intervention program, along with a LAPD representative and at least one individual from the academic sector competent both in the realm of the Public Health model, youth violence, and outcome measures.

3. General Intervention Services

Intervention services, or secondary prevention services, are generally geared toward children and youth identified with active risk factors. Many services in this arena, including mental health services, child welfare services, substance abuse treatment services, and mandated youth community service hours by the juvenile courts are services currently funded through County agencies. The key function that City programs will need to perform is coordinating these services through the case management of identified at-risk children, youth and their families and a targeted crisis intervention team.

Referrals would result from the prevention network, schools, families, and County agencies. In order to target limited resources to have the greatest impact, individual family case management services would be reserved for high risk children, youth and their families. Case management is used to define an overall picture of a youth’s preparation to function in the larger society. Individual interests, risk factors, and environmental conditions are used to create an individual profile. Personal achievement is used to set a plan for establishing and achieving one’s life goals. The goal of case management would be stabilization through service coordination, including testing for learning difficulties, life skill training, job preparedness, counseling, substance abuse treatment/counseling, and educational attainment. Case managers will work with the client to map out the best ways to achieve the designated goals, and then diligently monitor progress toward that end.

Case management must ensure at a minimum that the following services are provided where appropriate:

a. Health and Mental Health Services: These services are particularly important for high risk youth who benefit from evidence based family and individual counseling methodologies such as Functional Family Therapy and Multi-Systemic Therapy, both models in use through a pilot project between the Los Angeles County Probation Department and the Department of Mental Health. In partnership with the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and the Department of Mental Health, the center should be fully staffed with preventive health services, including screening
for mental and physical health by staff with the knowledge and expertise to refer those children and families to appropriate mental and physical health services, as needed. Evidence suggests that those children exposed to violence at a very early age actually have changes in their brain structure as a result of such exposure, including exhibiting symptoms of PTSD. In order to interrupt the next cycle of gang joining and violent behavior, early intervention with mental health treatment is critical.

b. **Child Welfare Services:** Violence in the home threatens not only the safety of the children in the home but also precipitates violent behavior from the child. Although the Office of Family Violence Prevention with the new department will oversee direct City programming around domestic violence and sexual assault, it is imperative that there is a timely connection to child abuse prevention and intervention treatment services in cases of violence in the home. In addition, foster youth services, and independent living programs for emancipated youth should be coordinated with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.

c. **Substance Abuse Treatment:** It is estimated that the majority of high risk youth are addicted to illegal substances. Effective intervention must involve substance abuse treatment and education to rehabilitate addicted and habitually using youth.

d. **Life Skills Training:** Many youths never receive a functional understanding of what it takes to live day to day, let alone thrive. Life skill curricula typically include the most common sense, day-to-day behaviors that these youth nonetheless have not learned. Communications, responsibility, money management, and other concepts are laid out, usually in very straightforward language. Generally, life skill curricula provide the tools for one to simply survive in the larger world outside of the neighborhood.

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104 Life skills training is also an important component to Gang Intervention case management. Please refer to Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

105 See Appendix 8, Safe and Healthy Families.
g. Basic Supportive Services: High-risk youth, particularly those being released from probation facilities, often need basic necessities such as food, clothing and transportation to even begin to think about being linked to educational institutions or jobs. It is imperative that case management include the capacity to offer this type of support to solidify the trust relationship with the youth and thereby strengthening their engagement over the long run.

h. Transition Planning and Follow-Up for Probation Youth: Research shows that premature involvement with the juvenile justice system and lack of appropriate support thereafter greatly increases the recidivism rate among high risk youth. By providing intensive transition support and planning for probation youth that focuses on building on the youth’s assets and providing educational and vocational opportunities greatly enhances the chance that the youth will be resilient to risk factors once they return to the community.

4. Employment Services

As this report has noted, jobs are a key element to violence prevention and gang intervention. For many gang members, particularly those 17 years and older, getting a job can be transformative. Not only does it provide an opportunity for stability, a job also offers an alternative to the violence associated with the illegal activities of the underground economy. As Father Greg Boyle from Homeboy Industries is renowned for stating, “Nothing stops a bullet like a job.” An addendum to this truth comes from many youth agree that, “Nothing stops a bullet like a meaningful job.” Employment services are effective, like YO! Watts Students for Higher Education Program, when training and educational opportunities are melded with entry into vocations and careers that hold the potential for a financially stable future.

In this sense, the Mayor’s efforts to bring more summer jobs for youth in 2006 with the goal of reaching 10,000 youth summer jobs by 2010, the potential pooling of federal resources between City, County and LAUSD as well as Councilman Reyes’ focus on local hiring and contracting for City expenditures are all headed in the right direction. Additional efforts toward creating permanent full-time employment for out of school and out of work youth will be necessary. Nevertheless, the City’s investment into youth employment program is dependent on declining federal dollars. In contrast, the City of New York has maintained the level of funding for youth programs over the years by committing city dollars to meet the gap. A similar effort is necessary for employment programs to be a significant component in a violence prevention strategy. In addition, opportunities existing throughout City departments, including proprietary departments must be coordinated and focused to meet the needs of the highest risk youth, including gang involved youth.

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106 New York City Independent Budget Office, “Since 2000, Funding Changes Cause Annual Uncertainty for Summer Jobs Program,” June 2006. The City of New York has increased funding for the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) in the last five years to cover the budget shortfall created by diminishing federal support for the program. In 2005, the City spent $26.4 million on SYEP, more than double what they on it spent in 2001.
5. Law Enforcement

Law enforcement efforts must be coordinated with the prevention and intervention network being proposed in this report. As Chief Bratton has noted, “We cannot arrest ourselves out of this problem.” Nor can police officers become social workers who deal directly with youth to solve the conditions precipitating the delinquent behavior. By developing clear and consistent referral guidelines between suppression efforts and prevention/intervention network activities, as is being attempted between GRP Boyle Heights and CLEAR, law enforcement can assist in putting youth on the right track. But law enforcement’s primary contribution to an effective comprehensive strategy will be smart targeted suppression that does not increase gang cohesion and activity and to develop fluid and supportive coordination with neighborhood prevention and intervention campaigns. In this sense, designated representatives from LAPD and City Attorney’s Office consistently participating in neighborhood based Community Violence Prevention Centers’ Interagency Intervention Teams will be critical. For such a referral and collaboration system to work well it is critical that police officers are rewarded for employing a problem solving approach that seeks to avoid youth arrests whenever possible.

Second, strategic deployment of law enforcement resources, particularly in the violence hot zones of the City is necessary and plays an important part in an overall strategy. For example, in Boston as well as in Chicago, coordination between intervention workers and police officers was key in not only reinforcing the message that violence will not be tolerated but also in deploying suppression efforts to specifically target those who were the source of violence. As better violence and gang activity reduction strategies start to produce results, prosecutors and police need to become more flexible in the enforcement of gang injunctions. The overbroad enforcement of the injunctions creates animosity between community and police and hinders the process of building trust and credibility needed for community-police collaboration. Part of Boston’s success was due to its focused effort to remove guns from the equation of youth violence. Los Angeles has not thus far focused on curbing access to guns but it must do so as part of a citywide violence prevention strategy. Finally, law enforcement needs to learn more about the violence as a public health problem model and consider how its current approach to gang crime needs to change to enhance broader gang activity and violence reduction plans.

Fortunately, LAPD is in the process of moving toward community based, problem solving policing and is seeking ways to work with intervention workers and community safety projects like the Los Angeles Urban League’s Crenshaw Initiative. It will take a substantial period of time before communities see these changes in their streets, but top LAPD leaders have signaled a willingness to work with gang intervention workers and to cooperate with neighborhood based strategies. Los Angeles County’s Sheriff Lee Baca has issued similar assurances.
6. Data, Research, and Evaluation\textsuperscript{107}

Lack of consistent and reliable data has been cited multiple times in this report as a key barrier to understanding the scale of the problem, to adopting appropriate programs designed to specifically address the needs of youth, to measuring performance, to assessing the impact of programs, and to build accountability throughout the City’s efforts. Elsewhere in this report, the Advancement Project has noted that the new department will house a Strategic Research and Initiatives section, integrating its work to the actual delivery of services on the ground. This section should also be supported by an external Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute that focuses on regional issues of violence and youth development. Because of the pivotal role that data, research and evaluation has, more detail is provided here on data gathering, maintenance and research on gang crime geographic patterns.

To conduct neighborhood level analysis of gang activity, violence, and the impact of potential interventions, it is necessary to assemble six groups of data:

- Socio-demographics (e.g. population, demographic profile, educational attainment, poverty, labor force participation)
- Economic Activities (e.g. number of worksites, employee population)
- Community Infrastructure/Social Capital (e.g. community based organizations, schools, parks, libraries, hospitals, transit services)
- Gang and Overall Crime Activities (e.g. all crime, all gang crimes, all violent gang crimes, domestic violence crimes, hate crimes)
- Policing/Police Beats
- Land Use and Development Patterns
- Intervention Efforts

This information should be aggregated to a census tract level for neighborhood level analysis. To achieve the greatest value from analysis of these data sets, it is important that LAPD and LASD data become standardized with good definitions of gang crime and gang members. Therefore, an important aspect of data gathering for the monitoring of gang crime activity patterns is to create a standardized definition of gang crimes and train police officers and analysts about how these definitions ought to be codified. Data standardization is especially important for analysis of violent crimes, since the movement of a specific type of crime in or out of the violent crime category could make a multi-year comparison impossible.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{107} See Appendix 9, Demographic Analysis and Appendix 10, Evaluation.
\textsuperscript{108} See Appendix 9, Demographic Analysis.
In addition to data collection, the City must institute rigorous evaluation strategies at two levels. The first level is individual program evaluation geared to provide quality control. Each program will develop measurable goals and objectives, consistent with the expected feasible outcomes of the program. Templates for individual program evaluation need to be developed by the Strategic Research and Initiatives section in collaboration with the external Research, Evaluation and Policy Institute. Training and technical assistance will be provided to all programs and collaboratives to assure that the program goals and objectives are reasonable. It is highly recommended that intake forms be standardized to the extent that they collect similar demographic data, attendance criteria, initial assessment, and on-going program monitoring components. Individual program level evaluation is likely to be process oriented to provide monitoring and accountability for programs, training, and policy development.

Spatial evaluation, the second level, will be conducted for the overall outcome of the citywide strategy. Similar to the geographic profiles conducted in Phase I of this project this will serve as baseline data. Data will be collected and reviewed annually. After five years of implementation, evaluation data analysis will be conducted using the regression and mapping models developed during the baseline phase. The study design is intervention versus control in which the targeted intervention sites will be compared to their baseline data and to the entire City to determine changes in violent crime and violent gang crime.

VII. Additional Regional Policy Actions

We reiterate that the City cannot solve the problem of community violence and gangs by itself. Business, schools, Los Angeles County and its agencies, philanthropy, civic and faith based institutions, individuals, families, and communities must all become agents of change. The report has already touched on some of these sectors, particularly community and the City. The following section focuses on the other necessary regional transformations.

A. Economic Development

The relationship between poverty, economic deprivation and violence is well documented. Importance of meaningful jobs and economic revitalization as both an intervention strategy for individuals, families and communities has been discussed. The Advancement Project returns to this issue to suggest that the Los Angeles region needs a comprehensive economic development plan that will rebuild and sustain the middle class through living wage jobs.

After the 1992 civil unrest, McKinsey & Company reported that the region would need an infusion of $6 billion and the creation of 75,000 to 94,000 jobs to revitalize the economy of Los Angeles’ neglected areas.\footnote{Los Angeles Times, “LA May Need $6 Billion to Rebuild, Analyst Says,” July 29, 1992.} Rebuild LA was the entity formed to draw private
investment and to implement such a strategy. After several years of trying, Rebuild LA folded after raising a fraction of the amount needed, about $500 million that resulted in minimal impact on the ground level. Much of the dollars raised ended up helping contractors and other business interests rather than providing living wage jobs for the residents of the impoverished areas. That was ten years ago. We have not had another attempt at addressing the core issue of poverty and economic deprivation in the region since then.

The City entities such as Community Reinvestment Agency and others can play a critical role in developing targeted strategies for highest need areas as well as job development strategies for targeted populations including high risk and gang involved youth. The City should also immediately convene regional stakeholders and policy groups such as the Economic Roundtable and the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) that have relevant expertise to develop a regional plan.

Opportunities exist in the Los Angeles region for creating living wage jobs. The region is rich in intellectual know-how, particularly around bio med, digital information technology, and environmental technology. At the same time, the region is the nation’s largest hub of international trade totaling $293.9 billion in 2005. With 198 college and university campuses, there are exceptional intellectual assets in the region. These assets and others make it possible to consider a strategic initiative to develop an industry based job development strategy.\textsuperscript{110}

In this regard, one particular industry of great potential is the “green industry.” Building on a diverse green technology base in the area, as well as on a history of developing new environmental markets and ambitious environmental policy goals, Los Angeles can help to build an industrial base for green technology thereby creating jobs. The most encouraging aspect about the green industry is that many of the jobs have low skill requirements but pay living wages and therefore represent good opportunities for workers to make economic progress after relatively short intervals of training.\textsuperscript{111}

B. Schools

Great changes have taken place in LAUSD in recent years. After decades of ignoring overcrowding, schools are being built on time and on budget. Student achievement has improved through rigorous curriculum standards and emphasis on testing. But the schools must do more. Despite laudable efforts under way inside LAUSD, there are still too many ways in which schools are not part of the solution. Collaboration with external resources including community based organizations is shunned rather than welcomed. Teachers lack training and resources to engage students. Violence prevention is an after thought. Community access to school facilities is discouraged.

\textsuperscript{110} Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, Los Angeles County Profile, May 2006.  
The school-centric prevention network proposed by the Advancement Project can only work if LAUSD chooses to become an active partner that breaks down existing barriers for partnership with the community and the City. It is no longer enough for schools to only think in terms of academic achievement of students or about the school day only. Schools must become partners with the City, County, communities and families to address the needs of the whole child. Changes within LAUSD should mirror developmental needs in providing instruction that promotes resiliency and positive health models, beginning in Kindergarten. Similar to the type of top to bottom organizational transformation described above for the LAPD and other City entities, LAUSD must come to the table with a new way of engaging in the regional strategy to end community violence and ensure safety and vitality of all children and youth.

Some of the critical roles that LAUSD should play in this regional strategy are:

- **Taking leadership on ensuring school safety.** In this regard, the efforts of the Working Group on Safe School Communities, particularly their attempts to develop data around student perception of safety to and from school as well as on school campuses. The Advancement Project looks forward to LAUSD developing policy actions to address the findings.

- **In-service training for all teachers, teachers aides, parents and caretakers** to assure that the developmental needs of children and youth are understood and incorporated into all programs and services.

- **Violence prevention curriculum implementation** is currently haphazard and reactive, but with some new initiatives, the Advancement Project looks forward to district wide and sustainable efforts to implement **best practices in school based violence prevention curriculum that is developmentally appropriate**.

- **Facility joint use agreements** with City, County and community entities to allow access onto school facilities during out of school time is a prerequisite to the implementation of the prevention network described in this report. A speedy and collaborative process to reach agreement must occur and will require leadership from the top.

- **Schools** offer a unique opportunity to conduct a **comprehensive assessment** of each and every child to open the door for early intervention and prevention to be effective. There is currently a unique opportunity for funding prevention and youth development. Funds from the Mental Health Services Act can be accessed to assure that mental and emotional health screening and treatment is implemented for very young children (pre-school age), those 10-14, and youth between 14 and 21. Many of the very young children living in high risk, disorganized areas are witnesses or/and victims of community and family violence. Currently, these children are not routinely screened at school entry for school readiness or for symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome disorder or other mental health problems. It is our recommendation that all children entering school for the first time be screened and again at the 3rd grade. Those found to need mental health services are referred to or
provided those services in their community. In addition, it is recommended that children be screened again upon entrance to middle and high school. Children suffering mental and emotional health deficits cannot learn and are not likely to be successful in school. Such an ongoing strategy would help to reduce the dropout rate in Los Angeles schools and positively increase educational attainment.

- Effective coordination between the City, County, communities and schools cannot occur without **timely and complete sharing of student information.** County and City entities systematically prohibited from collaborating with each other because of the way they interpret regulations that govern them. A primary example of this is the on-going debate about whether schools can share information with the other entities to improve educational outcomes for probation and foster youth. LAUSD and Los Angeles County Office of Education (LACOE) interpret Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the federal law guiding release of educational information on individual students to mean that no sharing of information can occur. In other jurisdictions, different interpretations have prevailed and information sharing does occur across entities.

C. Juvenile Justice in Crisis

Los Angeles’ juvenile justice system is in crisis. It is a broken system with a revolving door, where youth go back again and again, and after each detention end up—not rehabilitated— but worse off. In a 2001 investigation of the County’s three juvenile halls, the U.S. Department of Justice found that conditions in LA County juvenile facilities were so bad that minors, “suffered from harm or the risk of serious harm from the deficiencies in the facilities’ medical and mental health care, sanitation, use of chemical spray, and insufficient protection from harm.” This crisis required an immediate action plan by the County to overhaul the system in 2001, but five years later the County is still failing to address this crisis.112

Overcrowding of Probation facilities, inadequate supervision of probation youth, wholly deficient mental health and educational services in the camps and juvenile hall, high recidivism rates, high rates of youth on youth violence in the facilities, inappropriate use of force by staff, inadequate representation during adjudication, and juvenile cases routinely decided without complete educational and other records are all manifestations of an ill conceived and overloaded system.113

**Juvenile Incarceration Policy Needs to Be Re-examined:**

As the County and City address the crisis in juvenile detention and justice systems, they should seek to reverse a troubling trend in American juvenile justice that views and treats a majority of youth offenders, even very young ones, as adult criminals deserving adult

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112 In a recent attempt to hire a consultant to help reform the county's juvenile justice system the County failed and was not able to do so. Steve Lopez, Los Angeles Times, “Reform Bid Fades Away Amid Hems and Haws.”

113 United States Department of Justice Report, Second Semi-Annual Monitoring Report for the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, Los Angeles County and the Los Angeles County Office of Education, October 4, 2005. The California Youth Authority is equally problematic with recidivism rates as high at 91 percent at one point and currently at 75 percent.
penalties. This categorical abandonment of the traditional ethos of American juvenile justice, which viewed and treated child offenders as youth in need of rehabilitation, needs to be re-examined.\textsuperscript{114} Children are not adults and crimes by children are so influenced by group activity that principles of adult culpability and responsibility cannot reasonably apply to juvenile crime.\textsuperscript{115} These principles that distinguish adolescent behavior from adult behavior are routinely reflected in our traffic laws which account for the risks of youth development. This is not to suggest that serious juvenile crime should go without criminal penalty; it is to suggest that juvenile justice has lost sight of the importance of developmentally appropriate, youth-oriented and proportionate punishment that is designed to “preserve the future life chances of young offenders.”\textsuperscript{116} The system we have now in effect ends those life chances.

Today’s punitive juvenile justice trends are driven by the five to ten percent of violent juvenile offenders who exceed the parameters of traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice. “[B]etween 90 percent and 95 percent of all juveniles arrested for offenses of violence do not substantially diverge from the types of youths and crimes that can be processed and sanctioned by the modern American juvenile court.”\textsuperscript{117} In other words, the tiny percentage of youth offenders who present egregiously serious, violent and/or homicidal threat and who must be subject to a more rigorous system than the traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice framework, has triggered a punitive drive to prosecute and punish as adults vast numbers of juveniles who should receive rehabilitation, education, and development.

The alarm sounded over a new breed of violent youth for many decades now, which has supported the punitive juvenile justice mindset, also fails to take into account the central role of guns in youth violence. As one research reviewing youth homicide from 1976 to 1995 found, all of the increases in youth homicide rates were gun related homicides. Easy access to guns, rather than a fundamental change in the youth population, accounts for the lethality of youth violence today. In this sense, a system that punishes youth for violent behavior, does not rehabilitate them, and does not systematically curtail the availability of guns on the street can only fail to stem the tide of youth violence.\textsuperscript{118}

The punitive, non-rehabilitative, adult-oriented juvenile justice paradigm needs re-examination along with the adequacy of County facilities and programs for young offenders.

From the perspective of prevention and intervention, a critical opportunity for engagement should be offered when a youth enters the probation system. This is particularly true for gang prevention because a majority, 56 percent, of the youth in the Los Angeles County Probation Department facilities are gang affiliated.\textsuperscript{119} Nationally, many states and cities have rejected

\begin{footnotes}
\item[114] Zimring, p. 8.
\item[115] Ibid. p. 80
\item[116] Ibid. p. 86
\item[117] Ibid. p. 186
\item[118] The same research also noted that increase in youth arrests for aggravated assaults seem to result more from changes in police practices and reporting standards. Zimring, Franklin E., \textit{American Youth Violence}, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 31-47.
\item[119] Correspondence with Gina Byrnes, Administrative Services Bureau, Los Angeles County Probation Department. October 20, 2006.
\end{footnotes}
large prison like facilities and have moved toward smaller, community based rehabilitation centers for youth offenders with impressive decreases in recidivism rate. Experts note, for example, the relatively smaller gang problem that Boston experiences, compared to Los Angeles, is not only attributable to difference in size but also to the fact that Massachusetts was one of the first states to move towards a community based, small rehabilitation centers for youth offenders.

There are limited reforms under way. The former Chief Probation Officer, Paul Higa, presented a comprehensive reform plan in September of 2006 that provides a good beginning to transform the department. Some recent actions taken include:

- The Probation Department has implemented a research-based risk and needs assessment instrument and is now in the process of developing specific guidelines as to how it should be used in making placements.
- The County has contracted for additional training to increase the number of MST teams available to serve youth in the system.
- Over the next five years the California Institute for Mental Health will be coordinating a large-scale test of Treatment Foster Care to determine the best way to help counties implement that program.

While the City must wholeheartedly support these reforms, it must also connect with programs with the existing probation system to ensure that youth in the system are being assessed and referred appropriately. In every one of the cases in which a petition is filed, the Probation Department is supposed to have conducted a risk and needs assessment, recording the results in a system known as the Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency Checkup (LARRC). The City would link with this system and request that the Probation Department provide it with sufficient data to analyze the disposition pattern of all City initiated cases, down to the level of what kinds of services and supervision were provided, and including any subsequent arrests, controlling for the risk and needs assessment contained in the LARRC report. The data would also be the basis for collaboration at the neighborhood level between the proposed City’s Community Violence Prevention Centers and local probation officers for transition planning and re-entry services.

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120 Shelden, R.G., “Detention Diversion Advocacy: An Evaluation,” Juvenile Justice Bulletin, 1999. Young people in San Francisco’s Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, for example, have about half the recidivism rate of young people who remained in detention or in the juvenile justice system.


122 See Appendix 7, Public Safety.
D. Business and Philanthropy

Business and philanthropic sectors have played important roles in advancing major policy initiatives such as health, homelessness, and violence prevention. Similar leadership is needed as the City and the region moves toward a comprehensive strategy for violence prevention and community revitalization.

One clear arena where business and private sector entities can contribute is the development of and participation in regional economic development strategies with the ultimate goal of creating living wage jobs. Business and philanthropy also can play an important role in making funding available for specific one-time capacity building costs. Such costs may be related to establishing a research institute, management information system, evaluation, and staff training.

Focused investment may also play a role in a “place based” strategy where the private sector contributes to the revitalization of a particular neighborhood or area as a pilot demonstration. Such an attempt was successfully carried out in San Diego around the City Heights community. Price Charities, a philanthropic organization associated with Sol and Robert Price, founders of Price Club, and CityLink, a for-profit real estate development company, developed an approach to revitalization “focused on developing and enhancing public services, private enterprises, and physical facilities.” The approach followed in City Heights is now known as a holistic approach to redevelopment.

VIII. Sustainability

A. Cost Benefit Analysis

The question that needs to be answered at this point is: How much will this cost? And how will the City pay for it? Before these questions are considered, however, the City needs to consider what the current level of gang violence is costing the City.

Utilizing the data that was available from various City, County and State entities, the Vera Institute of Justice has calculated that gang violence in the City of Los Angeles is costing taxpayers and crime victims over $2 billion a year. Of this amount, more than $1 billion are attributable to direct government costs related to gang violence in the form of prosecution, incarceration, defense, courts and probation. The remaining $1 billion are victim related costs including direct monetary costs to victims such as loss of wages, property damage, and medical expenses as well as quality of life costs such as pain and suffering of the victim. Approximately 21 percent of these costs, or $247 million, are direct costs to the City. This amount does not include the other programming costs associated with prevention and intervention efforts of the City. Adding these costs, the total amount directly costing the

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City due to gang related crime is about $270 million a year. These are conservative estimates and do not account for crime and youth violence that are not captured in the official data. The full costs are higher.

To prevent further expenditure of taxpayer dollars into ineffective strategies, the City must at least utilize its existing dollars in a coordinated, more effective strategy. Throughout this project, the Advancement Project has repeatedly quoted research that states that investing one dollar in prevention results in seven dollars in savings of future crime costs. Other research has said that saving a high risk youth from a life of crime saves $1.7 to $2.3 million. These savings are not realized immediately but manifest over a period of time as outcomes from prevention and intervention programs take hold and can be measured.

It is difficult to estimate exactly how much the strategy outlined in this report would cost the City and eventually save the City without more accurate data on impact and service parameters of the programs. Nevertheless, a relevant analysis is available through research conducted with evidence based programs with validated outcome data that measures how many of the youth participating in a program are successful. Taking one evidence based program that promotes inter-agency collaboration toward better outcomes for high risk youth, this analysis suggests that by investing $1.7 million into program costs serving 8,500 youths, taxpayers may realize more than $17 million in benefits over time. Granted that these benefits would not be immediate, the analysis still shows the potential benefit from simply enhancing coordination among programs.

Looked at another way, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s office has estimated the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and incarceration cost of individual gang related homicide as $1.67 million dollars. There were a total of 249 gang related homicide in 2005 in the City. If only 25% of the gang related homicides could be prevented, the savings to taxpayers would be nearly $104 million dollars. If the cost of saving a high risk youth from a life of crime is $1.7 million, diverting 200 youth toward more gainful opportunities would result in savings of $340 million dollars. Such estimates do not account for the positive effect on tourism and locally based business resulting from improved perceptions of public safety. These are crude estimates that only serve to illustrate the potential fiscal magnitude of the benefits resulting from adopting a coherent and coordinated prevention and intervention strategy.

More reliable outcome data from programs to be implemented would allow for a precise benefits calculation in the future. In addition, accurate accounting procedures must be implemented to capture the full cost of the strategy adopted and resulting savings. The Advancement Project highly recommends that City contracts with expert consultants to continue a rigorous cost benefit analysis of the strategy that it adopts.

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124 See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis “Cost Benefit Analysis.”
125 Karoly, Lynn A., et al.
128 See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis “Vera Institute of Justice: Cost Benefit Analysis: Next Steps.”
129 See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis “Vera Institute of Justice: Cost Benefit Analysis: Next Steps.”
In addition, utilizing a rough measure of costs associated with the basic infrastructure required to implement the prevention/intervention network recommended by this report in one hot zone, we estimate the costs as follows:

Page 103: Estimated Annual Costs of Implementing Basic Prevention/Intervention Network in One High School Cluster
### Estimated Annual Costs of Implementing Basic Prevention/Intervention Network in One High School Cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Population Served</th>
<th>Rec and Parks(^a)</th>
<th>Beacon(^b) Center</th>
<th>CVPC(^c)</th>
<th>After School Program(^d) $2,120 per participant</th>
<th>OneSource(^e) $5,625 per participant</th>
<th>Gang Intervention(^f)</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual Arts High School (Enrollment 4,113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25% Coverage</td>
<td>5,581</td>
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<td>$450,000</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
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<td>$16,821,095</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>$450,000</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>$47,324,760</td>
<td>$4,623,750</td>
<td>$375,000</td>
<td>$55,773,510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Determining the population served:**
Using the Manual Arts High School cluster as defined by the LAUSD and school enrollment data from the California Department of Education, we project the estimated costs of providing services to 25 percent, 50 percent, and all enrolled school aged youths in the cluster. To determine how many participants would take part in OneSource (youth employment program), we used the Northeastern University’s “The Teen Disconnection in Los Angeles and its Neighborhoods” finding that one in five 16 to 24 year olds are out of school or out of work, to roughly estimate the number of enrolled students at Manual Arts High School that are in need of a job. The estimated costs are provided for informational purposes only.

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\(^a\) To calculate the costs of extending Department of Recreation and Parks’ hours of services and programming, we used budget information from Baldwin Village’s Summer of Success (SOS) in 2003 as a base figure. Using the 2003, SOS nine week cost of $120,000 and an additional $300,000 for overhead and inflation costs, we estimate that it would cost approximately $1 million to provide year round extended operational coverage.

\(^b\) The annual budget of a Beacon Center run by New York City’s Department of Youth and Community Development is $450,000, which covers programming and facility related costs. Although New York and Los Angeles vary in operational costs, we feel that $450,000 is a rough estimate of the minimum cost of operating a Beacon Center.

\(^c\) We used the Orange County Department of Probation’s annual budget of $2 million per Youth and Family Resource Center as the approximate annual cost of operating one Community Violence Prevention Center.

\(^d\) After school programming costs were calculated using the statewide budget standard of $10 a day to provide quality after school programming. We estimate that after school programming will be provided 212 days a year (180 school instruction days and 32 school year Saturdays).

\(^e\) The current Youth Opportunities System/One Source annual cost per participant with a measurable positive outcome, including employment and training, is $5,625.

\(^f\) Enhanced gang intervention services would cost approximately $375,000 per cluster in the Harbor and South LA area (12 City high school clusters) if the City’s current investment in gang intervention was tripled.

\(^g\) 25% coverage would entail providing One Source programming to 206 participants, 50 percent coverage would be 411 participants and 100 percent coverage would be 822 participants.
This chart indicates that the City would expend at least $50 million in each of the highest risk areas over several years to provide 100 percent coverage for all at-risk children and youth, to stabilize the situation and to work towards a revitalization strategy. The highest cost element is by far the provision of after school programs to cover at-risk children and youth and the figures vary drastically depending on the type of coverage sought. The implementation of Proposition 49 may subsidize these after school related costs. These are extremely rough figures and need further refinement by the City. However, two conclusions can be made from this analysis:

- The City needs a strategy to target its current resources to the areas where the need is greatest because these areas are not receiving nearly enough resources the solution requires.

- The City needs to develop a short and long term strategy to develop more dedicated resources towards violence prevention.

Some of the short term strategies include a focused and organized effort to tap all available funding sources including federal, state and private foundations. This would include not only tapping new funding streams such as federal youth development funds flowing from multiple sources but also better leveraging of existing streams. Despite the declining federal funds towards gang related initiatives, with Los Angeles being the primary urban center with the greatest gang problem, a proactive initiative by the City to begin discussions with federal entities to seek out federal support on the new comprehensive strategy would be highly recommended. With a single City entity accountable for the entire spectrum of prevention and intervention efforts, fund development efforts can also be coordinated and strategic.

Overall scarcity of federal funding means that the new City entity must also diligently pursue state resources. As the cost-benefit analysis shows, the state has a substantial interest in reducing gang violence, specifically in Los Angeles, given that 52 percent of the gang related crime costs, or nearly $600 million, are born by state agencies. Several cities including Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Minneapolis depend heavily on state resources for their gang and community violence prevention efforts in the form of dedicated anti-gang or anti-violence legislation.

It will also be important to work with existing local and state funding streams. Some of these include First 5, Mental Health Services Act, and California Department of Justice’s Gang Suppression Enforcement Teams. Becoming strategic partners to these on-going efforts and utilizing a network of providers who will receive support through these funding streams as a part of the prevention/intervention network will also be beneficial. On a related note, some jurisdictions have found that assisting smaller non-profit organization to access various funding sources as helpful to the overall strategy.

Finally, law enforcement agencies can access funds that are exclusively for law enforcement. Although the bulk of these dollars is primarily focused on suppression activities, creative funding strategies may be able to redirect at least some of this money. For example, the Southern Nevada Gang Task Force coordinates anti-gang programs through Department of Juvenile Justice and has been able to make sub-grants to over 160 community based
prevention and intervention organizations using federal grant money that is available to law enforcement.\textsuperscript{130}

Another recommended strategy is to build a coalition of national and local philanthropic organizations to fund strategic components of the comprehensive strategy. As mentioned above, the most likely areas would be one-time capacity building efforts such as building research capacity, data collection, information management system, evaluation, and staff training.

\textbf{B. Robust Sustained Funding Stream}

While the coordination of above strategies by a single entity will enhance the City’s ability to tap and leverage funding sources, the magnitude of the problem in the City and regionally requires that a new dedicated funding stream be developed. There are several examples of this approach.

\textbf{1. The Proposition 10 Approach}

In 1998, voters passed Proposition 10, creating a new funding stream dedicated for early childhood services by taxing tobacco products. This new stream is administered by First 5 California and filtered to each of the 58 California counties based on the live birth rate. Los Angeles receives roughly one-third of the total dollars or $138 million annually. In addition to funding various new early childhood services, the funding has been a catalyst for efforts to address the needs of children birth to age five systemically. For example, First 5 Los Angeles committed $600 million over five years to ensuring the availability of quality preschool for all four year olds in the County. In addition, the amount of new available resources has brought a variety of public and private stakeholders to the table with the clear intent to collaborate towards improving early childhood education and developmental services throughout the region.

\textbf{2. Oakland Measure Y}

On a smaller scale, new funding and new strategy for violence prevention was implemented in Oakland in the form of the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act, otherwise known as Measure Y. Measure Y instituted a commercial parking tax and a parcel tax in Oakland in order to raise a projected $20 million per year to fund public safety measures and violence prevention programming targeted at at-risk youth. Approximately $9.5 million of this funding goes to hiring and training police officers; $6.4 million goes to specific Measure Y programming including a violence prevention curriculum in elementary and middle schools, case management for at-risk middle schoolers, and mentoring for youth on probation; and the remainder of the funding goes to smaller grantees conducting outreach.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{130} See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis, “Vera Institute of Justice: Phase II Deliverable.”
\textsuperscript{131} See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis, “Vera Institute of Justice: Phase II Deliverable.”
3. **Los Angeles County Violence Prevention Initiative**

The Advancement Project recommends a similar measure in Los Angeles County to develop a new stream of funding dedicated to ensuring public safety through a comprehensive prevention, intervention, and suppression strategy. The initiative would result in a regional entity that would coordinate efforts between the City, County, LAUSD, LACOE and other stakeholder entities as well as broaden the community action teams to implement a sustainable strategy across the region.

**Page 107: Regional Violence Prevention Entity**
Chief Executive Officer and Staff

Board of Advisors

Board of Directors

City Departments and Staff

Data, Strategic Research and Evaluation

Chief Executive Officer and Staff

Appointing Authorities:
City Council President, City Attorney, Controller, LAPD Police Chief, District Attorney, County Board of Supervisors, Sheriff, School Board Superintendent, Committee of other LA County cities, Community-based gang prevention coalition

Types of Violence Prevention Entities:
- Regional Violence Prevention Entity
- Neighborhood Entity
In much of the same way as Proposition 10, the new initiative would bring stakeholders to the table who would collaboratively develop a coordinated regional strategy that is informed by reliable data, research and evaluation.

**Conclusion**

The City of Los Angeles needs to replace its small scale, uncoordinated, and siloed prevention and gang intervention programs with a comprehensive strategy that keeps safe neighborhoods safe, returns sliding neighborhoods to safety, prevents tipping point communities from tipping over into persistent violence, and in high crime neighborhoods reverses entrenched gang activity and violence and positions the community for development. The City needs creative leadership and centralized accountability that is free from bureaucratic constraints to solve this problem with external entities, schools and neighborhoods. But more than anything the City needs the public to engage this issue through public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns. Los Angeles will defeat its enduring epidemic of youth gang violence only when its leaders commit to this mission and the public decides that not another LA child should see gangs as their most viable rite of passage into adulthood. The time for studies is over. The time for effective action is here.
Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Political Mandate

Los Angeles City leaders must issue a strong and sustained political mandate to prioritize the mission of competently reducing gang activity and violence.

Recommendation 2: Comprehensive Strategy

The City should move from the current approach of small, uncoordinated, low impact programs to a strategy of comprehensive prevention, intervention, and community investment that is linked to strategic community policing suppression and designed to have neighborhood level impact. This comprehensive strategy requires:

- Jointly planned, highly coordinated, expertise driven, multi-jurisdictional, and interdisciplinary implementation.

- Expert design, extremely careful implementation, and a capacity for skillful coordination that the City currently does not have. The City must create a new framework that will permit innovative on the ground exploration and documentation of effective strategies.

- Public health and healing, child development, job development, and community development models to effectively address underlying conditions that spawn gangs and violence.

- Linkage to strategic suppression and community policing.

- Capacity to address the scope of the problem.

Comprehensive Strategy: Prevention

The comprehensive prevention strategy offers jointly planned and highly coordinated services that counter the conditions and risk factors that spawn violence and gangs, and alternatives to destructive lifestyles, while promoting healthy communities and families.

The comprehensive strategy should focus on both general prevention, intervention, and community investment as well as targeted gang focused prevention, jobs, and intervention programs that are not crime control oriented. It is important to distinguish between general and gang focused programming and it also is important that gang focused programs not reinforce gang identity and cohesion.
The comprehensive strategy should address precursors to violence that may originate in the home such as domestic violence, negative parenting, and acceptance of gang culture.

**Comprehensive Strategy: Intervention**

The comprehensive intervention strategy includes hard core gang intervention programs with fair evaluation and metrics systems, minimum qualifications for intervention workers, and differentiated exit strategies linked to robust job development for gang involved youth. Gang intervention leaders, like law enforcement, will need to cooperate in explorations of new approaches during the development of the comprehensive strategy.

**Comprehensive Strategy: Community Development and Investment**

The City must include a community development and investment plan in neighborhood violence and gang activity reduction strategy. Communities without jobs and basic infrastructure for economic, cultural, civic, and social development cannot sustain a long term violence and gang activity reduction strategy.

**Comprehensive Strategy: Community Policing and Strategic Suppression**

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), and other regional law enforcement agencies will be central partners in any comprehensive strategy. LAPD will need to accelerate its transition to problem solving community policing, develop the capacity to work with neighborhoods in executing a comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy, and cooperate in developing better data and crime fighting and gang intervention models.

**Action Items**

2.1 Create an expert planning process to develop the comprehensive strategy and its components described above and to assess how existing City programs and resources can be coordinated and integrated to achieve violence and gang activity reduction.

**Prevention:**

2.2 Create a seamless prevention network that is school centric with after school opportunities for elementary and middle school students, extended community access at high schools, and around-the-clock operation of park facilities.
2.3 Substantially increase funding and resources for after school programs, building on and investing in existing programs that are effective and developing with the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) additional resources.

2.4 Develop training for program staff and other City personnel to identify risk factors to facilitate prevention and early intervention.

2.5 Dedicate resources to ensure safe passages to and from school.

2.6 Focus gang prevention strategies that work on research identified risk factors for hard core gang activity, and specially developed prevention programs for young children and girls in gang saturated neighborhoods.

**Intervention:**

2.7 Create expert advisory and planning group to develop comprehensive strategies for intervention programs and a permanent Gang Intervention Advisory Board.

2.8 Increase investment for hard-core gang intervention programs to achieve 75% coverage of gangs in Los Angeles, equivalent to three times of the current investment.

2.9 Focus hard core gang intervention strategies on addressing gang group processes and the specific dynamics and culture of individual gangs.

2.10 Develop minimum levels of qualification and training requirements for gang intervention workers.

2.11 Develop tiered professional development and training for gang intervention workers with rigorous protocols for oversight.

2.12 Coordinate and integrate support services and programs to provide effective and safe exit strategies for gang members.

2.13 Coordinate and collaborate with law enforcement agencies.

2.14 Create a Chicago-LA collaboration that explores the experiences and expertise of gang intervention and violence interruption strategies used in both cities and that develops improved programs.

**Community Development and Investment:**

2.15 Create expert group to develop citywide short term and long term strategies to develop entry level and living wage jobs; industry based economic development plan for neglected areas and better use of Workforce Investment Act funds and similar resources.

2.16 Enact policy measures that require City hiring and contracting practices to prioritize hiring youth and contributing to violence reduction strategies.

2.17 Develop and allocate resources for a long term summer youth employment plan that matches the scale of jobs needed.

2.18 Examine and eliminate unnecessary barriers to City employment and education opportunities for ex-offenders and gang members, including unnecessary criminal background requirements.

2.19 Examine City development projects for opportunities to increase resources for community investment that aids violence and gang activity reduction strategies.
Recommendation 3: Scale and Scope of the Solution

City approaches to reducing gang activity and violence should stop focusing on small programs that address less than five percent of key populations and design a comprehensive strategy capable of confronting the size of the gang and violence problem.

Planning for implementation of a comprehensive strategy should be done in phases to eventually address the full scale of community violence with the goal of keeping safe areas safe, pull sliding communities with emerging violence back to safety, strategic intervention in tipping point areas to achieve safety, and saturating violent hot zones to achieve stabilization.

Action Items:

3.1 Establish a more accurate picture of the scale of the problem by developing and collecting standardized data variables and definitions of gangs, gang members, gang crime, spousal abuse, and child abuse.

3.2 Adopt a comprehensive, phased citywide strategy that is designed to address the scale of the problem.

3.3 Get a fuller understanding of the real scope of community violence and gangs by incorporating the impact of emerging trends such as the increased involvement of girls in violent behavior, evolving research on the impact of exposure to violence on child and youth development, and the apparent evolving trends in gang crime.

Recommendation 4: Entrepreneurial Department with Oversight

The City should create an innovative entrepreneurial Department of Neighborhood Safety to get accountability and results. Accountability for results requires centralized responsibility.

A new entrepreneurial governmental structure must be created because traditional bureaucracies do not have the agility, capacity, or freedom needed to carry out a comprehensive strategy. A comprehensive strategy requires expert design, extremely careful implementation, and a great capacity for innovation, exploration, rapid response, coordination, and cross-silo execution to have any chance of avoiding chaos and making a measurable impact.

The City needs an entity with sufficient power and institutional clout to streamline bureaucracy; command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions and LAUSD; and execute neighborhood based comprehensive strategy.
If the entrepreneurial department does not document substantial and sustained reductions in gang activity and violence in selected high crime neighborhoods within set time periods, the City should terminate it or change its strategy.

**Action Items: Governance**

4.1 Allocate resources to form the new entrepreneurial department.
4.2 Form an Expert Action Committee led by the City Administrative Officer (CAO), Chief Legislative Analyst (CLA), and the City Attorney with outside advisors to develop this new entity.
4.3 Appoint a new Deputy Mayor of Neighborhood Safety.
4.4 Form a Permanent Oversight Committee.
4.5 Form an Expert Policy Advisory Board.
4.6 Enact a measure that directs all legislation and policies related to the mission of gang activity and violence reduction to be channeled through the new department for coordination and policy consistency.
4.7 Include provisions for a ten year “perform or end” clause and an expertly developed rigorous research design and evaluation framework.
4.8 Enact measures that create an agile operation framework that frees the entity from traditional City department constraints. Examples may include but are not limited to hiring specialized exempt staff at all levels, using accountable but much more flexible contracting and hiring procedures that ensure the right specialists will be hired, developing creative communications strategies, and experimenting to find out what works.
4.9 Include a Strategic Research and Initiatives section to drive continuous high quality research, program development, improvement, and evaluation, as well as capacity to adjust and change strategies.
4.10 Enact a policy measure to compel mission alignment, and contributions to and participation in the mission across all departments.
4.11 Annual review of departmental programs falling under the City’s Children and Family Budget with performance measures by the Permanent Oversight Committee.

**Action Items: Operations and Service Delivery**

4.12 Tailor solutions to each neighborhood.
4.13 Develop all plans in consultation with neighborhood leaders and civic groups.
4.14 Conduct neighborhood by neighborhood assessment of violence, needs and assets with community stakeholders.
4.15 Define service areas by high school clusters for most prevention and intervention services with flexibility for gang intervention services and for probation and foster youth.
4.16 Establish Community Violence Prevention Centers in each service area as the basic infrastructure to coordinate comprehensive prevention and intervention services, track children and youth served, coordinate with suppression efforts and develop community and youth organizing strategies.
4.17 Coordinate City and County services in a neighborhood through creation of Interagency Intervention Team.
4.18 Maximize use of existing, functional and effective resources, networks, service capacity, and assets in a neighborhood.
4.19 Create access to key service elements including health and mental health, child welfare, substance abuse treatment, life skills training, parenting education and support, crisis intervention, basic supportive services, and transition planning for probation youth.
4.20 Focus on helping to maximize services for families of high risk children and youth.
4.21 Acquire expert assistance to provide culturally competent, linguistically fluent, developmentally appropriate services that improve program performance, facilitate communication, and improve access to services for immigrant and/or isolated and alienated communities.
4.22 Integrate youth and communities in all phases of assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation.
4.23 Develop Community Action Teams in each service area, representative of those who live and work in the area with a concerted effort to include immigrant communities.
4.24 Maximize existing community networks, councils, and collaboratives where possible.

Recommendation 5: Leadership

The Mayor and the City will have to find and appoint a high powered, politically skilled, and independent leader for the entrepreneurial Department of Neighborhood Safety.

The leadership of this entity will have to be bold; unafraid to take risks; willing to explore or conduct carefully designed experiments; have extraordinary political skills; have credibility with divergent sectors ranging from law enforcement to gang intervention workers to academics; and possess working familiarity with the many points of contention in the multiple disciplines and areas of expertise that come to bear in the development of a comprehensive strategy. There are few individuals who can do this job and they are unlikely to be found on civil service lists.

Action Items:

5.1 The Mayor, Deputy Mayors for Neighborhood Safety and Homeland Security, and the City Council should jointly appoint a search team that has the help of outside advisers to develop the qualifications profile, job description, and parameter for the leadership of this new department and citywide comprehensive strategy to reduce gang activity and neighborhood violence.
Recommendation 6: Think Tank

The City and other entities should jointly create a state-of-the-art Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute that offers accurate and independent data development, program evaluation design, and policy analysis support. The City must move from politically driven policy to research driven policy, must build evaluation into all programs, and develop greater capacity for policy analysis.

**Action Items:**

6.1 Enact a measure that funds an expert team to work with the CLA to develop a Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
6.2 Direct the expert team and CLA to seek joint venture agreements with universities, foundations, and think tanks.
6.3 Ensure that the Institute develops reliable data, good research protocols and practices, excellent evaluation, and state-of-the-art program design.
6.4 Ensure that the Institute is designed to help develop training for City staff and service providers on youth development, child development, violence prevention, human relations, and family violence prevention to increase subject matter expertise needed for gang activity and violence reduction strategies.
6.5 Integrate the Strategic Research and Initiatives section in the new City department with the Policy Institute.
6.6 Standardize data variables and collection procedures (e.g. intake forms) across City departments.
6.7 Train and provide technical assistance for City staff and service providers on evaluation.
6.8 Develop reliable assessment tools to identify high risk youth and gang involved youth using best research on risk factors.
6.9 Develop an information management system to track children served across City and County departments.
6.10 Develop departmental ability to provide timely data release to Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute for annual evaluation.
6.11 Develop program level evaluation templates.
6.12 Develop evaluation protocols for the comprehensive strategy.

Recommendation 7: The Money

The City’s gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over $2 billion a year, with many of those costs paid from State and County coffers. The City should maximize impact from and get documented results for current expenditures. After eliminating wasteful and ineffective approaches, the City should obtain new streams of funding for general prevention, intervention, and suppression and gang specific prevention, intervention, and suppression. Additional funds will be needed but should not be sought until competent strategies, rigorous oversight, and accountability frameworks for expenditure of new funds are in place.
**Action Items:**

7.1 Stop the dissipation and lack of impact with current funds by placing small and isolated programs into comprehensive and coordinated neighborhood violence reduction strategies that are efficient and generate results.

7.2 Conduct a thorough cost benefit analysis of the proposed entrepreneurial department’s impact on governmental and victim costs.

7.3 Eliminate duplicative administrative costs.

7.4 Find and end practices that consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for relatively little benefit to the public—for example, the costs of subsidizing take-home City cars for hundreds of City workers, unnecessary round-the-clock staffing, wasteful overtime practices, and idle City owned properties—and redeploy those dollars into a gang activity and violence reduction strategy.

7.5 Reinvest cost savings into the comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy and in increased support and investment for effective community based service providers, neighborhood organizations and other civic and faith based groups that can contribute to gang activity reduction, violence reduction, and community investment strategies.

7.6 Seek joint funding as well as joint investment and action with the State and County government to solve the gang violence problem. A joint investment among entities of the State, County, City, and LAUSD will increase the pooled funding and effectiveness for all government agencies.

7.7 Centralize efforts to determine whether the City is maximizing its eligible use of federal and state resources for youth development and other programs.

7.8 Examine existing funding streams for law enforcement and other specific funding sources to determine whether they would be better deployed into the comprehensive strategy.

7.9 Develop a coalition of national and local philanthropic organizations to fund strategic components of the comprehensive strategy.

7.10 Improve use of and levels of support for established local provider networks and the development of new local networks as needed.

7.11 Support, to the extent legally permissible, independent efforts to mount ballot initiative funding strategies for a regional comprehensive violence and gang activity reduction plan.

**Recommendation 8: The Regional Solution**

The City must design all gang activity and violence reduction programs in full recognition of the important fact that gangs and violence are a regional phenomenon that require regional strategies and cooperation with entities throughout the County.

**Action Items:**
8.1 Develop Memoranda of Understanding or other agreements for collaboration and joint planning with key County departments and other regional entities for continuous and structured collaboration at the neighborhood and inter-jurisdictional levels.

8.2 Participate actively in developing a regional strategy for gang activity and violence reduction.

8.3 Actively support ongoing reform measures in LAUSD, LAPD, and County Probation.

8.4 Expand participation in and cooperation with regional efforts to improve information sharing between regional and local entities serving children and youth.

8.5 Improve monitoring of service provision for City’s children and youth involved in the County child welfare, mental health, and juvenile justice systems.

8.6 Help develop an initiative to create a Los Angeles County Violence Prevention Initiative with a dedicated stream of funding to carry out the comprehensive region-wide strategy that will be needed for sustained reductions.

**Recommendation 9: Suppression**

In some divisions, LAPD and LASD are beginning to make important transitions to problem-oriented community policing that will be needed if suppression is to be a productive part of the comprehensive neighborhood gang activity and violence reduction strategy suggested in this report.

**Action Items:**

9.1 Expedite community policing and problem solving approaches that facilitate effective officer collaboration with community members to reduce gang activity and violence.

9.2 Cooperate with experts, the neighborhood safety department, and the proposed Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute to develop reliable gang data and other crime data.

9.3 Increase use of strategic, targeted crime fighting strategies that focus on violent offenders and avoid overbroad suppression tactics and aggressive policing that focuses on maximizing arrests across the board.

9.4 Increase resources to protect witnesses, and punish retaliation against and intimidation of community members who participate in gang activity reduction or law enforcement activity.

9.5 Develop partnerships with prevention and intervention programs under clear and consistent referral guidelines that do not hinder appropriate law enforcement and suppression.

9.6 Develop protocols with gang prevention and intervention networks to coordinate delivery of effective strategies that reduce gang activity, violence, and the numbers of youth ensnared in the broken juvenile justice system.
Recommendation 10: LAUSD as a Key Partner

LAUSD is a key partner for the City in gang activity reduction because schools are the one institution that has sustained contact with children, facilities, and the educational resources to develop the courses and counseling that are central to teaching violence prevention curriculum.

The City should begin immediately creating mechanisms and structures for joint planning with LAUSD on how to have schools play a central and leading role in several aspects of the comprehensive violence and gang activity reduction strategies recommended in this report.

**Action Items:**

10.1 Develop ways to assist LAUSD to transform schools into a central and strategic asset for violence and gang activity reduction, academic achievement, mental and physical health of children, and community vitality.
10.2 Form a team to begin discussions on the viability of potential funding for the LAUSD-City violence reduction collaboration.
10.3 Coordinate safe passage to and from school with the District.
10.4 Expedite facility joint use agreements with City, County, and community entities to allow access on schools during after school hours.
10.5 Develop age appropriate violence prevention curriculum for in school instruction.
10.6 Consult with district and charter school principals who have successfully developed campus-wide conflict mediation and violence reduction plans.
10.7 Develop comprehensive assessment strategies to identify and address needs of children facing multiple risk factors.
10.8 Facilitate timely and complete sharing of educational and other information with City and County entities to ensure delivery of appropriate services.

Recommendation 11: Juvenile Justice

The City’s efforts will continue to be hindered by debilitating and counter productive fallout from failures in the State Corrections, County Probation and juvenile adjudication systems. The City should seek ways to expedite extensive reforms needed in the regional criminal justice systems for juveniles and adults.

**Action Items:**

The City should seek ways to encourage and/or facilitate:
11.1 Formation of a task force to develop a master reform plan of the County Probation Department facilities to address the severe problems highlighted in the 2001 United States Department of Justice investigation.

11.2 An implementation plan that shifts juvenile justice away from large scale adult prosecution system for large numbers of juveniles towards a community-based rehabilitative model designed to give young people the resources they need to change behavior.

11.3 Improved engagement with parents and caretakers of youth involved in the juvenile justice system.

11.4 Adequate transition planning and coordination with City, other County and community entities for follow-up services that seek to protect children who are re-entering from detention or face dangerous circumstances and obstacles to rehabilitation.

**Recommendation 12: The Public Campaigns Against Violence and Youth Access to Guns**

Public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns involving broad sectors of Los Angeles will be important in generating the essential public movement that will be pivotal in a region-wide strategy to end youth gang involvement and neighborhood violence.

**Action Items:**

The City should help coordinate, raise funds, allocate planning funds, and generally support the following campaigns:

12.1 Los Angeles’ civic and faith-based sectors should be funded to lead a public campaign against violence and against youth access to guns—a civic movement against the culture of destruction that is engulfing LA’s poorest areas will be essential to turning this problem around.

12.2 Los Angeles’ philanthropic sector should help fund the formation of the independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute, intervention training, and programs that develop neighborhood leadership and community organizations dedicated to creating violence-free, healthy neighborhoods.

12.3 The region’s universities, think tanks and academic experts should contribute policy and evaluation expertise for the City’s comprehensive strategy and policy, including the formation of the Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.

12.4 The Business sector should help provide jobs and technical assistance to the City as it moves to create a competent, entrepreneurial model of government.

12.5 The entertainment and media sectors should offer substantial help in countering the glorification of gangs, violence and guns that fuels attraction to gang life, by helping to design and fund public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns.
12.6 The City should allocate planning funds to help recruit and coordinate leadership from the different sectors needed for these campaigns and to work with CeaseFire Chicago which pioneered such campaigns to jumpstart the civic movement needed to counter LA’s violence epidemic.
## Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach to Problem</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 4</th>
<th>Level 5</th>
<th>Level 6</th>
<th>Level 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Let the problem fester.</strong></td>
<td>Disconnected programs assigned to existing department not designed for violence prevention. Funding not to scale.</td>
<td>All of Level 2, plus a Gang Taskforce to increase intra and interdepartmental coordination. Funding and programs are still not to scale.</td>
<td>End ad hoc approach and create a department designed to reduce gang and other violence through citywide neighborhood-based revitalization strategies. Implement strategy in hot zones.</td>
<td>All of Level 4, plus develop a regional strategy and entity that move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction. Create neighborhood action plans.</td>
<td>City entity works with regional entity and neighborhoods to achieve coordinated, funded programs and services that produce results that can be seen and felt in formerly violent neighborhoods.</td>
<td>Achieve citywide public safety.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals of Approach</strong></td>
<td>No goals.</td>
<td>Reach a small percentage of youth with scattered prevention and intervention services without proof of results.</td>
<td>Attempting to coordinate existing programs to patch gaps in communication and collaboration by forming a Gang Taskforce. Higher quality of programs achieved through better coordination, but no increase in the number of youth reached.</td>
<td>Violence stabilization in hot zones. Restructure current resources into one City entity to coordinate services. A majority of children in hot zones will receive prevention services. Qualitative and quantitative evaluations of programs for constant improvement.</td>
<td>Improved school performance and reduced drop out rates. Move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction by creating jobs for young people and expanding intervention and prevention services. Close entrance ramps and create exit ramps for youth into and out of gangs. Creation of new entity to manage funding and regional coordination.</td>
<td>Significant reductions in violence in high crime zones, gang presence recedes. Increased programming reaches almost 100% of young people. Move to a standard that provides basic safety in most neighborhoods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequences of Approach</strong></td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not to scale</td>
<td>Not fully to scale</td>
<td>Not all neighborhoods are 100% safe from violent gang crime</td>
<td>Completely to scale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale</strong></td>
<td>Not to scale.</td>
<td>Fewer than 5% of gang members reached for intervention. Less than 7% of the almost 300,000 children living in high gang crime areas receive prevention services.</td>
<td>Same scale reached as Level 2, but quality of programs is higher and more focused because of coordination.</td>
<td>Reach at least 40% of high risk youth for intervention services and 25% of at risk youth for prevention services.</td>
<td>Reach at least 75% of high risk youth for intervention services and 50% of at risk youth for prevention services.</td>
<td>Reach at least 90% of high risk youth for intervention services and 100% of at risk youth for prevention services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Traditional department.</td>
<td>Gang Taskforce—slightly improved coordination</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial department with oversight.</td>
<td>Planning of regional and neighborhood strategy. New entity for regional collaboration and funding management.</td>
<td>Regional and neighborhood strategy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>Only suppression. Insufficient and unbalanced.</td>
<td>Insufficient to need. Taskforce has no authority over funds.</td>
<td>Restructure existing resources. Insufficient funding for need.</td>
<td>Plan for dedicated stream of funding.</td>
<td>Dedicated funding stream.</td>
<td>Dedicated, stable funding stream.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>No evaluation, data collection, or database planning.</td>
<td>Improved data collection and evaluation.</td>
<td>Permanent research entity within regional body.</td>
<td>Permanent research entity within regional body.</td>
<td>Permanent research entity within regional body.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>No engagement. Hot zones are riddled with violent crime.</td>
<td>No change in community.</td>
<td>Stabilization of crime in hot zones</td>
<td>Reduction in gang violence and membership in hot zones.</td>
<td>Significant reduction in hot zone crime rates. Most neighborhoods have basic safety.</td>
<td>Hot zones’ crime levels at a Westside rate. Community in partnership with City and regional leaders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth</strong></td>
<td>No programs. Some unevaluated programs available to limited numbers of youth.</td>
<td>Slightly higher quality programs for limited numbers of youth.</td>
<td>Most young people in high crime areas have access to prevention programs.</td>
<td>High crime areas have access to coordinated intervention and prevention programs. Youth’s school performance improves and drop out rates lessen.</td>
<td>All children in hot zones have access to intervention and prevention programs.</td>
<td>All children have access to constructive and healthy alternatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 54.3% or 74.2% of youth < 200%
- 26.95% or 36.8% of youth > 100%

Youth (ages 0-17): Council District 1:
Federal Poverty Threshold: 54.3% for youth = 100%
Federal Poverty Threshold: 26.95 or 36.8% of youth = 100%

Youth (ages 0-17):
Federal Poverty Threshold: 
- 26,844 or 41.0% of Youth < 200%
- 12,490 or 10.1% of Youth < 100%

Youth (Ages 0-17):
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 26,844 or 41.0% of youth < 200%
- 12,490 or 10.1% of youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17): Council District 2: [Map Details]
Council District 3:

- 1,004 Average SAT Score
- 45.9% of graduates college prepared
- 18.7% 4-year HS dropout rate

Total school enrollment: 41,208

Los Angeles City

Community Resources

- RecLeod Parks
- Recreation and Parks
- L.A.'s Best
- Mayor System
- Youth Opportunity
- L.A. Bridges
- Department of
  Community Dev., Dep't

Select resources to map
List all resources on map
List resources in selected area

Map Size
Zoom out
50 miles
25 miles
10 miles
5 miles
Community Characteristic

Select resources to map
List all resources on map
List resources in selected

Los Angeles City

- SAT score: 877 average
- 67.3% of graduates college-prepared
- 29.8% 4-year HS dropout rate
- Total school enrollment: 41,208

Council District 4:
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 22,557 or 45.7% of Youth < 200%
- 10,667 or 21.6% of Youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17):

Council District 4:
Los Angeles City

Community Resources

Selected resources to map:
- Los Angeles City

Community Characteristics

- Educational Attainment Complete
- High school diploma or higher
- Bachelor's degree or higher

- SAT score:
  - 865 average
  - 50.3% of grades college preparatory

- Dropout rate:
  - 23.3%

- 4-year HS enrollment:
  - 41,208

Council District 5:
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 8,042 or 18.9% of youth < 200%
- 3,836 or 9.0% of youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17)
Federal Poverty Threshold: 8,042 or 18.9% of youth > 200%
3,836 or 9.0% of youth > 100%

Youth (ages 0-17): Council District 5
Community Characteristic:

- Educational Attainment
  - 552 - 3,457
  - 372 - 552
  - 179 - 372
  - 0 - 179

- High school diploma (no degree or equivalent)

- % of students eligible for free or reduced lunch

- Average SAT score

- % of students enrolled in high school

- % of students enrolled in college

- % of students enrolled in adult education

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete high school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete college

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete graduate school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete professional school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete medical school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete dental school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete law school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete veterinary school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete engineering school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete architecture school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete nursing school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete business school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete computer science school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete education school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete social work school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete psychology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete sociology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete anthropology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete political science school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete philosophy school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete history school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete economics school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete geography school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete environmental science school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete oceanography school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete marine biology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete zoology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete botany school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete microbiology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete biology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete chemistry school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete physics school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete astronomy school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete earth science school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete atmospheric science school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete meteorology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete geology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete mineralogy school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete paleontology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete zoogeography school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete entomology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete ichthyology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete ornithology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete herpetology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete mycology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete parasitology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete veterinary medicine school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete nutrition school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete dietetics school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete public health school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete public affairs school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete housing school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete community development school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete urban planning school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete real estate school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete architecture school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete interior design school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape architecture school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape design school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape horticulture school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape planning school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management technology school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management science school

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management technology institute

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management technology institute

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management technology institute

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management technology institute

- % of students who have completed or are on track to complete landscape management technology institute
Council District 6:
- Total school enrollment: 41,208
- 25.6% 4-year HS dropout rate
- 36.2% of grads college prepared
- 939 Average SAT score
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 39,849 or 49.5% of youth < 200%
- 18,764 or 23.3% of youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17):
Community Characteristics

- Educational Attainment
- Household Income
- Employment

Resources
- Los Angeles City
- Recreation and Parks
- La Brea
- Community Development

Map Size
- 5 miles
- 10 miles
- 25 miles
- 50 miles
- Zoom Out
- Zoom In

Select resources to map
- List all resources on map
- Area
- List resources in selected

Council District 7:

- SAT score: 845 Average
- 4-year HS graduation rate: 20.5%
- Total school enrollment: 41,208
- 21.9% of 4th graders prepared for college
- 17.1% of 8th graders prepared for college
- 0.0% - 0.25%
- 0.25% - 0.45%
- 0.45% - 2.15%
- 2.15% - 4.18%
- Over 4.18%
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 39,331 for 46.5% of youth > 200%
- 18,333 or 21.7% of youth > 100%

Council District 7:
Youth (ages 0-17)
Community Characteristics:
- Select resources to map
- List all resources on map
- List resources in selected area
- Class Parks
- Recreation and Parks
- L.A.'s Best Mayor
- System
- Youth Opportunity
- L.A. Bridges
- Community Dev. Dept.
- Resources
- Los Angeles City

Council District 8:
- 826 Average SAT score
- 42.6% of 9th graders college prepared
- 38.5% 4-year HS dropout rate
- Total school enrollment - 41,208
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 53.46% or 68.0% of Youth < 200%
- 25.52% or 32.5% of Youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17):
Federal Poverty Threshold: 74,847 or 83.9% of Youth > 200%
Federal Poverty Threshold: 36,089 or 40.4% of Youth < 100%

Youth (Ages 0-17)
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 74,847 or 83.9% of Youth < 200%
- 36,089 or 40.4% of Youth < 100%

Youth (Ages 0-17):

Council District 9:
- 92.5 Average SAT score
- 72.6% of 9th graders college prepared
- 17.9% 4-year HS dropout rate
- Total school enrollment - 4,208

Council District 10:
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 43.817% or 62.33% of youth < 200%
- 20.979% or 29.8% of youth < 100%

Council District 10:
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 14.9% for 200% of Youth < 200%
- 7.2% for 14.7% of Youth > 100%

Youth (ages 0-17):
Community Characteristic

- High school graduation rate
- College enrollment rate
- Average SAT score
- College preparation

Educational Attainment
- High school completion rate
- College enrollment rate
- Average SAT score
- College preparation

Resources
- Los Angeles City
- Education Department
- Youth Opportunity
- LA.4 Enrich
- LA.4 BEST
- Recreation and Parks
- Class Parks
- Community Resources
- Downtown LA

Council District 12:
- 40.0% of graduates college prepared
- 41.9% 4-year HS dropout rate
- Total school enrollment - 41,208
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 14,693 or 24.7% of youth < 200%
- 6,863 or 11.5% of youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17): Council District 12
Federal Poverty Threshold: $14,693 or 24.7% of Youth < 200%
Federal Poverty Threshold: $6,863 or 11.5% of Youth < 100%

Youth (ages 0-17):
Council District 12: Los Angeles City
Council District 13:
Total school enrollment - 41,208
- 50.8% 4-year HS dropout rate
- 14.6% of grads college prepared
- 822 Average SAT score
- 822 Average SAT score
- 14.6% of graduates college prepared
- 50.8% 4-year HS dropout rate
Total School Enrollment - 41,208
Council District 13
Federal Poverty Threshold:
- 45.174 or 68.4% of youth < 200%
- 21.492 or 35.5% of youth < 100%

Youth (Ages 0-17):

Council District 13: [Location]
Poverty

Poverty Threshold:
- 40.319 or 57.0% of youth < 200% Federal
- 19.056 or 26.9% of youth < 100% Federal
Community Characteristic
- Educational Attainment
- 64.9% Average SAT score
- 34.6% of 9th grade prep
- 27.2% 4-year HS dropout rate
Total school enrollment - 41,208
Council District 15:
Background

The Advancement Project (AP) was selected by the City of Los Angeles as the contractor to develop a comprehensive strategy to reduce gang violence and gang activity in the city, effective March 2006. AP adopted the Public Health Model of Violence Prevention which advocates a multidisciplinary approach that reduces the factors that place youth at increased risk of being involved in gangs and violence while increasing the factors that permit youth to resist the lure of gangs. The goal of this project is to answer the question, “What would Los Angeles’ gang activity reduction system look like if we could start from scratch?”

After reviewing current gang reduction programs in Los Angeles, AP set about the task of identifying and determining ideal programs and best practices both locally and nationally. These assessments were undertaken to inform the development of options for implementing an ideal approach for Los Angeles to ensure the safety and vitality of all children.

AP reached out to various stakeholders including key City departments, LAUSD, gang intervention specialists, service providers and philanthropic organizations. Despite a very short timeline, AP also deemed it very important to seek feedback and advice from leaders and residents of the communities most impacted by youth violence. A Community Advisory Team composed of nineteen local leaders from six geographic areas was formed in July 2006 (see Attachment A). These nineteen individuals are not “gang experts” but persons recognized as knowledgeable about services and supports for children, youth and families in their communities, persons who value a comprehensive community approach to youth development, gang prevention and intervention. Their advice will help inform the development of recommendations to the City. They were also asked to assist AP in gathering information from other stakeholders in their respective communities.

As a result, 19 community forums and focus groups involving more than 440 participants were held from August 11th to September 19th in six geographic areas. Subsequently, two additional focus groups and one community forum were held in November and December to deepen our understanding of some of the findings, bringing to more than 500 the number of people involved in 23 discussions convened through the Community Engagement process.

1 In November and December, we had the opportunity to convene two additional focus groups: one with members of the Youth Justice Coalition and another with domestic violence service providers. We facilitated both focus groups, given that the individuals and networks of these organizations are directly connected to the issue of community and gang violence. AP was also invited to take part in the November Urban Issues Breakfast Forum, a monthly forum that focuses on urban social, economic and political issues in LA’s central communities, to inform participants of this project.
The six targeted geographic areas are:

- East/Northeast Los Angeles
- Venice/South Bay
- North San Fernando Valley
- Mid San Fernando Valley
- University Park/South Los Angeles
- Central Los Angeles

The purpose of these forums was to:
1. Inform community residents and stakeholders of the GARS project;
2. Identify “what works” in communities - community assets, resources and best practices - that should be considered in developing recommendations to the City Council; and
3. Identify the elements that must be included in a citywide strategy to reduce youth violence but that will also work in local communities.

Participants included parents, advocates, youth, current and former gang members, staff of City and County agencies and representatives of organizations that represent larger constituencies such as: faith-based groups, schools, health and mental health providers, community-based organizations, child- and youth-related service groups, family support groups, labor, small businesses and economic development and housing agencies. Six of these meetings were bilingual sessions (English/Spanish) to accommodate the participation of non-English speaking parents and/or youth; one parent group in Panorama City was conducted entirely in Spanish.

All groups were provided with background materials, an executive summary and website access to the AP assessment of current gang reduction programs in Los Angeles, the Phase I Report. All groups were asked the same three questions:

1. What “works” in your community to support positive youth development? In gang prevention and intervention? What could work?

2. What community resources (programs, groups, organizations, individuals, institutions, funding etc.) are being used --or should be used – in this community to reduce gang activity, to discourage gang membership and to encourage exiting gangs and support positive youth development?

3. What/who must be included in a citywide strategy to be realistically implemented and supported in your community?

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2 These “planning areas” could serve as an intermediate level of organization between neighborhood-based networks (and service providers) and the city governance structure, bringing together youth-serving networks, community and nonprofit organizations, faith-based groups, hospitals, school-based programs, public agencies, collaboratives and others within each area to improve planning, coordination of efforts and better use of resources.
MAJOR THEMES

Although the community dialogues were rich with ideas and opinions about “what works” in communities to reduce youth violence, a number of “themes” were repeated in many, if not all, of the meetings and can, along with all of the information gathered, help inform the development of options for a citywide strategy. The following is a summary of preliminary findings of the rich material gathered to date.

What Works

- Reaching children early; focus on middle school
- Parent involvement with their children and with the institutions that educate and serve them
  - accountability of institutions coupled with support and education of parents
- Collaboration and partnerships across sectors (education, social services, juvenile justice, law enforcement etc.)
- Responsive schools and improved educational environments
- Meaningful jobs; training youth for a trade or a career
- Comprehensive approaches to stop gang violence and improve youth development that clearly define the role of prevention and intervention but link the two.
  Approaches that
  - require broad community involvement;
  - build multi-sector connections;
  - can count on sufficient resources for the long-term;
  - include multi-year planning;
  - value work with hard core gang members that requires one-on-one intervention over the long term, and
  - include a sustained funding source independent of changing political winds.
- Targeted gang intervention programs with workers who understand the gang and prison cultures and are valued for their expertise
- Accessible and meaningful programs for youth, especially teens, located in neighborhoods during after-school hours and on weekends. These programs include:
  - mentoring and tutoring
  - sports leagues and camps
  - workshops created by and with youth in their interest areas (e.g. art, music)
  - life skills training and counseling
  - leadership opportunities
  - youth-community connections and volunteer service
  - new experiences for youth outside of their immediate neighborhood.
- Youth programs that:
  - are consistent and continue year after year
  - are dedicated to empowering youth and organizing them to advocate for social justice
  - are community-based
  - offer incentives for youth participation;
  - include transportation options that keep youth safe;
  - help parents and children bond;
  - are managed by experienced and caring adults who understand youth culture and are sensitive to the culture, language, education and economic situation of families;
  - build upon proven successful models of the 1970s and 1980s.
- Safe spaces for youth; centers in every neighborhood
- Safe communities; resident involvement and positive police-community relations
- Policies and funding that allow all youth and families to participate in programs and receive services, including immigrant families
- Program accountability with better tools for evaluation; community and City agencies working together to define “success”, success measures and program standards
- Better informed funders and public officials
Local Assets and Resources (most often mentioned)

- Children and youth
- Parents and parent organizations
- Compulsory education, schools and school-based programs
- School counselors
- Service infrastructure/providers – family support and parent resource centers
- Neighborhood infrastructure - community-based groups and volunteers
- Youth-serving organizations and advocacy groups
- Parks and open space
- Libraries
- Elected officials, council members
- Law enforcement/LAPD
- Businesses and workforce development groups
- Faith-based groups and networks
- Child and youth-related public systems including City agencies and County departments, especially Probation, DPSS, DCFS, LACOE
- Neighborhood councils
- Universities, colleges and researchers

What/Who must be included in an implementation strategy

Using different scenarios from their own experience, participants expressed general support for a comprehensive, sustainable strategy built on a citywide vision but implemented as a mosaic of efforts in different communities. That is, a shared vision with flexibility in its implementation. This strategy would engage community resources across organizational boundaries and systems of care, be youth-centered and link resources to action plans in a way that will achieve better results for at-risk youth and their families at the neighborhood level.

The citywide strategy should be based on an equitable investment in prevention, intervention and suppression strategies and

- Clearly distinguish “prevention” from “intervention” efforts but link the two to support the individual child, teen or young adult;
- Include a coordinated referral and support system among service sectors, including schools and law enforcement;
- Acknowledge and provide support and opportunities to relieve the pressures put on families as a consequence of poverty, low-paying jobs and the lack of education;
- Support asset-based models that value children, youth and families within the context of their culture and language.
To be successful, participants most often cited the following elements as being critical to a citywide strategy:

1. Have the Mayor and top City officials provide visible leadership, making youth a priority and setting aside funding to support that decision;
2. Support reform efforts to ensure the commitment of school administrators and faculty to school-community partnerships and the adoption of more responsive school policies;
3. Establish/strengthen collaborations and partnerships, especially local ‘school-provider’ collaborations, to better serve children and families;
4. Improve inter- and cross-sector communication to facilitate immediate access to information;
5. Hold funded groups, local institutions and city leaders accountable for results;
6. Reframe program evaluation to focus on results, not numbers, and include a community perspective in selecting indicators to measure progress;
7. Centralize data collection and information but make it widely available to improve planning and services;
8. Re-evaluate City policies, programs and funding priorities informed by affected communities and those working with gang-involved youth;
9. Ensure that sufficient program resources are available for the long-term; and include multi-year planning and funding to allow community groups and city agencies to serve all youth who seek services and/or support;
10. Increase funding and staff for one-on-one intervention with gang-involved youth and reward creativity in successful outreach and program development for hard-to-reach youth and families;
11. Strengthen neighborhood structures, respect local leadership and involve youth in the design of local solutions;
12. Support for comprehensive community mobilization that equips and empowers community members, especially youths, to organize and advocate for policy changes;
13. Address inter-related issues of affordable housing, transportation and safety in the most impacted communities; and
14. Develop media campaigns that tout youth and families as valued assets for the City of Los Angeles.

The most frequently suggested programmatic components mirrored the “what works” concepts:

A. Focus on middle schools.
B. Expand the number of places/spaces and centers where youth can be safe, create a sense of community, learn and play.
C. Provide affordable, accessible, quality programs for all youth irrespective of their legal status. Expand after-school programs and include gang-involved youth.
D. Targeted programs to meet specific needs and interests of youth, such as:
   - Substance abuse treatment (especially for use of methamphetamines)
   - Tattoo removal as a safety and employment issue
   - Immigrant and undocumented youth
   - Youth coming out of prison
   - Youth with no family structure nor supervision
   - Girls and pre-teens at risk of jumping into gangs
E. Long-term programs for hard-core gang members.
F. Workforce development and the hiring of youth into meaningful jobs.
G. More creative avenues for parent involvement; parent support networks.
H. Hold parents accountable for their children but provide support, education and childcare.
I. Create a “211” or “website for youth” to inform youth about programs and services available.
J. Strengthen the preventive aspect of law enforcement.
K. Do away with expanded background checks and identification of felons on employment applications.
L. Implement Special Order 40 which is intended to help immigrant communities report violence without being questioned by law enforcement.

People who must be involved in implementing a citywide strategy:
Every individual, institution and resource available in the most impacted communities must be involved if gang activity is to be reduced, especially:
- Parents and guardians
- Youth
- Former gang members
- School teachers, administrators and staff; leadership of LAUSD and LACOE
- Staff of community-based and non-profit organizations
- Civic leaders, elected officials and policy makers
- Caring adults who motivate and help youth
- Program and City staff who know and understand communities
- County leaders and agency representatives
- Business people and employers
- Law enforcement, judges and district attorneys
- Church leaders and faith-based groups
- Academics, artists and funders
- Celebrities and upscale residents who can bring attention to the issue

Former and current gang members spoke passionately about the need for a safety net for individuals leaving the gang lifestyle. Support for hard-core gang members requires long-term, intense one-on-one interaction by special individuals who can build trust and provide an element of consistency for them. It is these individuals who are reaching out to the youth who are neither working or enrolled in school.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our goal in this compacted process was to reach a representative group of individuals who live, study and work in the communities most impacted by gang violence in the City of Los Angeles. Thanks to the support and energy of our Advisors, meetings were held from Pacoima and North Hills in the San Fernando Valley to San Pedro and Wilmington in the South Bay. We heard the voices of youth and adults in Westlake, Boyle Heights, Koreatown and Hollywood and listened to the parents, providers and advocates of Echo Park, Venice, El Sereno, Cypress Park, the Vermont Corridor and Watts. We also heard the stories of the immigrant experience of the families of Pico Union, Canoga Park and South Los Angeles, to name a few.

All of these participants represent a wealth of experience, knowledge and perspectives that can inform this process. The community-based organizations in particular possess a valuable lived experience and
understanding of the communities they serve. Some of the groups receive City funding, many do not, but they all represent valuable resources available in the neighborhoods of Los Angeles.

The overarching message heard across all groups is: “We’ve talked enough; it’s time to act –together”. Most communities we visited recognize that the complexity of the gang problem requires comprehensive multi-sector (and city-county) solutions. They are of the opinion that the City cannot build healthier communities without addressing basic quality of life issues such as housing, jobs, transportation, safety, healthcare and education. The underlying assumption reinforced through this process is that resources and collaborations IN neighborhoods affected by gangs will help end the violence if given the means and flexibility to do so. Many participants expressed the hope that City and County agencies will partner with resources and leadership that already exist in these communities, sensitive to the cultural, linguistic and socio-economic differences of their respective neighborhoods.

WHAT “WORKS” IN COMMUNITIES TO SUPPORT POSITIVE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT? TO SUPPORT GANG PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION?

- **Reach children early; focus on middle school**
  Participants were very much in agreement that prevention efforts should begin as early as 4th and 5th grade when the child begins to make decisions about drugs, gangs and peers. Parents and youth agreed that middle school is the age when children are influenced by lifestyle images, street culture and violence. The presence of counselors, mentors and role models in schools was given high priority as was the development of a more relevant curriculum that will interest students so they won’t drop out in 8th and 9th grade. Learning about one’s culture was also identified as a way to offset values learned in the street.

  “Middle school is the great ignored wasteland of public education and of our society.” “Test scores dropping in 7th and 8th grades have something to do with the structure and discipline they receive in middle school.” “School staff need training because they don’t know the neighborhoods.” “Schools (teachers) use ‘labels’ and make decisions about these kids without really knowing them.” “We are in a culture war with kids bombarded with gangsta rap and attitude, getting a distorted view of reality.”

- **Parent involvement with children and with the institutions that educate and serve them**
  Every group spoke about the important role parents play in countering gang recruitment and at-risk behaviors in children. They agreed that parents should be held accountable for their children, but that many parents lack a high school education themselves and need support to meet basic family needs in addition to education on how to access resources and deal with their children – i.e. wrap around services. Creating opportunities for parents to meet and interact with other parents, and providing more venues for parents to be with their children (e.g. parks) were considered important strategies.

  “It’s really not about caring, they just don’t know, like my mom who...couldn’t tell me what to do so I had to do it by myself.” “Families need more support than we think. Parents are working two jobs and still live in poverty. They are too tired to come to a class or deal with their child. We need to change the environment and support them to have a better quality of life.” “What works is parenting programs like SEA – a network of parenting classes offered through community organizations and vocational schools.” “Parental involvement is an option in most programs, but
it should be a mandate.” “It’s clear that a lot of folks are under so much stress just to pay bills working 80 hours a week that they don’t have time to invest in their children. This is where a ‘safety net’ needs to support them.”

- **Collaboration and partnerships across sectors**
  The more animated discussions in the forums had to do with the importance of collaboration and partnerships and the need for long-term relationships built on trust. Service providers acknowledged the need to do more to bring everyone together (education, social services, juvenile justice, law enforcement, elected officials, parents etc.). Highly dedicated individuals and organizations are working together in every community to tackle the gang problem but are asked to do more with scarce resources. One community forum suggested getting help from an outside facilitator to help groups learn how to work together more effectively. Collaboration and coordination of programmatic efforts in prevention and intervention were considered to be among the most important strategies the City could support at the local, regional and City levels – and within service sectors. It’s about focus, information, communication and resources. Leaders shared the desire to institutionalize existing collaborations so that they not disappear if members retire, change jobs or leave.

  “Collaboration works!” “There are many passionate people in this community with a lot of strength. It is so important that we are here together and that we try to consolidate our knowledge, skills and passion on behalf of the community.” “We have to build a bridge to create a continuum for the child from when he is born until he can participate (in society).” “We have many community assets providing services but what is lacking is coordination – one group doesn’t know what the other is doing. The Council office should take the lead in organizing this...” “Everyone should be involved in developing strategies: CBOs, gang intervention workers, youth, mental health providers, corporations willing to invest in youth, etc.” “Collaboration should be the underpinning of everything we do.”

- **Responsive schools and improved educational environments**
  The importance of schools, a positive school environment and caring school personnel surfaced repeatedly. Overcrowded schools, revolving administrators, large class size and overburdened teachers who can’t deal with “problem kids” were all identified as barriers to positive child development in schools. However, there were strong feelings about the importance of teachers knowing their students, not letting them go through school without an identity, not just a number. At the same time, participants conceded that most public schools do not have the resources needed for the number of children enrolled and look to school reform as an option.

  “Schools are not performing as they should, especially in developing brotherhood among the kids.” “The schools are not innocent bystanders in the gang situation; they are creating angry children.” “What works is collaboration between the school administration and faculty with CBOs working with the same children.” “There should be a body within the school that meets regularly to discuss the issues of families at that campus, then those issues will be addressed sooner.” “Schools should open their doors to service providers but they get territorial (even when) we extend free services...” “Charter schools work: public education is a breeding ground for prisons.”

- **Meaningful jobs; training youth for a trade or career**
Jobs and workforce development were repeatedly raised as a major component of any City strategy to address gang violence. Young adults were vocal about the need for job opportunities, information about resources available to help them get to college and alternatives to college. Youth pointed to the lack of adequate long-term training needed to qualify for more than a minimum-wage job. The disappearance of the summer youth employment concept was also noted. For former or current gang-involved youth, adult education and other alternatives were considered critical. For this population, jobs should build self-esteem and fulfill the practical purpose of bringing income into the household. They strongly advocated for large employers to reconsider policies that prohibit hiring people with criminal records.

“School is not for everyone so you have to have job training and a trade.” “Schools are not preparing kids for college; we’re just being prepared to graduate high school.” “Kids see gang members with money so they follow them.” “Employers should have higher expectations of youth and offer support...meaningful jobs that build character and teach values.”

➢ **Comprehensive approaches to stop gang violence and improve youth development that clearly define the role of prevention and intervention but link the two.** Approaches that
  
  - require broad community involvement;
  - build multi-sector connections;
  - count on sufficient resources for the long-term;
  - include multi-year planning;
  - value and support work with hard core gang members that requires one-on-one intervention over the long term; and
  - include a sustained funding source independent of changing political winds.

Several participants stated that they found it difficult to speak about prevention and intervention strategies together because they target different populations. The perception is that there are many more prevention than intervention programs in the City and that prevention discussions dominate efforts to discuss intervention issues. “Good gang intervention” was defined as “effective outreach” – getting to the youth not served by prevention programs and linking that individual to programs. Collaboration with service providers was considered essential to success. Intervention responds to the population at the point where they are in their lives.

Prevention, as defined by the Advancement Project, refers to programs that prevent youth violence, teach life skills, and enhance youth resiliency so that youths can seek productive alternatives to high-risk behaviors including gang membership.

Participants in several groups discussed the importance of a comprehensive approach to gang violence which requires that law enforcement, teachers and other professionals go beyond their appointed roles to help youth rather than punish them. It also requires understanding a young person in the context of his/her life experience and identifying the needs of the entire family, if necessary. It can also mean supporting a child when the family cannot be approached.

“Intervention is not about jobs, it is about saving lives.” “Prevention is about stopping the cycle.”
“*When you can refer a kid to a program that can assist him and not incarcerate him, that’s*
prevention and intervention.” “We should restructure how we work with police officers as providers of service.”

- Targeted gang intervention programs with workers who understand the gang and prison cultures and are valued for their expertise.

Additional support needs were identified for subpopulations of gang-involved youth:

- Substance abusers (especially for use of methamphetamines)
- Tattoo removal - a safety and employment issue as well as a health issue
- Immigrant and undocumented youth
- Youth coming out of prison
- Youth with no family structure or supervision
- Girls and pre-teens at risk of jumping into gangs

Providers in every region of the City agreed that reduction of violent crime requires a greater investment into long-term programs that deal with hard core gang members. And that this will require increasing the number of experienced workers who can “stop the war”, who know how to deal with the human element, career training and placement. Helping someone who is getting out of prison requires a one-on-one commitment of 3 to 5 years. But intervention workers themselves usually have no health care, no mental or physical support nor any staff development opportunities. They burn out because of the pressures of the work and the low-regard in which they are held by law enforcement, schools and other institutions that depend on them in times of crisis. “What works” is institutionalizing this work by giving it a more organized structure and resources.

It was also suggested that the City has a role to play in pushing for policy change in related arenas such as reform of the criminal justice system and prisons because work being done in the streets of Los Angeles is undone by the prison system. (For example: youth on parole are required to return to the community where the crime was committed, forcing them back into their old neighborhoods.) The City can also provide leadership by working with large employers to “ban the box” on employment applications and change policies on background checks that are not job-related (e.g. credit checks). This would provide more job opportunities to former gang members. For example, as a felon, a young person cannot join the JobCorps.

“Effective outreach to gang members works...Bridges II gives us the greatest autonomy and flexibility to deal with gang members.” “Real networking is happening that will reduce the mayhem in communities.” “The hard core gang member is the shooter. If we can impact that individual, we can impact the rest.” “Ex-gang members can knock on doors and cross racial barriers.” “There are not enough intervention workers in the street to refer youth to programs. We are six for the whole Harbor Area.” “Every community should have agencies that address gangs.”

- Accessible and meaningful programs for youth, especially teens, located in neighborhoods during after-school hours and on weekends.

Many programs and activities were listed by participants. Those most frequently mentioned for prevention strategies include:

- mentoring and tutoring
- sports leagues and camps
- workshops created by and with youth in their interest areas (e.g., art and music)
- life skills training and counseling
- leadership opportunities
- youth-community connections and volunteer service
- new experiences outside of their immediate neighborhood

In response to questions put to them, youth reported that they drop out of programs because they are “boring” and are not encouraged to attend – no incentives. There were differences of opinion among parents and youth about the value of having art and mural painting for youth interested in tagging, but there was more agreement about using music to attract youth to workshops and related activities. Affordable camps were seen as opportunities to expose young people to outdoor activities and an environment outside of their immediate neighborhoods. Funding programs for teenagers (ages 13-18) was frequently identified as “what works” for youth because of the perception that most program target younger children.

“In the eyes of youth, the street has more to offer than a program.” “You have to make it clear to kids that a program or school gives them a better chance at xxx (something concrete, a better life). They need an incentive.” If it costs $50,000 to incarcerate a youth, there should be $50,000 to educate a youth.”

**Youth programs** that:
- are consistent and continue year after year
- are dedicated to empowering youth and organizing them to advocate for social justice
- are community-based
- offer incentives for youth participation
- include transportation options that keep youth safe
- help parents and children bond
- are managed by experienced and caring adults who understand youth culture and are sensitive to the culture, language, education and economic situation of families
- build on proven successful models like those of the 1970s and 1980s (i.e. Project Heavy, Teen Post, El Proyecto del Barrio) A child did not have to be “in trouble” to get help.

Many youths expressed their desire to be involved with programs and organizations that provide them with tools to create actual change and improvements in their communities. They recognize that to have a voice and improve the current practices and policies that affect young people and their families, they need adequate education and training on how to effectively organize and advocate. They believe that community members must lead efforts to alter existing conditions in their neighborhoods by having a voice and a seat at the table when policies are being decided in the City and to increase accountability among the City’s leaders, a belief strongly supported by many youths, especially those who participated in the Youth Justice Coalition focus group.

The discussions focused on the importance of using asset models for youth development rather than the current deficit model. Adults and youth alike agreed on the importance of finding more creative ways to reach and engage young people. For example, teaching them to be employers instead of employees, helping them create their own businesses. “What works” is programs that are smaller, more relationship-based and include more communication between parents and program staff. The
observation was made several times that teens have learned to distrust promises because of the lack of continuity of programs which are often dropped due to funding cuts, lack of volunteers/parent involvement and/or a change in personnel.

“Kids join gangs because there is nothing here for them to do.” “Youth need to be involved, ask them what they want to know and do; involve them in the solution from the beginning.” “Business owners, celebrities and high-end individuals need to be educated about what’s happening about gangs and get involved.” ”We need teen programs with people that know what they are talking about and know what’s going on in the streets...bring older guys who have been in gangs and understand.”

Safe spaces for youth; centers in every neighborhood

Much was said in several community discussions about the lack of community and youth centers in their neighborhoods, the lack of safe spaces where young people can go after school adjourns and “hang out” on weekends. Recreation centers/parks were often mentioned as good alternatives if safety is addressed. Frustration was expressed in several meetings about the presence of LAUSD and City facilities and parks that could be used for programs and sports but are not usually available. The point was made several times that gang members are often put out of schools and need an all-day center with activities for them. One community described a “truancy center” where young people could report, be off the streets and continue their education in the interim with the help of tutors.

“Schools don’t involve the neighborhood; they also don’t have money.” “Every community needs to have a (multi-purpose) center that is advertised throughout the community; a center with (ongoing) activities and events that involve families and youth.”

Safe communities; resident involvement and positive police-community relations

Safety is a concern common to all communities. As a community issue, it was generally seen as the responsibility of all members in a community. As a gang issue, it was more often framed in terms of youth, parents, law enforcement and schools. School safety was most often considered critical to the reduction of youth violence. Opinions were divided about the success of efforts to strengthen community-police relations. Parents in several communities stated that communication with police officers has improved the gang situation and welcomed greater police visibility. Others were concerned that police were visible in some neighborhoods only after a mugging or a homicide. One parent questioned the logic of having law enforcement in the schools while parents are absent, while a young adult supported more police on campus because of the frequent intrusion of gang members. There was general praise for some LAPD programs like PAL, Kids Cop and others efforts that serve to break down negative barriers between youth and police.

Communities were also divided about the value of gang injunctions. Some parents and community-based groups felt that they were a significant strategy that served the community well. Others felt that injunctions provide a barrier to employment and a pretext for police harassment of gang youth and immigrant families. Former gang members made the observation that many immigrant families cannot identify gangs and miss the signs of gang membership in their children. Accessible and affordable public transportation was framed as both a safety and parenting issue (e.g., teens cannot use public transportation to access programs if they cross gang boundaries; parents in Wilmington travel two hours on a bus to reach a middle school because there is no direct route).
“Kids don’t listen to you, they watch you.” “We need protection. Stop the drive-bys.” “The new police captain has been very helpful.” “We have programs like ‘Safe Passages’ but they still need funding; 5 people can’t walk 100 kids.” “If we expect to bridge community and law enforcement, we need to see community members in law enforcement.”

- **Policies and funding that allow all youth and families to participate in programs and receive services, including immigrant families**

  Policy changes that will facilitate participation of at-risk youth and families in programs were identified by several groups. For example, City-funded programs were perceived to be selective because of the eligibility criteria and the fact that the District Attorney’s assistance to victims of crimes is available to those not involved in gangs. Similarly, youth will not participate in programs that have a “zero tolerance” policy. And many groups noted the need to address the Federal prohibition against the use of public funds for services to undocumented youth and families.

  Questions were raised in two meetings whether funding from Proposition 49, 21st Century and other special initiatives for after-school programs were addressing the gang problem and providing the kinds of services needed on school campuses.

  The equitable distribution of resources to prevention, intervention and suppression was supported as a desired goal. But there was concern about the lack of a stable funding stream equal to the task. An increase in the sales tax or a similar mechanism was suggested to ensure funding over a longer period of time and to safeguard the funding from shifting political priorities. This would also make multi-year funding more feasible, providing programs more flexibility to do longer-term planning.

  “People have been doing this work for a long time and are still not receiving the funding they need while law enforcement receives millions of dollars.” “...there are huge discrepancies in funding...we need Bridges counselors, a good teen center, programs with a bus to pick up kids after school and drop them where their parents can pick them up after work. We don’t have this in our community. It’s not fair.”

- **Program accountability with better tools for evaluation; community and City agencies working together to define “success”, success measures and program standards**

  Community-based organizations generally agree that all City-funded projects must be held accountable for results and the deliverables promised under City funding agreements. But there is also strong agreement that City agencies and providers must work together to reshape the City’s data collection and evaluation systems to include qualitative as well as quantitative measures. Organizations need tools to do proper evaluation based on common definitions and agreed-upon measures. By working together, City funders and service providers should agree on more relevant measures of success.

  The widely held perception among intervention providers is that organizations that succeed in their work receive less funding compared to those who do not. They agree that much better data is required to establish baselines, set priorities and measure progress. “What works” is a partnership between the City and other stakeholders to select appropriate indicators and put an evaluation process in place that will be less burdensome to City-funded agencies. The time currently required to compile data, prepare
reports and deal with City paperwork is considered to be a poor use of scarce staff resources. One group made the suggestion that the City be responsible for evaluation through site visits and other methodologies.

“We need to show results.” “The City is fixated on numbers. They don’t talk about qualitative work which takes more time and relationship building.” “The parts of the City that are being more effective because of collaboration are being penalized for being more successful.” “We have to go to the City leaders and require more accountability (for City funds).” “We need a centralized network for programs that keeps them accountable for the use of funds.” “We need stats to support the need.”

- Better informed funders and public officials

Participants in several communities suggested that a concerted effort should be made to discuss with individuals who control significant public and private dollars how gang issues reflect the general health of the City and what is happening with families who are just surviving. That it will be necessary to raise the profile of the issue by funding media campaigns to explain the problem and get many more people involved. Business owners, prominent citizens, upscale residents and celebrities also have a stake in the City.

“Funders have to know the reality of living in these communities.” “When there are killings, our elected officials should speak out.” “We must have a public statement from City leaders that youth are a priority and that funding will follow that priority.”

Other Observations/Suggestions:

- Reasonable expectations work. “Evidence-based” is the new ‘silver bullet’. Reasonable expectations apply to programs as well.
- Judges and district attorneys must get involved with a new vision and a new mandate. Their decisions must better reflect what people are doing on the front lines and not view suppression as the only option.
- Gentrification is pushing families into communities with more gang activity. Low income housing is needed.
- Community-owned organizations that are perceived to have “gone corporate” must be held accountable for how they are investing funds in the community.
- The City should develop a resource guide or website through each Council office.
- Designate Vermont-Manchester as a “safe corridor” project.

Community Resources

A number of organizations, programs, institutions and community groups were identified during the community forums. This information will be included in the Advancement Project Team’s analysis of community assets and best practices to be considered in developing recommendations to the City Council.

Acknowledgement
This report cannot adequately capture the many voices we heard in communities across the City over a period of about six weeks. But we have attempted to provide a snapshot of the experience as we listened to residents of all ages and backgrounds who care about the future of children and youth in Los Angeles. Everyone we met had something to offer and many are working every day to make Los Angeles a better place in which to live. We thank them for their candor and willingness to share their knowledge to help inform the Advancement Project’s effort to develop recommendations for a gang activity reduction strategy in the coming months. We extend a special thanks to the members of the Community Advisory Team and our hosts who organized the forums in very short order and made this process possible. (See Attachment B.)
GANG ACTIVITY REDUCTION STRATEGY

Community Advisory Team

East/Northeast
Norma Cervantes  Roosevelt High School – Healthy Start
Rick Hernandez  Variety Boys and Girls Club
Tammy Membreno  Barrio Action Youth & Family Services

Central L.A.
Robert Aguayo  El Centro del Pueblo
Larry Lue  Chinatown Service Ctr.
Susan J. Rabinovitz  Children’s Hospital Los Angeles
Angela Sambrano  CARECEN

University Park/South L.A.
Saundra Bryant  All People’s Christian Center
Marqueece Dawson  Community Coalition
Arturo Ybarra  Watts Century Latino Organization

North San Fernando Valley
Robert Arias  Communities in Schools
Maritza de Artan  Casa Esperanza, Blythe Street Project

Mid San Fernando Valley
Monica Austin-Jackson  New Directions for Youth
Maggie Cervantes  Tierra del Sol/New Economics for Women

Venice/ South Bay
Connie Calderon  Wilmington Teen Center
Steve Clare  Venice Community Housing Corp,
Gloria Lockhart  Toberman Settlement House

Citywide
Rev. Frank Alton  Immanuel Presbyterian Church
Sylvia Drew Ivie  The California Endowment, Consultant

Staff:  Leticia Ramirez, Advancement Project
        Cecilia M. Sandoval, The Sandoval Group
# COMMUNITY FORUMS & FOCUS GROUPS

August – September, 2006

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<th>AREA</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<td>Barrio Action Youth &amp; Family Svcs Roosevelt Healthy Start Center</td>
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<td>All People’s Christian Center</td>
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<td>Bethel AME Church South Los Angeles</td>
<td>All People’s Christian Center Community Coalition</td>
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<td>CD 15</td>
<td>Sat. 8/26</td>
<td>Watts Century Latino Orgz. Watts</td>
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<td>CD 15</td>
<td>Mon. 9/18</td>
<td>Office of Councilwoman J. Hahn Watts</td>
<td>Watts Gang Task Force</td>
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<td>CD 1, 4, 13</td>
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<td>Korean Youth &amp; Community Ctr Koreatown</td>
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<td>CD 6,7</td>
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<td>Pacoima Community Center Pacoima</td>
<td>Communities in Schools</td>
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**Community Forums and Focus Groups held in Phase III:**

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<th>Convener</th>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Justice Coalition</td>
<td>11/1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Issues Breakfast Forum</td>
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<td>Peace over Violence Domestic Violence service provider focus group</td>
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<td>East/Northeast</td>
<td>Central L.A. (Pico Union)</td>
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<td>What Works</td>
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<td>Jobs for youth</td>
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<td>After School programs</td>
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<td>Comprehensive programs and mentoring</td>
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<td>Providing safe spaces for youth, including weekends</td>
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<td>Meeting basic family needs; parent education</td>
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<td>Collaboration and communication among community-based organizations</td>
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<td>Using ex-gang members to reach youth</td>
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<td>(Parents and youth)</td>
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<td>Jobs and job training</td>
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<td>Education and culture</td>
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<td>Start early – 4th grade</td>
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<td>Parenting education</td>
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<td>Centers for youth and families</td>
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<td>Art and music</td>
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<td>Mentoring and mediators</td>
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<td>Collaboration and teamwork</td>
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<td>What Works</td>
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<td>Experienced workers</td>
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<td>Support children and youth</td>
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<td>Begin young (Head Start, 5th grade)</td>
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<td>More programs/spaces for youth</td>
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<td>Support families; provide parent education</td>
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<td>Quality of school education</td>
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<td>Low income housing (impact of gentrification)</td>
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<td>Help ex-felons get jobs (delete ID box)</td>
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<td>(Hollywood)</td>
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<td>Accessible programs</td>
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<td>Programs for targeted youth populations</td>
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<td>Staff knowledgeable about community</td>
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<td>Partnerships and collaboration</td>
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<td>Strengthen schools and change teacher attitudes</td>
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<td>Begin early (elementary; grades 2-5)</td>
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<td>Parent involvement/education</td>
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<td>What Works</td>
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<td>More programs/right programs</td>
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<td>Programs that build on what youth like (art, music); their interests</td>
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<td>Youth employment</td>
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<td>Space and community centers</td>
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<td>Comprehensive approach/use assets differently.</td>
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<td>Stronger neighborhoods</td>
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<td>Collaboration; combine resources</td>
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<td>Higher expectations re. education of children and youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gang prevention program in every middle school; different approaches</td>
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<td>Copy gang intervention programs of the 1970s</td>
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<td>East/Northeast</td>
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<td><strong>What/Who must be Included in Strategy</strong></td>
<td><strong>What/Who must be Included in Strategy</strong> (Pico Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ex-gang members</td>
<td>- Involve everyone in forming strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Centralize data/documentation for programs</td>
<td>- View violence from health perspective – drug problem, double identities, tattoo removal etc</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Human relations training for youth</td>
<td>- Invest in education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Hold parents accountable</td>
<td>- Wrap around services for families</td>
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<tr>
<td>- LAUSD commitment</td>
<td>- Invest in violence prevention/families</td>
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<tr>
<td>- LAPD responsible to the community</td>
<td>- Public statements from city leaders that youth are a priority and fund it</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Preventive aspect to law enforcement job</td>
<td>- All agencies have a youth component</td>
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<td>- Create a sense of community in neighborhoods.</td>
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<td>- Value neighborhood identities and culture.</td>
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<td>- Law enforcement refer youth to services</td>
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<td>- Implement Special Order 40</td>
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<th>Venice</th>
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<td><strong>What Works (University Park)</strong></td>
<td><strong>What Works (Watts TF)</strong></td>
<td><strong>What Works</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- More youth programs</td>
<td>- Availability of resources</td>
<td>- Support education-related efforts</td>
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<td>- Involving parents and adults</td>
<td>- Community-based &amp; operated programs</td>
<td>- Better schools</td>
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<td>- Mentors</td>
<td>- Holding groups accountable</td>
<td>- Accountability (begin at the top)</td>
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<td>- Jobs and job training for youth</td>
<td>- Holding City officials accountable</td>
<td>- Value kids</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Collaboration/coordination of resources</td>
<td>- Safe environments in schools</td>
<td>- Link prevention and Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collaboration with schools and colleges</td>
<td>- Parents and schools working together</td>
<td>- Collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Acknowledge differences between the roles of prevention, intervention and suppression</td>
<td>- Alternatives to arrest</td>
<td>- An entity/facilitator to help us collaborate</td>
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<td>- Counseling for youth</td>
<td>- Quality programs</td>
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<td>- Parent involvement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Parenting/family classes</td>
<td>- A different approach to evaluation</td>
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<td>- Activities for youth</td>
<td>- Funding and flexibility in defining</td>
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</table>
**Efforts and how they link up**
- Intervention done well means good outreach methods
- A holistic approach

**Government resources**
- Parents & Youth
  - Job opportunities
  - Focus youth on attending college
  - Police presence
  - Activities for young people
  - Parental involvement
  - Parent support/parenting classes
  - Education
  - Positive role models
  - Sport programs and safe transportation
  - Safety in neighborhoods/parks

**Success**
- Involve upscale residents
- Police officers from our community
- Change “us v. them” attitudes

**What/Who must be included in Strategy**
- Organize. Designate Vermont-Manchester a “Safe Corridor” project
- Grassroots movement to link people with resources
- Everyone in the community involved
- Change priorities – better coordinate limited resources
- Connect parents and gang members to services
- Deal with hard core gang members -different values
- More funding for intervention
- A coordinated effort – stop working in silos

**What/Who must be included in Strategy**
- Ministers/counselors
- The community
- Parents
- Schools
- Community oversight for policing
- Peace process coordinator
- Dept of Youth & Community Dev.
- Community volunteers
- Program audits
- Inclusive process with youth, parents, leaders (Latino and African American)
- Local board members for programs
- Leadership development

**What/Who must be included in Strategy**
- Collaboratives
- More people involved
- Judges and DA’s better reflect what people are doing on frontlines
- Gather statistics to help collaboration
- Politicians speak out, get media attention
- Educate business owners, celebrities (visibility)
- Long-term programs/resources for hard core gang members
- Link prevention and intervention
- Reform criminal justice system and prisons, penal codes
- Employers hire people w/records
- Neighborhood councils
- Ongoing sustained source of funding
- Faith-based ministry working with the incarcerated and their families
- Use County resources
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<tr>
<th>North SFV</th>
<th>Mid SFV</th>
<th>South Bay</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Works</strong> (Pacoima)</td>
<td><strong>What Works</strong> (Parents - Panorama City)</td>
<td><strong>What Works</strong> (San Pedro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Acknowledge and reward successful intervention efforts</td>
<td>- Parents informed re. programs available</td>
<td>- Serve entire family</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Collaboration (equitable model of prevention, intervention and suppression)</td>
<td>- Leadership programs for youth</td>
<td>- Early education</td>
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<td>- Comprehensive asset-based approach</td>
<td>- Programs in libraries and parks</td>
<td>- Parent education</td>
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<td>- Respect hard core gang intervention efforts</td>
<td>- Community-police relations</td>
<td>- Intervention (1 on 1)</td>
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<td>- Better tools for evaluation – more than quantitative measures</td>
<td>- Church programs</td>
<td>- Programs that broaden youth’s perspectives</td>
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<td>- Resources for the long term</td>
<td>- Vigilance in apartment buildings</td>
<td>- Successful schools</td>
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<td>- Youth centers and after-school programs</td>
<td>- Positive working relationships in neighborhood</td>
<td>- Collaboration among agencies</td>
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<td>- Understanding changing youth environment</td>
<td>- Peace marches</td>
<td>- Political support, open-minded leaders</td>
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<td>- Parental involvement</td>
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<td>(Wilmington)</td>
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<td>- Encourage/support system change</td>
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<td>- Police presence, positive relationships</td>
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<td>- Revive successful programs of the 1970s and ‘80s when all kids could participate</td>
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<td>- Parent involvement and support of parents</td>
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<td>- Educate funders and City leaders</td>
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<td>- More programs for youth</td>
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<td>- Fund existing programs like the Teen Center</td>
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<td>- Experienced adults helping kids on the streets</td>
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<td>- Start early (middle school)</td>
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<td>- More funding and resources for programs</td>
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<td>- Jobs for youth</td>
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<td>North SFV</td>
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<td>What/Who must be included in Strategy</td>
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<td>What/Who must be Included in Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Workforce development</td>
<td>▪ Everyone must be involved</td>
<td>(San Pedro)</td>
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<td>▪ Legislation re. background checks</td>
<td>▪ Parents especially</td>
<td>▪ Schools – LAUSD</td>
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<td>and identifying as felons</td>
<td>▪ Parent accountability for their children</td>
<td>▪ LAUPD</td>
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<td>▪ Hold City accountable for evaluation, not</td>
<td>▪ Neighborhood councils</td>
<td>▪ Existing program</td>
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<td>nonprofits</td>
<td>▪ Evening curfew for youth and vigilance</td>
<td>▪ Ex-gang members</td>
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<td>▪ Equitable mode: prevention, intervention</td>
<td>▪ Job skills training for youth</td>
<td>▪ Churches</td>
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<td>and suppression</td>
<td>▪ Community service/volunteering</td>
<td>▪ Job training facilities</td>
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<td>▪ Evaluate workers - care for youth</td>
<td>▪ Jobs and programs for gang-involved</td>
<td>▪ Youth</td>
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<td>▪ Programs drive evaluation</td>
<td>youth</td>
<td>▪ Parents</td>
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<td>▪ Equity in pay – city v. nonprofit workers</td>
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<td>▪ Mentors</td>
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<td>(Wilmington)</td>
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<td>▪ Councilmember</td>
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<td>▪ Parents</td>
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<td>▪ Counselors in schools and on the streets</td>
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<td>▪ Schools</td>
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<td>▪ Faith-based groups</td>
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<td>▪ Transportation</td>
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<td>Current &amp; Former Gang Members</td>
<td>Current &amp; Former Gang Members -Youth</td>
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<td>▪ More gang intervention programs</td>
<td>▪ More programs and opportunities in our neighborhood</td>
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<td>▪ Funding for proven intervention programs</td>
<td>▪ Staff who are interested and give us attention</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Better schools and teachers who are interested in their students</td>
<td>▪ Access to programs in open youth-friendly spaces like parks (not in office buildings with security guards)</td>
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<td>▪ Understanding the culture of communities</td>
<td>▪ Need to know about programs</td>
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<td>▪ Community development/housing</td>
<td>▪ Involve youth in research, decision-making and in developing strategies and programs</td>
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<td>▪ Jobs and support for ex-felons trying to change their lives</td>
<td>▪ Abolish discrimination by raising awareness and sensitivity</td>
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<td>▪ Stop police harassment</td>
<td>▪ Teach conflict resolution skills in schools</td>
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<td>▪ Collaboration and joint efforts</td>
<td>▪ Identify sources of violence (i.e. socio-economic, discrimination, gentrification etc.)</td>
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<td>▪ Prevention efforts including sports, mentors, parks, caring adults</td>
<td>▪ Reframe image of youth in the community</td>
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<td>▪ Reframe cultural norms around violence</td>
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<td>▪ Spend dollar-for dollar to match intervention funding with law enforcement funding</td>
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<td>▪ Set up community hearings to educate the community</td>
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<td>▪ Create safe spaces where youth can express themselves and their concerns about law enforcement and work together on solutions</td>
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<td>▪ Create legislation to give youth something of benefit such as mandatory job training</td>
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<td>▪ Create ‘safe havens’ in all communities for youth to express themselves freely, obtain services for youth and their families, and help develop the next generation of leaders</td>
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The proposed City Entity and Regional Entity Charts identify a Neighborhood Task Force/Entity structure that effectively will allow schools within a high school feeder pattern to organize (as some already have) into a “school/neighborhood safety” collaborative. Members of this collaborative would include representatives of the high school, its feeder middle and elementary schools in addition to key civic, business, and law enforcement representatives. These collaboratives could be sub-units of larger school cluster/community-based organizations, as in the Boyle Heights Learning Collaborative (BHLC), or could be stand alone entities as in the San Pedro School Safety Collaborative. In Boyle Heights, a BHLC Steering Committee comprised of school and community leaders, is co-chaired by the City Councilman, Jose Huizar, and the School Board representative, Monica Garcia. Active participants include representatives of the Hollenbeck Police Department, White Memorial Hospital, PUENTE Learning Center, Proyecto Pastoral at Dolores Mission, Inner City Struggle, California State University, Los Angeles, East Los Angeles Community College, Hollenbeck Bridges Program, Youth Opportunity Program, Junior Achievement, East Los Angeles Community Corporation (ELACC), New Schools Better Neighborhoods, and other organizations important to the health and welfare of the community. The BHLC Steering Committee receives a report at every meeting from law enforcement, which is amplified/clarified and improved upon by school and community members. Each principal and community leader makes appropriate use of the information within their own organization to take action in reducing and/or eliminating gang activity. The essential element of a
“school/neighborhood” safety task force would be planning, implementation/coordination, and evaluation at a grassroots level of gang violence prevention and intervention strategies which incorporates and integrates the reality and the challenges within the schools, its turf, and its community. Information sharing, joint planning, and shared resources would help streamline disparate and sometimes smaller and isolated efforts that exist within the neighborhood “system.” The outcomes of such a strategy could result in the following:

1) A reduction in school truancy; which limits gang activity and helps improve academic achievement;

2) Development of cluster-wide commitment/action to address gang related problems by sharing resources and information;

3) Increased information for parents and pooled resources for parental support and involvement;

4) Communication and engagement with neighborhood business and civic leaders; and

5) Increased advocacy for prevention programs within schools and neighborhoods.

The current strategy proposed by Mayor Villaraigosa to manage 3 of the lowest performing clusters of schools would fit well with this proposed strategy. These clusters are surely to be located in communities that suffer from the lack of organized social capital, bookstores and libraries, after-school enrichment opportunities, parental engagement in schools and other community/school educational and enrichment opportunities for children and their families. These three school clusters will also gain the support and involvement of important civic, business and community leaders and make gang prevention an issue that can be embedded and
addressed throughout the education, family, and community development that would accompany the Mayor’s strategy.

A quality education is the best antidote to gang involvement. Education is a 24-hour enterprise taking place at home, in the community and in the schools. Yet schools have been charged to do all things for students who can’t depend on their families and their communities to provide fully for all their needs. This initiative provides yet another opportunity to communicate that education and gang prevention are inter-related, that they are everybody’s concern, and that accountability for use of funds and for outcomes produced by these must be shared by members of the neighborhood and its schools.
Introduction

Each year, hundreds of men, women and children are needlessly murdered in the streets of Los Angeles because of gang violence. Against the odds, the City sponsors a few dozen Gang Intervention Workers to stem the tide of homicides, assaults and other criminal activities by these misdirected youths. Supported by a loose network of social workers and other service providers, the City’s system of combating youth violence is nonetheless akin to filling the Grand Canyon with a shovel.

Despite fiscal limitations, the City continues to support programs that in many respects are at the fore of our national knowledge about the control and reduction of youth violence. This section provides some review of lessons learned locally and across the Country to combating gang violence and reclaiming our youths and communities by actively engaging that sector that is directly responsible for interacting with current, former and potential gang members.

History

Direct intervention with troubled youths has been a public charge since early in the 19th Century. More recently, our major urban centers have struggled to deal with the direct and indirect effects of youth gang violence. Since the 1950’s, cities across America have established programs to work with this population, with the general intent of helping to reintegrate them into the mainstream culture.

Beyond incarceration, efforts have varied from helping youths get back into schools or alternative schools, providing job training, offering socialization and recreational opportunities, and other forms of personal development. The City of Los Angeles followed this pattern with Youth Workers employed through the Recreation and Parks Department until the late 1970’s when Proposition 13 forced the program to be cut.

Following an immediate increase in violence, the City and County partnered to create Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS). Patterned after the Philadelphia Model, CYGS used former gang members and other street savvy individuals to work with gangs as well as individuals in reducing gang-related violence. While CYGS was responsible for mitigating gang violence county-wide, their budget was never more than $4 million. When it closed in 1995, the combined budget for intervention was $2.5 million.

Following the closing of CYGS, the City distributed funds to nonprofit agencies to continue the work with gangs and their members. Generally, this reallocation promoted the same type of work as before, although with little coordination between these programs. These programs were also not required to provide substantive evaluation other than process-type reporting. As well, there was no strong guidance given to the balance between creating change in the individual or the group.

With the advent of Bridges in 1998, agencies were provided opportunities to create programs that reflected local needs. However, and as before, there was no guidance on the balance between individual reclamation or building peace between rivals. Currently, the Bridges
agencies do include a solid component of individual reclamation, in part because Federal funding (CDBG) requires job readiness. And, while the most recent Request for Proposals (2003) and subsequent Requests for Contract Renewals require addressing the peace process, there are no outcome objectives for this area. Rather, ‘any ‘success’ in this area is left to the individual contractors to address.

**Defining Intervention**

“Gang Intervention” has been loosely defined as any activity designed to help an active gang member become a functional member of the larger society. This definition also incorporates efforts to keep gang members from degrading their communities through violent acts. Therefore, gang intervention includes efforts directed at both the individual and the group. These efforts can be directed to any ethnic group although specific approaches may vary. As well, these varying approaches also recognize that both young men and women can get caught up in the gang lifestyle.

Individual reclamation includes getting a youth back into school or an alternative educational institution, helping with pending court cases, providing job readiness skills and job placement, counseling, therapy, family support and myriad other services. In many cases, Gang Workers are also mentors to the youths that they work with regularly.

The group process typically revolves around mediating or mitigating gang warfare. Historically, intervention programs have been concerned with ‘putting out fires’, that is, limiting retaliation to an act, or mediating an on-going feud. Gang Workers often act in a manner similar to shuttle diplomacy, going between neighborhoods to resolve disagreements so that tensions are reduced. Often, the best that can be done is to create agreements on how two groups can effectively avoid each other. In some cases, however, Intervention Workers are able to create ‘understandings’ between groups that effectively help both sides to understand that the other is the same in all aspects but the turf that they claim. This latter circumstance comes close to acting on the nature of gang violence as group suicide.

An advanced form of the group process is the peace process that has been used effectively in Los Angeles for over a decade. This approach relies on the formation of peace agreements or other formal or semi-formal relations between a number of gangs. The early 1990’s saw several such opportunities, including the Watts Peace Treaty, Harbor Area Truce and Valley Unity Peace Treaty. Significant components of the latter two remain in effect today.

The theoretical underpinnings of gang intervention are found in the Sociology of Knowledge (SOK). Also known as Phenomenology, the Sociology of Knowledge (SOK) is that branch of sociology that explains how reality and/or knowledge is created. Knowledge is what one believes to be true and accurate, and forms the basis for their individual thoughts and actions. SOK is a recognized theoretical training ground for professionals—gang intervention workers, planners, social workers, etc.—who work in the open community because it provides them with the ability to coin sensitizing concepts that identify what is happening in the field with their direct work with the target populations.
Alternation: Alternation is one such sensitizing concept. This concept is the phenomenological mechanism for reality transformation: replacing existent realities and worldviews with alternative structures and perceptions.

For Gang Intervention Workers (GIW’s), alternation is replacing anti-social values and behavior with those that are pro-social. All gang intervention work is based on the concept of alternation. Gang Intervention Workers are properly known as “reality alternators”. Knowledge of the alternation process enables gang intervention workers and case managers to transform the reality and value structures that set gangs into violent activities as well as locking one into gang life. Such radical life changes make alternation the most powerful theory and methodology available to gang workers and case managers working with gangs (Berger & Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality, pages 157-161).

Community organizers unite inner-city residents into neighborhood organizations empowering them to deal with public and private sector policy decisions and actions impacting the neighborhood. This process finds the organizer gathering a large and representative cross sample of the area. The leaders that develop through this process undergo a life transforming experience in that they become expert at the exercise of power and how to use that power to overcome both public and private sector barriers to individual, family and community growth.

GIW's perform similar work in gang-impacted neighborhoods. The difference is that they focus specifically on building a gang peace and youth development infrastructure by uniting gang members and their families for these goals.

The leaders that emerge from this process are usually existent gang leaders with a lengthy history of profiting from their neighborhood’s negative activities. The leaders’ transformation through the alternating process finds them morphing into dedicated and effective peace makers. They lead their “homies” to the peace table with other gang members and gang leaders.

Local peace-building efforts that harness or embrace all of the gangs in a given geographic neighborhood are networked with neighboring peace networks. These networks develop into regional and multi-regional peace tables as they involve more gangs. For instance, the 1993 Watts Peace focused initially on the gangs within the Housing Authority properties, but soon came to include surrounding neighborhoods who sought the opportunity for a cessation of violence.

Stages of Alternation: Alternation occurs on both an institutional and individual level. In the world of gang peace mediation, the alternation process starts on the institutional level and then works its way down to the individual level.

Whether it is the alternation of a gang or an individual gang member, the alternation process goes through several stages of development, including:

1) **A License to Operate:** The gang workers secure the trust and support of the gang leaders and thus the members.
2) **Preliminary challenging and softening the reality**: The gang workers challenge the gang’s need for warfare and the individual gang member’s participation in gang life.

3) **Preliminary alternation/mediation**: Gang leaders agree to meet with hated rivals to begin discussing the end of warfare between their respective neighborhoods.

4) **Mid stage alternation**: The leaders actively participate in peace tables, and assist the gang intervention workers in reaching out to the gangs that are not at the table.

5) **Full group alternation**: The peace tables become multi-regional in nature and gang motivated warfare has ended.

6) **Full individual alternation**: The Gang workers refer individual clients identified through the peace process to case managers who develop case plans to transform the individual lives. Grief relief counseling frees individuals from the post traumatic stress disorder stemming from years of urban violence. Drug rehabilitation, vocational training, entrepreneurial development, etc. are just some of the services that further the life transformation.

The result is more than just pacification. Total alternation means a complete change in values and life styles. The majority of the gang members stop the gang warfare. As the years of hate and violence move into the background, the gang members go through life transforming processes through case management and mentoring.

The central role of gang intervention workers (GIWs) in addressing these barriers is that of a mentor. They guide gang members into the steps to take and values to embrace in order to achieve alternation. GIW are natural mentors because of their own experiences with exiting gangs. Their recovery provides insight into the thinking and actions of gang members. This insight includes the “love” commitment made to gangs, and how daily violence and trauma induces post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD can generate the chemical abuse, anxiety, and rage that typifies gang life. This insight helps GIW form bonds of trust and respect - the license to operate - with gang members.

GIW’s use this license to mentor gang members into alternation. Alternation - or cognitive reframing - is the primary objective of GIWs because it allows the reclamation of gang members and redirection to positive life outcomes. Mentors foster alternation by annihilating gang mentality and teaching gang members new and independent ways of thinking about operating in society. GIWs then refer clients to case managers, and see to it that clients follow through by formulating and implementing a case plan that eliminates barriers that are keeping the client from exiting gangs.

Because breaking the gang’s hold is initially a destabilizing experience, the GIW must establish alternative support systems for alternating gang member to embrace. Options may include providing support groups for exiting gang members. Using alternatives of the 12-step recovery methodology, GIW’s turn exiting gang members into missionaries motivated by the change to reclaim other gang members. A second strategy is to help the parents of recovering gang members through parenting classes. The resultant strengthening of the family unit makes it an emotional support system that replaces the gang.
There is one further step where alternation is relevant and necessary. That is alternating the neighborhoods where gang members live and operate. It's necessary to transform the socio-economic conditions that give rise to the formation and continued existence of gangs. It is essential to build in a community organizing that would include both youth organizing and adult organizing components.

This action would accomplish several things:

1) Youth Organizing would provide a structural mechanism or outlet for "recovering" or "alternating" gang members to engage in positive constructive collective action that would be healing to the individuals, as well their parents and the larger community. This would provide a supportive group activity that could substitute for some of the attractive collective elements that the gang experience provides. Moving gang members out of the collective experience of the gang - which obviously has some positive group support elements - into a very individualized alternation model would be necessary, but not sufficient for a full alternation process. A community organizing component would be complementary, not mutually exclusive, with the final steps of the process described above.

2) Separate but complementary community organizing by adults in the community could:
   a) Provide allies for youth organizing projects seeking to change a whole range of conditions of direct self interest concern to young people;
   b) Incorporate support groups for parents of current & alternating gang members; and
   c) Do "traditional" community organizing to change larger neighborhood conditions (employment opportunities, education, housing, public safety, etc.) that breed gangs in the first place.

An added note, is that there is growing hard empirical evidence that crime, violence and other negative indicators—including drug use, teen pregnancy, school drop outs, etc—are reduced when social capital is increased, while positive outcomes rise, such as health and mental health, educational attainment, and civic participation. A very effective way to generate social capital is through community organizing.

A community organizing component that includes both youth and adult projects is an essential piece of the alternation strategy.

A Review of Service Types

Phase II of this study included a review of gang intervention strategies in the Los Angeles area and elsewhere across the Country. That review yielded four types of intervention approaches. Each attempts to create the individual or group change described above through rather unique strategies. The approaches are:

- The Community Control model refers to programs that stress controlling violence through a strong police presence. The primary partners are local and regional Law Enforcement offices, Probation Officers, and prosecutors. In most cases, community organizations, including individuals who are considered street-smart, are used as
intermediaries and to let youths know that continued violence will result in immediate and heavy pursuit and prosecution.

- **Hard-core** Intervention programs are designed to work with youths to reduce the immediate causes of violence. Generally, street workers attempt to broker peace between warring factions, or intervene prior to any occurrence of violence. The peace-building process takes the mediation a step further by building on the relationships with gang leadership to create any of various types of cessation to violence. Peace Treaties, truces, cease fires and other relationships are used to describe a process to manage violence by eliminating or reducing violence, often before it happens. The Workers will manage a regular meeting (or act through “shuttle diplomacy”) to mediate between neighborhoods. Typically, these workers are ‘street-savvy’; oftentimes, they can be former gang members.

- **Community Service**: describes programs that support personal development of current or potential gang members. In these cases, the outreach effort is often designed to let violent or criminal youths understand that they are being targeted for arrest and prosecution, and that participation in some form of personal development will offset the potential punitive actions. In other cases, community service providers will work with targeted youths to access various types of support, including counseling, job readiness, academic support, mental health counseling, family support and other related services. Staffing can often include a mix of street-savvy individuals who conduct outreach to well-trained and educated therapists.

- **Community-building**: These programs work to improve the overall livability of their community. Programs include economic development is partnership with job preparedness. Community maintenance may also be included in these programs.

It should be noted that most programs included a combination of all four types of programming. Most common are the Community Control and Community Services approaches, which to varying degrees are found within almost all of the programs reviewed. Another way to look at this interrelationship is that, while local communities may want to focus on preventing gang violence by interrupting the flow of youths into street gangs and reclaiming those who are already in, nonetheless, there is a need to manage those who are currently members of these gangs and continue to engage in violent acts.

In addition, there is a refinement on the Hard Core approach that is best characterized as a “Community Organizing” strategy. This strategy recognizes that at current resource levels, it is not possible to work directly with each gang member. Rather, Gang Workers interact with the leadership of each neighborhood, providing mentorship, guidance and alternatives to matching violence with violence. Often, it is a matter of gaining the trust of the gang leadership that in the event of conflict, they will contact a Gang Worker before striking out against the other. While this concept was also found in other locales, most notably Chicago, it was only in the local arena that this refinement was specified.

The Community Service model is, metaphorically, the Carrot. Services include the following:
Case Management is used to define an overall picture of a youth’s preparation to function in the larger society. Individual interests, risk factors, and environmental conditions are used to create an individual profile. Personal achievement is used to set a plan for establishing and achieving one’s life goals. Treatments can include testing for learning difficulties, life skill training, job preparedness, counseling, substance abuse treatment/counseling, and educational attainment. Case Managers will work with the client to map out the best ways to achieve the designated goals, and then monitor progress toward that end.

Job Development, training and placement: For many gang members, particularly those 17 years and older, getting a job is the end all. Not only does it provide an opportunity for stability, jobs also offer an alternative to the violence is usually an accents to the underground economy. As Father Greg Boyle is renowned for stating, “Nothing stops a bullet like a job.” However, given the economic state of the communities where gang violence is most prevalent, most youth do not have the opportunity to learn what it is like to have a job until later in life. Issues like showing up on time and every time, dressing appropriately, knowing how to interact with customers, are all relatively foreign concepts to anyone who has little practice in these capacities.

Likewise, many employers are reticent to hire gang members. Tattoos, sagging clothes and other physical elements of the gang lifestyle do not mix well in professional environments. Many youth need an appropriate environment to see the benefits of working and earning a living, which will in time prompt them to change their habits and presentation to more appropriate demeanors. Job placement programs recognize that entry level options must also be accepting of the youths and the obstacles that they face, and provide some tolerance of them. While it is not expected that employers should coddle their employees, job placement is critical in matching each youth to the right opportunity.

Ultimately, there are simply not enough jobs to go around within the confines of the communities where the most serious gang violence is found. Many areas still reel from the devastation caused by the industrial flight of the early 1980’s. Regional planners continually point to the disconnect between the locations of the workforce and the jobs. For young men and women who are looking for their first job, regardless of their circumstance, finding that job can in itself be a very disheartening experience. The need to promote job development in these areas of the City, ala the Community Development model, is promoted by many service providers.

Life Skills: Many youth never receive a functional understanding of what it takes to live day to day, let alone thrive - Most are in survival mode. Many factors contribute to this condition, including the inability of parents to provide adequate guidance throughout the youth’s life development, a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness, lack of positive role models at later developmental stages, and the lack of opportunity to practice living in the real world. Life skill curricula typically include the most common sense, day to day behaviors that these youth have not learned. Communication, responsibility, money management, and other concepts are laid out, usually in very straightforward, language. Generally, life skill curricula provide the tools for one to simply survive in the larger world outside the neighborhood.
Parenting: Through the intervention process, it is often discovered that parents and youth function in a weakened family structure with little or no parental control or oversight. Often, teens or even younger children run the family. In these situations, the youth often receive their emotional support and other perks from the gang who have displaced the family in this network of guidance and support. Parenting training enables the parent(s) to resume/assume control of the family unit and become a positive factor in moving their children past the gang and other negative street life. Parenting training mimics life skills training in many ways, while focusing primarily on family dynamics. Communications and internal responsibilities are prime components of these programs. Goal setting, joint decision-making and other practices are used to build a family’s resiliency while helping them as a unit to thrive despite obstacles.

Crisis Response/Grief Therapy: The City of Los Angeles has established a cadre of volunteers whose sole responsibility is to respond to the scene of violent events. In addition to gang shootings, Crisis Response teams assist at fires, serious traffic accidents, or other traumatic events. Responders will interact with victims, witnesses or family members who may be emotionally impacted by the occurrence, and where necessary help provide access to follow-up care.

Findings and Recommendations

The following section relates improvements to the current system of gang intervention as provided by the City. Current City expenditures cover less than two or three percent of active gang members. The mediation activities cover more, since the focus is on the group rather than the individual, yet best estimates are that only a quarter of gangs are currently engaged by a gang intervention program on a regular basis. In general, these recommendations are intended to create efficiencies and improve the effectiveness of these services.

Layered Services: The Case for Networking

Earlier it was noted that the City provides a number of distinct services to residents through a rather uncoordinated process. Included are hard core gang intervention, case management, parenting, academic enrichment, after-school recreational and social programs, job readiness and placement, mentoring and others.

The line between prevention and intervention is often blurred because youth do not fall easily into classifications of gang member or wanna-be by age or grade in school. So, while Middle Schools are the homes to many active gang members, programs like Bridges I tend to be prevention-focused.

Within intervention specifically, while a need exists to help alter both the individual and group, funded agencies struggle to do one or the other well, while attempting to do both with the same funds can impact the quality of either. As a result, the ultimate outcomes also become diluted.

Recommendation 1: The City should focus current Bridges II resources on hard core intervention. Contracted agencies should be encouraged to adopt a community organizing component to their hard core unit that would provide reclaimed youths the opportunity to redirect their inherent leadership capabilities to the benefit of the larger community.
network of case management and job training programs should be created and expanded at least to those areas covered by City gang intervention contractors. If possible, one agency or department should be used for this purpose; however, it is possible that the network can include both the agency and nonprofit service providers for these strata.

**Recommendation 2:** Each agency funded by the City should be required to submit an annual workplan that identifies the gangs that they will be working with in the coming year. The workplan should outline a plan for the year with each gang that follows the following stages of work:

- Establish relationship with gang
- Established License to Operate
- Individual Reclamation of youth
- Mediation/Pace Process
- Peace Table Participant
- Maintenance of relationship and peace

The workplan should identify, by neighborhood, their current status and where the agency intends to get over that year.

As part of the plan, every known gang should be identified, even though the agency might not have intentions or resources to work with that group during the upcoming year. Nevertheless, this will give the City a better idea of the level of gang activity across the City.

**Recommendation 3:** The City should examine all funding to nonprofit agencies whose service target the 14 to 24 age group to see that opportunities exist to include gang-involved youths. Where services include outreach to high-risk youths, contracts for service should be modified to include the City contracted intervention agencies.

Staff Qualifications - As the City’s intervention services vary, so do the qualifications of their staff. All programs include a mix of former gang members, where the balance reflects an orientation toward individual or group reclamation. While each agency should be left to determine who specifically is best-suited to conducting hard core intervention, there are nonetheless some issues regarding staff qualifications.

**Recommendation 4:** Agencies conducting hard core intervention under contract to the City should adhere to the following:

- All staff should be subject to a background check. Sex crimes or crimes against minors should be cause for exclusion from hiring.
- Any current or potential staff member currently on Probation or Parole should officially notify their Parole or Probation Officer regarding their intent to work in this field.
- All staff should have a minimum a High School diploma or GED.
- The City should continue to require that each staff member complete the Youth and Gang Violence Intervention Specialist Training Program (Certificate Program) within their first year of employment.
• All staff should be required to complete at least 20 hours of training annually. Post-secondary education in a related field can qualify for this requirement.

Compensation-In the 2003 RFP, the City established an average compensation level for Intervention Workers. While this target served for planning purposes, it was disregarded by agencies after the fact, so that resources could be maximized (See “Scale, below). As a result, both salaries and fringe benefits vary greatly. In many cases, the low level of compensation negatively impacts the quality of services as trained, effective gang workers leave to pursue better paying opportunities. Likewise, minimal compensation negatively affects the relationship with peers in other sectors. Finally, minimal compensation can enhance the lure of the underground economy.

Recommendation 5: The City should, in concert with contracted gang intervention agencies, establish compensation ranges for Intervention Workers and supervisory personnel. These ranges should consider work and volunteer experience, completion of the Certificate Program, other personal advancements, and other factors to be mutually determined. The same process should be conducted for fringe benefits, with a differing scale similar to the City’s Living Wage Ordinance. This negotiation should be conducted to correspond with the City’s annual budget process.

Scale Issues-The level of investment in gang violence reduction does not allow adequate coverage of the City’s major crime hubs. While the focus on hard core intervention, combined with the planned approach proposed above creates greater efficiencies in this investment, there will nonetheless be a shortfall that will prohibit coverage to identified hot spots. An approach to this shortfall is to allow each gang intervention program to operate complementary components that at once establish a peace process while attending to the on-going violence among those neighborhoods who remain outside the formal program. Specifically, a cadre of staff from each agency should concentrate on ‘putting out fires’, that is, responding to random violence as they do now. A part of this effort will be to begin the process of building relationships with these neighborhoods that can later provide entree to the planned process identified earlier.

Recommendation 6: In advance of a better estimate of the number of gang-involved youths, funding for intervention should be doubled. In subsequent years, as Annual Workplans are developed, the City can adjust resources accordingly.

Evaluation: Certainly, it is important to identify the outcomes from the investments asked of the City. There are two forms of outcome measures that can be employed. Individual reclamation can be measured by the effectiveness of various treatments, including counseling and life skills training (criminal conduct, recidivism) and job training/placement (job retention). The group process can be evaluated by trending gang-motivated criminal activities in the areas targeted through the Annual Workplans.

Recommendation 7: The City should create an evaluation component that will provide on-going monitoring and evaluation of City-sponsored programs, including follow-up of case managed and other clients. As well, conduct regular assessments of the change in
levels of gang-motivated violence relative to the planned activities of the contracted gang intervention agencies.
Key Points in Street Gang Patterns and Policies:

The last three pages of the book list six suggestions for gang control policy that represents our summary views on the matter. After reviewing the book, I would highlight the following:

Definitions—of gang, of gang membership, of gang crime—matter! It’s critical to have a clear consensus on these definitions. Conceptual definitions need to be articulated in an operational form so that they can be applied with reliability for program targeting and evaluation purposes.

Interventions must be informed by reliable, local data and an awareness of the patterns evident in generic (research) data. Sole reliance on law enforcement data would be a limitation. Policies based on conventional wisdoms, ideology or political considerations will be less successful than those based on clear understandings of local and generic gang information.

There are a multiplicity of possible goals for gang control programs and policies—individual, group and community goals as these are related to prevention, intervention and suppression goals. Goals should be clearly articulated and program models carefully matched to the goals. Avoid programs that are narrow in scope, but beware the highly complex, comprehensive models—these require very close attention to implementation. “Make it like the picture.”

We advocate very careful targeting of programs and clients and maintaining the focus on gangs rather than delinquency more generally. Placing programs in locations demonstrating highest need and targeting youth most at risk for joining gangs is important. Programs should recognize peak joining ages (13-15), substantial female participation and gang-specific risk factors. Our review identified peer networks, non-delinquent problem behaviors, attitudes toward delinquency and parental supervision as key risk factors. Recognizing the strong, independent effects of gang membership on crime, intervention with lower risk youth, or those less gang-involved, will produce less crime reduction.

Over-reliance on law enforcement and suppression should be avoided, and increased attention paid to community contexts, group process and gang structures. The variety of gang structures and their fluidity should be recognized. Important also are group processes—the situational character of leadership, shifting levels of cohesiveness and varying commitments to the gang. Finally, gang control efforts should appreciate neighborhood processes, including informal social control and social organization.
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It is imperative that we develop a plan for the City of Los Angeles that includes both prevention and intervention. If we focus only on intervention and suppression for high-risk and gang involved youth, and use a law enforcement approach we will find that the results will be the same as they have been in the past, e.g. violent crime rates decrease as violent and crime involved youth are removed from the streets, but in another decade, when the youth now growing up do not receive the supportive and therapeutic support that they need, we will face another increase in gang and youth violence. This pattern is demonstrated in Los Angeles by tracking violent crime and homicide. We experience a dramatic increase beginning in the mid-1980s, followed by a dramatic decrease in the mid 1990s, we are now experiencing the beginning of an increase, and if we don’t take a long-term strategy, we will experience another increase. Once again, if all we do is what we have done in the past, we can expect the same result: a lull and then another increase in homicides and other violent crime.

Sustainability
In Fiscal Year 06/07 the State of California allocated 817.4 million dollars to California Youth Crime and Violence Prevention Programs in various state departments. The majority of the funds were allocated to the Department of Education, 550 million to After School Education and Safety Act, 17.4 million to School Safety Consolidated Competitive Grants, and 94.9 million to School Safety and Violence Prevention.\(^1\) However the majority of the funds not allocated to After School programs have been invested in school police and plans that are to be implemented after an incident has occurred. Few dollars are invested in prevention and youth development programs by the schools. At the same time the Corrections Standards Authority received 119.0 million to implement the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act.\(^2\) It is not clear how if at all these funds are reaching the City for prevention, and intervention programs to reduce youth and gang violence through strategies such as youth and child development. The Governor vetoed funds to address and support re-entry programs for youth.

Youth Development and funding
There is currently a unique opportunity for funding prevention and youth development. Funds from the mental health act can be accessed to assure that mental and emotional health screening and treatment is implemented for very young children (pre-school age), those 10-14, and youth between 14 and 21. Many of the very young children living in high risk, disorganized areas are witnesses and/or victims of community and family violence. These children are not now routinely screened at school entry for school

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\(^1\) Commonweal, the Juvenile Justice Program bulletin, October 2006.

\(^2\) Ibid.
readiness or for symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome disorder or other mental health problems. It is our recommendation that all children entering school for the first time be screened and those found to need mental health services are referred or provided those services in their community. In addition, it is recommended that children be screened again upon entrance to middle and high school. Children suffering mental and emotional health deficits cannot learn and are not likely to be successful in school. Such an ongoing strategy would help to reduce the dropout rate in Los Angeles Schools.

Ideally, each selected cluster should have a community coalition composed of community leaders, law enforcement, schools, parents, health and mental health care providers, community based agencies, local business leaders, policy makers, and youth. Each coalition or network should have a facilitator or convener. These neighborhood or cluster coalitions should be based on the Los Angeles VPC model, which has been successfully implemented in local communities, cities and counties across the Country. It is critical to assure that community based agencies include faith based; gang intervention, youth violence prevention, domestic violence programs, victims or survivors support services and other interested parties. It is important to have youth represented on the decision making body of the coalition on a regular basis, since they are the most likely victims of gun violence in the community, and actually are important in getting buy-in by the youth.

All staff in each program and cluster will receive training on child development and program objectives will be reviewed to assure that they are developmentally appropriate for the children that will be receiving services. In addition, we strongly recommend in-service training for all teachers, teachers aides, parents and caretakers to assure that the developmental needs of children and youth are understood and incorporated into all programs and services.

It is important for these groups to conduct a neighborhood assessment of the assets and deficits within the neighborhood, as part of the implementation of the program.

We strongly recommend that centers for healthy children and families be included in each of the clusters targeted for prevention, and intervention services. These centers established with a partnership with the LA Department of Public Health and the Department of Mental Health should be fully staffed with preventive health services, including screening for mental and physical health with staff with the knowledge and expertise to refer those children and families to appropriate mental and physical health services, as needed. Evidence suggests that those children exposed to violence at a very early age, actually have changes in brain structure as a result of such exposure and in order to interrupt the next cycle of gang joining and violence promoting youth, early intervention with mental health treatment is critical.

We recommend that each cluster should include programs that are age appropriate and have had rigorous evaluations. Currently the Nurse Family Partnership is being implemented by the Los Angeles County Public Health Department on a limited basis for high-risk parents identified in Public Health Clinics. Arrangements with and funding for the Nurse Family Partnership Program should be put in place in each cluster so that high
risk pregnant and parenting individuals can be enrolled in this program as they are identified.

Furthermore, every effort should be made to assure that all high-risk four year olds are enrolled in “Perry” pre-school programs in order to facilitate school readiness. When possible these pre-school sites should be located in the community at a neutral site, i.e. a community center, school based clinic, school or faith-based facility. It is imperative that these sites are monitored to assure that they are implemented as intended in the Perry Pre-school plan.

The clinic centers should also house employment training and referral services, assistance with tax preparation, assistance with food and housing as well as ongoing community based activities for youth and their families.

Kindergarten and elementary school children should receive as part of their ongoing curriculum training in handling conflict non-violently, bullying prevention, and mental health services as appropriate. There are strong evidence based programs available in each of the targeted areas. Children suffering from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) cannot learn. Local businesses can be enlisted to provide mentoring and support for the neighborhood center. It is also critical that all programs implanted collect appropriate data to assure that the programs are implemented with fidelity to the program goals and objectives.

All personnel must receive training in child and youth development to assure that the programs are responsive to the needs of the children.

Health services for children and parents who have lost a loved one to violence should also be made available.

After-school programs are not enough, we also must provide programs that engage all students interest, so the implementation of sports, music and arts programs must be added back to all of the school clusters.

Best and Promising Practices
The Chicago CeaseFire Project currently operating in 19 areas in Chicago shows great promise in reducing gang violence. The strategies are similar to the case management strategies used by Community Youth Gang Services, a gang intervention project in the LA area in the 1990s. The elements of such a comprehensive program exist in Los Angeles. However, significant re-design of the programs such as Bridges II would be required, training in data collection, restructuring of staff and training for individuals, former gang members, and outreach workers is needed to implement such a program in Los Angeles. The City of Chicago similarly to Los Angeles is also focusing on reducing the accessibility and access to handguns as a necessary component to reduce violent youth and gang activity.
Comprehensive strategies for high-risk and gang involved youth must provide services to the entire family including parents, and siblings to reduce the likelihood of adding to the multi-generational structure of gang involvement, and lifetime criminal behavior. Jobs, multi-systemic therapy, and particularly drug and alcohol treatment for substance abusing youth and parents must also be available within the community.

Special support services for children and youth of incarcerated parents, and parents serving in the current conflict overseas are imperative to prevent these children and youth from acting out and head-off depression and other common occurrences of children in these situations.

Programs that we recommend for implementation within the cluster sites and costs per pupil are listed below:

1. **Nurse-Family Partnership**\(^3\) (Formerly Prenatal and Infancy Home Visitation by Nurses), guided by a strong theoretical orientation, consists of intensive and comprehensive home visitation by nurses during a woman’s pregnancy and the first two years after birth of the woman’s first child. While the primary mode of service delivery is home visitation, the program depends upon a variety of other health and human services in order to achieve its positive effects.

Program Targets:

The program is designed to serve low-income, at-risk pregnant women bearing their first child. The program is currently being implemented in Los Angeles County by the LA County Public Health Department. A MOU would need to be initiated with the County to provide this program for all high-risk women within each cluster.

Program Content:

Nurse home visitors work with families in their homes during pregnancy and the first two years of the child’s life. The program is designed to help women improve their prenatal health and the outcomes of pregnancy; improve the care provided to infants and toddlers in an effort to improve the children’s health and development; and improve women’s own personal development, giving particular attention to the planning of future pregnancies, women’s educational achievement, and parents’ participation in the work force. Typically, a nurse visitor is assigned to a family and works with that family through the duration of the program.

Program Outcomes:

This program has been tested with both White and African American families in rural and urban settings. Nurse-visited women and children fared better than those assigned to control groups in each of the outcome domains established as goals for the program. In a 15-year follow-up study of primarily White families in Elmira, New York, findings showed that low-income and unmarried women and their children provided a nurse home visitor had, in contrast to those in a comparison group:

- 79% fewer verified reports of child abuse or neglect;
- 31% fewer subsequent births;
- an average of over two years’ greater interval between the birth of their first and second child;
- 30 months less receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children;
- 44% fewer maternal behavioral problems due to alcohol and drug abuse;
- 69% fewer maternal arrests;
- 60% fewer instances of running away on the part of the 15-year-old children;
- 56% fewer arrests on the part of the 15-year-old children; and
- 56% fewer days of alcohol consumption on the part of the 15-year-old children.

Program Costs:

The cost of the program was recovered by the first child’s fourth birthday. Substantial savings to government and society were calculated over the children’s lifetimes. In 1997, the two-and-a-half-year program was estimated to cost $3,200 per year per family during the start-up phase (the first three years of program operation) and $2,800 per family per year once the nurses are completely trained and working at full capacity. Actual cost of the program will vary depending primarily upon the salaries of local community-health nurses. Communities have used a variety of local, state, and federal funding sources to support the program, including Medicaid, welfare-reform, maternal and child health, and child abuse prevention dollars.

For all pre-school children in high risk families within each cluster:

2. Perry Pre-School Program\(^4\) provides high-quality early childhood education to disadvantaged children in order to improve their later school and life performances. The

intervention combats the relationship between childhood poverty and school failure by promoting young children’s intellectual, social and physical development. By increasing academic success, the Perry Preschool Project is also able to improve employment opportunities for its participants later on in life.

Program Targets:

The Project is aimed at low socioeconomic families who have children, ages 3 and 4.

Program Content:

The Perry Preschool Project is a two-year intervention that operates 2.5 hours per day, 5 days per week, for seven months per year, and includes weekly home visitations by teachers. Its success is largely due to the following components:

1. A developmentally appropriate curriculum that views children as active, self-initiated learners.
2. Small classrooms of no more than 20 children and at least 2 staff that allows a more supervised and supportive learning environment.
3. Staff who are trained in early childhood development and education, which receive supervision and on-going instruction, and who meet frequently with parents and other caregivers.
4. Sensitivity to the non-educational needs of disadvantaged children and their families, which includes providing meals and recommending other social service agencies.
5. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of both teachers’ activities and children’s behaviors and development.


Program Outcomes:

Evaluations have demonstrated a wide range of successful outcomes for Perry Preschool children, compared to those who did not receive intervention, including:

1. Less delinquency, including less contact with juvenile justice officials, fewer arrests at age 19, and less involvement in serious fights, gang fights, causing injuries, and police contact.
2. Less antisocial behavior and misconduct during elementary school and at age 15.
3. Fewer lifetime arrests through age 40 (36% vs. 55% with 5 or more arrests); fewer arrests for violent crimes (32% vs. 48%), property crimes (36% vs. 58%), and drug crimes (14% vs. 34%).
4. Higher academic achievement, including higher scores on standardized tests of intellectual ability and higher high school grades.
5. Fewer school dropouts at age 19 (33% vs. 51%), and higher rates of high school graduation.
6. Greater commitment to school and more favorable attitudes about high school.
7. More employed at age 27 (69% vs. 56%) and age 40 (76% vs. 62%); higher median annual earnings at 27 ($12,000 vs. $10,000) and 40 ($20,800 vs. $15,300).
8. Greater economic independence and less reliance on public assistance, including welfare usage.
9. Fewer pregnancies and births for women at age 19.

For elementary age children we recommend the PATHS Program, which if not implemented in the schools could be incorporated into after school programs.

3. The PATHS (Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies)\(^5\) Curriculum is a comprehensive program for promoting emotional and social competencies and reducing aggression and behavior problems in elementary school-aged children while simultaneously enhancing the educational process in the classroom. This innovative curriculum is designed to be used by educators and counselors in a multi-year, universal prevention model. Although primarily focused on the school and classroom settings, information and activities are also included for use with parents.

Program Targets:

The PATHS Curriculum was developed for use in the classroom setting with all elementary school aged-children. PATHS has been field-tested and researched with children in regular education classroom settings, as well as with a variety of special needs students (deaf, hearing-impaired, learning disabled, emotionally disturbed, mildly

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mentally delayed, and gifted). Ideally it should be initiated at the entrance to schooling and continue through Grade 5.

Program Content:

The PATHS Curriculum, taught three times per week for a minimum of 20-30 minutes per day, provides teachers with systematic, developmentally-based lessons, materials, and instructions for teaching their students emotional literacy, self-control, social competence, positive peer relations, and interpersonal problem-solving skills. A key objective of promoting these developmental skills is to prevent or reduce behavioral and emotional problems. PATHS lessons include instruction in identifying and labeling feelings, expressing feelings, assessing the intensity of feelings, managing feelings, understanding the difference between feelings and behaviors, delaying gratification, controlling impulses, reducing stress, self-talk, reading and interpreting social cues, understanding the perspectives of others, using steps for problem-solving and decision-making, having a positive attitude toward life, self-awareness, nonverbal communication skills, and verbal communication skills. Teachers receive training in a two- to three-day workshop and in bi-weekly meetings with the curriculum consultant.

Program Outcomes:

The PATHS Curriculum has been shown to improve protective factors and reduce behavioral risk factors. Evaluations have demonstrated significant improvements for program youth (regular education, special needs, and deaf) compared to control youth in the following areas:

1. Improved self-control,
2. Improved understanding and recognition of emotions,
3. Increased ability to tolerate frustration,
4. Use of more effective conflict-resolution strategies,
5. Improved thinking and planning skills,
6. Decreased anxiety/depressive symptoms (teacher report of special needs students),
7. Decreased conduct problems (teacher report of special needs students),
8. Decreased symptoms of sadness and depression (child report – special needs), and
9. Decreased report of conduct problems, including aggression (child report).

Program Costs:

Program costs over a three-year period would range from $15/student/year to $45/student/year. The higher cost would include hiring an on-site coordinator, the lower cost would include redeploying current staff.

The following program is strongly recommended for children, teachers and families in the primary grades.
4. The Incredible Years Series\textsuperscript{6} is a set of three comprehensive, multi-faceted, and developmentally-based curriculums for parents, teachers and children designed to promote emotional and social competence and to prevent, reduce, and treat behavior and emotion problems in young children.

Program Targets:

Children, ages two to eight, at risk for and/or presenting with conduct problems (defined as high rates of aggression, defiance, oppositional and impulsive behaviors). The programs have been evaluated as "selected" prevention programs for promoting the social adjustment of high risk children in preschool (Head Start) and elementary grades (up to grade three) and as "indicated" interventions for children exhibiting the early onset of conduct problems.

Program Content:

This series of programs addresses multiple risk factors across settings known to be related to the development of Conduct Disorders in children. In all three training programs, trained facilitators use videotape scenes to encourage group discussion, problem solving, and sharing of ideas. The BASIC parent series is "core" and a necessary component of the prevention program delivery. The other parent training, teacher, and child components are strongly recommended with particular populations that are detailed in this document.

\textit{Incredible Years Training for Parents.} The Incredible Years parenting series includes three programs targeting parents of high-risk children and/or those displaying behavior problems. The BASIC program emphasizes parenting skills known to promote children's social competence and reduce behavior problems such as: how to play with children, helping children learn, effective praise and use of incentives, effective limit-setting and strategies to handle misbehavior. The ADVANCE program emphasizes parent interpersonal skills such as: effective communication skills, anger management, problem solving between adults, and ways to give and get support. The SUPPORTING YOUR CHILD'S EDUCATION program (known as SCHOOL) emphasizes parenting approaches designed to promote children's academic skills such as: reading skills, parental involvement in setting up predictable homework routines, and building collaborative relationships with teachers.

\textit{Incredible Years Training for Teachers.} This series emphasizes effective classroom management skills such as: the effective use of teacher attention, praise and encouragement, use of incentives for difficult behavior problems, proactive teaching strategies, how to manage inappropriate classroom behaviors, the importance of building

positive relationships with students, and how to teach empathy, social skills and problem-solving in the classroom.

Incredible Years Training for Children. The Dinosaur Curriculum emphasizes training children in skills such as emotional literacy, empathy or perspective taking, friendship skills, anger management, interpersonal problem solving, school rules and how to be successful at school. It is designed for use as a "pull out" treatment program for small groups of children exhibiting conduct problems.

Program Outcomes:

1. Six randomized control group evaluations of the parenting series indicated significant: Increases in parent positive affect such as praise and reduced use of criticism and negative commands.
2. Increases in parent use of effective limit setting by replacing spanking and harsh discipline with non-violent discipline techniques and increased monitoring of children.
3. Reductions in parental depression and increases in parental self-confidence.
4. Increases in positive family communication and problem solving.
5. Reduced conduct problems in children's interactions with parents and increases in their positive affect and compliance to parental commands.
6. Two randomized control group evaluations of the teacher training series indicated significant:
7. Increases in teacher use of praise and encouragement and reduced use of criticism and harsh discipline.
8. Increases in children's positive affect and cooperation with teachers, positive interactions with peers, school readiness and engagement with school activities.
9. Reductions in peer aggression in the classroom.

Two randomized control group evaluations of the child training series indicated significant:

- Increases in children's appropriate cognitive problem-solving strategies and more pro-social conflict management strategies with peers.
- Reductions in conduct problems at home and school.

Program Costs:

The costs of curriculum materials, including videotapes, comprehensive manuals, books and other teaching aids for the Parent Training Program are $1,300 for the BASIC program, $775 for the ADVANCE program, $995 for the SCHOOL program; $1,250 for the Teacher Training Program; and $975 for the Child Training Program. Discounts are available for purchases of more than one set of any program. Training and technical assistance costs are charged based on a daily fee.
For those families with children who are acting out joining gangs and involved in delinquent behavior, we recommend a program that focuses on healthy changes in family interaction and has been shown to significantly change adolescent behavior.

### 5. Functional Family Therapy (FFT)

Functional Family Therapy (FFT) is an outcome-driven prevention/intervention program for youth who have demonstrated the entire range of maladaptive, acting out behaviors and related syndromes.

#### Program Targets:

Youth, aged 11-18, at risk for and/or presenting with delinquency, violence, substance use, Conduct Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, or Disruptive Behavior Disorder.

#### Program Content:

FFT requires as few as 8-12 hours of direct service time for commonly referred youth and their families, and generally no more than 26 hours of direct service time for the most severe problem situations.

#### Delivery modes:

Flexible delivery of service by one and two person teams to clients in-home, clinic, juvenile court, and at time of re-entry from institutional placement.

#### Implementation:

Wide range of interventionists, including para-professionals under supervision, trained probation officers, mental health technicians, degreed mental health professionals (e.g., M.S.W., Ph.D., M.D., R.N., M.F.T.).

FFT effectiveness derives from emphasizing factors which enhance protective factors and reduce risk, including the risk of treatment termination. In order to accomplish these changes in the most effective manner, FFT is a phasic program with steps which build upon each other. These phases consist of:

- **Engagement**, designed to emphasize within youth and family factors that protect youth and families from early program dropout;
- **Motivation**, designed to change maladaptive emotional reactions and beliefs, and increase alliance, trust, hope, and motivation for lasting change;

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• **Assessment**, designed to clarify individual, family system, and larger system relationships, especially the interpersonal functions of behavior and how they related to change techniques;

• **Behavior Change**, which consists of communication training, specific tasks and technical aids, basic parenting skills, contracting and response-cost techniques; and

• **Generalization**, during which family case management is guided by individualized family functional needs, their interface with environmental constraints and resources, and the alliance with the FFT therapist/Family Case Manager.

**Program Outcomes:**

Clinical trials have demonstrated that FFT is cable of:

• Effectively treating adolescents with Conduct Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Disruptive Behavior Disorder, alcohol and other drug abuse disorders, and who are delinquent and/or violent;

• Interrupting the matriculation of these adolescents into more restrictive, higher cost services;

• Reducing the access and penetration of other social services by these adolescents;

• Generating positive outcomes with the entire spectrum of intervention personnel;

• Preventing further incidence of the presenting problem;

• Preventing younger children in the family from penetrating the system of care;

• Preventing adolescents from penetrating the adult criminal system; and

• Effectively transferring treatment effects across treatment systems.

**Program Costs:**

The 90-day costs in two ongoing programs range between $1,350 to $3,750 for an average of 12 home visits per family.

For youth in Foster Care, those who may be re-entering the community from incarceration, and for many youth in place of incarceration we recommend implementing the following well-tested and evaluated program. This program would be implemented in partnership with County Probation, and DCFS.
6. **Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)**\(^8\) is a cost effective alternative to group or residential treatment, incarceration, and hospitalization for adolescents who have problems with chronic antisocial behavior, emotional disturbance, and delinquency. Community families are recruited, trained, and closely supervised to provide MTFC-placed adolescents with treatment and intensive supervision at home, in school, and in the community; clear and consistent limits with follow-through on consequences; positive reinforcement for appropriate behavior; a relationship with a mentoring adult; and separation from delinquent peers.

Program Targets:

Teenagers with histories of chronic and severe criminal behavior at risk of incarceration.

Program Content:

*MTFC Training for Community Families.* Emphasized behavior management methods to provide youth with a structured and therapeutic living environment. After completing a pre-service training and placement of the youth, MTFC parents attend a weekly group meeting run by a program case manager where ongoing supervision is provided. Supervision and support is also given to MTFC parents during daily telephone calls to check on youth progress and problems.

*Services to the Youth's Family.* Family therapy is provided for the youth's biological (or adoptive) family, with the ultimate goal of returning the youth back to the home. The parents are taught to use the structured system that is being used in the MTFC home. Closely supervised home visits are conducted throughout the youth's placement in MTFC. Parents are encouraged to have frequent contact with the MTFC case manager to get information about their child's progress in the program.

*Coordination and Community Liaison.* Frequent contact is maintained between the MTFC case manager and the youth's parole/probation officer, teachers, work supervisors, and other involved adults.

Program Outcomes:

Evaluations of MTFC have demonstrated that program youth compared to control group youth:

- Spent 60% fewer days incarcerated at 12 month follow-up;
- Had significantly fewer subsequent arrests;

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• Ran away from their programs, on average, three time less often;

• Had significantly less hard drug use in the follow-up period; and

• Quicker community placement from more restrictive settings (e.g., hospital, detention).

Program Costs:

The cost per youth is $2,691 per month; the average length of stay is seven months.

All of the above programs that we recommend have been rigorously evaluated and shown to be effective. These programs work. A note of caution, once again is that these programs must be implemented with fidelity, and constant monitoring to assure that they are implemented as intended and that they are working as intended.
## Community, Family & Individual Risk Factors Lifeline

### Community Risk Factors
- Lack of community stability (transient)
- Lack of jobs (poverty)
- Violence/Gangs
- Blighted neighborhood
- Nuisance businesses
- Lack of green space
- Low performing schools
- Lack of civic infrastructure
- Lack of service providers
- Politically disenfranchised
- Community isolation
- Economic investment/job development
- Physical revitalization
- Peace building between gangs
- Baseline public safety
- Smaller learning communities
- Leadership development

### Family Risk Factors
- Low-income/dual income (poverty)
- Low educational attainment
- Family violence/gang membership
- Single parent (isolated parent)
- Immigration status
- Addiction
- Addiction
- Mental illness
- Gang recruitment
- Substance abuse
- Parent
- Parent
- Incarcerated parents
- Incarcerated parents
- Incarcerated parents
- Incarcerated parents
- Incarcerated parents
- Incarcerated parents

### Individual Risk Factors / Interventions

#### Prenatal
- DV/substance abuse
- Single teen parent
- Low education (no GED)
- Low income
- Lack of prenatal care
- Incarcerated parents

#### 0 – 2
- DV in home
- Lack of quality care
- Neglect/abuse
- Health/safety/injury risk
- Incarcerated parents

#### 3 – 4
- DV in home
- Lack of quality care
- Neglect/abuse
- Health/safety/injury risk
- Incarcerated parents

#### 5 – 9
- Lack of early intervention/assessment
- Neglect/abuse
- Poor school attendance/performance
- Gang recruitment
- Substance abuse
- Safety (community, school, home)
- No supervision (after school)
- Incarcerated parents

#### 10 – 15
- Negative peer network/gang
- Risky sexual behavior
- Substance abuse
- Poor academic performance
- Dropout
- Availability of weapons
- Lack of supervision
- Incarcerated parents

#### 16 – 21
- Negative peer network/gang
- Risky sexual behavior/parent
- Substance abuse
- Poor academic performance
- Dropout
- Availabilty of weapons
- Undocumented
- CalGang database/gang injunction

#### 22 +
- Unemployed/underemployed
- Undocumented
- Parent
- Substance abuse
- Mental illness
- Homeless
- Unable to read/no life skills
- Prison/high recidivism
- Three strikes
- Gang membership
- Criminal activity

### IF NOT, THEN:
- Low birth weight
- Health complications
- Removal/foster care
- Abuse victim

### Parent education
- High quality care
- Nurse Family Partnership
- Access to medical care
- Access to prenatal care
- Substance abuse treatment

### Violence prevention
- Mental health
- After school/recreation
- Role model/mentor
- Good school/college prep
- Life skills
- Sex education
- Gang intervention
- Substance abuse prevention

### Jobs/job training
- Gang intervention
- Gang intervention

### Permanent Marginalization
- Gang membership
- Jail/Camp/CYA/Prison
- Homeless
- Unemployed
- Dropout
- Parent
COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION: SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL

Community Violence Prevention Center

- **PRIMARY**
  - Case Management
  - Family Support Services
  - Information & Referral
  - School Based Prevention
  - Parks

- **SECONDARY**
  - Case Management
  - Family Support Services

- **TERTIARY**
  - Case Management
  - Family Support Services
  - Functional Family Therapy

- **GANG INTERVENTION**
  - Case Management
  - Hardcore Gang Intervention
  - Peace Building (Alternation)
  - Exit Ramps
  - Re-entry

**CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAM**

**MOU RELATIONSHIPS**
- SCHOOLS
- JUVENILE COURTS
- PROBATION
- DHS/DPH
- DMH
- DCFS
- DISTRICT ATTORNEY

**COMMUNITY ADVISORY TEAM**

**RESEARCH & EVALUATION ENTITY**

**Law Enforcement Coordination**
COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES

SCHOOL BASED SERVICES
- After-school
- College-prep
- Parent involvement in school
- Needs assessment (learning disabilities, assets)
- Remedial education
- Safe passage
- Transitions Institute
- Violence prevention curriculum

COMMUNITY HEALTH
- Teen pregnancy prevention
- Education on AIDS/HIV, STDs
- Gun removal program

YOUTH ADVOCATES
Recreation & Diversion
- Parks & sports leagues
- Drop-in centers
- Youth leadership development
- Mentoring
- Annual calendar of community service projects
Community Service
- Mandated hours supervision
- Graffiti removal/environmental projects
- Other misc. community service projects

CASE MANAGEMENT
- Need assessment of individual and family
- Coordination of services
- Information, referral and follow-up
- Family action plan and basic support services
- Differentiated protocol and expertise by referral source/risk of case
- Intensive transition services for youth

CHILD WELFARE
- Child abuse prevention, intervention and treatment
- Foster youth services
- Independent living program (emancipated youth)

MENTAL HEALTH
- Family counseling
- Individual counseling
- Parenting education
- MST/FFT for juvenile offenders

GANG INTERVENTION
- Peace Building
- Targeted case management for exit ramp
- Re-entry transition planning and case management
- Life skills development
- Graffiti removal

STRATEGIC SUPPRESSION
- Coordination with case management and gang intervention team
- Coordination with school police

LEGAL SERVICES
Public education on rights around arrest and children's rights, including:
- Expungement of records
- Gang injunction related legal problems resolution
- Juvenile court liaison

COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES

COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION & ACTION TEAM
- Network and coalition building among community based organizations, faith based institutions and other civic groups to enhance "social efficacy" to ensure safety and vitality of community
- Safe passage
- Youth council

EMPLOYMENT
- Training and workforce readiness and entrepreneurship programs
- Coordination with schools for vocational training and higher education
- Placement for paid internships, apprentice programs, and jobs

WOMEN & GIRLS’ SERVICES
- Gender based violence prevention
- Domestic violence prevention
- Sexual assault prevention programs
- Shelters
Introduction

In previous sections of this report we have described how young offenders are currently treated within the juvenile and criminal justice systems that serve the city, as well as what the scientific and expert practitioner community consider to be best practice in the design and delivery of programs to serve these youth. As in many other cities across the nation, there is a considerable gap between current practice and what “best practice” suggests.

The most cost-effective programs for dealing with serious young offenders (FFT and MST) use a variety of proven methods to educate and empower parents to effectively supervise their youth. Even for those youth who must be placed out of their homes, a program called Treatment Foster Care, which places youth in specialized foster homes while continuing to work with their biological parent, has been shown to be much more cost-effective than traditional group homes.

However, current intervention efforts for delinquent and gang-involved youth in the city still rely heavily on traditional probation supervision and out-of-home placements in group homes, probation camps and state facilities. Little attention has been paid to evaluating these programs or tailoring placements to the specific needs of individual youth. Only a very small number of youths are currently being placed in FFT and MST programs funded by the Department of Mental Health.

However, there are signs to suggest that some of the deficiencies of the current system have been recognized by those with the power to make improvements and a number of important changes are already underway. The Probation Department has implemented a research-based risk and needs assessment instrument and is now in the process of developing specific guidance as to how it should be used in making placements. The County has contracted for additional training to increase the number of MST teams available to serve youth in the system. Over the next 5 years the California Institute for Mental Health will be coordinating a large-scale test of Treatment Foster Care to determine the best way to help counties implement that program.

What this section will attempt to do is show what kind of a role the City can play to insure that these reforms result in improved programs and that its youthful offenders and their families are adequately served in a way that reduces the likelihood of future offending and gang violence.
Where New Gang Members Come From

Gang violence and membership will not be contained until a way is found to cut off the flow or recruitment of new members into the gangs. Gangs create positions and opportunities for leadership. Even when law enforcement is successful in taking down the current leadership cadre of a particular gang, new leaders are waiting to step up and assume their positions. In fact, successful removal of a gang’s leadership cadre is likely to result in an increase in immediate violence as potential candidates compete for leadership positions. Effective strategies for reducing gang violence must include effective methods for reducing the flow of new recruits into the street gangs.

The youth most likely to be recruited or attracted to membership in a violent street gang is one who is:

- Already exhibiting some of the behaviors appropriate for gang members.
- Attracted by some of the benefits associated with gang membership (membership in a group, protection from other gangs, excitement, etc.)
- Located in an environment where gangs are able to exert significant influence.

Where are you most likely to find youth already exhibiting the behaviors that characterize street gang members? In juvenile correctional facilities and programs.

Where are the benefits of gang membership likely to be most important or valued and gang influence most persuasive? In correctional settings.

The youth most likely to become gang members are those who are placed in gang dominated correctional programs. There, the pressure to join and rewards of membership will be the greatest. The next most likely group to become members are those who are exhibiting anti-social behavior, reside in gang-dominated neighborhoods, and associate with gang members. Youth from both of these groups make up a large percentage of the youth who are involved in the juvenile justice system. How that system handles these youth can have a significant impact on whether they go on to become involved in violent gang activity or avoid gang involvement all together.

Thus, any city concerned about violent gang activity has to be concerned about the nature and quality of programming provided by the juvenile justice system, over which it has no direct powers. The question then is where to focus and how to express these concerns? To answer this question we have to look at the various players who make up the juvenile justice system, and the roles that they play.
How the Juvenile Justice System Makes Programming Decisions

The police are the advance forces or the scouts for the system. They usually are the first to connect a specific youth with a criminal act, make initial contact, and decide whether the case requires further action or not. Rather than seeking a petition from the Juvenile Court, the police may refer the case to some kind of health or social service agency, or merely send the youth home with a warning. Since premature involvement in the juvenile justice system has been shown to increase the likelihood that some youth will continue offending, some communities provide formalized diversion programs to work with youth and families without involving the formal powers of the court where they are unnecessary. Others do not. Such programs depend on the availability of local programs to meet the needs of the diverted youth. The City of Los Angeles does not provide such a network of diversion programs, leaving it to the police to generate their own. This situation needs to be reversed. The police are best at enforcement and investigation. Human services can best be provided by other sources. It is still the police who can produce the most accurate records of youth who are arrested or detained, and the immediate disposition of the case.

The Probation Department serves as the formal intake arm of the Juvenile Court, deciding which cases are serious enough and strong enough to proceed with a formal petition. The Probation Department also investigates and reports on the youth’s background including: prior arrests and placements, home life, performance at school, gang involvement, delinquent friends, and any other factors that may be predictive of future delinquency. If the youth pleads or is found to be guilty of the charges, then the Probation Department usually prepares a disposition recommendation for the court, suggesting where the youth should be placed to reside, and what conditions should govern his behavior during the placement. In order to fulfill this latter role, Probation Departments have to either operate themselves, or contract with private providers to provide the range of services and supervision they think their juvenile probationers are likely to need.

The state Department of Corrections acts as a back-up system for Probation, offering a range of programs and custodial levels for youth who are too serious for probation to work with, too dangerous to be allowed to reside in the community, or who have failed in a sufficient number of prior placements that Probation does not wish to work with them any further.

It is the role of the Juvenile Court to oversee this whole process. The court is charged with balancing the developmental interests of the minor against the public safety interests of the larger community. It makes the critical decisions in all of the more serious cases and is charged with seeing justice done to all parties to a case.

Given the responsibilities of the Probation Department and the Juvenile Court, which are county and state run agencies respectively, to protect the developmental interests of the juvenile and the public safety interests of the community, we might expect juvenile justice systems to be very vigilant and aggressive in promoting use of the most effective
programs for reducing delinquency. After all, reductions in recidivism rates benefit the developmental interests of the youth and the public safety interests of the community. Unfortunately vigilance and aggressive promotion of effective programming are not the characteristics used to describe the juvenile justice system in Los Angeles. Recent audits and assessments of the Los Angeles Probation Department and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation show that they are a very long way from providing youthful offenders, and LA City residents, with the most effective programs that are currently available. The programs they do offer are poorly documented, unevaluated, and based on outmoded concepts.

Given this situation, the question now becomes – What is it that the City of Los Angeles can and should do?

A Role for the City

If the juvenile court is doing a good job in carrying out its responsibilities, then there is not much more that the city needs to do. At a very minimum it needs to assure itself that the juvenile justice system is performing up to par, based on up-to-date best practice standards and an analysis of case disposition patterns and outcomes, controlling for established risk and protective factors. If such an assessment is not being performed on a routine basis, then there is no way of assuring that the system is doing a proper job. If that is the case, then a city that is counting on the performance of the juvenile justice system to help it deal with particular crime problems has no alternative but to conduct such an assessment or audit itself.

How is this to be done? The first step in initiating this process is to assign some agency within city government the task and resources to carry it out. Potential candidates for this role might include the Police Department or City Attorney’s Office but realistically; the best agency to carry it out would be the City Controllers Office. That office has the kind of staff, analytic capabilities, oversight responsibilities, and report preparation experience that are required for this job.

The data required to support this mission has to be generated by the Probation Department and the Police. The Probation Department will know the ultimate disposition of every youth for whom a petition is filed. In every one of the cases in which a petition is filed, the Probation Department is supposed to have conducted a risk and needs assessment, recording the results in a system known as LARK. All that is needed for the City to perform its monitoring role is for Probation to create a way in which analysts can link the LARK assessment and case disposition records for any individual, and then use Police records to check for subsequent arrests.

At the very least, the city should request that the Probation Department provide it with sufficient data to analyze the disposition pattern of all City initiated cases, down to the level of what kinds of services and supervision were provided, and including any subsequent arrests, controlling for the risk and needs factors contained in the LARK.
assessment report. On a periodic basis, or if the outcome data begins to suggest a reduction in effectiveness, the City should conduct a more detailed program audit to determine whether programs are following the prescribed protocols on which they are based. Only by conducting the data analyses and audits suggested above can the City assure itself that it is receiving effective crime prevention services from the county and state.

In this era of evidence-based assessment and programming, what the City of Los Angeles, and any other city for that matter, has the right to expect is that:

- The Juvenile Court will place youth in various levels of custody and programming, based on the risk they pose to the community and the specific risk-factors that contribute to that risk.
- And that any agency that assumes custody or responsibility for supervision and services for delinquent youth will provide programming which is consistent with best practice and most cost-effective for taxpayers.

The City monitor should be looking for patterns of placement and services that reflect the best practices described in the previous section. Younger offenders with minor records and at-risk youth should not be brought together in groups for programming purposes. Rather their participation in more mainstream activities like after-school programs and recreational groups should be encouraged and facilitated along with the involvement of their parents.

For youth with more serious records, who are expected to continue residing at home, assistance should be provided to the family in the form of Functional Family Therapy or Multi-Systemic Therapy, depending on the composition and capabilities of the family. If the system does not have adequate capacity to provide these services to all the families that could benefit from them, then first priority should be given to the families of those youth who pose the greatest risk to the community.

For those youth who need to be placed out of their home because of some family-related factors, but are eventually expected to return home, Treatment Foster Care is the placement of choice. Only those youths whose most recent offense or criminal histories require that they be placed out of the community should be placed in a residential facility. These youth will require reentry programs using evidence-based methods to support their return to the community.

Given the slow pace at which the Probation Department has moved to adopt recent advances in evidence-based programming, only close and detailed monitoring by an independent entity will assure that their progress and performance remain the focus of management attention.
Parenting Education and Training

Background and Review of the Literature

From a review of the parenting education literature, we learn that a host of researchers conclude that “poor parenting practices represent some of the most robust risk factors for conduct problems in childhood and adolescence,”¹ and that “lack of parental involvement, poor monitoring and supervision, and harsh and inconsistent discipline, have all been established as strong predictors of antisocial outcomes in children and adolescents.”² Parenting education, therefore, has been viewed as a means of moderating risk for substance abuse among adolescents;³ mitigating aggressive, destructive or oppositional actions in children;⁴ alleviating depression and reversing delinquency.

The notion of whether parents are strictly responsible for their children’s behavior is complex, of course. Intervening social factors including longer working hours for parents and caregivers, declines in employment at a living wage and financial stress upon families, single parenting and unmarried couples as caregivers, problems of acculturation for immigrant families, and competition for “family time” all contribute to stressful family situations. “Parents are expected to, and expect to, teach children to obey rules, norms, and laws of mainstream society; teach them how to take care of themselves; and share with them the families’ histories and values.”⁵

As far as the efficacy of parent training, a good deal of research has been devoted to evaluating the effectiveness of both behavioral and non-behavioral programs. Lundahl, Risser and Lovejoy (2006), have compiled a meta-analysis of 63 peer reviewed studies of parent training research. Beginning with an initial 2,875 identified studies, these final 63 were selected based upon a set of 9 criteria. Each of these evaluations utilized at least one treatment and one control group and reported pre and post test means and standard deviations. The authors have concluded that the effects immediately following treatment programs were small to moderate. Several interesting, but not surprising, observations gleaned from their review indicate:

- “Family adversity is believed to undermine efficacy of parent training interventions by disrupting parent training processes and implementation of recommendations;”
- Participant characteristics such as “low socioeconomic status, single parent status, young parent age, unstable housing and reliance on government subsidies are associated with poorer outcomes;”
- Child age influences treatment outcomes: younger children benefit most from “child management skills taught in behavioral parent training...[while] older children...benefit more from non-behavioral programs which focus on improving parent-child communication patterns.”
- The features of parent training programs also influence outcomes, including: “differences in theoretical orientation, amount of intervention, qualifications of the person who delivers parent training, mode of delivery (e.g., individual, group, self-directed), therapeutic components provided and targeted recipients.”

In general, Lundahl and colleagues find that “parent training outcomes are expected to be enhanced when behavioral treatments are used, when there is a focus on overcoming practical
barriers (e.g., transportation), and when multisystemic treatment options are presented to families who face high levels of adversity.”

Summary of an Examination of Findings in Parent Education Programs in Los Angeles

Locally, parenting education and training programs are delivered in many diverse locations and settings. Programs including Headstart and Early Headstart; First 5; Healthy Start; pre-schools; unified school districts; LA Bridges programs; Police Activities Leagues; for-profit businesses and individual practitioners; non-profits including counseling centers and domestic violence shelters; and religious institutions all have a variety of formal and informal parenting programs available to their clients. Parenting education also takes place, however, through individual and family counseling and within home visits by social workers. As listed on the Healthy City website, approximately 130 resources for parenting education are available around Los Angeles.

Findings from Interviews

Interviews with staff from 20 different parenting programs (see attached list) provided insight into the types of programs available and the make-up of the parents who attend workshops.

Most training is offered through group classes, last 1 ½ to 2 hours per class, are offered weekly and, on average, consist of 10-20 classes per session. People in Progress offers 3-6 sessions for individual participants, in addition to one group class. Some programs allow parents to continue on an on-going basis, some have a 2nd level “support group” that grow out of the workshop group, some create independent parent “clubs,” some refer to other sources for continuation of services or for follow-up. A few providers offer sessions for up to 52 weeks to accommodate court-ordered clients. All provide support services in house or through referral. After English language classes, Spanish are the most popular; there are several agencies that provide classes in Asian languages. Parents attending classes are not separated by age of child in most of the cases. In a couple of programs which receive funding, their sources do require at least 2 categories of attendees: parents of 0-5 and parents of adolescents. Most clients (estimated between 50%-80%) are mandated to participate in parenting classes and are referred by DCFS, Family Court, or Probation. Fees are, generally, low-cost with charges based on sliding-scales. Some private and government grants help fund programs.

A variety of curricula are used in teaching. Some are widely distributed, including: Breakthrough Parenting, STEP (Systematic Training for Effecting Parenting), Catch Them Being Good and NuParent. Children’s Bureau of Southern California created the NuParent curriculum and trains dozens of “partner” agencies on its use. The partners teach the curriculum to their own client base. NuParent is a family support and development program in which classes are based upon developmental milestones of children (birth to 6 months, 6-12 months, 12-18 months, 18-24 months, 24-36 months, 36 months to 5 years). Following a series of 8 sessions, parents are encouraged to join an on-going support group. An evaluation of the curriculum is currently underway.
But most parenting curricula have been developed “in-house” (custom designed) specifically for the provider agency and their clients and/or adapted from another curriculum. Most curricula have not undergone an independent, outcome-based evaluation. A sampling of topics named as “most important” components of the curricula include:

- Anger management/alternative discipline/positive discipline
- Connecting/communication
- Improving parent-child relationships
- Emotional coaching
- Building emotional competency
- Developing self-esteem
- Domestic violence
- Child development/realistic expectations
- Core needs of children
- Behavior modification
- Parents as partners
- Knowledge of gangs and drugs
- Sex education
- Responsibility
- Empowerment

Two popular, “custom designed” curricula used in LA have been created by SEA and the Center for Nonviolent Education and Parenting. SEA (Soledad Enrichment Action) classes are also self-designed and are taught at 33 SEA sites to over 9,500 parents a year. The curriculum was created specifically for parents of high-risk teens. SEA reports that they have had “excellent” evaluation results with parents. The curriculum created by the Center for Nonviolent Education and Parenting (CNVEP) is designed to teach parents how to be “emotional coaches” for their children and determine what children need to feel unconditional acceptance, affection and appreciation. CNVEP is currently undergoing a formal evaluation of the curriculum. This curriculum is used by a number of the LA Bridges programs. It reaches about 5,000 parents a year.

Interviewees were asked what areas of parent training they felt need improvement. Responses named the need for: additional funding; audio-visual materials to use in class training; workbooks to provide to the parents; training to those who mandate parenting education regarding method of referral (i.e., sensitivity to parents’ needs and avoidance of punitive measures and tone as well as an understanding of the length of time needed for parent participation/impact); childcare during parenting classes; staff training for instructors regarding how to address individual student needs within a group setting.
# Parenting Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency Name</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Barrio Action Youth and Family Center</td>
<td>Tammy Memreno</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Boys &amp; Girls Club of Venice</td>
<td>Dr. Harry Drasin</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Breakthrough Parenting</td>
<td>Dr. Jayne Major</td>
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<td>4 Center for Nonviolent Education and Parenting</td>
<td>Ruth Beaglehole</td>
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<td>5 Chicana Service Action Center, Inc.</td>
<td>Alicia Reyes</td>
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<td>6 Children’s Bureau of Southern California</td>
<td>Lani Parente</td>
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<td>7 Children’s Institute International</td>
<td>Benilo Ornelas</td>
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<td>8 Counseling West</td>
<td>Linda Shudall</td>
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<td>9 Cypress Park Youth and Family Center</td>
<td>Michael O’Connell</td>
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<td>10 Kheper Life Enrichment Institute</td>
<td>Erica Byrd</td>
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<td>11 Hathaway (Hathaway Sycamore Child-Family Research Center)</td>
<td>Cilvia Esqueda</td>
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<td>12 Hathaway Family Resource Center</td>
<td>Yvonne Sarceda</td>
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<td>13 Helpline Youth Counseling, Inc.</td>
<td>Jeff Barber</td>
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<td>14 La Clinica del Pueblo, Inc.</td>
<td>Pat Powell</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 People in Progress</td>
<td>Sandra Estrada</td>
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<td>16 New Directions for Youth</td>
<td>Monica Jackson</td>
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<td>17 SEA Soledad Enrichment Action</td>
<td>Estela Valle</td>
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<td>18 Sunrise Community Counseling Center</td>
<td>Dr. Jefferson Sa</td>
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<td>19 Toberman Settlement House</td>
<td>Gloria Lockhart</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Vista Del Mar – Julia Ann Singer Center</td>
<td>Stephanie Katzman</td>
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6 Op Cit
# Parenting Programs

**Source:** Healthy City

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<td>El Nido Family Centers</td>
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<td>counseling services and family life education</td>
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<td>Fremont-Washington Community Adult School</td>
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<td>Children's Institute, Inc</td>
<td>90005</td>
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<td>Community college Foundation</td>
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<td>Education Services Employment Services Family Life Education Holiday Assistance Personal Goods WIA Programs</td>
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<td>Education Services WIA Programs Youth Services</td>
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<td>Adult Education Counseling Services Emergency Food Services For Older Adults Youth Services</td>
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<td>ARTT of Fatherhood</td>
<td>9011</td>
<td>323-238-0445</td>
<td>NPCL, family support services</td>
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<td>Avalon Carver Community Center</td>
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<td>court ordered parenting classes, education, home improvement, substance abuse services</td>
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<td>Chinatown Service Center</td>
<td>767 N. Hill St., Ste 400</td>
<td>90012</td>
<td>213-808-1700 Ext: 240</td>
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<td>First 5 LA</td>
<td>750 N. Alameda St.</td>
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<td>Teen Post - Chinatown</td>
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<td>Free Spirit</td>
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<td>People in Progress</td>
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<td>United American Indian Involvement, INC</td>
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<td>Families for Families</td>
<td>2203 S. Harvard Blvd.</td>
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<td>Girls and Boys Town</td>
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<td>Pathways</td>
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<td>838 E. 6th St.</td>
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<td>SEA Estrada Courts School</td>
<td>3225 Hunter St</td>
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<td>SEA Soto</td>
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<td>213-381-2931</td>
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<td>Asian Pacific Health Care Venture, Inc</td>
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<td>90027</td>
<td>323-644-3888</td>
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<td>Children's Hospital, LA</td>
<td>4650 Sunset Blvd., Mail Stop #59</td>
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<td>323-669-2153</td>
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<td>Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center</td>
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<td>Assistance League of So Cal</td>
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<td>East LA Skills Center</td>
<td>3921 Selig Place</td>
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<td>Barrio Action Youth and Family Center</td>
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<td>Wilson-Lincoln Community Adult School</td>
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<td>Centro de Alegria</td>
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<td>Dolores Mission Women's Cooperative</td>
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<td>Home-SAFE</td>
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<td>Breakthrough Parenting Services</td>
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<td>Van Nuys Office</td>
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**Recommendations Regarding the Development of a City Entity for Violence Prevention**

On December 8, 2006, Peace Over Violence convened a focus group to brief key leaders in the domestic violence field (see attached list) in Los Angeles about the current work of the Advancement Project on the Citywide Gang Activity and Reduction Strategy and to stimulate discussion regarding the creation of a city entity to house a violence prevention program. These domestic violence agencies all receive varying amounts of funding from the city for a portion of their programming and are invested in elevating the focus on family violence as part of a city-wide prevention strategy.

Following the presentation by Advancement Project’s Susan Lee and Pilar Mendoza, participants raised several concerns:

- Grouping domestic violence programs and program funds together with gang violence prevention programs has the potential to reduce the attention upon the importance and intricacies of domestic violence. Domestic violence is widely accepted as a contributing/root factor in gang/community violence and requires “high visibility” in order for successful prevention measures to be implemented.
- Current city fund levels for domestic violence services are not adequate for far reaching intervention and prevention strategies.
- Naming a city department the “Department of Neighborhood Safety” does not address the nature of violence targeted and does not embrace the need for prevention programming.
- Domestic violence intervention/prevention measures are handled by both the City and the County, compelling a need for cooperation between the two entities. For example, the County Departments of Children and Family Services and Probation are points of entry for many of our clients. We need a “bilateral approach” incorporating City and County agencies in order to effect change.

Further discussion of opportunities and recommendations raised the following points:

- “Housing” domestic violence programs with the gang violence prevention programs has the potential to help elevate the issue of domestic violence within the City structure of departments.
- Cross-training between domestic/sexual violence and gang/community violence prevention providers is necessary and more likely if the two fields are linked.
- The Department of “Youth, Family and Community Safety” (or something of a similar nature) might be a more appropriate title for a new department.
- The “split” between City and County policies, procedures and approaches must be reconciled.
# Focus Group Participants List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vivian Sauer</td>
<td>Jewish Family Service, Family violence Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lisa Steele</td>
<td>1736 Family Crisis Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Schirmer</td>
<td>Rainbow Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eve Sheedy</td>
<td>LA City Attorney’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senta Kreger</td>
<td>Sojourn Services for Battered Women and Their Children</td>
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<td>Leslie Anne Ross</td>
<td>Children’s Institute, Inc.</td>
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<td>Chun-Yen Chen</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Women’s Center</td>
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<td>Ruth Slaughter</td>
<td>Prototypes</td>
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<td>Patti Giggans</td>
<td>Peace Over Violence</td>
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<td>Cathy Friedman</td>
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<td>Susan Lee</td>
<td>The Advancement Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilar Mendoza</td>
<td>The Advancement Project</td>
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Gang Related Crimes by Census Tract

- 0
- 1 - 10
- 11 - 20
- 21 - 30
- 31 - 40
- 41 - 96

N=835, Mean=13.4, Sd=14.9
Min=0, Max=96
Gang Related Violent Crimes by Census Tract

- None
- 1 - 10
- 11 - 20
- 21 - 30
- Higher than 30

N=835, Mean=7, Sd=8.1
Min=0, Max=51
Violent Gang Related Crimes To All Crimes Ratio - 2005

Estimated 2005 Population
- Less than 2000
- 2001 - 4000
- 4001 - 6000
- 6001 - 8000
- Over 8000

Mean = 18 and SD=16
This brief report provides a set of recommendations for data gathering, maintenance, and research on gang crime geographic patterns. The report is divided into three sections: data gathering and database development, quality control, and analysis.

I. Data gathering and database development

Ultimately, it is the aggregate impact of gang crime activities that affects the quality of life in a particular neighborhood, and it is the socio-spatial condition of a neighborhood that creates an opportunity structure for these incidents to occur. Therefore, any policymaking and/or planning process that addresses the issue of gang crimes abatement must focus on the cumulative impact of this phenomenon and its consequence at the neighborhood level. This approach involves monitoring socio-spatial conditions, demographic patterns, political dynamics, and economic structures at a unified geographic scale. To this end, and for the purpose of neighborhood level evaluations of any policy intervention, it is necessary to assemble six groups of data:

1) Socio-Demographics
2) Economic Activities
3) Community Infrastructure/Social Capital
4) Gang and Overall Crime Activities
5) Policing/Police Beats
6) Land Use and Development Patterns (and their changes over time)
7) Intervention Efforts

This information must be assembled/aggregated to a common geographic scale. For the purpose of this program, the census tract is an appropriate unit of analysis, both for the convenience of data gathering and for neighborhood-level analysis. While census tracts are somewhat larger than some of the locally defined neighborhoods, from a data analysis perspective they are the most commonly used units of analysis. To achieve consistency with existing research on social issues, adopting the census tract as the unit of analysis is highly recommended.

The six datasets, listed above, should contain a handful of variables each. It is important that these datasets are populated only with appropriate variables and that they do not become data dumping files. The following is a list of some of the suggested variables for each dataset. However, final decisions regarding additional or alternative variables should be made by the analytical staff.

1. Socio-Demographics

This dataset should contain selected variables from the decennial census, as well as current year estimates of major demographic indicators (provided through entities, such as Geolytics). At minimum, the following variables should be included in the dataset: total population, population density, number of households, number of occupied housing units, housing crowdedness index, renter-occupied and owner-occupied housing units, population growth (since the last decennial census), race, ethnicity, age, gender, native born population, foreign born population, citizenship status, educational attainment, median household income, per capita income, poverty, and labor force participation.
2. Economic

Economic Activities

This dataset should include the total number of worksites and employee population at the equivalent of a 2-digit SIC by census tract. This database will be useful for exploring the underlying economic opportunities, as well as identifying some of the major nodes of employment in the region. In the absence of a detailed land use map, this database can also identify some of the major industrial and commercial areas in the region.

3. Community

Community Infrastructure

Gang intervention and policies for the abatement of gang crimes will need to rely on community resources and infrastructures. To that end, a comprehensive database of such resources will be necessary. Every effort should be made to include the following information in this dataset:

a. community based organizations (location and type of services)
b. schools (location, enrollment, racial and ethnic demography of students, school performance)
c. jurisdictional and political district offices
d. parks
e. libraries
f. public sector offices
g. clinics and hospitals
h. transit services (and routes)

4. Gang and Overall Crime Activities

The following is a list of variables needed in this category:

a. all crimes
b. all violent crimes
c. all gang crimes
d. all violent gang crimes
e. domestic violence crimes**
f. hate crimes, especially those motivated by race, ethnicity, or religion**

** -- Domestic violence and hate crimes are monitored by a number of advocacy groups. As such, an effort must be made to consult with these advocacy groups regarding the overall spatial distribution of these crimes.

Crime data should be aggregated to the census tract level. For comparability and data privacy purposes, aggregation should be performed using a Geographic Information System (GIS) and maintained at the census tract level.

This information will be provided primarily by the Los Angeles Police Department. While census information, current year demographic estimates, and economic data are fully standardized, information provided by public sector offices (in this case LAPD) must be standardized (i.e., by definition and collection methodology) before they can be fully employed in any analysis. This is especially true if a longitudinal comparison/analysis is needed. As such, an important aspect of data gathering for the monitoring of gang crime activity
patterns is to create a standardized definition of gang crimes and train police officers and analysts about how these definitions ought to be codified. Data standardization is especially important for the analysis of violent crimes, since the movement of a specific type crime in or out of the violent crime category could make a multi-year comparison impossible.

5. Policing/Police Beat
   In order to weigh the data against issues of over and/or under-policing, simplified indicators of the police beat or the level of policing needs to be included in the annual data set.

6. Land Use and Development Patterns
   Parcel level data should be aggregated to the census tract level. This can be performed within a GIS environment. Preferably, this information should be provided by the city planning department. This information should be monitored in order to develop a better understanding of development-driven changes within a community.

7. Intervention Efforts
   Information regarding particular intervention efforts should be collected and codified (by census tract). The evaluation team should be consulted regarding what information is needed and how the dataset should be organized (e.g., variables, etc.).

II. Quality control

During the first year of its establishment, a complete data protocol, including data standardization and updating schedules, should be developed. Annual updates of each dataset will be a function of when various datasets are made available. Given the three year evaluation horizon of this program, annual datasets and their quality control are of the utmost importance.

In order to assess the reliability of various datasets, statistical analyses and mapping should be performed, using all variables. Descriptive statistics and data visualization are the fastest procedures for examining each variable.

The use of an external consulting service for an annual audit of the data could further enhance the reliability of the data and assure that they are created in a timely fashion and are maintained appropriately. Furthermore, examining the accuracy of the data on annual basis enables the evaluators to comfortably rely on this internal data source. This is especially important for examining neighborhood level changes.

III. Analyses

In addition to the annual basic statistical assessment of the data, research on gang crime activities should be made possible through the establishment of the proposed database. Intervention efforts to reduce the level of gang activities are ultimately measured by their neighborhood-level impact. While there are a number of area-based assessment techniques available to the evaluators, it is crucial that a number of analyses are conducted internally on an annual and multi-year basis. Annually, the office should conduct the following analyses:
1. Measure changes in the level of gang crimes (especially violent crimes), controlling for population.

2. Identify areas with high levels of violent gang crime to violent crime ratio and measure changes annually (again, controlling for population).

3. Conduct hot spot analyses of the gang crime data and measure longitudinal changes at the tract level.

4. Conduct correlation and regression analyses to identify variables that are most likely to explain/predict the concentration of gang crimes and its changes over time (a specific methodology for area-based evaluation will be suggested by the evaluation team). Regression analysis should be conducted, controlling for various environmental (e.g., land use and community infrastructure).

5. Trend surface analysis will be helpful for monitoring the overall spatial shifts over time. This analysis will require multi-year data and should be conducted annually, after the second year.
Evaluation of the Citywide Gang Reduction Strategy

The primary responsibility for assuring that ongoing evaluation is conducted with integrity of the data systems, data collection analysis, and interpretation shall reside within the “Research and Evaluation Institute.” A unit of academic and community based evaluation specialists, which can be contained within the new division of violence prevention or be contracted out to a university or academic institution. The Institute staff shall be responsible for training all segments of the violence prevention effort in data collection strategies, data entry and how to appropriately and consistently collect, record and code data.

Evaluation will consist of three major components.

**Component 1: Monitoring and data collection**

Recommendations for improved standardized data collection must be implemented. In addition, LAPD data must be monitored on a regular basis as least annually, to assure that the data are reliable and valid. Discrepancies in data collections within the separate divisions will be corrected before the data can be analyzed and interpreted, and as data are monitored, changes can be made to assure that the data are being collected and entered as intended. All data sets will be subject to the same scrutiny, including community-based programs, law enforcement, school, health care providers, etc. Furthermore, we recommend that the City agencies agree on a minimal set of variables to be collected in a standardized way by all city departments so that data sets can “talk” to each other and will thus be useful for telling the story of the city’s efforts to reduce gang and youth violence and build healthy communities.

**Component 2: Template for individual program evaluation**

This component is realistically expected to provide quality control analysis of the individual programs and strategies. Each program will develop measurable goals and objectives, consistent with the expected feasible outcomes of the program. Templates will be developed by the Institute for each program type. Training and technical assistance will be provided to all programs and collaboratives to assure that the program goals and objectives are reasonable considering the program activities. Intake forms will be standardized to the extent that they will all collect similar demographic data, attendance criteria, initial assessment and ongoing program monitoring components. It is most likely that the evaluations will be process oriented since prevention programs are expected to require lengthy implementation periods to actually effect change in outcome measures. Moreover, the overall community evaluation, component 3, is expected to be sensitive to changes in outcomes and levels of violence and crime in each of the targeted areas. This component will provide monitoring and accountability for programs, training, and policy development.
Component 3: Neighborhood, community cluster outcome evaluation

This evaluation component will consist of the overall outcome evaluation of the clusters, communities, neighborhoods, and city effect of the proposed City Strategy. Data will be collected at the census tract level and will use spatial evaluation similar to the baseline geographic profiles that have been done as part of this report in Phase I. Similar data and variables as used in Phase I which will be considered baseline, will be collected annually and will be reviewed annually. When the data have been collected for each of the three years following implementation, evaluation data analysis will be conducted using the regression and mapping models developed at the baseline.

The study design is intervention versus control in which the target areas will be assessed by comparing the baseline models with the three year data collected on all of the same variables as the baseline, and the addition of some variables not available at the baseline such as re-entry data at the census tract level from the County Department of Probation, and land use data also from the County Office of Urban Research. Crime data and the variables provided by LAPD at baseline will continue to be collected with the caveat that any changes in definitions or variables will be reported to the evaluation institute immediately. We would also suggest that Emergency Department Data on non-fatal injuries caused by violence would also be included in the model.

Each of the targeted intervention sites will be compared to their baseline data and to the entire City at the three-year milestone to determine changes in levels of violent crime and violent gang crime. Data analysis will use regression, and multiple regression analysis for comparison, with attention paid to intra-class correlations. Specifically, for a given outcome, the dependent variable will be the outcome values over the three years of intervention. The independent variables will be the baseline data at the start of the study as well as contextual data describing the various locations included in the study. The unit of analysis will be the census tract. The mixed regression models will incorporate the intra-class correlations among the census tracts as well as those over time.1

A primary variable to be included in the models is an indicator that has value (1) if the area is targeted for intervention and has value (0) if not. We test the null hypothesis that the coefficient of this variable is zero, and if it is rejected, we conclude that the intervention has an effect. We would then proceed to estimate the magnitude of the effect.

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Cost-Benefit Analysis

From: Megan Golden and Jena Siegel, Vera Institute of Justice
Dall Forsythe, N.Y.U. Wagner School, Consultant

As part of the Advancement Project’s effort to develop a comprehensive gang violence reduction strategy for the City of Los Angeles, the Vera Institute of Justice analyzed the costs of gang violence to government, and potential savings that can result from investing in programs that have been shown empirically to reduce gang crime. This memo presents the results of that analysis. The first section provides an overview of our approach and findings. The second section presents the criminal justice costs of gang crime for city agencies, county agencies, and state agencies. It also discusses medical costs of treating victims. The third section presents projected cost savings from a variety of prevention and intervention programs that have been rigorously evaluated. The final section includes recommendations for how the City, County, and State might improve their capacity to make empirically-based policy and budgeting decisions in this area in the future, in addition to suggestions for how to use this analysis.

Overview

The consequences of gang crime are substantial, including injury, death, property damage, the arrest and often lengthy incarceration of gang members, and extensive costs to victims, defendants, communities, and taxpayers. Vera’s work with the Advancement Project has focused on government costs because the investment by government in programs to reduce gang violence can be advantageous from both a public safety and a fiscal perspective, as forward-looking investments can save money in the long-term. We hope the Advancement Project can use this
analysis of the costs of gang violence and the potential cost savings of various programs to help City, County, and State government officials make wise budgeting decisions.

Our analysis focuses on the costs of arresting and processing gang members through the criminal justice system, because these are the largest and most direct government costs of gang crime. We also calculated government-funded medical costs for treating victims in the most serious cases. Given the limitations of data availability, time, and budget, our estimates are only approximations. However, to ensure that they are a sufficiently reliable basis for budgeting decisions, we used two different methods, with different strengths and weaknesses, to calculate the costs. The first method of calculation relies on the annual budgets, per capita costs, and the approximate proportion of crimes that are gang-related in each major criminal justice agency. The second method draws on an analysis conducted by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), the research branch of the Washington Legislature. Their methods are the most in-depth and methodologically sound criminal justice cost-benefit analyses that have been published.

The calculations were also reviewed by a former Budget Director for the State of New York and a former Deputy Budget Director for the City of New York, both of whom have significant experience making criminal justice budgeting decisions.

Our analysis showed that gang violence in the City of Los Angeles costs the City, the County, and the State hundreds of millions of dollars each year. What is most striking, however, is the proportion of costs of violence in the City of Los Angeles that are incurred by the County and the State. According to our calculations, the State is incurring approximately 52% of the total costs for the incarceration and parole of adult and juvenile offenders, while the City incurs approximately 21% and the County incurs 27%. These findings suggest that it would be wise for the County and the State to invest in efforts to reduce gang violence within the City.

Our analysis suggests that gang violence in the City of Los Angeles is costing these three levels of government in California approximately $1.145 billion per year in criminal justice system costs. Broken down more specifically, gang-related crime costs City agencies approximately
$246,880,524 per year, County agencies approximately $304,785,871 per year, and State agencies approximately $593,905,502 per year. We have also roughly calculated that medical costs resulting from gunshot wounds to victims of gang members in the City of LA is costing the government approximately $45,296,446 annually. Due to the nature of insurance and medical payment, this cost is divided among California and federal agencies.

The chart that follows shows the costs resulting from gang crime in Los Angeles by agency, calculated using budget figures and estimates of numbers of LA gang cases handled. These calculations are very conservative estimates, as explained in detail in the next section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Annual Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>$243,764,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Attorney</td>
<td>$3,115,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Attorney's Office</td>
<td>$9,798,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Defender</td>
<td>$17,438,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior Courts</td>
<td>$6,615,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheriff's Department</td>
<td>$230,289,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCR Adult Prison</td>
<td>$524,475,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCR Adult Parole</td>
<td>$39,746,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Probation</td>
<td>$898,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYA Incarceration</td>
<td>$20,752,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYA Parole</td>
<td>$2,315,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Probation (Home)</td>
<td>$21,176,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Probation (Detention)</td>
<td>$25,194,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,145,581,897</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have also calculated the approximate annual taxpayer costs of gang violence using the estimates of marginal resource operating and capital costs provided in WSIPP’s 2001 report, *The Comparative Costs and Benefits of Programs to Reduce Crime*,¹ and their 2006 follow-up report, *Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Future Prison Construction, Criminal Justice Costs, and Crime Rates*.² From this, we have computed that the gang violence that occurs each

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year in Los Angeles costs the California criminal justice system approximately $1,097,036,170. Using the figures in the Washington report, we are able to estimate costs for crime victims as well as taxpayers. Out-of-pocket monetary victim costs for annual crime total approximately $363,476,000 and quality of life costs add another $709,125,000, totaling $1,072,601,000. Please see the next section for more details on these calculations. The table below shows the total cost per agency, based on the number of gang crimes in 2005 as recorded by the Los Angeles Police Department (See Appendix A). Please note that, although we have divided the costs by agency and jurisdiction, the organization of institutions and services are likely to differ between Washington and California, so we are more confident about the totals than about the distribution of costs to specific agencies and jurisdictions. It is striking that although the two methods of calculation differ, the total costs are remarkably similar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Costs Per Annual Crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police/Sheriff (Ci)</td>
<td>$50,059,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts and Prosecutors (Ci, Ct, St)</td>
<td>$51,757,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Juv Detention (Ct)</td>
<td>$260,318,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Juv Probation (Ct)</td>
<td>$16,527,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juv Rehab, Institutional (S)</td>
<td>$300,476,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juv Rehab, Parole (S)</td>
<td>$66,772,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Adult Jail (Ct)</td>
<td>$146,121,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Adult Probation (Ct)</td>
<td>$23,643,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Corrections (Prison) (S)</td>
<td>$157,717,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Corrections (Parole) (S)</td>
<td>$23,643,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,097,036,170</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While gang crime is extremely costly for government, there are programs that have been proven in multiple studies to reduce criminal behavior. By investing in these programs, the City, County and State government can reduce their costs. Vera determined projected government cost savings of evidence-based programs to reduce criminal behavior using a sophisticated analysis conducted by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy. This evidenced-based analysis can be used by thoughtful officials and community activists in other jurisdictions, including Los Angeles, to estimate the impact on crime of many such programs. Because crime is costly to


WSIPP’s 2001 and 2006 reports. See footnotes 1 and 2 for full citations.
government and to individual victims, programs that have been proved to reduce crime will provide savings to taxpayers and a variety of benefits to victims in the medium- and long-term. Some of the programs under consideration by the Advancement Project are similar or identical to programs that have undergone this rigorous analysis by WSIPP researchers, and their work allows us to estimate the impact of a portfolio of those programs. This selection is outlined in more detail in the third section of this memo, but we stress that the choice of programs is made for illustration, and can be modified as the Advancement Project’s work proceeds. The illustrative program array outlined here would save state and local taxpayers $59 million over the lives of the program participants, and would save victims an additional $112 million.

Our emphasis on programs with evidence-based results is not meant to preclude analysis of new programs or other initiatives that have not undergone such scrutiny. Indeed, upfront investment in programs whose benefits have been tested and evaluated is an important way to help pay for programs that have not undergone systematic evaluation, or programs with more general scopes which provide fewer savings for taxpayers.

**The Government Costs of Gang Crime**

In this section, we discuss the specific steps that Vera took to analyze the current costs incurred by government as a result of gang activity, the limitations of this type of analysis, and the detailed calculations that we conducted to determine the costs of gang violence.

Vera identified Los Angeles City and County agencies and California State agencies that are incurring substantial costs relating to or resulting from gang crime in the city of Los Angeles: the Los Angeles Police Department, the City Attorney, the District Attorney, the Public Defender, the Superior Courts, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, the Probation Department, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Adult and Juvenile Incarceration and Parole), and Los Angeles County hospitals. Within the criminal and juvenile justice systems, government agencies pay for the investigation of crime; the arrest, prosecution, defense, detention, and trial costs of alleged offenders; and the confinement, parole, and/or probation of
offenders. In addition to the criminal justice costs of gang crime, Vera calculated the costs to the government of treating gunshot victims of gang crime who are uninsured or who are insured by Medi-Cal.

The costs of gang violence to Los Angeles City and County and California State agencies are illustrated in the following chart.\(^4\)

**Figure 1: Gang Crime and Subsequent Costs**

*Figure 1: Gang Crime and Subsequent Costs*

**Limitations of Cost-Benefit Calculations**

\(^4\) This chart includes Part I crimes since the LAPD only keeps track of gang crimes that fall into this category.
The methods used to arrive at these calculations have their strengths, but it is important to be cognizant of the limitations of each before using the numbers to justify funding. Conducting an analysis that most accurately reflects the government costs of violence requires significant resources and time, and also requires that government agencies methodically and systematically collect data and statistics that can be used in the analysis. In the absence of these resources or figures, we have been forced to make educated guesses in a number of places. For example, based on data from the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, we have assumed that 70% of adult jail and prison inmates, probationers, and parolees are gang-involved. However, record-keeping differs in the County Department of Probation, and those data suggest that only 3% of Los Angeles County probationers are gang-involved. These large differences in estimates result because the Department of Probation does not require Probation Officers to keep track of this statistic, and their record-keeping systems only can count a probationer as gang-involved if the officer has noted this fact in their file by chance.

The first method of calculation also cannot account for criminal justice costs that are incurred in the future. This factor is mitigated by WSIPP’s methodology, which uses marginal operating and capital costs. As stated in the 2006 WSIPP report, “The model uses estimates of marginal operating and capital costs of the criminal justice system. Marginal criminal justice costs are defined as those costs that change over the period of several years as a result of changes in workload measures. Some short-run costs must be changed instantly when a workload changes. For example, when one prisoner is added to the state corrections system, certain variable food and service costs increase immediately, but new corrections staff are not hired the next day. Over the course of a governmental budget cycle, however, new corrections staff are likely to be hired to handle the larger average daily population of the prison. In the institute’s analysis, these ‘longer-run’ marginal costs have been estimated, rather than immediate, short-run marginal costs. These longer-run marginal costs reflect both the immediate short-run changes in expenditures, and those operating expenditures that change after governments make adjustments to staffing levels, often in the next budget cycle.”

This method, therefore, is able to calculate the direct costs (both current and projected) of violence that occurs each year. By applying the

figures to Los Angeles, we are able to calculate the approximate criminal justice and victim costs of one year of gang-related crime.

However, this method brings with it another set of problems. The multi-year approach and present value analysis is not strictly compatible with annual budgets and the usual approaches to preparing them. Moreover, the WSIPP methodologies are complex and more difficult for legislators or citizens to understand.

Method 1: Current Criminal Justice and Medical Government Costs Using LA Data

Vera used two different calculation methods to determine the government costs of gang violence in Los Angeles. The first method was to calculate the cost per crime based on (1) the per capita cost to the agency per day/month/year; and (2) the number of LA city gang members (or victims) served per year. Where per capita cost was not available, we divided the agency’s total budget, or the budget for a designated program, by the total number of individuals served (or other unit of analysis – e.g. arrests effected, cases represented). Where the number of gang members served per year was unavailable, we estimated the number using the proportion of gang arrests relative to the number of total arrests per year by the Los Angeles Police Department, or using the proportion of gang-involved detainees/inmates relative to the total number of detainees/inmates housed per year by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.

Based on the movement of adult and juvenile offenders through the system, Vera calculated the current costs of gang violence to each LA City and County and California State agency. Please see Appendix A for a diagram of the flow of people from arrest to incarceration and parole.
According to the LAPD, there were 6,619 Part 1 gang arrests in 2005. The total number of Part 1 arrests in the City was 29,292. There were a total of 159,106 arrests (Part 1 and 2). The total budget for FY 05-06 with pension and fringe was $1,368,277,896.

The Washington State Institute for Public Policy has calculated that the average felony arrest costs the police approximately 16.5 times as much to investigate/arrest as a misdemeanor. Assuming that a similar ratio exists between Part 1 and Part 2 arrests, we can calculate that in 2005, each Part 1 arrest cost approximately $36,828 to investigate/arrest.

6,619 Part 1 gang arrests at $36,828 each totals $243,764,532.

This calculation assumes that 100% of the LAPD budget is spent on making arrests. While this is probably not the case, one could make the argument that the purpose of the Department is to uphold public safety through investigations and arrests and thus all of

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6 The LAPD’s Gang Unit’s annual budget is $53,027,883 per year. However, according to Sergeant Wesley McBride, who has worked in the field of public safety for over 30 years including investigating gang crime for the LASD and is currently serving as the president of the California Gang Investigators Association, the gang unit only makes a small fraction of the gang arrests and makes non-gang arrests when necessary. Consequently, this number is not an accurate reflection of the costs of gang crime to the LAPD.

7 See Appendix A for LAPD gang crime statistics.

8 As identified by LAPD statistics.

<http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat/content_basic_view/24435> (29 November 2006).


10 WSIPP’s 2001 report, Table IV-D, page 82.
their activities aim towards this end. In addition, this calculation is based on the number of annual gang arrests as identified by the LAPD, which is likely an undercount, and does not include misdemeanor or drug crimes, which are not tracked specifically by the LAPD as gang crimes.

**City Attorney**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Attorney</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gang Unit Budget</td>
<td>$3,115,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The City Attorney’s Gang Unit’s annual budget is $3,232,355, and $3,115,992 of this total is paid for by the City.\(^{11}\) There are likely other costs related to gang crime not included in this budget, but this can serve as a conservative estimate. The City Attorney handles misdemeanors prosecutions.

**County Agencies**

**District Attorney’s Office**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Attorney’s Office</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total annual budget</td>
<td>$288,193,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage spent on gang crime</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total annual spending</td>
<td>$9,798,562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we assume that the District Attorney spends the same percentage of its budget on gang crime as the City Attorney (3.4%),\(^{12}\) we can calculate that the District Attorney spends approximately $9,798,562 on gang crime per year (total annual budget = $288,193,000).\(^{13}\) This is likely a grossly conservative number, but we are forced to make assumptions such as this due to a lack of statistics. The District Attorney handles felony prosecutions for the City of Los Angeles.

**Public Defender**

\(^{11}\) Statistics provided to Vera by Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project, based on work by Peter Greenwood.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Defender</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felony cases represented</td>
<td>104,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total gang cases</td>
<td>24,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage from LA City</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang cases from LA City</td>
<td>9,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per case cost</td>
<td>$702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted to 2005</td>
<td>$723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$6,796,602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In FY 2004-2005, the Public Defender’s Office provided representation on 104,866 felony cases countywide. If we assume that approximately 23% those cases were gang crimes (based on percentage of LAPD Part 1 arrests that are gang-related), the Public Defender’s Office defended 24,119 gang cases.

If we assume that 39% of those cases are from LA City (based on total representation in the LA County jail), that would equal 9,406 LA City gang cases defended.

According to the Public Defender’s office, each felony case cost $702 to defend in 2004. If we adjust this number to 2005 using the consumer price index, each case costs $723 to defend.

By multiplying the number of cases (9,406) by the per case cost ($723), we can calculate that the Public Defender spent $6,796,602 on LA City gang cases in 2005.

14 Public Defender information given to Vera by Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project, who was given statistics on October 27, 2006 by Robert Kalunian, Chief Deputy Public Defender.

15 Public Defender statistics given to Vera by Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project.
Sheriff’s Department Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual corrections budget</td>
<td>$843,553,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of inmates from LA City</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of housing LA City inmates</td>
<td>$328,985,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of gang-involved inmates</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of LA City gang-involved inmates</td>
<td>$230,289,975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Sheriff’s Department FY 2005-2006 corrections budget was $843,553,021. According to the Sheriff’s Department, 39% of its detainees/inmates are from the City of Los Angeles, and 70% of its detainees/inmates are gang-affiliated. By taking 39% of the budget, and then 70% of the budget, we can calculate that the LASD spends approximately $230,289,975 on gang crimes per year.

Department of Probation (Adult)17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adult Probation</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (yearly)</td>
<td>$1,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of adults on probation</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage from LA City</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of probationers from LA City</td>
<td>19,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage that are gang-involved</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of gang-involved probationers</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>$898,338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Department of Probation spends $1,534 per person annually for supervision. There are approximately 63,000 adults on probation each year. 31% of people on probation are from LA City, and 3% are gang-involved, totaling 586. The total annual cost of supervising LA City gang-involved probationers is $898,338.

According to Gina Byrnes at the Department of Probation, officers do not routinely identify gang-affiliated probationers. Probation staff will sporadically make a note of it in their paperwork, but there are no official records keeping track of this statistic. Ms.

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16 All Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department statistics and budget figures given to Vera by Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project. The budget and statistics were originally prepared on October 17, 2006 by Conrad Meredith of the LASD’s Custody Budget Unit in response to an information request submitted by the County Administrator’s Office on behalf of the Advancement Project.

17 All Department of Probation data prepared by Gina Byrnes in the Administrative Services Bureau and given to Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project on October 20, 2006.
Byrnes stated that 3% is an extremely conservative undercount but they have no other way to estimate the number. We will use this percentage in our calculations because it is official, but if we assumed that 70% of probationers were gang-involved (like the LASD inmate population), the total annual cost would be $20,957,643.

**Department of Probation (Juvenile, Home and Detention)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probation (Home)</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of probationers per year</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36% from LA City</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56% gang involved</td>
<td>4,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (annual)</td>
<td>$5,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>$21,176,064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Department of Probation, there are 20,000 juveniles on probation each year. 36% of the probationers are from LA City, and 56% are gang-involved. This totals 4,032 gang-involved probationers from LA City. The per capita cost of supervising a juvenile probationer is $5,252.18

4,032 probationers at $5,252 each costs the County $21,176,064.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probation (Detention)</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (daily)</td>
<td>$215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of stay (days)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (based on avg stay)</td>
<td>$7,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detentions per year</td>
<td>15,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of detentions per year</td>
<td>$124,973,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36% from LA City, 56% gang involved</td>
<td>$25,194,567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Gina Byrnes in the Probation Department, 90% of costs for Probation Halls ($155.2 million) and Camps ($92.9 million) are for minors with gang affiliation. Given that 36% of the population is from LA City, this would total $80.38 million in Probation costs per year. However, if we err on the conservative side and use daily per capita costs, we can calculate a more precise figure.

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18 Department of Probation statistics given to Vera by Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project
According to the Department of Probation, the daily per capita cost is $215. Using the average daily population (1,582) and the number of annual detentions (15,710), we can calculate the average length of stay (37 days)\(^1^9\) and thus the average cost per capita ($7,955).\(^2^0\)

15,710 detentions at $7,955 each totals $124,973,050. According to Probation, 36% of probationers are from LA City and 56% are gang-involved, totaling $25,194,567 in costs resulting from gang crimes in LA City.

State Agencies

**Superior Courts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior Courts</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of annual nontraffic criminal cases</td>
<td>307,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget approximation for nontraffic criminal cases</td>
<td>$73,752,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per case</td>
<td>$240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases from LA City (39%)</td>
<td>119,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of gang-related cases (23%)</td>
<td>27,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,615,840</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In LA Superior Court, criminal filings made up 84.3% of all filings (2,232,834 of 2,647,346) in 2004-2005.

In 2004-2005, 307,307 nontraffic criminal cases were filed in LA Superior Court, including criminal habeas corpus appeals, criminal appeals, juvenile delinquency cases, and nontraffic felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions, or 11.6% of all filings.

The Court’s total budget for 2004-2005 was $635.8 million. 11.6% of $635.8 million is $73,752,800. $73,752,800 divided by 307,307 comes to $240 per filing.\(^2^1\)

---

\(^1^9\) Average length of stay = average daily population \* days per year / number of annual entries into the jail (1,582 \* 365 / 15,710)

\(^2^0\) Average cost per capita = average length of stay \* daily per capita cost ($215 \* 37)

If we assume that 39% of the cases were from LA City (119,850), and 23% were gang crimes (according to LAPD statistics), we can calculate that there were 27,566 cases at $240 each, totaling $6,615,840.

This calculation is extremely conservative, given that the average cost per filing is heavily weighted by the cost of traffic cases, which cost significantly less than prosecuting a gang case; however, given the lack of relevant statistics, this is the most accurate estimation we can make.

**California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Adult)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDCR (Prison)</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (yearly)</td>
<td>$34,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of offenders</td>
<td>170,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33% from LA County</td>
<td>56,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39% from LA City</td>
<td>21,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70% gang involved</td>
<td>15,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly cost of LA gang members</td>
<td>$524,475,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s annual per capita cost of imprisoning an offender is $34,150. In 2005, it had 170,475 total offenders under its jurisdiction. 33% of these were from Los Angeles County, which totals 56,257.22

If we assume that there is the same ratio of LA City to LA County people in the prisons that there is in the LA County jail, that would equal 39% of the 33%, totaling 21,940 inmates from LA City. If we assume that 70% are gang involved (according to LASD’s estimate of their inmate population), there are a total of 15,358 gang-involved inmates from the City of LA.

15,358 people at $34,150 per year costs the State $524,475,700.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parole</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (yearly)</td>
<td>$4,067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s annual per capita cost of supervising a parolee is $4,067. In 2005, CDCR had a total of 115,699 parolees under its jurisdiction. 35,817 of these were from LA County.\(^{23}\)

If we assume that there is the same ratio of LA City to LA County people in the prisons that there is in the LA County jail, that would equal 39% of 35,817, which totals 13,969. If we assume that 70% are gang involved, there are a total of 9,773 gang-involved parolees from the City of LA.

9,773 people at $4,067 per year will cost the State $39,746,791.

\[\text{California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Juvenile Incarceration</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of wards (March 2004)</td>
<td>4,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (annual)</td>
<td>$71,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updated to 2005</td>
<td>$73,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage from LA County</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total from LA County</td>
<td>1,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36% from LA City, 56% gang involved</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>$20,752,131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of March 2004 (the most recent date for which data is available), the California Youth Authority housed 4,222 wards.\(^{24}\) CYA’s annual per capita cost (including mental health care) in 2003-2004 was $71,700, adjusted to $73,851 for 2005 using the CPI.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\) \textit{Ibid.}\n

If we assume that 33% are from LA County (like the CDCR adult population), there are a total of 1,393 wards from LA County. If we assume that, consistent with the Department of Probation’s population, 36% of juvenile probationers are from LA City and 56% are gang involved, there are a total of 281 gang members from LA City. We expect that this number is extremely conservative, as there is likely a much higher number of gang-involved youth incarcerated by the State than on County Probation; however, these are the best estimates we can make.

281 wards at $73,851 each will cost the state $20,752,131. This totals 6% of the Probation Department’s annual budget.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Juvenile Parole</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of parolees</td>
<td>4,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget</td>
<td>$37,022,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita cost (budget/4,158)</td>
<td>$8,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage from LA County</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total from LA County</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36% from LA City, 56% gang involved</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>$2,315,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of March 2004 (the most recent date for which data is available), the California Youth Authority supervised 4,158 parolees. The total annual budget for Parole is $37,022,000.27

If we calculate the per capita annual cost based on the total budget and the total number of parolees, it equals $8,904.

If we assume that 31% are from LA County (like the adults), there are a total of 1,289 parolees from LA County. If we assume that, like the Department of Probation, 36% are

---

26 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Budget Overview. <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BudgetRegs/budgetOverview.html> (30 November 2006). Juvenile Operations = $170,634,000; Juvenile Education, Vocations, and Offender Program = $131,590,000; and Juvenile Healthcare = $55,976,000 totaling $358,200,000.

from LA City and 56% are gang involved, there are a total of 260 gang members on parole from LA City.

260 parolees at $8,904 each produces State costs of $2,315,040, which is 6% of the total CDCR Juvenile Parole budget.28

Medical Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Homicide and Assault arrests in LA City (2005)</td>
<td>15,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number that are gang-related</td>
<td>3,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage that are gang-related</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total annual shooting victims</td>
<td>2,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang-related shooting victims (at 21.5%)</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of these that are fatal</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion that are non-fatal</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of treating a fatal gunshot wound</td>
<td>$50,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of treating a non-fatal gunshot wound</td>
<td>$103,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of gang-related gunshot wounds</td>
<td>$36,659,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of homicides/assaults that do not involve guns</td>
<td>13,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assuming that half of these require medical treatment</td>
<td>6,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assuming that 21.5% are gang-related</td>
<td>1,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of treating a stab-wound victim</td>
<td>$13,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total annual cost for crimes not involving guns</td>
<td>$19,960,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost of all gang-related medical treatment</strong></td>
<td>$56,620,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of victims not insured/covered by government insurance</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total annual cost to government</td>
<td>$45,296,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the LAPD, the total number of homicides and aggravated assaults in LA City in 2005 was 487 and 15,502, respectively, totaling 15,989. The total number of gang-related homicides, attempted homicides, and felony assaults was 244, 579, and 2620, respectively, totaling 3,443, which is 21.5% of the total number in LA City.

According to the LAPD, the total number of shooting victims in 2005 was 2227.29

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Assuming that 21.5% of the shooting victims were gang-related, there were 479 gang shooting victims in 2005.

According to the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development Hospital Discharge Data, medical charges for non-fatal firearm injuries increased from $29,817 in 1997 to $64,985 in 2002. Using the same rate of change, we can estimate that the cost in 2005 was $103,814.30.

In addition, according to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, the medical cost of treating a gang homicide victim is $50,261.31.

Please note that these costs only calculate immediate hospital/morgue costs, and do not include the cost of follow-up care, physical therapy, mental health care, or any other foreseeable medical expenses.

Out of these 479 gang-related shooting victims, we do not have a clear sense of how many were fatal and how many were non-fatal. However, we do know that at a maximum, 244 were fatal, since according to the LAPD, there were 244 gang-related homicides in 2005. Given the fact that fatal gunshot wounds cost approximately half as much to treat as non-fatal gunshot wounds, we can make a conservative estimate by assuming the maximum number of fatal shootings (244) and the remaining number as non-fatal shootings (235). Using these assumptions, 244 fatal gunshot wounds at $50,261 each totals $12,263,684, and 235 non-fatal gunshot wounds at 103,814 each totals $24,396,290, bring the final cost to $36,659,974.

In addition, we know that out of the 15,989 annual victims of homicide and aggravated assaults, 13,762 are not shooting victims. If we assume that half of these victims require medical care, and 21.5% are gang-related, there are 1,479 additional victims with medical costs.

30 Statistics given to Vera by Leticia Ramirez of the Advancement Project, originally from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development Hospital Discharge Data, prepared by LAC-DHS-IVPP: August 24, 2006. Updated by Dall Forsythe using average rate of growth.
According to Ted Miller and Mark Cohen (1997), the cost of treating a stab wound is approximately 1/13 of the cost of treating a gunshot wound.\(^{32}\) Assuming that this is true in LA, we can infer that it costs $13,496 (1/13 of 103,814) to treat the other 1,479 victims, totaling $19,960,584.

This brings the total cost of annual medical care to $56,620,558.

According to the most in-depth study of gang related medical costs in Los Angeles County that has been conducted, 58% of victims being treated for gang-related gunshot wounds had no third party reimbursement, 22% had Medi-Cal, and 20% had medical insurance.\(^{33}\)

If, in this vein, we assume that 80% of the costs are being covered by the government (likely a combination of City, County, and State funds), we can estimate that the medical cost of gang violence to government is approximately $45,296,446.

**Method 2: Criminal Justice and Victim Costs Using WSIPP Figures**

Vera’s second method was to calculate the cost of gang violence to each agency based on the type of crime committed using the figures in the Washington State Institute for Public Policy’s reports. WSIPP’s approach is based on a sophisticated analysis of marginal and operating costs. This methodology is able to account for the additional costs added by each crime, and also calculates the cost beyond the present fiscal year. We believe that this method of calculation is more accurate than an estimate based on total budget costs. By adjusting for inflation, we calculated that the approximate criminal justice government costs of gang violence that occurred in 2005 totaled $1,097,036,170. Vera adjusted for inflation using the West Region Consumer Price Index from the US Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.\(^{34}\)

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The table below shows the WSIPP cost estimates for both criminal justice government costs and victim costs, by type of crime.

**Figure 2: WSIPP’s Estimates of Marginal Resource Operating Costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Units Used in Cost Estimate</th>
<th>Murder/ Manslaughter</th>
<th>Rape &amp; Sex Offenses</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Aggravated Assault</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Misdemeanor</th>
<th>Year in Which Unit Cost Estimates are Based</th>
<th>Annual Real Cost Estimation Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police and Sheriff's Offices</td>
<td>$ Per Arrest</td>
<td>$51,848</td>
<td>$4,436</td>
<td>$6,436</td>
<td>$5,770</td>
<td>$5,770</td>
<td>$365</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior Courts &amp; County Prosecutors</td>
<td>$ Per Conviction</td>
<td>$127,905</td>
<td>$3,616</td>
<td>$1,532</td>
<td>$1,532</td>
<td>$1,532</td>
<td>$1,532</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Detention, with Local Sentences</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$30,100</td>
<td>$10,100</td>
<td>$10,100</td>
<td>$10,100</td>
<td>$10,100</td>
<td>$10,100</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Probation</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$9,228</td>
<td>$1,228</td>
<td>$1,228</td>
<td>$1,228</td>
<td>$1,228</td>
<td>$1,228</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Rehabilitation, Institutions</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$9,020</td>
<td>$9,020</td>
<td>$9,020</td>
<td>$9,020</td>
<td>$9,020</td>
<td>$9,020</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Rehabilitation, Foster Care</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$17,047</td>
<td>$17,047</td>
<td>$17,047</td>
<td>$17,047</td>
<td>$17,047</td>
<td>$17,047</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Jail, with Local Sentences</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Community Supervision, Local Sentence</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Corrections, Institutions</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Corrections, Post-Prison Supervision</td>
<td>Annual $ Per ADP</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>$2,868</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By using the Consumer Price Index, West Region (see Appendix C), we were able to update the costs to reflect approximate 2005 figures. The table below shows the updated figures, in addition to the total calculations. We can see that there is a total of $1,097,036,170 in criminal justice system costs incurred by the government, $363,476,113 in victim monetary costs, and $709,125,091 in victim quality of life costs.

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35 WSIPP’s 2001 report, Table IV-D, page 82.
Figure 3: 2006 Marginal Resource Operating Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Manslaughter/Murder</th>
<th>Rape</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Agg. Assault</th>
<th>Property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police/Sheriff</td>
<td>$32,597</td>
<td>$6,631</td>
<td>$6,631</td>
<td>$6,631</td>
<td>$5,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts and Prosecutors</td>
<td>$161,288</td>
<td>$7,169</td>
<td>$1,919</td>
<td>$1,919</td>
<td>$1,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Juvenile Probation</td>
<td>$2,497</td>
<td>$2,497</td>
<td>$2,497</td>
<td>$2,497</td>
<td>$2,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Rehab, Institutional</td>
<td>$45,396</td>
<td>$45,396</td>
<td>$45,396</td>
<td>$45,396</td>
<td>$45,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Rehab, Parole</td>
<td>$10,088</td>
<td>$10,088</td>
<td>$10,088</td>
<td>$10,088</td>
<td>$10,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Adult Jail</td>
<td>$22,076</td>
<td>$22,076</td>
<td>$22,076</td>
<td>$22,076</td>
<td>$22,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Adult Probation</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Corrections (Prison)</td>
<td>$23,828</td>
<td>$23,828</td>
<td>$23,828</td>
<td>$23,828</td>
<td>$23,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Corrections (Parole)</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
<td>$3,572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Victim Costs (Monetary)       | $1,422,982          | $8,610  | $3,254   | $2,019       | $6,608   |
| Victim Costs (Quality of Life)| $2,640,460          | $88,221 | $8,056   | $10,963      | $87      |

| Total Justice System Costs/Crime | $344,243 | $164,158 | $158,908 | $158,908 | $157,808 |
| Total Victim Costs/Crime        | $4,063,442 | $96,831  | $11,311  | $12,982    | $6,695   |
| Annual Number of Crimes in LA   | 244       | 32       | 2015     | 4176       | 152      |

| Justice System Costs           | $83,995,342 | $5,253,049 | $320,200,108 | $663,600,819 | $23,986,853 |
| Victim Monetary Costs           | $347,207,671 | $275,535  | $6,557,485  | $8,430,947  | $1,004,475 |
| Total Victim Costs              | $991,479,832 | $3,098,593 | $22,790,718 | $54,214,398 | $1,017,663 |

| Total Justice System Costs     | $1,097,036,170 |
| Total Victim Monetary Costs    | $363,476,113   |
| Total Victim QOL Costs         | $709,125,091   |
| Total Victim Costs             | $1,072,601,204 |

Victim Costs

In addition to estimating the criminal justice costs, we also used the WSIPP report to estimate victim monetary costs and victim quality of life costs. According to the WSIPP report, a study by the US Department of Justice in 1996 was able to successfully estimate victim costs of crime.\(^36\) The study divided victim costs into “monetary costs,” which include medical spending, mental health payments, future earnings, and property damage, less public programs, and “quality of life

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costs,” computed from jury awards for pain, suffering, and lost quality of life. For the purposes of analyzing government costs, we adjusted these figures to 2005 using the CPI and calculated the total victim costs by multiplying it by the number of arrests in each category as reported by the LAPD. Please note that these numbers are conservative, as there could be multiple victims from a single arrest. We estimate a total of $363,476,113 in victim monetary costs and $709,125,091 in quality of life costs. We caution against the widespread use of these numbers, as they are controversial in public policy settings.

**Projected Benefits and Cost Savings**

In addition to estimating the current costs of gang crime in the City of Los Angeles, Vera also used the report published by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy to estimate potential cost-savings resulting from the implementation of the Advancement Project’s recommendations, in addition to other program possibilities. The WSIPP has assembled and reviewed a vast library of studies evaluating anti-crime programs. The Institute has used these studies to answer a critical question: “What works to reduce crime?” They have reviewed programs for adults as well as juvenile offenders, and for a limited number of preventive programs. From their analysis of these programs, they calculated the effect of those programs in reducing criminal activity during the lifetime of a program participant.

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37 This method for dividing costs has been used in other studies, including a study of the costs of crime by state by the Children’s Safety Network Economics and Data Analysis Resource Center. See www.edarc.org/pubs for more information.

38 See, for example, Clear, T. (1996). The cost of crime—Or are prisons or community programs the best crime prevention investment? Community Corrections Report 4 November/December, cited in 2006 WSIPP report, page 37. Also, please note discussion from page 37 of WSIPP’s 2006 report: “In addition to costs paid by taxpayers, many of the costs of crime are borne by victims. Some victims lose their lives. Others suffer direct, out-of-pocket, personal or property losses. Psychological consequences also occur to crime victims, including feeling less secure in society. The magnitude of victim costs is very difficult—and in some cases impossible—to quantify. In recent years, however, national studies have taken significant steps in estimating crime victim costs. One U.S. Department of Justice study by Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996) divides crime victim costs into two types: (a) Monetary costs, which include medical and mental health care expenses, property damage and losses, and the reduction in future earnings incurred by crime victims; and (b) Quality of Life cost estimates, which place a dollar value on the pain and suffering of crime victims. In that study, the quality of life victim costs are computed from jury awards for pain, suffering, and lost quality of life; for murders, the victim quality of life value is estimated from the amount people spend to reduce risks of death. The quality of life victim cost calculations are controversial for use in setting public policy.” For a more in-depth discussion of the victim costs of violent crime, including costs from factors such as ongoing psychological costs, increased work load of or psychological injury to other family members, loss of companionship, trauma to witnesses, and community fear of crime, see “The Costs and Consequences of Violent Behavior in the United States” by Mark Cohen, Ted Miller, and Shelli Rossman.
The table below labeled “Reducing Crime with Evidence-Based Options: What Works, and Benefits & Costs,” is drawn from WSIPP’s 2006 report. Although the Institute analyzed 571 individual programs, in this table the results have been aggregated and presented in a more general typology of programs. The effects are outlined in Column 1, where a negative number corresponds to a reduction in future criminal activity.

Once programs have been shown to reduce crime, the next step is to estimate the benefit of that reduction in criminal activity. This estimate was based on the detailed cost data WSIPP developed for the State of Washington. In our preliminary analysis, we have assumed that the cost of crime in California does not differ from Washington enough to require adjustment.39 Those benefits from reduced criminal activity in the future are calculated separately for taxpayers and for crime victims. The first set of benefits is important to budget officials, legislators on appropriating committees and, of course, to taxpayers themselves. The second set of benefits is important to the full range of policy-makers and, of course, to crime victims and their families.

Benefits for taxpayers and for crime victims per program participant are displayed in Columns 3 and 2 respectively.

The next step is the calculation of the cost per participant of providing the program, presented in Column 4. Finally, the net present value (NPV) of the benefits less the costs is provided for each program type in Column 5. Net present value analysis is the standard methodology used in business and in policy analysis to summarize a set of costs and benefits which stretch several years into the future. For example, a corporation analyzing whether to enter a new business line will use the net present value of future costs and revenues to determine whether to move ahead with the investment. We note that this kind of long-term analysis is not regularly used in governmental budgeting, where a greater emphasis is placed on annual costs and savings.

39 Several comparative analyses of the costs of criminal justice agencies in California and Washington suggest that the cost per inmate of those systems differ by a significant amount. In general, California costs seem to be about 75-80% of those in the state of Washington. However, in discussions with us, WSIPP researchers suggested that those differences are likely to be offset by longer sentences and higher incarceration rates in California, and suggested that we simply use the Washington data without adjustment. We have done so, with the caveat that this issue deserves additional study.
### Exhibit 4

**Reducing Crime With Evidence-Based Options: What Works, and Benefits & Costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>Effect on Crime Outcomes</th>
<th>Benefits &amp; Costs (Per Participant, Net Present Value, 2006 Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent change in crime outcomes, &amp; the number of evidence-based studies on which the estimates are based (in parentheses)</td>
<td>Benefits to Victims of the Reduction in Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs for the Juvenile Offender System</td>
<td>Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (or, regular group care)</td>
<td>-22.6% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adolescent Drug Treatment Program (for lower risk offenders)</td>
<td>-10.8% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family Integrated Transitions</td>
<td>-15.6% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence-based Family Therapy on probation</td>
<td>-15.6% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mental Health Treatment Programs</td>
<td>-12.3% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admission Reduction Treatment</td>
<td>-7.3% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-trial</td>
<td>-11.3% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile boot camp to offset institutional time</td>
<td>-10.3% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restorative justice for low-risk offenders</td>
<td>-8.7% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interagency coordination programs</td>
<td>-2.6% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile drug courts</td>
<td>-5.1% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular surveillance-oriented parole (vs. no parole supervision)</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile intensive supervision parole programs</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile detention facilities</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile intermediate parole supervision</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scored Straight</td>
<td>+8.4% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community/vocational training for juvenile offenders</td>
<td>-15.6% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile education programs</td>
<td>-17.2% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other family-based therapy programs</td>
<td>-13.2% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Team-Based intervention</td>
<td>-10.2% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile behavior modification</td>
<td>-8.7% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life skills education programs for juvenile offenders</td>
<td>-12.3% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drug treatment programs (vs. regular juvenile court)</td>
<td>-2.7% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile cognitive-behavioral treatment</td>
<td>-2.7% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court supervision vs. dummy release with services</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile programs with services (vs. release)</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juvenile intensive probation (as an alternative to incarceration)</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grouped Interaction</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Preventive Programs (crime reduction effects only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>Effect on Crime Outcomes</th>
<th>Benefits &amp; Costs (Per Participant, Net Present Value, 2006 Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent change in crime outcomes, &amp; the number of evidence-based studies on which the estimates are based (in parentheses)</td>
<td>Benefits to Victims of the Reduction in Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse Family Partnership-Mothers</td>
<td>-0.2% (3)</td>
<td>$11,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse Family Partnership-Children</td>
<td>-0.4% (3)</td>
<td>$8,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Education for families (3-4 year olds)</td>
<td>-0.4% (3)</td>
<td>$8,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle School Development Project</td>
<td>-0.4% (3)</td>
<td>$8,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduation</td>
<td>-0.4% (3)</td>
<td>$8,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-the-Counter Drug Use Treatment</td>
<td>-0.4% (3)</td>
<td>$8,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-Child Interaction Therapy</td>
<td>-0.4% (3)</td>
<td>$8,652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Program types in need of additional research & development before we can conclude they do or do not reduce crime outcomes:

- Case management in the community for drug offenders
- Court-based diversion of non-violent offenders
- Increased drug testing (on parole) vs. minimal drug testing
- Juvenile justice programs
- Juvenile court reporting
- Juvenile job programs
- Juvenile treatment programs
- Juvenile mentoring programs
- Mentoring in juvenile justice

---

This table is full of useful data, but it is also cumbersome and includes some data we will not need in our review. We have simplified these data to make them more accessible for use in the anti-gang initiative. Our first step was to eliminate the column specifying effects, allowing us to concentrate more easily on costs and benefits. We have also dropped the adult offender programs, which are less relevant to the anti-gang initiative. Finally, we have eliminated any program areas where WSIPP was unable to estimate an effect or calculate a net benefit, or where the effect was an increase in costs, or the net benefit was negative.

With this smaller data set in hand, we also calculated one additional data element. We have included the net benefit for taxpayers as well as the total net benefit, which also includes benefits for crime victims. By isolating the taxpayer benefit, we hope to make the analysis more persuasive to budget officials, and to emphasize that many of the programs detailed will not only pay for themselves in taxpayer dollars saved over a period of years, but can also throw off benefits sufficient to fund other programs of value where evaluation studies have not yet produced evidence of reductions in crime.
### Figure 5: WSIPP Summary of Program Economics (in 2006 $)^{41}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Description</th>
<th>Benefits Per Participant</th>
<th>Per Crime Victims Only</th>
<th>Benefits (NPV)</th>
<th>- Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net cost per participant</td>
<td>Taxpayer Only</td>
<td>Taxpayer Only</td>
<td>Taxpayer and Victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse-Family Partnership -- Mothers</td>
<td>5,049</td>
<td>8,161</td>
<td>11,531</td>
<td>3,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse-Family Partnership -- Children</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>8,632</td>
<td>4,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-K for low-income 3 &amp; 4 year-olds</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>4,644</td>
<td>8,145</td>
<td>4,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Dimensionable Treatment Foster Care (vs regular care)</td>
<td>6,945</td>
<td>32,915</td>
<td>51,828</td>
<td>25,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescent Diversion Project (for lower risk offenders)</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>18,208</td>
<td>24,328</td>
<td>16,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Integrated Transitions</td>
<td>9,665</td>
<td>19,502</td>
<td>30,708</td>
<td>9,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Family Therapy on probation</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>14,617</td>
<td>19,529</td>
<td>12,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multisystemic Therapy</td>
<td>4,264</td>
<td>9,622</td>
<td>12,855</td>
<td>5,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression Replacement Therapy</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>6,659</td>
<td>8,897</td>
<td>5,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teen Courts</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>4,238</td>
<td>5,907</td>
<td>3,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Boot Camp to offset institution time</td>
<td>(8,077)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restorative Justice for low-risk offenders</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>4,628</td>
<td>2,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency coordinative programs</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td>2,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Drug Courts</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>3,167</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these updated costs and benefits, we can create a menu of program options for the City of LA. In the table below, we have assumed an arbitrary and illustrative number of participants. Using the Excel spreadsheet that we have attached, the Advancement Project or the City can plug in any number of program participants and the total cost and benefits will automatically be generated.

---

### Figure 6: Portfolio Selection Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Description</th>
<th># of participants</th>
<th>Net per participant</th>
<th>Total Program Cost</th>
<th>Net Taxpayer Benefits</th>
<th>Total Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nurse-Family Partnership -- Mothers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,049</td>
<td>504,900</td>
<td>311,200</td>
<td>1,464,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse-Family Partnership -- Children</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>73,300</td>
<td>418,900</td>
<td>1,282,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-K for low-income 3 &amp; 4 year-olds</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>5,930,000</td>
<td>40,510,000</td>
<td>121,960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Dimensionable Treatment Foster Care (vs regular care)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,945</td>
<td>694,500</td>
<td>2,597,000</td>
<td>7,779,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescent Diversion Project (for lower risk offenders)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>191,300</td>
<td>1,629,500</td>
<td>4,062,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Integrated Transitions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9,665</td>
<td>966,500</td>
<td>983,700</td>
<td>4,054,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Family Therapy on probation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>232,500</td>
<td>1,229,200</td>
<td>3,182,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multisystemic Therapy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,264</td>
<td>426,400</td>
<td>535,800</td>
<td>1,821,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression Replacement Therapy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>89,700</td>
<td>576,200</td>
<td>1,465,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teen Courts</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>936,000</td>
<td>3,302,000</td>
<td>9,209,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Boot Camp to offset institution time</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>(8,077)</td>
<td>(2,019,250)</td>
<td>2,019,250</td>
<td>2,019,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restorative Justice for low-risk offenders</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>366,000</td>
<td>1,060,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency coordinative programs</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>2,103,000</td>
<td>5,187,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Drug Courts</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>2,777,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>4,622,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,139,850</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,971,750</strong></td>
<td><strong>169,169,750</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This simplified presentation also allows the Advancement Project to create a portfolio of crime reduction programs suitable for the anti-gang initiative now under study. Using the cost per participant, the Project can estimate the costs and benefits of an initiative with a given number of participants. As evidenced by the table above, the total benefits of many of these programs for taxpayers and for crime victims are striking. As discussed earlier, it is also possible to argue that the positive net benefit for taxpayers of any recommended portfolio can be used to invest in other programs where evidence-based analysis does not show reductions in crime, but where other positive results are anticipated.
Recommendations

Establishment of Capacity to Track Data

As part of a comprehensive, long-term effort to reduce gang violence, we believe that the Advancement Project’s key recommendations should include both better data collection by existing agencies as well as the establishment of a new research institute to support the City in developing more precise measures of gang violence. Without better data on gang crimes and their disposition, it is difficult to accurately compute the costs of gang violence, and therefore determine which agencies are most heavily affected. As discussed above, we found this to be a significant problem in our analysis and were forced to apply the estimates or assumptions of one agency to a number of agencies that do not keep track (or do not make available) these types of statistics.

Similarly, it is difficult to determine the best mix of investments to reduce crime without independent and rigorous analysis of programs and their results. The gang phenomenon in Los Angeles is without precise parallel elsewhere in the country. We assume in this analysis that programs that reduce juvenile criminality will work as well in Los Angeles as they do in other urban settings, but the analysis of programs in other cities must be buttressed by rigorous analysis of anti-crime initiatives in Los Angeles.

A new institution should replicate the Washington State Institute of Public Policy’s trail-blazing work in the cost-benefit analysis of anti-crime programs. It might be situated in a university setting, or alternatively, could be a free-standing nonprofit. In either case, it should have a multi-year commitment of start-up funding from the City and County of Los Angeles, and should be free to seek additional support from foundations and federal agencies. A quick estimate suggests that base costs might total as much as $1 million a year during its startup period, and long-term support of perhaps half that amount might be required on a continuing basis. We think the return on this investment will be very high indeed.
Simultaneously, however, is crucial to pay attention to definitions of gang involvement and to who is gathering and managing this data, as there exists a gray area between what counts as a “gang crime” and crime that is committed by someone who might be loosely gang-involved or gang-affiliated. It is apparent that each agency is defining “gang-involvement” differently, particularly as it relates to the classification of gang members under their respective watch. There are important questions to be answered about the categorization of gang crimes, especially in light of gang enhancement laws and the potential increase in gang involvement after a period of incarceration. We urge the Advancement Project to proceed carefully in this area and remain cognizant of the current political focus on incarcerating gang members.

Next Steps

How can these findings best be used to justify and secure funding for a comprehensive approach to gang violence in Los Angeles? We recommend that you start this process by having discussions with budget officials at the City and County levels, who will have to understand and agree with the methodology behind the analysis in order to use it to justify investments in cost-saving programs. You should use this opportunity to not only integrate their comments and feedback into the analysis, but also to discuss how they can plan for upcoming budget cycles by implementing programs that have demonstrated taxpayer savings. If resources allow, Vera would be happy to take part in these meetings or work with the Advancement Project to prepare beforehand. You should also begin a process of getting State officials to realize the potential payoffs of investing in local gang initiatives.
Appendix A: Criminal Justice System Flow
Appendix B: LAPD Citywide Gang Crime Summary, December 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIME</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>THIS MONTH</th>
<th>LAST MONTH</th>
<th>YR-TO-DATE</th>
<th>LAST YTD</th>
<th>% CHG LAST YTD</th>
<th>SYR AVERAGE</th>
<th>% CHG TO SYR AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Homocide</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>258.6</td>
<td>-18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Attempt Homocide</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
<td>723.2</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Felony Assault</td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2620</td>
<td>2625</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>3049.2</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 &quot;Attacks on Police Officers&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>-20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td>162</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2339</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
<td>2631.0</td>
<td>-23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Shots Inhabited Dwell</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>262.8</td>
<td>-27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Kidnap</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Rape</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>-30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Arson</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 &quot;Witness Intimidation&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>776.8</td>
<td>-17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Extortion</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-20.0</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Carjacking</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>165.6</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>456</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>9619</td>
<td>7203</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>8127.6</td>
<td>-18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gang crime totals were prepared by the Area Gang CAD units and this report was compiled by Special Operations Support Division.

Appendix C: CPI-U, West Region, all items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPI-U</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>Adjustment Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>108.00</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
<td>1.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>110.50</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>1.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>114.30</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>1.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>119.00</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>1.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>124.60</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>1.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>131.50</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>1.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>137.30</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>1.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>142.00</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>1.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>146.20</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>1.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>149.60</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>1.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>153.50</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>1.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>157.60</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>1.261</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>161.40</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>1.232</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>164.40</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>1.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>168.90</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>1.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>174.80</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>1.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>181.20</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>1.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>184.70</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>1.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>188.60</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>193.00</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>198.80</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you requested, this memo outlines additional steps for the City to take moving forward. These steps are meant to complement the “Recommendations” section of our recent Cost-Benefit Analysis memo.

**Make Sure Budget Officials Agree with Analysis**

- Review calculations and methods and make adjustments as necessary based on feedback from budget officials.
- Research and select potential programs or changes to current programs that have been shown to reduce gang activity, are needed in neighborhoods with high rates of violence, and are also cost effective; these should be heavily influenced by the Advancement Project’s findings and the cost-benefit analysis.

**Develop Projected Budget For New Programs**

- Develop expense budget to implement proposed gang reduction programs or oversight body. Include budget for first year and start-up expenses, as well as budget for fully implemented program.
- Come up with five-year budget projections of expenditures and savings; presumably the expenditures will initially exceed the savings, but over time, the savings should surpass the costs.
- Identify City agencies in which the programs will be located and potential funding streams; work with the agency heads to move forward with planning.
- Work with budget officials, the Mayor’s Office, and the City Council to include program costs in the City budget for the upcoming year.

**Meet With County and State Officials**

- Develop strategic plan to approach County and State budget officials and representatives to discuss the potential payoffs of investing County and State money in LA City gang initiatives. This will likely include many of the steps discussed above, including...
reviewing and adjusting the methods for the cost-benefit analysis based on feedback from budget officials

**Develop Tracking Mechanisms**

- Begin the process of developing mechanisms to track data on gang violence that were incomplete or difficult to obtain in the current cost analysis; this may result in the City issuing an RFP for consulting and/or research services to conduct a more in-depth cost analysis at this point or in the future, or may take the form of establishing a more formal capacity or body to collect this data
In Phase II, Vera researched governmental and non-governmental funding streams to determine possible sources of funding for a comprehensive approach to reducing gang activity and violence in the City of Los Angeles. Vera also researched eight jurisdictions around the country to learn about how cities leverage federal, state, local, and private funding to develop, implement, and maintain anti-gang programs. The jurisdictions we chose to examine were Chicago, Oakland, Dallas, Minneapolis, Boston, Miami, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. This research builds on and complements the research conducted by the Bronner Group in Phase I.

In the memo that follows, we describe our findings and recommend strategies to identify and secure funding. In Part I, we report on our research on federal and foundation funding streams and discuss the potential for reprogramming some of these resources. In Part II, we explore how other jurisdictions have utilized these funding streams, as well as other creative funding mechanisms, to support their anti-gang efforts.

Along with Bronner’s findings concerning government structures and David Marquez’s analysis of city, country, and state funding streams, we hope that the strategies discussed in this memo will be helpful in developing a comprehensive strategy to secure funding for a new approach to gang reduction in Los Angeles.
Part I: Federal and Foundation Funding Streams

Federal funding for anti-gang programs

Options for maximizing federal funding

Three main options for effectively leveraging federal funding emerged from our research:

- Coordinate the available formula and discretionary funds for local law enforcement and juvenile justice, and focus those funds on anti-gang efforts;
- Explore and tap federal funds for youth development, and direct those funds to gang-prevention programming by taking an active approach with federal funders; and
- Pursue congressional earmarks.

Attorney General Alberto Gonzales this February announced the Department of Justice’s comprehensive anti-gang strategy focusing on collaboration, prosecution, prevention, enforcement, and reentry. This is a good time to tap the federal government’s funding for anti-gang programming.

Coordinating federal law-enforcement funding

Federal funds available to local law enforcement for anti-gang programs can be organized into three categories: (1) general crime control assistance to state and local governments, (2) targeted anti-gang assistance to state and local governments, and (3) youth-gang suppression, intervention, and prevention. A great deal more money is allocated to general crime control than to the other categories.

General funding that may be applied to anti-gang programming generally comes in the form of formula-based block grants that allow some degree of local discretion in establishing spending priorities. Targeted funding generally comes through discretionary, competitive grant awards, and must be applied to anti-gang programming.

The trend in Congress for the past few years is toward reduced funding of local law enforcement agencies through general block grants. Since 2001, funds formerly allocated to standard policing and anti-crime programs have been shifted to counter-terror programs.

There has also been a trend toward earmarking federal violence-prevention funds for specific programs or agencies. For example, while Congress appropriated about $12 million a year for discretionary grants to address youth gang issues in the mid-1990s, that amount has decreased in each succeeding year. As congressional earmarking increased, allocations to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) decreased, until in 2003 the budget line-item for anti-gang efforts was eliminated entirely.

This section first gives an overview of general federal funding for law enforcement, then describes targeted gang-suppression and gang-intervention funding, then describes youth gang
and delinquency-prevention funding. At least some general crime control funds can be used for a range of gang prevention and intervention activities, so coordinating with law enforcement agencies to make maximum use of those funds in implementing the comprehensive strategy is one potentially useful approach. Targeted gang-related funding for adults tends to be allocated to specific programs (e.g. Project Safe Neighborhoods), which should be part of the comprehensive strategy. Funding for youth gang programs and delinquency prevention has decreased substantially in recent years so may not be the source of significant funds, but the Justice Department has developed and invested in a clear model for developing and administering youth gang prevention strategies which is similar to the approach that the Advancement Project is developing. Showing that the City is using that model in applications for funding will help Los Angeles in its efforts to secure funds, to the extent any are available.

General Law-Enforcement Funding

The Justice Assistance Block Grant program (JAG) is the primary vehicle for federal funding of local law-enforcement agencies. The JAG grants consolidated and replaced the former Local Law Enforcement Block Grants, Edward G. Byrne Formula Grants, and COPS Hiring Grants, and reduced overall federal spending on law-enforcement block grants. All localities with gang problems use some chunk of their JAG funds for gang suppression and intervention, but the exact size of that chunk is difficult to determine. Los Angeles receives what appears to be the maximum amount of federal money awarded according to the formulas.\(^1\) Localities that receive law-enforcement block grants have fairly broad authority to spend that money to plan and implement programs to meet local needs.

In Table 1, Los Angeles is compared with the eight other largest cities in the US, listed in descending order by population, regarding federal formula funding for law enforcement. In 2001, Congress appropriated $418 million to the Local Law Enforcement Block Grants; by 2004, that number had dropped to $115 million, and in 2006 the LLEBGs were folded into the Justice Assistance Grants.

Table 1: Federal JAG allocations to the largest US cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Combined 06</th>
<th>City 06</th>
<th>County 06</th>
<th>Combined 05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$4,794,817</td>
<td>$4,794,817</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$8,676,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$3,912,329</td>
<td>$3,372,125</td>
<td>$540,204</td>
<td>$6,665,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>$3,419,443</td>
<td>$3,191,648</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$6,293,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>$2,062,127</td>
<td>$1,653,014</td>
<td>$409,113</td>
<td>$3,341,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>$1,801,657</td>
<td>$1,801,657</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$3,141,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>$1,022,169</td>
<td>$662,752</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$1,845,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>$574,893</td>
<td>$484,841</td>
<td>$90,052</td>
<td>$957,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>$638,843</td>
<td>$606,863</td>
<td>$31,980</td>
<td>$1,117,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>$1,404,761</td>
<td>$1,189,398</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$2,393,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Targeted Gang-Suppression and -Intervention Funding

Earlier this year Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced that six sites, among them Los Angeles, would be designated to receive $2.5 million each to implement the DOJ’s Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative. (The other sites are Tampa, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Dallas/Fort Worth, and the “222 Corridor” in east-central Pennsylvania.) The Initiative is headed up by the United States Attorney General to implement the combined prevention ($1 million), law-enforcement ($1 million), and offender re-entry ($500,000) approaches. LA will be targeting these resources in the southeast part of the county, where the gang problem is thought to be the worst.

The federal government is strongly interested in addressing gang problems through collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and that interest is embodied in the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative. The US Attorney for each site will take a lead role in coordinating law enforcement with prevention efforts by organizing “a summit of law enforcement and community leaders to discuss best practices, identify gaps in services, and create a prevention plan to target at-risk youth within their individual communities.”

That coordination role could serve as a model for obtaining federal funding for anti-gang efforts in the future.

In the past, LA has received significant federal law-enforcement money for anti-gang programs. The major programs that include funds usable for anti-gang initiatives are Weed and Seed, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and Gang Reduction Education and Training (GREAT).

- Weed and Seed

  The DOJ’s Community Capacity Development Office now oversees the Weed and Seed program, and describes Weed and Seed as “a strategy—rather than a grant program—that aims to prevent, control, and reduce violent crime, drug abuse, and gang activity in designated high-crime neighborhoods across the country.” The CCDO funds more than 300 Weed and Seed sites around the country. In 2004, the most recent year for which site-specific allocation information is available, three community groups in Los Angeles (Central American Resource Center, Gwen Bolden Youth Foundation, and LAPD Explorer Post) each received $225,000 continuation grants (the maximum allocated), and one group (LAPD Southeast Explorer Post) received a $50,000 program support grant. In fiscal year 2006, the maximum Weed and Seed award was $175,000.

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3 Id.
Project Safe Neighborhoods

PSN is a federal grant program that “brings together federal, state and local law enforcement and communities in a unified effort to reduce gun crime across America.”\(^6\) In February 2006, the Department of Justice announced it would “dedicate $30 million in grant funding to support new and expanded anti-gang prevention and enforcement efforts” under the PSN program.\(^7\) In 2006, Central California was awarded $1,018,901 under the PSN anti-gang initiative; the original award was reduced by 30% when LA received the $2.5 Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative money described above. Because of the amount of anti-gang money awarded to Los Angeles, the district became ineligible to receive general PSN funds.

GREAT in LA

In 2006 the City of Los Angeles received $250,000 in GREAT funding for the LAPD to offer an anti-gang curriculum in the schools.

Table 2 compares Los Angeles’ Weed and Seed, general PSN, PSN anti-gang, and GREAT allocations with those of other large cities. Unlike the formula grants compared in Table 1, these are all discretionary and competitive grants, so the amounts awarded correspond to the number and quality of applications submitted by each jurisdiction.

**Table 2: Federal anti-gang program allocations to cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PSN 06*</th>
<th>PSN Anti-gang 06**</th>
<th>GREAT 06</th>
<th>W&amp;S 04***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$208,309</td>
<td>$388,217</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$2,142,150(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$0 (ineligible)</td>
<td>$1,018,901</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$500,000(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>$240,100</td>
<td>$641,579</td>
<td>$143,245</td>
<td>$225,000(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>$178,023</td>
<td>$749,538</td>
<td>$259,792</td>
<td>$655,000(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>$222,388</td>
<td>$314,159</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$1,275,000(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>$94,112</td>
<td>$626,777</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$225,000(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>$0 (no request)</td>
<td>$289,010</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>$140,841</td>
<td>$545,996</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>$0 (no request)</td>
<td>$463,818</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$225,000(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Allocations are by federal judicial district
** Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Dallas each received an additional $2.5 million under the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative
*** Amount is followed by the number of sites receiving funding

\(^6\) US DOJ Fact Sheet, note 2
\(^7\) Id.
In addition, Congress has appropriated $10 million to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the current fiscal year to develop a National Gang Intelligence Center and gang information database. The Center and database will rely on local law-enforcement agencies, and will support those agencies by providing intelligence on local gangs. California has a similar database, CalGang, which is supported by state funds.

Youth Gang and Delinquency-Prevention Funding

Like law-enforcement funding for anti-gang programs, federal youth-gang funding is both general and targeted. The DOJ’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs (OJJDP) administers both funding streams.

The general federal grants for juvenile justice primarily are delivered through Juvenile Accountability Block Grants, previously known as the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants. Title V of the JABG program directs funds to crime-prevention programs; these are known as Community Prevention Grants. The JABG program is administered on the federal level by OJJDP, in California by the Corrections Standards Authority, and in Los Angeles City by the Mayor’s office. JABG funds can be used for anti-gang programming: in FY06 the City received $1.4 million to carry out two programs, the LA Bridges Gang Prevention and Intervention Program and the Mayor’s Restorative Justice Initiative. Coordinating with entities eligible for JABG funds and focusing on gang-prevention programs would be a useful strategy for Los Angeles.

In funding specific to youth gang prevention, the OJJDP has for a number of years developed and promoted a three-pronged strategy for combating youth gangs, involving suppression, intervention, and prevention. Suppression involves coordinated law-enforcement efforts, intervention is targeted at extremely high-risk youth (and involves coordination between law enforcement and community service providers), and prevention involves programs for youth exposed to a wide range of risk factors for gang membership. Prevention programs may not be specifically categorized as gang prevention programs.

The model also includes a two-tiered structure for coordinating the range of strategies. A steering committee, which is responsible for coordinating across strategies, includes representatives of multiple disciplines and levels of government. For each strategy, there is an operational team that includes the agencies that need to cooperate on that strategy (e.g. an enforcement team includes police, probation, parole, prosecutors). Those operational teams feed back information to the steering committee. Each program should collect data and base decisions on what evidence shows to work or not to work. The combination of this structure and

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the focus on data and analysis is supposed to create a process where decisions are made based on what will be most effective rather than based on political considerations.

Los Angeles was one of four pilot sites receiving funding for OJJDP’s Gang Reduction Program in FY04. According to the NYGC, “[t]he primary goal of the GRP is to reduce youth gang crime and violence in targeted neighborhoods/communities through an integrated application of proven primary and secondary prevention, gang intervention, and suppression practices;” East LA was the target area. The law enforcement component of this program got started first and the other components have taken longer to get underway. No new grants for the Gang Reduction Program are available, and the Urban Institute’s evaluation of the program is forthcoming. If that evaluation is favorable, perhaps GRP will be funded again and Los Angeles will be eligible for a continuation grant.

Now, the bulk of federal funding for prevention and intervention programs for youth at high risk of gang involvement goes to the Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA) (discussed below) and to the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC). In 2006, $85 million of the total of $416 million allocated to JAG was earmarked for the BGCA for delinquency-prevention programs in collaboration with law enforcement. Coordinating with the BGCA in Los Angeles on gang-prevention funding is advisable.

The NYGC serves as a clearinghouse of information and assistance on youth gangs. OJJDP funds the NYGC to provide technical assistance and training to OJJDP-funded anti-youth-gang programs, particularly the Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program and the Gang Reduction Program. Los Angeles was not among the sites selected for the Schools program, and funding for Gang-Free Schools is limited to continuation money for the original four sites.

Coordinating the general and gang-specific funds, directing them toward gang-prevention efforts, and developing processes that enable law-enforcement agencies to work effectively with gang-prevention program providers is the OJJDP’s main strategy for fighting youth gangs. A strategy for maximizing federal youth-gang funding in LA should to the extent possible adhere to the national model OJJDP developed, by beginning with an analysis of how current dollars are being spent, by having a two-tiered structure to coordinate efforts across agencies, and by integrating suppression, intervention, and prevention.

Tapping youth-development funds

Another promising strategy for obtaining federal funding for L.A.’s new approach is to seek federal youth-development funds that can be used for gang violence prevention. The prevention prong of the federal government’s comprehensive strategy involves programs for youth exposed to a wide range of risk factors for gang membership. Many prevention programs are not specifically categorized as gang prevention programs, but more generally as programs designed to reduce youth crime. Thus, prevention programs can fit into both the city’s gang violence prevention strategy and various federal agencies’ youth development funding agendas.

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Earlier this year the America’s Promise Alliance, a partnership of corporations, nonprofit service organizations, policy makers, advocacy organizations, and faith groups engaged in youth development work, published a Guide to federal resources for youth development. The compilers identified a number of federal grant programs that either (1) include youth gang members or potential gang members among the populations served by the programs, or (2) include reducing juvenile delinquency or gang participation among the programs’ goals.

Some of these programs currently are in operation in Los Angeles, and all of them could be operated in Los Angeles. Programs identified in the Guide with no apparent presence in LA (based on web research) are listed below. Please see Appendix A for funding information on selected programs.

Education Department, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative

Education Department, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
Migrant Education Even Start

Education Department, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Life Skills for State and Local Prisoners Program

Education Department, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
School Dropout Prevention Program

Education Department, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
Improving Literacy through School Libraries

Health and Human Services, Office of Minority Health
Family and Community Violence Prevention Program

Justice Department, OJJDP
Gang-Free Schools and Communities
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/programs/ProgSummary.asp?pi=6&ti=&si=&kw=&PreviousPage=ProgResults

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Although the grants programs may be targeted to youth-gang prevention, many of the programs serve other needs of youth. The 4H program (the USDA Cooperative Extension Service’s program for youth), for example, offers programs in LA, but the programs are not targeted toward gang prevention. Programs identified in the Guide currently operating in LA are listed below.

Agriculture Department, Cooperative Extension Service
4H Youth Development
University of California
http://celosangeles.ucdavis.edu/youth/

Agriculture Department, Cooperative Extension Service
Children, Families, and Youth at Risk
University of California
http://groups.ucanr.org/cyfar/index.cfm

Corporation for National and Community Service
AmeriCorps and Vista
Numerous AmeriCorps programs in Los Angeles
http://www.nationalservice.gov/state_profiles/pdf/CA_AC.pdf

Corporation for National and Community Service
Learn and Serve America
Cal State LA, LA Unified School District, UCLA
http://www.learnandserve.gov/about/role_impact/state_profiles_detail.asp?tbl_profiles_state=CA

Corporation for National and Community Service
Retired and Senior Volunteers Program (RSVP)
Los Angeles (City) Recreation and Park RSVP
http://www.laparks.org/dos/senior/seniorvolunteer.htm

Education Department, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Mentoring Program
Los Angeles Unified School District

Education Department, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Safe and Drug-Free Schools National Program
Los Angeles Unified School District
http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/ca/consolapp.asp

Education Department, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
Elementary and Secondary School Counseling Discretionary Grants
Los Angeles Unified School District
In sum, one fruitful strategy may be to work actively with federal funders of youth-development programs to get federal support for components of LA’s comprehensive strategy, under the more general rubric of youth development. Coordinating with community-based organizations that provide alternatives to gangs and crime-prevention programming to tap new sources of federal funding also will help maximize these funds in Los Angeles. Rather than waiting for grant notices to appear, the City should begin discussions with the federal offices that oversee youth development funding about Los Angeles’s new comprehensive strategy and where the components of the strategy intersect with the office’s interests to determine whether additional funds can be provided to the City.

Pursuing congressional earmarks

As noted above, earmarks have increased in number and dollar amount while congressional appropriations to block grants and discretionary awards have been declining in recent years. Federal spending on anti-terrorism programming has supplanted spending on ordinary law enforcement and on human services programming that might reduce gang crime by offering alternatives to youth.

California received federal earmarks for anti-gang programming in 2006, including $1 million for the pilot Gang Suppression Enforcement Team in the Attorney General’s Bureau of Narcotics. A number of California cities also received anti-gang funding through earmarks,
according to Youth Today. Persuading members of Congress to insert gang-prevention funding for Los Angeles into an appropriations bill could be a profitable strategy.

One particular source of earmarking is the Byrne Discretionary Grant program. While the Byrne Formula Grants were not funded in 2006, the Byrne discretionary grant program is still in existence, consisting in 2006 of direct earmarks and funds from the Department of Defense supplemental act. The discretionary grants were funded at $191.7 million this year.

However, there are a few cautions about pursuing earmarks: First, earmarking generally is not considered “good government.” Second, this request would have to fit into the city’s legislative agenda, which doubtless includes a host of other Congressional priorities. Finally, earmarking cannot be considered a sustainable funding strategy.

State funding for anti-gang programs

David Marquez earlier produced a thorough review of state funding for Los Angeles’ anti-gang efforts. One change in funding since David’s report is contained in the recently-enacted appropriations bill. Over the objections of the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), the legislature supplemented the state Department of Justice budget by $6.5 million to add four new Gang Suppression Enforcement Teams (GSETs) to the original one, which is housed in the Attorney General’s Bureau of Narcotics enforcement. Next year the DOJ wants to add two more teams, resulting in a $10 million program with fifty full-time permanent positions.

The original GSET was a pilot program funded by a $1.1 million federal grant. “The pilot GSET program has been used throughout the state to uproot street gangs that have either taken over a significant portion of a community or capture specific gang members that have committed a particularly heinous crime,” according to an Assembly Budget Committee report. Whether one of the new teams will be based in Los Angeles is not clear yet, but it seems likely.

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11
Foundation Funding for Anti-Gang Programs

Key Points and Recommendations

- Foundations are not reliable as the sole or primary sources of ongoing project funding over the long term, but can be extremely helpful as a source of planning or capacity building money.
- Foundations tend to support projects that are innovative, address areas of great need, produce visible and tangible results, and are sustainable.
- This is an opportune time for Los Angeles to approach foundations for support of a comprehensive gang initiative given the wide-spread recognition of the gang problem, the political and community support behind implementing a new approach, and the City’s commitment to basing the initiative on empirical evidence and best practices.
- While there are only a small number of foundations that directly support “anti-gang initiatives,” Los Angeles may be able to interest other foundations by framing the problem as a community, public health, criminal justice, or juvenile delinquency issue.

Overview

While foundation support usually is not enough to entirely support a long-term strategy, like the one proposed by the Advancement Project, foundation funding can be a useful and often essential addition to other funding streams. Jurisdictions across the country struggling with gang problems use foundation funding to launch projects, support ongoing program development, train staff, evaluate a program’s performance, and institutionalize reforms on a broad scale.

Foundations aim to fund initiatives that are innovative, that are sustainable, that produce visible results, and that are receiving funding from other foundations or government partners. Most foundations are interested in funding programs but do not want to fund core services indefinitely; rather, they often prefer to fund programs or services that will eventually be self-sustaining.

Instead of looking to foundations for significant ongoing support, a better tactic for the City of Los Angeles may be to apply for foundation funding to launch the strategy, and then rely more heavily on government funding sources to maintain the strategy. For example, a foundation might take interest in giving a large amount of support (millions of dollars) over four years in the form of seed money, which could be largest in its first year and trail off over the course of the following three years. This would enable the foundation to take part in the creation and launching of an innovative strategy or program, and also to invest its money in building the capacity of the community to implement and maintain the program. Playing this role appeals to foundations looking to engage in a shared commitment to make a difference in the lives of children, communities, and the justice and health care systems.

The types of things that could be paid for with large seed grants include: developing research designs and collecting baseline data; developing a set of performance measures for each segment of the strategy; designing, building, and implementing a management information system that supports front-line work, performance measurement, and evaluation; developing and
implementing training for staff; piloting specific programs and new strategies; and planning and developing pilot protocols for fostering cooperation between key players.

Strategies

LA’s Pitch

Developing a strategy for approaching foundations is crucial, and Los Angeles is currently well-positioned to make a strong case to garner foundation support for the development of a comprehensive gang strategy for the City. In applying for funding, this is an important moment of opportunity: Los Angeles has a great need for new strategies, the necessary political support and government funding, the involvement of many key players, and the desire to build a program founded on evidenced-based practices.

First, there is a great need for services and coordination. The gang problem in Los Angeles is nationally recognized as a major problem that needs new solutions. Many existing governmental and community-based programs target gang members, but their effectiveness has been hampered by a lack of comprehensive and coordinated strategies based on empirical evidence and best practices.

Second, there is currently political support at the local level for anti-gang endeavors. The City government’s investment of a half-million dollars in the planning process undertaken by the Advancement Project is an indication of their commitment to invest in new solutions. This support is crucial to move forward because a successful comprehensive approach relies on the backing and cooperation of the City. In addition, this makes the proposal appealing to foundations that are interested in funding projects that are self-sustaining and supported in part by the government.

Third, many key players in addition to government agencies are already involved in the planning process and are committed to rethinking how the City should handle gang activity. These key players work in all different areas of the system and can create an approach to gang violence that is far-reaching and multi-faceted. The Advancement Project alone has gathered together researchers, community group and nonprofit leaders, consultants, and experts in crisis intervention, gang violence reduction, and community organization. A proposal should list those involved and get letters of support from the key players.

Finally, the City has demonstrated commitment to develop an approach based on empirical evidence and best practices. By examining the strengths and weaknesses of current programs in Los Angeles, by developing an understanding of best national practices in reducing gang violence, and by researching funding strategies and government structures in jurisdictions around the country, the Advancement Project will be proposing an approach that relies on the most effective, tangible, and affordable national and local practices.
Selecting Foundations

Selecting foundation that might be interested in funding gang reduction strategies requires strategic thinking because few foundations directly state that they fund anti-gang initiatives. Instead, foundations that are interested in helping at-risk youth, building safer communities, and supporting more general anti-violence programs may be good funding partners. In addition, brainstorming creative ways to frame the gang problem can open up new funding streams that might not be otherwise apparent. For example, thinking about gang violence as a public health issue opens up public health funding streams. This strategy is currently used to support gang programs in cities including Chicago, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis.

Although having many foundation supporters can be useful, securing one or two large grants for capacity building will be more efficient than gathering many smaller grants. Administering small grants can require significant attention and resources that could otherwise be spent implementing the new strategy. Another helpful strategy is to identify potential funders and start developing relationships with contacts at those foundations, since blind proposals are unlikely to be successful. The City of LA and the Advancement Project should schedule initial meetings with these contacts to explain the initiative and gauge the interest of the foundations. These meetings will help the City tailor the proposal to the interests of each foundation to increase the possibility of securing funding. These meetings can be held before the final proposal is finished, as this process of developing relationships takes time.

Vera conducted preliminary research on large foundations that might be interested in funding LA’s comprehensive anti-gang initiative. We selected five foundations that fit well with the aim of the project: the Ford Foundation, the California Endowment, the California Wellness Foundation, the JEHT Foundation, and the Allstate Foundation. This is only a snapshot of the many foundations whose program interests align with the goals of this initiative. We have not made contact with these or other foundations yet, but can do so in Phase III if the Advancement Project determines it will be useful.

- Ford Foundation
  

  Areas of Interest: The Foundation's goals are to strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement. Grants are made primarily within three broad categories: knowledge, creativity, and freedom; asset building and community development; and peace and social justice. The Foundation might be interested in funding LA’s comprehensive gang reduction strategy under either the second or third program area.

  Specifically, the Ford Foundation has funded programs that reduce youth crime and violence, especially by developing and revitalizing communities in urban areas. This has been achieved through cooperation with local law enforcement authorities as well as through community-based initiatives to intervene with those prone to gang involvement. Past recipients include New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago.
The Ford Foundation seeks to fund programs and strategies that are developed and implemented by partnerships among government, non-profits and community groups, and businesses. The collaboration between these groups in Los Angeles makes the City a good applicant for funding from Ford.

*Types of Funding:* The Ford Foundation gives money for general/operating support, management development and capacity building, program development, program evaluation, research, seed money, and technical assistance.

*Total grant amounts and relevant awards:* The Ford Foundation gives over $500 million in grants each year, both in the United States and internationally. In the last two years, the Ford Foundation has funded gang research and reduction programs in Mexico and Central America as well as many programs for at-risk youth around the world. Ford has funded multiple projects at the Vera Institute and the Advancement Project, D.C.

*Application Process:* Unsolicited letters of inquiry are accepted and the Foundation reviews applications all year.

- The California Endowment
  [www.calendow.org](http://www.calendow.org)

*Areas of Interest:* The California Endowment works to expand access to quality healthcare for underserved communities and individuals with the following three goals: increasing access to health, creating culturally competent health systems, and improving community health and eliminating health disparities. Historically, the Endowment has not directly funded anti-gang or anti-violence programs, but they provide a substantial amount of support to programs addressing health issues in California. In particular, their “community health and elimination of health disparities” program area may be a good source of funding, as it seeks to eliminate disease and injury by focusing on social and physical environments that contribute to unhealthy behaviors. As discussed above, public health foundations should not be overlooked, and funding may be available, for example, for anti-gang programs that focus primarily on the effects of gang violence on public health.

*Types of Funding:* The Endowment grants awards for building/renovation, conferences/seminars, technical assistance, general/operating support, and program evaluation.

*Total grant amounts:* The Endowment gives over $150 million annually in California and will award one, two, or three-year grants.

*Application Process:* The Endowment accepts unsolicited proposals throughout the year.
California Wellness Foundation
http://www.tcwf.org/

Areas of Interest: The California Wellness Foundation funds programs that seek to build safer and healthier communities in the following eight areas: diversity in the health professions, environmental health, healthy aging, mental health, teenage pregnancy prevention, violence prevention, women’s health, and work and health. More specifically, the Foundation seeks to fund projects that prevent youth violence and youth involvement in gangs through mentoring programs, gang intervention programs, reentry programs, and community or after-school violence prevention programs. While they do fund some intervention and treatment programs, they tend to focus on prevention. The Wellness Foundation also provides grants to organizations involved in leadership development for violence prevention. In addition, they set aside a certain amount of funding each year that is granted to innovative programs outside the core areas of interest.

Types of Funding: The Foundation provides grants for general/operating support, program development, program evaluation, research, and seed money, among others.

Total grant amounts and relevant awards: In recent years, the Foundation has given approximately $40 million in grants per year, with individual grants ranging from approximately $20,000 to about $300,000 for a one-to-three-year period, although they also award larger grants at times. The Foundation has given several million dollars to anti-gang and violence reduction programs and research throughout the country and specifically in the Los Angeles area.

Application Process: The Foundation does accept unsolicited proposals. Initially, a letter of interest should be submitted, which will be followed by an invitation for a full-proposal. The review process is ongoing throughout the year.

JEHT Foundation
www.jehtfoundation.org

Areas of Interest: The JEHT Foundation works closely with a variety of criminal justice reform efforts, including juvenile justice initiatives, correctional alternatives, and reentry strategies. The Foundation considers proposals that advance alternatives to incarceration as well as proposals that promote systemic change in criminal justice policies and practices. Two of their specific areas of focus are on reducing incarceration and recidivism without risk to public safety and redirecting resulting savings into programs serving at risk youth and adults. These areas of focus make the JEHT Foundation a good match for the initiative being proposed by the City of Los Angeles. In addition, the Foundation has a particular interest in funding programs and strategies in partnership with government and community coalitions that are committed to implementing major justice system reforms. Los Angeles has
commitments of program support and funding from the City government as well as many community groups who are interested in moving this strategy forward.

Types of Funding: JEHT gives grants for continuing support, general/operating support, management development/capacity building, program development, program evaluation, and research.

Total grant amounts: In recent years, the JEHT Foundation has given grants totaling approximately $20 million per year and up to $750,000 to individual projects, and has given money to both the Advancement Project and Vera in the past.

Application Process: The Foundation requires that a letter of inquiry be sent before a formal proposal is submitted, and grant decisions are made twice per year.

- Allstate Foundation

Areas of Interest: The Allstate Foundation, a national foundation funded by subsidiaries of the Allstate Insurance Company, awards grants in three areas: Safe and Vital Communities; Economic Empowerment; and Tolerance, Inclusion, and Diversity. Under Safe and Vital Communities, the Foundation funds youth anti-violence programs and neighborhood revitalization/community capacity building initiatives. Under the Tolerance, Inclusion, and Diversity program, the Foundation supports programs teaching tolerance to youth, ending hate crimes, and alleviating discrimination. Currently, the Allstate Foundation is not doing gang-specific work in California, but seems to be a strong candidate for this type of work in the future.

Types of Funding: Allstate gives money for general/operating support and program development.

Total grant amounts and relevant awards: The Allstate Foundation gives over $15 million annually in grants. In 2005, it gave $400,000 to two national programs that promote community-based approaches to preventing crime (and specifically gang violence) among youth: the National Crime Prevention Council and the Injury Free Coalition for Kids.

Application Process: The Foundation reviews proposals throughout the year and does accept unsolicited proposals.

In addition to these five foundations, other foundations that might be interested in funding LA’s comprehensive anti-gang strategy include:

- Ralph M. Parsons Foundation
- Irvine Foundation
- Mott Foundation
- Ahmanson Foundation
- Community Foundation Silicon Valley
- Stuart Foundation

We can provide additional information or make contact with these foundations in Phase III if it would be useful to the Advancement Project moving forward.
Part II: Lessons Learned From Other Jurisdictions

Introduction

In order to develop a more hands-on understanding of the ways that cities seek out, secure, and leverage different types of funding for anti-gang and anti-violence programs, Vera and the Bronner Group conducted research into the anti-gang efforts taking place in eight cities around the country. Vera and Bronner worked with the Advancement Project to identify cities that are implementing innovative programs or using innovative funding streams. The Advancement Project initially selected the following four cities: Oakland, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago. Vera and the Bronner group explored a number of jurisdictions and ultimately chose Dallas, Minneapolis, Miami, and Washington, D.C. as the remaining four cities, either because of their use of innovative strategies to address gang violence or because of the magnitude of their gang problem. Initially, Vera took the lead on the Chicago, Dallas, Minneapolis, and Oakland, and Bronner took the lead on Philadelphia, Boston, Miami, and Washington, D.C. Vera also made follow-up calls to relevant sources in the cities that Bronner researched, in addition to speaking with Phelan Wyrick, the Gang Program Coordinator at OJJDP; Jerry Simon, the Director of the Southern Nevada Community Gang Task Force; and Buddy Howell, currently an Adjunct Researcher at the National Youth Gang Center and former Executive Director and Director of Research and Program Development at the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Vera researched programs and budget streams in each city to learn about the extent of gang activity, attempted solutions, and strategies to fund these programs. We gathered and reviewed reports and research and developed an understanding of the funding mechanisms in the respective jurisdictions. We also worked with Bronner and the Advancement Project to design a list of important goals and lessons that we hoped to learn. From there, we developed a more specific template of questions that we used in our phone calls and emails. In each jurisdiction, we reached out to contacts in the Mayor's office, the City's budget office, the City Council, local service providers and non-profits, and any relevant funders. Our questions focused on the following two areas:

Funding

We sought to learn about state and federal funding streams in each jurisdiction, as well as recent patterns or trends in funding. For example, we hoped to uncover any substantial increases or decreases in funding, and any major shifts in funding sources. We also gathered information on strategies and lessons learned in each city’s efforts to obtain and sustain funding, and asked about any innovative funding mechanisms that had been used in the city.

Gang Programs and Structure

In addition to our funding questions, we asked questions about the types of gang programs that currently exist in the city, as well as any programs that had been in existence in the recent past. We learned about which agencies are administering programs and whether there is any coordinated oversight or evaluation of the programs, as well as what the structure of the
programs looks like; i.e., if the programs are mostly prevention, intervention, or suppression programs, and whether there is any coordination or cooperation between the three prongs. We also asked about obstacles to the formation of partnerships and how those obstacles could be handled. Finally, we inquired into whether the city had developed any type of interagency task force or identified city-wide goals and desired outcomes of anti-gang programs.

Themes Across Cities

The cities we investigated varied widely in their approaches to addressing gang activity. Some cities did not address gang activity as a discrete issue at all, choosing instead to pursue anti-gang programming within the wider context of youth violence. No two cities were alike in the quantity, diversity, or coordination of their anti-gang and violence prevention programming. Consequently, different cities coordinated their funding efforts in different ways (if at all). Different cities also drew from different funding sources, although there was considerable overlap at the federal level.

It was difficult to ascertain whether the level of funding in each city is sufficient to support the necessary programs since the nature and extent of gang problems across jurisdictions varies widely, and also because each city’s approach to reducing gang violence is unique. However, all of the jurisdictions that we examined feel that their anti-gang or violence programs are underfunded and that they do not have the necessary resources to combat the problem. Described below are those themes that emerged with relative consistency across two or more cities.  

Accountability

In each city, the word we heard come up most often when asking about funding strategies was “accountability.” There was a nearly unanimous consensus among everyone with whom we spoke that the single most important element in obtaining or sustaining funding in the present climate is the ability to demonstrate successful outcomes. There was wide agreement that it is very difficult to obtain funding unless the methods being used are transparent and evidence-based, and programs have built-in evaluative mechanisms. Contacts at both the Chicago Area Project and the Chicago Police Department reiterated this sentiment, explaining that there has recently been an increased demand for empirical data to obtain funding in prevention, intervention, and suppression programs, and that it is almost impossible at this point to secure funding without these evaluative measures.

Intergovernmental Partnerships

While no city that we investigated had a seamless system that connected all of the government entities and private agencies involved in gang suppression, intervention, and prevention, almost every program in every city used partnerships between at least some public agencies in order to

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16 Please see Appendix B for more detailed information on Chicago, Oakland, and Dallas, the cities Vera staff researched most thoroughly. This complements the information compiled by Bronner for Phase I.
17 Specifically, Howard Lathan, the Executive Director of the Chicago Area Project and Ellen Scrivner, the Chicago Police Department’s Deputy Superintendent for Administrative Services.
effectively deliver services. Despite some difficulties coordinating different levels of government and nonprofits, successful partnerships were frequently cited as not only necessary for a substantively successful program, but also crucial for a well funded program. Forming successful partnerships is important to securing funding for two reasons. First, widespread support across agencies and levels of government is a necessary prerequisite for obtaining significant funding. It is difficult to generate that level of support without involving a large and diverse group of stakeholders in program planning and implementation. Second, partnering with a variety of agencies can open up new funding sources. For example, Oakland’s Measure Y initiative reported that it was able to access SAMSHA and Department of Labor funding because of its partnerships with local mental health agencies and with a job readiness program.

In addition to opening up funding opportunities, creating partnerships is also a practical way to encourage the integration of prevention, intervention, and suppression programs. This integration has been shown to be more effective than using a single approach in dealing with gang activity and violence, and is promoted by the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention. OJJDP encourages this three-pronged approach to gang activity that is complemented by a steering committee or advisory board composed of local leaders from multiple disciplines, to ensure the integration of strategies. This model of gang activity reduction is currently in place in multiple jurisdictions under’s OJJDP’s auspices and continues to be adopted by localities around the country.

Targeting Services

Several programs have stressed the importance of targeting services in order to get maximum leverage out of existing funding. For example, Philadelphia’s Youth Violence Reduction Project (YVRP), a partnership of various Philadelphia agencies and organizations that was created to steer at-risk youth towards more productive lives through intervention programs, has benefited both financially and programmatically by focusing its efforts on particular police districts with high levels of violence. In Oakland, the Measure Y initiative, a program which coordinates intervention and prevention programs and the Oakland Police Department programs, designates particular populations at whom the programs it funds must be targeted. Further, coordination between agencies and between types of intervention, prevention, and suppression programs is enhanced when each program or agency is clear about which populations it should be targeting and which populations do not appropriately fall within its reach.

Violence Prevention as Public Health

Nationally, there has been a trend towards conceptualizing violence prevention – which encompasses gang prevention and intervention – as a public health issue. A public health approach to violence prevention is an integral part of many cities’ anti-violence initiatives, including Oakland, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis. In some of these cities, the public health approach has opened up new funding sources. For example, the CeaseFire program in Chicago receives funding from the UIC School of Public Health. County departments of public health also contribute to violence prevention efforts that are framed as public health initiatives.
**Decreased Reliance on Federal Grants**

According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, federal funding for gang-related initiatives has steadily decreased in recent years. Officials in several of the jurisdictions we investigated noted this fact in our conversations. Some officials described having to cut personnel, partially in response to the decreased availability of federal grant money. Some directors of programs that were initially created with federal grant money found that they could not depend on sustained funding from the federal government, and ultimately had to look elsewhere to ensure the survival of their programs. Where federal grants are available, recipients describe experiencing a decrease over the years in the amount of discretion accorded to grantees. The scarcity of federal grant money, resulting from a combination of decreased funding and decreased discretion, has affected suppression, prevention, and intervention agencies alike.

**State Funding**

Several of the cities placed a great deal of reliance on funding from the state, often in the form of a particular anti-gang or anti-violence bill. Boston drew considerable funding from the Charles Shannon gang prevention grant program, from which it received several million dollars of state money, which was distributed to the Boston Police Department as well as the Office of Human Services and other smaller entities. When Philadelphia’s Youth Violence Reduction Partnership (YVRP) was searching for funds to sustain its existence, it found help from the Pennsylvania state government’s commitment to the Blueprint for a Safer Philadelphia. Minneapolis has depended on funding for suppression as well as intervention and prevention from programs such as Minnesota HEALS and the Minnesota Gang Strike Force. The state of Illinois is the primary funding source for the Chicago Area Project, a key service provider in Chicago’s anti-gang efforts.

**Non-Government Funding**

In several cities, anti-gang and anti-violence programs have found it helpful and even necessary to depend at least in part on non-governmental funding sources. In some cases, valuable support has come from local or national foundations and businesses. Philadelphia’s YVRP has been able to expand its reach due in part to funding from Philadelphia Safe and Sound, a nonprofit organization that supports programs which improve the health and well-being of children in Philadelphia. In Oakland, Safe Passages has utilized grants from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to coordinate several anti-violence initiatives involving government and non-profit partnerships. Minneapolis has drawn substantial funds from non-government sources, and has been particularly successful in building corporate support for an anti-violence campaign. Minnesota HEALS, a primary organizer and funder of anti-violence efforts in Minneapolis and St. Paul, has been supported since its inception by corporations such as Honeywell and General Mills, which have offices in downtown Minneapolis.
Support for Small Non-Profits

Assisting small non-profits in obtaining independent funding has been cited as one way to capitalize on small amounts of money that are available from various sources. The head of the Southern Nevada Gang Task Force noted that with the Task Force’s support, small non-profits obtained the knowledge necessary to apply for grants for which they had always been eligible but had never been able to take advantage of. In Oakland, the director of the city’s violence prevention initiative noted that providing technical support to the non-profit community was a key element of her job.

Other Strategies

Law Enforcement in a Leadership Role

While all anti-gang programs have suffered in recent years from the decreased availability of federal grant money, suppression agencies have not been hit as hard as their counterparts in prevention and intervention. Law enforcement agencies still receive substantial federal money through Justice Assistance Grants, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and COPS. While this funding primarily supports suppression-oriented programs, creative funding strategies may be able to at least redirect this money in part. For example, the Southern Nevada Gang Task Force coordinates anti-gang programs through the Department of Juvenile Justice – a law enforcement agency – and has been able to make sub-grants to over 160 community based prevention and intervention organizations using federal grant money that is available to law enforcement.

Redirected Taxes

In Oakland, new funding – along with a new strategy – for violence prevention came in the form of the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act, otherwise known as Measure Y. Measure Y instituted a commercial parking tax and a parcel tax in the city in order to raise a projected $20 million per year to fund public safety measures and violence prevention programming targeted at at-risk populations. Approximately $9.5 million of this funding goes to hiring and training police officers; $6.4 million goes to specific Measure Y programming, including a violence prevention curriculum in elementary and middle schools, case management for at-risk middle schoolers, and mentoring for juveniles on probation; and the remainder of the funding will go to smaller grantees who are doing outreach work.

Asset Forfeiture

In California, the Health and Safety Code requires that 15% of money that local law enforcement receives from asset forfeiture funds must be used to fund programs that address drug abuse and gang activity. Our best estimate is that under this provision, approximately half a million dollars of asset forfeiture funds is available for gang prevention.\textsuperscript{18} We do not know how these funds are

\textsuperscript{18} In 2003, LA County initiated seizure of about $10 million in assets. Of this $10 million, 65% is required to be distributed to the state and/or local law enforcement agencies that participated in the seizure. Of this $6.5 million, 15% (approximately $1 million) must be deposited in a special fund and used for the sole purpose of funding
currently being used, but ensuring that they are being used effectively should be part of LA’s overall strategy.

*Creative Methods*

- **Partnering with School Districts**

  In Oakland, school districts are responsible for the costs of running their schools, and they are reimbursed by the County on a per-student basis. The number of students is based on daily attendance, which is taken during second period. Youth Sounds, a youth service organization in Oakland that teaches young people to use technology creatively, teaches electives in the public schools during second period, and then keeps a portion of the profit that the school district makes from the increased attendance at those classes. This enables the program and the school to partner in providing services to at-risk youth without the school incurring extra costs and, in addition, encourages a higher attendance rate at school.

- **Utility Top-Off**

  Utility companies around the country have begun to work with communities in order to support local non-profits through “top-off” plans. Utility companies with top-off plans offer customers the option of rounding monthly bills up to the nearest dollar. Sometimes there is an additional option of rounding up to the nearest two or five dollars. Customers who opt to participate thus pay, on average, an additional six to twenty dollars per year on their utility bills. The utility company places those extra dollars into a fund that supports community organizations. The fund may be designated for a particular purpose or may be used to supply grants to varying projects or organizations.

programs to combat drug abuse and divert gang activity. We can infer that approximately half of this money will be used specifically for gang programs.
## Appendix A: Funding Details on Selected Programs
from the *Guide to Resources for Youth Development*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Award Avg / Range</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USDA, Cooperative Extension Service</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>4H Youth Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children, Families, and Youth at Risk</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>$150,000 - $200,000</td>
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<td><strong>Corporation for National and Community Service</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>AmeriCorps State, National, and NCCC</td>
<td>$258,960,000</td>
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<td>AmeriCorps Vista</td>
<td>$95,470,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn and Serve America</td>
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<td>$298,610</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired and Senior Volunteers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DOE, Office of Secondary and Elementary Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant Education Even Start</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Dropout Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving Literacy through School Libraries</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DOE, Safe and Drug-Free Schools</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safe Schools/Healthy Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Skills for State and Local Prisoners</td>
<td>$4,980,000</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DOE, Fund for the Improvement of Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Elementary and Secondary School Counseling</td>
<td>$39,000,000*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HHS, SAMHSA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Community Mental Health Services</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HHS, Youth and Families, Community Development Block Grants</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Youth Sports Program</td>
<td>$34,315,000*</td>
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<td><strong>HHS, Office of Minority Health</strong></td>
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<td>Family and Community Violence Prevention</td>
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<td><strong>HUD, Community Planning and Development</strong></td>
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<td>YouthBuild Collaborations</td>
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<td><strong>DOJ, OJJDP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gang-Free Schools and Communities</td>
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Specific dollar amounts for the Elementary and Secondary School Counseling program and the National Youth Sports Program are not available, but total budget amounts for the DOE’s Fund for the Improvement of Education and HHS’s Youth and Families Community Development Block Grants are listed above.
Appendix B: Expanded Notes on Chicago, Oakland, and Dallas

Chicago

Structure

Chicago’s nonprofit and governmental agencies have formed partnerships in the recent past to address juvenile detention reform and juvenile crime more generally. Chicago’s participation in the Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) required the city to form a collaborative that would (and did go on to) plan and implement drastic reforms in Cook County’s juvenile detention system. The JDAI collaborative was composed of approximately 50 members, including essential policymakers, government officials from all branches, and representatives from a variety of service providers. The group was eventually broken down into subdivisions that were directed by an executive committee. Many of the challenges faced by Cook County officials organizing this collaborative are documented in the Casey Foundation’s report on the project.

More recently, the city of Chicago has used Federal Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants to fund a Juvenile Gang Intervention Partnership Pilot Program (JGIPP - also referred to as the Juvenile Justice Intervention Partnership Program). The program focuses on providing diversionary services for juveniles who are gang-affiliated or at-risk for gang affiliation and are eligible to be diverted instead of prosecuted upon arrest. The program is the result of collaboration between the Police Department and the Cook County Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition (JCEC). The JCEC is a coalition of agencies that includes the State Attorney’s Office, the Juvenile Probation Department, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, the Chicago Board of Education, the Chicago Department of Public Health, the Allstate Insurance Company, and the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Despite these promising models for collaboration, including one which specifically names reduction of gang membership as a goal, there is no single entity in Chicago that coordinates gang prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts citywide. The JCEC, for example, is organized around a particular funding source and programming effort. While that effort involves collaboration between several types of agencies, it does not necessarily bring together the wide range of suppression, prevention, and intervention activities that are taking place across the city. Howard Lathan, Associate Executive Director of the Chicago Area Project, reported that gang initiatives are conducted by a variety of Chicago agencies, and that each agency oversees its own programs according to its own approach or modality. He stated that programs are not linked in any particular way, and that ultimate responsibility and accountability for gang problems lies with the Police Department. Ellen Scriver, the Chicago Police Department’s Deputy Superintendent for Administrative Services, similarly stated that the Police Department has

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19 A list of contacts can be provided for the information outlined in this section.
21 The Chicago Area Project (CAP) is a community-based organization that focuses on delinquency prevention and intervention. CAP was founded in the 1930s and has received national recognition for its work in direct service, community organizing, and advocacy.
internal organization around gang issues and has working relationships with some community-based organizations, but that there is no formal coordination between agencies and no formal oversight of city-wide gang programs.

Given the absence of any coordinating person, agency, or task force, it is difficult to speak of the city as having a particular gang strategy, goal, or mechanism for evaluation. Rather, each agency is likely to have its own set of goals, strategies, and evaluative tools. Staff members in the city’s legislative and executive offices echoed Mr. Lathan’s assertion that ultimate responsibility for addressing gang activity lies with the police department. In response to the question, “what is the best thing that has happened to reduce the impact of gangs in your community?” both Mr. Lathan, from the Chicago Area Project, and Dr. Scrivner, from the Police Department, responded by citing particular efforts within their respective agencies. Mr. Lathan felt that community empowerment and accountability were instrumental in reducing gang activity, and Dr. Scrivner pointed to the use of new technology and increased specialization in gang issues within the Department as the most effective strategies.

**Funding**

In Chicago, government funding for most prevention and intervention programs is disbursed through the recently created Department of Children and Youth (DCY). DCY administers federal, state, and city funds to over 300 organizations. A few of these organizations, such as B.U.I.L.D. and the YMCA’s Street Intervention Program, specifically focus on gang intervention. Many others serve at-risk youth or provide more general youth development services. In 2006, DCY’s budget will be approximately $193 million, including about $3.2 million from Chicago’s corporate fund, $10.2 million from Chicago’s Community Development Block Grant, and $177.1 million from other grants (almost entirely Head Start and day care). The vast majority of that money – about $167.7 million – will go towards programs that serve children who are five years old or younger. Approximately $15.4 million will go to programs for young people in general, including programs that could be classified as prevention programs but do not specifically target delinquent or gang-involved youth. About $364,000 will go to prevention and outreach, which includes youth delinquency programs.

The Illinois State Department of Human Services allocates a small amount of money (about $250,000) for youth services, with $13,000 of that money tagged especially for juvenile justice programs. It seems doubtful that this money would go to Chicago.

Gang suppression is the province of the Police Department, which has a budget of over $1 billion, almost all of which is drawn from Chicago’s corporate fund. In 2005, the police department received about $32.5 million of grant money. For our purposes, notable grants in 2005 included a Byrne Justice Assistance Grant ($6.3 million), Gang Information Exchange Program ($1.3 million), Gang Resistance Education and Training ($273,000), Juvenile Block Grant ($1.7 million), and Project Safe Neighborhoods ($520,000).

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22 Specifically, Darcel Beavers, Chief of Staff to the Chairman of the City Council Committee on Budget and Government Operations, and Lee Hettinga, assistant to the Mayor’s Chief of Staff.
The Police Department appears to be using its Juvenile Block Grant to fund Juvenile Intervention Support Centers, which are the product of the JGIPP and JCEC. JISCs facilitate and oversee service referrals for young people who are diverted from the juvenile justice system. Other gang-specific initiatives funded by the Police Department include gang prevention workshops, officers and Detectives who are gang specialists, technology to track patterns of gang crime, and gang intelligence units within the department.

**Oakland**

*Structure*

Oakland has not engaged in any organizing, as far as we can tell, specifically around the issue of gangs or gang crime. However, the broader issue of violence prevention is at the forefront of local policy, and – particularly in recent years – Oakland has formed multi-agency partnerships that seek to comprehensively address violence prevention. According to Anne Marks, who planned and directs the “Measure Y” initiative at the Department of Human Services, violence prevention has taken precedence over gang-specific initiatives because gangs are not as integral a component of Oakland’s violence problems as they are in cities like Los Angeles or Chicago.

In 2003, the City of Oakland released a Violence Prevention Plan. The Plan was the product of work from a diverse group of over 170 city, county, state, and federal officials, and representatives from service providers. The Plan was divided into six policy areas: prevention and positive alternatives for youth; breaking the cycle of family violence and sexual assault; adult and young offender initiatives; reducing access to illegal weapons; reducing the negative impact of alcohol and drug abuse; and community building and problem solving strategies. The Plan outlined strategies to address each of these areas and specified each strategy’s objectives. The Plan also detailed specific activities that could be taken to meet those objectives, and which government, non-profit, or private agencies should be enlisted in carrying out those activities.

The recommendations made in the Violence Prevention Plan ultimately laid the groundwork for the strategy developed by the Measure Y office in the Department of Human Services. Measure Y is a new initiative that was created by the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act of 2004, an ordinance adopted by the City of Oakland in fall of 2004, and is the largest anti-violence effort taking currently taking place in the city. Key components of the Measure Y program are hiring additional police officers (primarily community policing and problem solving officers) and providing grants to local agencies for the purpose of providing services in specified areas, including reentry training and employment, street outreach, mental health services, sports and recreation, and after school jobs. The target populations for these services are children and young people under the age of 30 who are at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of violence. Specifically, Measure Y focuses on juveniles or young adults who are on probation or parole; youth who are truant, suspended, or expelled from school; sexually exploited youth; and children who are exposed to violence (generally domestic violence). Measure Y also has an evaluation component, and has contracted with independent researchers to measure the outcomes of its work. Measurement will take different forms for different aspects of the initiative.
Implementation of Measure Y is overseen by the Oakland City Council and an 11-person Oversight Committee. Measure Y’s violence prevention programming aspects are run by a Measure Y office at the Department of Human Services (DHS). Anne Marks, the director, states that one of Measure Y’s goals is to create coordination between various intervention and prevention service providers and the police department, and that the greatest obstacle is facilitating functional communication between systems. For example, she has found that the probation department had no consistent communication with the school system, despite the overlap in their consumer populations. However, more coordination is taking place between community-based police officers and social service agencies.

**Funding**

The Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act that created Measure Y also created an additional property/real estate tax and increased the Oakland parking tax in order to fund Measure Y. These taxes have added approximately $20 million per year to the city’s revenue, approximately $9.5 million of which goes to hiring and training police officers, and about $6.4 million of which goes to DHS’s Measure Y programming. Measure Y at DHS has used some of this money to fund ongoing programs, including a violence prevention curriculum in elementary and middle schools, case management for at-risk middle schoolers, and mentoring for juveniles on probation. Most of the remainder of the funds will go to 15 grantees, 5 of which are funded to do street outreach with delinquent or at-risk youth.

In addition to specific Measure Y funding, the Measure Y office has obtained some funds from other sources. Partnership with health care services, which address violence as a public health issue, has provided some access to Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Program (EPSDT) grant money. There has also been some access to Community Service Block Grant money, and to grants from the Department of Labor for prisoner re-entry.

Ms. Marks has found that the most important element in obtaining and sustaining funding has been involvement in local politics. In regards to leveraging existing funding resources, she stated that the Measure Y office has spent a lot of time “developing and nurturing” existing nonprofits that are too small or insufficiently organized to obtain funding for which they might otherwise be eligible.

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23 The oversight committee is composed of the Alameda County Chief of Probation; the Chair of the Maxwell Park Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council; the Program Coordinator at San Quentin’s Centerforce and Ranch Re-entry Project; the Executive Director of First Place Fund for Youth; the Secretary for the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council 21Y; the Principal of VBN Architects; a member of the Police and Corrections Team, the Program Coordinator of the Books Not Bars Youth Program at the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; and the Coordinator for the Administrative Office of the Courts at the Judicial Council of California.
Dallas

Structure and Funding

There seems to be very little coordination or organizing of gang programs in the city of Dallas at this time, and while there are some community-based prevention and intervention programs, the majority of the programs are suppression-based. The Dallas Police Department’s (DPD) Division on Youth and Family runs the Gang Unit, which documents and tracks gang activity in the city. In addition to the Gang Unit, the DPD has established three programs to reduce violence: the First Offender Program, the Target Truant Enforcement program, and the Law Enforcement Teaching Students program. The Division on Youth and Family has a budget of approximately $11 million per year.

The First Offender Program aims to reduce the recidivism rate among juveniles by providing counseling and educational programs to juvenile offenders after their first arrest. Its service target for FY 2005-08 is to enroll 70% of 850 referred juveniles into the program and maintain a 90% successful completion rate. This program costs approximately $400,000 to run per year.

The Target Truant Enforcement (TTE) program’s main objective is to reduce overall crime by 10% and homicide by 20% with a target date for completion set for October 2006. According to the city’s FY05-06 Planned Annual Measure, the TTE will implement 175 coordinated initiatives between Interactive Community Policing officers and Patrol officers.

The DPD also sponsors the Law Enforcement Teaching Students (L.E.T.S.) program. An anti-drug/anti-violence life skills program aimed at preteens, L.E.T.S. was developed for Dallas area schools as an inter-agency effort between the DPD and the Dallas Independent School District. It teaches four core skills (self-confidence, conflict management, decision-making, and peer pressure reversal) at the fourth grade and sixth grade level. All classroom visits are facilitated by specially trained police officers. L.E.T.S. is funded by the City’s Public Safety & Homeland Security Fund, totaling approximately $725,000 per year.

In addition to suppression programs, there are community-based intervention and prevention programs. The Dallas Parks and Recreation Department sponsors and runs the Juvenile Gang Prevention Program, funded by their Youth Programs Division. This program costs slightly over $1 million per year. There are also a handful of community-based organizations such as Vision Regeneration, which employs former gang members and provides mentoring and counseling services, as well as several faith based organizations that provide mentoring and activities for at-risk youth.

At the state level, the Texas Attorney General’s Office runs a Criminal Law Enforcement Division. Within this, the Juvenile Justice Division serves as a clearinghouse for information related to youth crime and its prevention and maintains a gang information database which can be accessed by law enforcement agencies. The Texas Attorney General also runs a program called "Gangs 101: What We All需 to Know," a curriculum designed to teach community members and parents about gang-related issues such as the psychology of gang recruitment, the structure of the gang culture, common gang identifiers, and graffiti awareness.
Federal Funding and Initiatives

In 1996 and 1997, the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) initiative targeted five geographical areas that were home to seven of the city's most violent gangs. Three main suppression strategies were employed: 1) Saturation patrols/high-visibility patrols, which stopped and frisked suspected gang members and made appropriate arrests; 2) Aggressive curfew enforcement, targeted specifically at suspected gang members; and 3) Aggressive enforcement of truancy laws and regulations, enforced by both police and school districts.

In addition, earlier this year, Dallas/Fort Worth was chosen by the Attorney General’s Office as one of the six sites selected to receive $2.5 million to implement the Department of Justice’s Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative.
Appendix C: Bibliography

Anti-gang programs


**Youth violence prevention programs**


Federal funding for anti-gang programs and youth development


Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2006 Survey of Law
Enforcement Gang Units solicitation,  

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/great.html


Department of Justice. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Field-Initiated and Research and Evaluation Program,  

Statistical information and costs of gangs

California Gang Investigator’s Association data from the early 1990s:  


Comments on Funding and Reprogramming

Assumption:

The proposed Department of Neighborhood Safety will provide the best opportunity to organize, coordinate and ensure effective and efficient delivery of services designed to prevent and reduce gang related violence. In this model, policy (Council) and budget (Mayor) setting entities are compelled to provide oversight with prescriptions, negotiate, develop and ultimately share accountability, before the interested community. The major challenges, I believe are grants management and personnel. The oversight committee should include staff from the Office of the City Attorney, to ensure an appropriate distribution of relevant grants and RFP’s and ensure timely approval through the necessary commission, mayoral and Council approvals and monitoring. Additionally, the reprogramming of funds will necessitate a shift in personnel. And the expectation is that any personnel involved in the successful implementation and management of this “new” organization will be mission directed with relevant experience. And just as important that management possesses the authority to hire personnel to promote a “culture” supporting the mission and have the support to expand and contract the agency as needed in response to strategic management decisions.

Key Commissions and Departments and their respective funding challenges and opportunities:

Proprietary Commissions and Independent Charter Departments with Commissions:

LA World Airports – Employment Programs
DWP – Youth Services Academy - Education
Harbor – Gang prevention and Development Programs

Proprietary Departments generate their own revenue stream to meet budget demands. The Commissions overseeing these departments have control over the spending of “special funds or trusts” and have responsibility for the expenditure of monies received from bonds. In short the proprietary departments and its respective Commissions have exceptional fiscal authority apart from other Commissions. Reprogramming funds away from these departments is not infeasible, however, it will require additional negotiation with justification. Leveraging or bringing additional funding into special youth serving programs may be a more pragmatic route, if there is value in the targeted program. Jurisdiction, however, over program implementation and evaluation from outside could become challenging with a Board approved collaborative agreement.

Independent Charter Department with Commission

Recreation and Park

The RAP Commission, besides its influence on policy and personnel, oversees and approves contracts, MOU’s, and controls all RAP sites and is empowered to manage the RAP Fund and
can direct its investment with the assistance of the City Treasurer. Additionally the RAP Commission can exert influence on the bureaucratic organization of the Department.

RAP and its Commission possess the most significant amount of influence relative to the amount of proposed funding in the $100 million Department of Neighborhood Safety Model. Although CDD may manage more of the funding identified in the Department of Neighborhood Safety Model, it is regulated by either Federal or State agencies, albeit modified by City Council and the Mayor.

The majority of RAP funding is categorically derived from the City’s general fund and supplemented by Special revenue and trust funds. RAP, however, has in the last five years increased its receipt of grants to finance gang prevention related programming and employment and training. While the Federal Local Law Enforcement Block Grant is expiring, RAP has received a total of $3.32 million in Cardenas-Schiff (JJCPA) funds via LA County Probation and the State Board of Corrections. $520,000 was approved in 2006-7 to support outreach to youth challenged by gang turf, lack of transportation means and distance during “peak juvenile crime occurrences” in support of the CLASS Parks YEIP programming. $190,000 was approved in the previous fiscal year (2005-6) to outreach to out-of-school youth. Currently an MOU exists between RAP and the County as approved by the RAP Commission, Council and Mayor.

Grants Management:

The reprogramming challenge, especially with grant funding and council committees, rests in their isolation from each other, unless political leadership or the CAO or CLA recognizes an opportunity and facilitates cooperation. In other words, discussion authorization to apply or execute a grant rarely invites collaboration from other committees or departments, despite shared outcomes. There is little evidence in my evaluation of funding streams of meaningful grants coordination at the front end of the pipeline when grants are noticed. Cooperation has occurred when there is a drive to backfill or finance a funding gap. Opportunity for leveraging or collaboration has rarely occurred in the front end and relationships are not developed. On the other hand RAP’s relationship with Probation and LAPD that emerged from the distribution of Prop A youth employment monies has developed into a steady source of JJCPA funding. Within the city outside of CCYF, the committee and departments have convened to combine their efforts to finance shared objectives relative to youth services. The Public Safety Committee handles justice grants, Arts, Health and Humanities oversees Recreation and Parks, HCED oversees CDD’s federally funded programs and projects, and Education and Neighborhood oversees the relationship between LAUSD and the City.

The Department of Neighborhood Safety Model could serve as a grants coordinator, respecting the overlapping funding cycles of local, federal and private grants, and provide legislative direction to manage cash flow to ensure the steady implementation of programming.

Reprogramming

The major sources of grants received from the City contributing to the Department of Neighborhood Safety Model are Justice Grants, CDBG and WIA- YOS. Firstly, WIA funding is
becoming extremely inflexible. Despite CDD’s request embedded in the RFP promoting collaboration with the Family Development Network and outreach and service to out-of-school youth, the result has been negligible. The goal is to efficiently expedite and graduate youth from the program as a positive exit, which challenges agencies to case manage at-risk youth with exceptional needs and thus require more attention. Positively, the General Fund has provided opportunity to supplement the Youth Opportunity System with approximately $2 million per year. This funding can be reprogrammed and possibly leveraged with RAP YEIP or another city sponsored youth employment program to specifically serve at-risk/high need youth.

CDBG funding, despite the challenges faced with the reduction of the Public Service Cap to 15%, is reprogrammable with restrictions relative to the Consolidated Plan goals and agency eligibility, both programmatically and geographically. The Family Development Network is the result of the restructuring of the Human Service Delivery System, which occurred in 1998-9. The restructuring was designed to support the philosophy and goals of family self-sufficiency. This approach shares objectives with the Department of Neighborhood Safety Model. In the effort to reprogram CDBG dollars, besides making organizational changes to CDD, the Federal Department Housing and Urban Development must be brought into the discussion to avoid ensuring its facilitation and avoiding possible retrofitting of program design.

Justice Grants / LAPD

The Mayor’s office of Criminal Justice Planning has been restructured. Justice related grants, however, are still legislated through the Public Safety Committee. The Police Commission oversees grants, contracts and the budget of the LAPD, subject to Council and Mayor review and approval. In the past several years, there has been a significant reduction in Local Law Enforcement Block Grants and Justice Assistance Grants. LAPD, however, has received significant private funding relative to other city departments not empowered to deliver youth related programming. This funding has served to supplement, and in some instances, wholly fund internal programs. LAPD has also used special funds to finance its programs. Relative to reprogramming, we can look at the Jeopardy program, which receives general fund support and the GREAT program. The GREAT program is a key LAPD program, whose movement away from LAPD administration could be supported by a policy directing police officers away from activities deemed as social work or teaching. LAPD involvement can still be integrated into the curriculum. The overall management may be another agency.

Cardenas-Schiff (JJCPA) with various criteria for eligibility, is already being leveraged, and in some sense being redirected toward RAP by LA County Probation. This trend should continue. Overall, we should consider all grants related funding and general funding for reprogramming. The challenge will emerge in the possible impact of institutional programs such as the Explorers, Jeopardy, Deputy Auxiliary Program (DAP) and Police Athletic League (PAL) programs. Jeopardy should be a primary target as it does benefit from a contribution from the general fund. The other aforementioned programs, including Jeopardy, receive private funding and LAPD, and possibly the Police Commission, will hesitate to let this go. An approach is to consider the programs benefiting the most from justice grants and the general fund and exclude programs where there is a greater dependence on special funds and private donations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring Department</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>Sub-Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Board of Public Works Clean and Green</td>
<td>1,514,803</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Reoccurring funding, Program with strong Council and Mayor support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWP Youth Services Academy</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,114,803</td>
<td>Reoccurring funding which could be certainly leveraged. Funding, however, is influenced/approved by DWP Commission. It should be considered for integration with other programs sharing similar objectives. However, it operates as an in-house program.</td>
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<td>CDD Summer Youth Employment</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>6,333,968</td>
<td>Managed and monitored through CDD. Reoccurring funding. Very malleable, reprogrammable. Very popular. It has generally received the same amount year after year. Funding can be easily leveraged with other CDD (WIA), RAP and BPW programs.</td>
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<td>Board of Public Works Operation Clean Sweep</td>
<td>4,166,368</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>25,955,695</td>
<td>Still trying to break down this amount per source. Funding is reprogrammable, however, it has become an institutionalized program at City Hall. Very popular. Funding from the City has remained steady. Funding, however, from CDBG, has been decreased.</td>
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<td>CRA LA Job Corp</td>
<td>167,600</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>6,593,557</td>
<td>Similar political and funding dynamics to DWP Youth Service Academy. Highly leveragable.</td>
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<td>CDD Youth and Family Centers</td>
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<td>Reprogrammable, however, it is leveraged with CDBG to offset impact on Public Service Cap.</td>
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<td>CDD LA Bridges I and II</td>
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<td>15,432,862</td>
<td>Reprogrammable. Funding technically is allocated year to year.</td>
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<td>LAPD Jeopardy</td>
<td>983,195</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>983,195</td>
<td>Reprogrammable. Popular in Public Safety Committee even without much solid documentation of long term results. LAPD leverages operational and facility costs with private funding and CBO's relative to facility and some programming.</td>
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<td>Harbor Commission Gang Alternative Program</td>
<td>64,844</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>64,844</td>
<td>Reprogrammable, however, influence with oversight from the Harbor Commission, which determines where it goes.</td>
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<td>LAPD Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)</td>
<td>6,840,600</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>6,840,600</td>
<td>Reprogrammable, however, leveraged with other LAPD initiatives and resources.</td>
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<td>CDD Gang Reduction Program (Boyle Heights)</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>25,955,695</td>
<td>Reprogrammable. However, is key programmatic funding. Very leveragable.</td>
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<td>City Attorney Operation Bright Future</td>
<td>269,502</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>269,502</td>
<td>Reprogrammable. Funding has remained steady in past years. Key component of CA's intervention programs.</td>
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<td>Commission on the Status of Women YWAR</td>
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<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>6,593,557</td>
<td>Technically reprogrammable, however, program is managed primarily by non-exempt employees. Also, funding has increased incrementally in the past few years. Program has also become &quot;institutionalized.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Funding Source</td>
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<td>Kidwatch LA</td>
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<td>San Pedro YMCA</td>
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<td>Harbor Community Development Commission</td>
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<td>Los Angeles County Contribution</td>
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<td>52,026,090</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- **Reprogrammable funding, separate from core CDBG funding.**
- Funding is malleable and leveragable. One of the initial CCYF community based programs. It is a reoccurring program with steady funding. Budget and program influenced by CCYF Commission and Office of the Mayor.
- CDBG represents its core funding. Has CBDO status which has increased its CDBG funding flexibility. As a collaboration based program, it is highly leveragable, housing both FDN and WIA programs under its umbrella.
- Technically non-reoccurring funding, however, it appears year to year and is reprogrammable.
- Technically one time (non-reoccurring) funding and reprogrammable. However, the organization has received year to funding on a regular basis.
- Same as above. Reprogrammable.
- General fund monies. Reprogrammable, however, it is part of the core (program related) funding of the Commission and very central to its mission. Also, Human Relations Commission has influence on policy and budget.
- Same as above.
- City match to California Dept of Education Grant. Non-reoccurring funding tied to length of grant - one year.
- Highly regulated initiative, which hinders opportunity to leverage programming and modify expenditure related goals. Has proven difficult to reprogram and leverage. Leadership is key in this respect as it funding amount demonstrates potential.
- Supplementary funding. Reprogrammable.
- Specialized program reprogrammable and leveragable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Program Description</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rec and Parks</td>
<td>Youth Employment Internship Program</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>Employment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec and Parks</td>
<td>Youth Employment Services</td>
<td>252,920</td>
<td>Employment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Magnet School Program</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
<td>YWAR</td>
<td>276,000</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec and Parks</td>
<td>After School / Latch Key Child Care</td>
<td>390,123</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>LA Bridges I</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Intervention Program (JJDPP)</td>
<td>432,000</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Juvenile Accountability Incentive Grant</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Eco Academy</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Education Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Clean and Green</td>
<td>1,054,613</td>
<td>Education Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>WIA - Youth Opportunity Services</td>
<td>22,805,400</td>
<td>Employment Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Youth Opportunity Movement Grant</td>
<td>442,000</td>
<td>Employment Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Youth Opportunity Movement (Watts, Boyle Heights, Pacoima)</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>Employment Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Operation Clean Sweep</td>
<td>688,203</td>
<td>Employment Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Neighborhood Action Program</td>
<td>8,292,866</td>
<td>Family Support (Specialized)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Breakdown of Funding Sources for DNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Youth and Family Centers</td>
<td>25,720,921</td>
<td>Family Support</td>
<td>CDBG-HUD funded leveraged with city dollars. This funding addresses operational and programmatic objectives. Long time (legacy) project for CDD. Can be leveraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Family Development Network</td>
<td>9,578,500</td>
<td>Family Support</td>
<td>CDBG - HUD. <strong>Technically reprogrammable.</strong> Also can be considered a collaborative program. It is the core of the human services delivery system and designed to promote leveraging of public and private resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Rita Walters Learning Complex</td>
<td>989,600</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>CDBG - HUD. <strong>Technically reprogrammable.</strong> CDBG, however, represents core funding. Funding has remained at around the same level year after year. Leveragable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)</td>
<td>54,160</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>USDOJ - Bureau of Justice. Program objectives may restrict reprogramming opportunities. It can and has been leveraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG)</td>
<td>438,000</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>Difficult to reprogram, however, it can be redirected in future use to greater intervention uses and to support or leverage other programmatic efforts with similar objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Central City Neighborhood Partners</td>
<td>583,500</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>CDBG - HUD. <strong>Technically reprogrammable.</strong> CDBG, however, represents core funding. Funding has been reduced slightly year to year. Leveragable as a collaborative, houses WIA and FDN programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Weed and Seed (Southeast Division)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>USDOJ -Community Capacity Development Office. Difficult to reprogram, can be leveraged toward intervention efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Weed and Seed (Harbor Division)</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>USDOJ -Community Capacity Development Office. Difficult to reprogram, can be leveraged toward intervention efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Deputy Auxiliary Program</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>USDOJ (from Weed and Seed) Not highly reprogrammable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Deputy Auxiliary Program</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>HUD. Reprogrammable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Magnet School Program</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Beside private grants, this includes funding from COPS grant (US DOJ) and US Dept of Education. However, unable to determine exact amount. Not highly reprogrammable. Reprogramming requires support of Police Commission and Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Jeopardy</td>
<td>25,207</td>
<td>Gang Specific</td>
<td>Reprogramming requires support of Police Commission and Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Explorer</td>
<td>435,622</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>Allocation by Bureau: West (155,232); Central (66,263); Valley (158,608); South (55,419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Explorer</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>Wells Fargo - toward operational expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Juvenile Impact Program</td>
<td>69,770</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>Reprogramming requires support of Police Commission and Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Police Activity League</td>
<td>194,177</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>Reprogramming requires support of Police Commission and Chief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Private Funding - Foundations, Donations, Boosters**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Magnet School Program</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Explorer</td>
<td>435,622</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
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<td>LAPD</td>
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<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Juvenile Impact Program</td>
<td>69,770</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>Reprogramming requires support of Police Commission and Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Police Activity League</td>
<td>194,177</td>
<td>Youth Development</td>
<td>726,469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Breakdown of Funding Sources for DNS

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LAPD Rampart</th>
<th>LAPD Harbor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration Programs</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Weed and Seed project designed as a collaborative effort between LAPD, a CBO (sub-contractor) other local agencies and business. Difficult to reprogram. It can be leveraged.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprogramming requires support of Police Commission and Chief.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private funding</td>
<td>1,451,676</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Total</td>
<td>127,825,572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Categories of Public Sector Structure</td>
<td>Primary Characteristics</td>
<td>Illustration of Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIERARCHICAL</strong></td>
<td>• Uniform delivery of public service from one governmental entity</td>
<td>New Deal Governmental structures developed to meet public need are the basis of cabinet and agencies throughout the federal system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organizational structure with the expertise and professional skills &quot;in-house&quot;</td>
<td>Law enforcement entities for the better part of the twentieth century existed in highly specialized areas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had different charters to follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OUTSOURCED</strong></td>
<td>• Third party delivery of services in various models: contracts between government agencies, commercialization, public-private partnerships, outsourcing, privatization</td>
<td>Two prime examples are the Department of Energy and the NASA Program which both spend more than 80% of their respective budgets on contracts. DOE has only 16,000 with contractors outnumbering employees by 130,000 people. Both agencies have become de facto contract managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOINED-UP / COLLABORATIVE</strong></td>
<td>• Dismantling the stovepipes between two formerly hierarchical government agencies to better share information and coordinate efforts</td>
<td>Provision of human services, for example, in the State of Oregon's &quot;No Wrong Door&quot; initiative. Guiding principle is that the &quot;first point of contact&quot; is where the citizen will get the service they need. Five networks of service have been reduced to one integrated network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Government agencies creating more of a &quot;one stop shopping&quot; method of service provision, thus utilizing relationships and technology to share information and efforts to better serve</td>
<td>&quot;Joined-up&quot; government is a signature component in the British model today. TO insure that no one falls through the cracks and faces social 'exclusion', reps from five ministries are required to coordinate at a high level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Categories of Public Sector Structure</td>
<td>Primary Characteristics</td>
<td>Illustration of Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networked</td>
<td>Governing by network represents the confluence of four trends that are altering the shape of public sectors worldwide:</td>
<td>When welfare reform was adopted, the most dramatic example of a governmental transformation might be the Milwaukee, Wisconsin model. The government in Wisconsin made a fundamental shift in the mission. Instead of dispensing cash benefits to welfare recipients, government began to help families achieve economic self-sufficiency. Administrative entitlements were out; work requirements, job training, transportation assistance and time limits were in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The rise in the use of private firms and non-profits to do government's work;</td>
<td>Responsibility for the operation of this mission change devolved to 72 agencies scattered across Wisconsin. These entities were paid a flat fee and allocated a significant level of operational freedom. In exchange for the flexibility, each agency had to agree to state-administered performance criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Efforts to &quot;join up&quot; governments horizontally and vertically to streamline processes from the perspective of the customer-citizen;</td>
<td>This approach opened the formerly county monopoly on welfare administration to bids from private providers. Today more than 70% of the &quot;W-2&quot; agency workload is now handled by private providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Technological breakthroughs that dramatically reduce costs of partnering; and</td>
<td>Milwaukee is the most dramatic example with all former &quot;W-2&quot; county agencies now being private organizations- four non-profits and one for-profit firm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Increased citizen demands for more choices in public services.</td>
<td>Milwaukee's hierarchical county administered system could adequately administer the old welfare system of enforcing rigorous cash-payment receipt guidelines but the system was not equipped for the more complex challenges of welfare reform.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity Description</th>
<th>Form of Governance</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Funding/Resources</th>
<th>Category Identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Quality Management District (AQMD)</td>
<td>Regional District Established to Protect Resident Populations of Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and the Urban Areas of Los Angeles from the Ill-Effects of Air Pollution</td>
<td>Air Pollution Control</td>
<td>$110.6 million in 05-06 comprised of fees on businesses violating air quality standards and a surcharge on car registration of vehicles.</td>
<td>* Joined-Up* or Collaborative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Board comprised of 12 members with 3 of the members being appointed (one by the Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Senate Rules Committee. The other 9 members are elected officials from the Counties and Cities of the Southern California Basin covering 10,743 square miles and inhabited by 16 million people.</td>
<td>Organization Resource: Executive Office and Highly Specialized Team of Legal and Technology Professional serving the Governing Board in District Configurations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Water District (MWD)</td>
<td>Regional District is a consortium of 26 cities and water districts that provides drinking water to nearly 18 million people in parts of Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura counties.</td>
<td>Provision of Adequate and Reliable Supplies of High-Quality Water to Meet Current and Future Needs</td>
<td>$1.69 Billion Operating Budget and $506.3 million Capital Budget for debt service and operations and maintenance of the Colorado River Aqueduct, treatment plants and reservoirs.</td>
<td>Joined-Up or Collaborative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Board of Metropolitan is comprised of a 37 member Board appointed by the 26 member cities and water districts to insure the safe and efficient delivery of 1.7 billion gallons of water per day to a 5,200 square mile service area.</td>
<td>Organization Resource: Executive Office and Highly Specialized Team of Legal and Technology Professional serving the Governing Board in Specialty Areas of Maintenance, Construction, Treatment Plant Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)</td>
<td>School District is a State legislated program with the mission to educate all students in the jurisdictional boundaries of LAUSD to a high level of achievement that will enable them to be responsible individuals and productive members of the greater society.</td>
<td>Educate K-12 Children</td>
<td>Total School District Budget is $13,167,000,000 for ‘05-06 from mostly state and federal sources of revenue as seen on the &quot;financial information&quot; on the attached page.</td>
<td>Joined Up or Collaborative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAUSD Board of Education Board of Directors has 6 District positions. These are elected positions to be accountable to the State of California whose legislative mandate and funding for K-12 education prevail over local jurisdictions, including the City of L.A. The LAUSD boundaries encompass 710 square miles, including the City of Los Angeles, several other cities, and unincorporated parts of L.A. County.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Superintendent of Schools and a highly structured district professional staff and teachers totaling 77,754 employees of the District provide educational services to 727,117 K-12 students and 149,893 community adults and early education centers.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metropolitan Transit Authority (METRO)</strong> Los Angeles County</td>
<td>Transportation District is the transportation planner and coordinator, designer, builder and operator of the region covering 1,400 square miles, and encompassing 10 million people or nearly one-third of California’s residents.</td>
<td>Transportation planner, designer, builder, and operator for 10 million residents</td>
<td>Total Transportation budget for 2006 is $2.859 billion. This mixed source revenue stream is from four primary sources: sales tax, federal, state &amp; local grants, passenger fares and advertising, and net proceeds from financing supports the second largest bus system in the U.S., operates three light rail lines and one heavy rail line with 220,000 boardings daily, and supports the new construction of light and heavy rail lines.</td>
<td>Joined Up or Collaborative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOS ANGELES HOMELESS SERVICES AUTHORITY (LAHSA)</strong></td>
<td>The Metro Board of Directors governs the activities of this transportation public agency with 13 voting members. The Board of Directors include the five Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the Mayor Los Angeles and three appointees, four members appointed by the L.A. County/City selection committee, and one non-voting member appointed by the Governor. These Board members serve on the Board but also function in standing committees of the Board.</td>
<td>A Chief Executive Officer and a highly specialized organization of planners, construction project managers for the massive construction of new lines, communications staff to maintain effective relationships with residents as the system operates and is being built simultaneously, and a COO to maintain a management handle on the train, bus and other operations.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOS ANGELES HOMELESS SERVICES AUTHORITY (LAHSA)</strong></td>
<td>Authority is a joint City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles created public agency since 1993 to provide funding and guidance for a network of local, non-profit agencies with missions to help people leave homelessness permanently. The mission of this networked government structure is to “support, create and sustain solutions to homelessness in L.A. County by providing leadership, advocacy, planning and management of program funding.”</td>
<td>Housing Services Coordinator in Los Angeles County</td>
<td>Each year LAHSA distributes between $45 million and $60 million in public funds for homeless services. LAHSA is the conduit for federal, state and local funds to be distributed through competitive procurement methods following the guidelines of the originating governmental entity. Once the procurement is complete, and the Commission approves an award of funds to a service provider, LAHSA then enters into contractual agreements with awardees who carry out the work. Currently, there are contracts with more than 80 agencies under 120 different program types.</td>
<td>Networked Government Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity Description</td>
<td>Form of Governance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAHSA</td>
<td>governed by a politically appointed 10 member Commission. Five members are selected by the County Board of Supervisors and five are chosen by the Mayor and City Council. The LAHSA Commission has the authority to make budgetary, planning, funding and program policies. LAHSA also has a 39 member Advisory Board and has also convened a 60 member Blue Ribbon Committee to help sharpen the focus of the agency as advocate and integrator of service to homeless populations in L.A. County.</td>
<td>Organizational structure is not that of an operator of services as in the other structural organizations in this analysis. An Executive Director with an organization that is designed to network includes strategic planning, grants and contracts management, program managers and an information technology element. Awards of contracts to private and non-profit providers represent the fundamental nature of the organization.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Coastal Commission</td>
<td>Commission is an independent, quasi-judicial state agency. The Commission was first established by voter initiative in 1972 (Proposition 20) and later made permanent by the legislature in the California Coastal Act of 1976.</td>
<td>Protect, conserve, restore, and enhance environmental and human-based resources of the California Coast and ocean for sustainable and prudent use of current and future generations.</td>
<td>With a $ 15 million operating budget, the Commission enforces the Coastal Act that calls for the protection and enhancement of public access and recreation, marine resources, environmentally sensitive habitat areas, marine water quality, agriculture, and scenic resources, and makes provisions for coastal-dependent industrial and energy development. New development in the coastal zone requires a coastal permit wither from local government or the Commission. Local governments are required to prepare a local coastal program (LCP) for the coastal zone portion of their jurisdiction. After the LCP is approved, new development is delegated to the local government, subject to limited appeals to the Commission. The Commission is also the principal state agency for purposes of administering the federal Coastal Zone Management Act.</td>
<td>Joined Up or Collaborative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission is governed by its twelve member body appointed equally with four members each- the Governor, Senate, and the Assembly. Six of the voting commissioners are locally elected officials and six are appointed from the public at large. Four ex officio (non-voting) members represent the Resources Agency, the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, the Trade and Commerce Agency, and the State Lands Commission.</td>
<td>Organization is highly specialized in regulatory and technical knowledge of the coastal zone, marine life, and the permitting requirements for developing along the California Coast. There are six offices in different state areas with the headquarters in San Francisco.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Governance Structures in Southern California and Key Characteristics

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<td><strong>Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA)</strong></td>
<td>Authority is a State of California chartered public agency as set forth in the State’s Health and Safety Statutes. The local jurisdiction, Los Angeles, expressed a local need for this State agency in 1938 and formed the Authority to perform the job of slum clearance and the production and management of low-income housing. The Authority is then accountable to the State, the City, and then to the federal government which provides the vast majority of funding.</td>
<td><strong>Mission of the HACLA is expanding to also provide all possible opportunities to help families reach economic self-sufficiency goals.</strong></td>
<td>With a mostly federal budget of approximately $600 million, the HACLA manages some 9,000 units of housing in its inventory, administers 50,000 Section 8 / Housing Choice Vouchers, provides an array of resident services programs to youth, families, and elderly in its programs. In addition, the HACLA manages a $25 million per year rehabilitation program for its aging housing inventory, and has served as government integrator in the new HOPE VI program approach to revitalize the housing and the neighborhood at select public housing sites.</td>
<td>Joined Up / Collaborative Moving Toward Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy</strong></td>
<td>The Mayor appoints the seven members of the Board of Commissioners, with the approval of the City Council. Two of the seven members of the Board of Commissioners are residents of the HACLA’s housing programs.</td>
<td><strong>Direct action, alliances, partnerships, and joint powers authorities, the mission is to strategically buy back, preserve, protect, restore, and enhance treasured pieces of Southern California to form interlinking network of parks, open space, trails, and habitat areas that are accessible to the public.</strong></td>
<td>Modest operating budget of $700,000 from State funds is the operating budget for the Conservancy.</td>
<td>Networked Government Structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Table includes a brief description of each entity, their form of governance, key service, and funding/resources. The category identifier indicates the type of governance structure.*
### Governance Structures in Southern California and Key Characteristics

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservancy consists of nine voting members, three ex-officio members, and six legislative members. This policy making entity for the Conservancy is broadly representative of state, regional, and local interests. A twenty-six member advisory committee meets jointly with the Conservancy and offers citizens the opportunity for even greater participation.</td>
<td>Provides a safe and supervised after school education, enrichment and recreation program for elementary school children ages 5 to 12.</td>
<td>A small staff acts as the networking integrator for the various joint powers agreements, and the relationships with non-profits and other entities for advocacy and planning purposes of the natural habitat surrounding Los Angeles.</td>
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**Better Educated Students for Tomorrow (LA's BEST)**

A non-profit organization created in 1988 by Mayor Tom Bradley to address an alarming rise in the lack of adequate adult supervision of children during the critical hours between 3 and 6 p.m. From its inception, LA’s BEST has maintained a balance of high quality standards for education, enrichment, and recreation guided by a clear vision and mission, and supported with a values based belief system that is woven into the programming.

Provide a safe and supervised after school education, enrichment and recreation program for elementary school children ages 5 to 12.

With an annual budget of $35 million that comes from two major levels of government and also from the private sector, is in every sense a true partnership. The program started and remains in the Mayor’s Office, but has dual residency and involvement through LAUSD. Co-management of the program not only allows LA’s BEST to make use of opportunities directed to the City of LA and LAUSD, but to also be a reliable partner and influence on education policy. The hybrid structure of LA’s BEST has been recognized as a very versatile entity than that of most independent “third party agencies.”

**Networked Non-profit Integrator**

Board of Directors is responsible as policy-makers of the program for oversight and strategic planning, including the creation of a diverse and sustainable funding base for the organization. Expanded advisory board is responsible as stewards of the program for assuring quality and representing diverse community and constituency views to the organization.

LA’s BEST takes responsibility for training and supporting a staff which includes many of the most dedicated and effective after school employees in the U.S. The Corporate management is in the Mayor’s Office and it worked hand-in-hand with the Operations Management staff located at LAUSD. The program focuses on training and quality in its programming and educational approach. The organization places an emphasis on training and staff development and has done that since 1988.
*Note, this chart does not include all administrative, clerical and fiscal staff
*Note, CVPCs will expand over time requiring additional Regional Directors and CVPC staff.
*Note, this chart does not include all administrative, clerical and fiscal staff
Appointing Authorities:
City Council President, City Attorney, Controller, LAPD Police Chief, District Attorney, County Board of Supervisors, Sheriff, School Board Superintendent, Committee of other LA County cities, Community-based gang prevention coalition
Youth Gang Violence Prevention in Boston Ten Years after the Boston Miracle

At the height of the national youth gun violence epidemic in 1996, the city of Boston became famous for implementing a strategy that was given credit by many for reducing the youth homicide rate to zero, and keeping it there for several years. The strategy was called Operation Cease Fire and was coordinated by a working group consisting of representatives from the Boston Police Department, Probation, the District Attorney and U.S. Attorney’s office, many other criminal justice agencies, social service agencies, ministers from neighborhood churches (known as the TenPoint Coalition) and researchers from the Kennedy School of Government. The key elements of Cease Fire included:

- Regular working group meetings that were used to analyze data on gang violence and develop plans for reducing it;
- Announcements and publicizing of the Cease Fire, and plans to enforce it;
- Enhanced enforcement by all agencies against gangs found to have violated the Cease Fire;
- Mobilization of community support for the strategy, particularly by the TenPoint Coalition, that regularly walked the neighborhoods;
- Mobilization of community services for youth who desired to give up their gang activities.

Boston differs from LA in that gangs are much less of a presence (1400 total gang members), smaller in size (25-70), and the city has many more resources to deal with them. The TenPoint Coalition was formed by ministers from small neighborhood churches and was initially very critical of the police. It took them awhile to learn that not all police were insensitive to their local problems, and that some could be trusted and worked with. The Boston Gun Project depended a lot on personal relationships and trust at the working level to get things done. In addition to its planning and analysis functions, the Working Group served as a forum to hold members accountable for their performance.

In the years that have passed since Cease Fire was implemented, there has been considerable debate as to how much of Boston’s decline in youth homicides was due to the project. Political leaders, police officials and David Kennedy, who led the Kennedy School team, have been the strongest supporters of the program. Kennedy also points to positive outcomes from a number of replications of the project that took place with Justice Department support. Those who claim that Cease Fire only accounted for a part of the decline include Debra Prothrow Stith, other public health and social service practitioners, and Anthony Braga, another of the Kennedy School participants. They point out that many other violence prevention efforts had been launched in the years preceding Cease Fire, that the decline was underway 2 years before Cease Fire was implemented, and that that many other cities experienced similar declines.

The success of Cease Fire was so widely acclaimed in the years following its implementation that a flood of visitors from other cities flocked to Boston to learn more about the project and key participants were in constant demand to talk about the program at professional meetings. Not surprisingly, all of this attention put a strain on personal relationships. Some felt they were not getting enough credit or that others were claiming too much. As the homicide rate remained at
record low levels, interest among Boston officials in supporting the program began to taper off and key individuals moved on to assume other responsibilities. Most notably, Lt. Gary French, the police official who had chaired the Working Group, moved out of the Gang Unit to work on sex crimes and David Kennedy moved to New York. Also, the funding that had been available for prevention and social service programs was greatly reduced.

By 2004 Boston’s homicide was on the rise – up to 68 compared to 44 in the previous year. In 2005 there were 75 homicides. All of the increase was in youth homicides. Gary French moved back to the Gang Unit and with the Commissioner’s approval reconvened the Working Group and the TenPoint Ministers went back to walking their neighborhoods.

The causes of recent gang homicides appeared to have changed. In the 1990s youth homicides had appeared to be business related – drug deals gone bad or one gang encroaching on another’s turf. Recent homicides appeared to result from individual beefs – “you disrespected me or one of mine. I have to get even with you.”

The reconvened Working Group began meeting on a regular weekly basis at Police Headquarters, chaired by Lt. French. Many of the members were the same ones who had participated in Cease Fire. The new strategy that has been adopted by the Working Group is trying to broker truces between the gangs that are in conflict. On the day of our arrival (Nov. 5, 2006) the Boston Globe ran a story that provided some of the details about a truce that had been in place since being arranged by the group over the summer.

The police have their own intelligence to indicate which gang rivalries are reaching a point of violence. The city’s gang street workers are used to make the arrangements for the truce meeting with gangs. Negotiations were initiated by telling each gang that their rivals were interested in making a peace, although was not initially the case. Each gang was allowed to indicate what they wanted out of the truce and who, from their rival gang, they would have to see at the truce meeting in order to know it was for real.

On the day of the meeting the leaders from each gang were met in their home territory, patted down for weapons and cell phones, and transported by van to a neutral location, the Library of the Kennedy School for the first truce. The truce mediators had posted a set of rules to govern discussions and behavior at the meeting. A visible police presence, seen through glass windows, was provided outside the room. The truce negotiations took no more than 15 minutes to complete and then it was on to eating pizza and drinking cokes. The youth all seemed to be relieved by the process. It gives them an excuse for not continuing the violence.

After a truce has been negotiated there is a concerted effort to maintain the peace. Gang members are given the cell phone numbers of ministers and street workers with whom they can check out rumors. Working Group members will go out of their way to help gang kids who are abiding by their agreements. This includes such things as helping them to get city-funded summer jobs or getting prosecutors to go easy on them on unrelated cases. At the time they were negotiating the first truce the police knew that there were big cases being developed against many of the leaders who ended up at the peace table. This confirmed for the police that they had the right people at the table. Six months later most of them are off the street and doing time.
The information for the story in the Globe was not released by the Working Group but by higher-ranking officers in the PD or City Hall. The Working Group would just as soon keep their operations below the radar and not draw publicity. They feel that all those who need to know about the truces are being informed. They are not now interested in the kind of national attention that Cease Fire drew in the past.

Some of the interesting points to come out of our meeting with three TenPoint ministers were how they got started and their connections with city hall. They initially tried to reach out to gang kids at funerals. It took a while before they were ready to work with the police. Given their success in the past, now the Mayor will call in the faith community every three months or so and compare data on where recent shootings have occurred and the location of their churches. The ministers are expected to help control things in their neighborhoods.

Dr. Ulric Johnson is the founder of Teens Against Gang Violence and currently runs a program at Springfield College in Charlestown. When he formed TAGV he had just been hired to develop and run a prevention program at a community center where drug sales was the major problem. *TAG-V was the result, a multi-generational gang with colors that required parent participation.* Johnson believes that the media and culture reinforce the public’s addiction to violence. He also feels that kids want to belong to some group and that gang membership is natural. The issue is who controls the gang.

The primary lessons for LA from the Boston experience appear to be:

- With more resources at your disposal you can take a more nuanced approach to gang violence, balancing the threat of enforcement with the offer of valued resources and opportunities.
- Forming relationships with churches and other service providers can increase community acceptance of enforcement efforts.
- Police and street workers have to work together to further peace negotiations.
- At the community level, all relationships are personal.
- An effective Working Group and personal relationships can overcome organizational roadblocks.
NOTES ON BOSTON SITE VISIT

Sessions:
1. Anthony Braga, Kennedy School of Government
2. Lt. Det. Gary French, Boston Police Department
3. Ulric Johnson, Springfield College
4. TenPoint Coalition
   Chris Sumner, Executive Director
   Rev. Matt Gibson
   Rev. Jeffrey Brown

This trip included visits with key participants in the Boston Operation Cease Fire. That project brought together Law Enforcement, City personnel, service providers and academic to work with youths who were involved with local gangs. The results of this effort became known as the Boston Miracle because of their success at curbing gang violence.

A key moment in their formation of the service network was a stabbing at the funeral for another gang member. The Mayor seized on the occasion to push clergy, service providers, and other to coordinate their services and focus on that particular population—what they found was that, while many of them provided services to the same individuals, there was no coordination of those services. Clergy’s response was the TenPoints Strategy.

‘Governance’ was not a significant issue; the program was led by the Boston Police Department, who had the ability to call together community members they felt could be key to the project’s success. The model was based on opening lines of communications with the different targeted gangs. City “Street Workers”, along with clergy and social service providers, were responsible for letting gang members know that any retaliation to recent violence would result in heavy police crackdown on other activities, particularly their drug trade. However, the Street Workers would also let the gang members know about the availability of support services, anywhere from counseling to job training and placement. As a result, gang violence dropped from approximately 40 homicides in 1996 to only five in 1999.

According to Braga, key elements of the project included their success at compiling a network of capacities, or variety of service providers who could respond to a variety of needs presented by the targeted individuals, and a balance of sanctions (suppression) and providers. In his words, they worked to develop ways to ‘tax’ bad behaviors. Lt. French, however, felt that the service side of the formula was lacking, which influenced the ultimate increase in violence.

When the program was implemented, there were about 40 Street Workers from a variety of backgrounds employed by the City. While some were former gang members, individuals with serious records were not hired. Currently, they are working with the City’s 40+ gangs, whose combined membership is estimated at about 1400 members.

According to French, the police had all the information that they needed related to gang violence. What they were more interested in was reducing the violence to ease pressure on their own need to respond to retaliation violence. He also noted that Probation Officers helped bring influential gang
members to the table by negotiating debts, that is, they could get fees, fines and other penalties against individuals waived in exchange for their participation.

A key component of the project was the “10 Points Coalition”, a network of black clergy, who assisted in creating the service providers network and conducting outreach to gang members. The Coalition began in response to escalating youth violence in the early 1990’s. The clergy also could be critical of law enforcement, while at the same time building relationships with them. Through the project’s early years, membership was primarily black and Protestant. Recently, efforts have been made to include Catholic and Muslim leaders.

While the project was effective, is did not include attempts to address long-term structural issues. For instance, the program did not include the schools as an active partner, however the school police were involved.

Also according to Braga, the Cease Fire broke down when Lt. French left his post with the Boston P. D’s Youth Violence Strike Force. Subsequent leadership of that unit became more concerned with arrests than reducing violence. Gang crime statistics were low at that point, and their focus shifted to re-entry programs. The Street Workers were also reassigned to community centers and schools. Interestingly, since that time, the number of homicides and other violence crime has increased significantly.

The clergy saw the breakdown of the project a bit differently. In their minds, once the violent statistics went down, the City diverted their attention to other issues and began focusing services primarily on teens. As well, there was no new leadership, particularly once Lt. French left his post.

Homicide Statistics:
1999: 5
2003: 40+
2004: 68
2005: 75

Only recently has the group begun involving hard-core former gang members. One significant sample involves a former ‘shot-caller’ who, in partnership with the Clergy and others, has helped to establish a truce between two of the City’s main rivals. Important attributes that have contributed to the success of that truce include his relationships with those neighborhoods and ability to communicate in street terms with gang members. He and clergy members constantly conduct shuttle diplomacy between both sets, to keep an active dialogue and settle issues as they arise.

In conjunction with the truce, a unique form of cooperation sprang from an example of non-communication. Several members of the targeted sets were arrested in sweeps of the housing projects where they lived a couple days before they were to meet with their rivals. Members of the Working Group needed to get those individuals released, at least long enough to attend the meeting. Boston PD, backed by the clergy and others, managed to secure those releases, leading to successful negotiations.
Notes on Chicago Site Visit

Billie Weiss and I recently visited Chicago to learn more about their violence prevention initiatives. Together, we visited with staff of the Chicago CeaseFire, Dr. Irving Spergel from the University of Chicago and the Illinois Violence Prevention Initiative. Each had important information to benefit the current study for the City of Los Angeles.

Chicago CeaseFire
Chicago CeaseFire has operated in and around Chicago since 2000. The program includes several community-focused components, including:

- Community Mobilization
- Public Education
- Faith-based Networking
- Violence Interrupters,
- Outreach, and
- Police Relations

The program is very targeted to specifically selected “Beats” within police districts. There are 27 operational locations in the City, and another 5 in other communities (East St. Louis, Maywood, North Chicago, Rockford and Aurora.) There are 25 Districts throughout the City, and nine to fifteen Beats per District.

Staffing for the project falls into two primary categories, Outreach Workers and Violence Interrupters. Currently, there are 50 Outreach Workers and 26 Violence Interrupters. Both groups generally mimic the ethnicity of the communities they serve. Both also tend to have participated in the gang lifestyle, and most have criminal records. It is estimated that 70% of the Outreach Workers are ex-offenders, mostly felonies and many serious/violent offenders. For the Violence Interrupters, it is more like 99%. However, neither group can employ individuals who have histories of domestic violence or crimes that involve minors. Both groups will hire individuals who are actively on Probation or Parole.

The Outreach Workers focus on individual behavior, acting in part as Case Managers; engaging, mobilizing and educating the broader community; and interacting with Law Enforcement. Staff work in teams. Typically, each team includes a Violence Prevention Coordinator, Outreach Supervisor and up to three Outreach Workers. While the Coordinator deals with the community at large, the others focus on the gang members and their families. The Outreach Workers are employed by nonprofit community partners located in the targeted areas. The Violence Interrupters, on the other hand, are employed by CeaseFire specifically to mediate violence between gangs.

The nature of gangs have been changing in Chicago. Make-up continues to include African-American, Mexican and Puerto Ricans. However, all three seem to be drifting from highly structured units to more fragmented associations. This characteristic has made it more difficult to outreach to the gang members.

It is estimated that there are 120 gangs in the City, although estimates on membership range from 70,000 to 200,000. Gangs considered to be responsible for about 80% of the homicides annually.
There is no significant increase in the role of girls, although there is a rise in the number of fights on school grounds that involve young women.

The program has strong ties to religious institutions. Many churches serve as Safe Havens—for which some receive compensation. Others participate in community events, particularly responses to shootings.

Schools do not have a strong relationship with CeaseFire. Outreach Workers do try to get youths back in school, and will accompany the students to various counseling or related meetings. Otherwise, the Outreach Workers do not have a significant presence on school ground.

Publicly, staff do not work closely with Chicago PD. However, as there is a strong focus on preventing the next crime—the retaliation—program staff can provide street information about potential shootings or other crimes that can work to mitigate a potential act. Police often inform program staff about where they intend to apply pressure to the gang members. This pressure, often termed “Just Cause” when it follows the shooting of a child or fellow officer, includes intensive targeting of gang members for any minor infraction. Also, the Police will often combat gang violence by making it difficult for a particular gang to continue operating underground businesses. The nature and location of these businesses are sometimes provided by Outreach Workers.

The program’s annual budget is around $8 million. The budget per community, which usually includes one or two targeted Beats, is about $250,000. There are generally one or two gangs per Beat. While the focus is on the Beats, they recognize that the work often engages youths in neighboring areas.

The community components range from general events, public education campaigns and mobilizing events within 72 hours of a homicide. Emphasis is placed on making sizeable public showings following these shootings. Staff also pass out anti-violence materials at these events. A unique aspect of the Outreach Workers is to advertise their phone numbers for people who can report a potential shooting. Potential callers include those who think they may be targeted, those who think they might be directed to do the shooting, other gang members who want to preempt the shooting, or community members who may have access to this information.

The program includes interventions at hospitals. Shooting victims, it is held, are more open to the thought of changing their lifestyle, particularly in the moments immediately following their being shot. This is also a good time to dissuade the victim from considering retaliation. At the same time, the Violence Interrupters will work with the victim’s fellow gang members. It is held that the best potential clients are those who have been shot.

The program is almost exclusively working in the intervention realm, as opposed to prevention. The latter, particularly with the schools, is not included because it would take away from the resources that are available to work with the gang members directly.
When selecting new target areas, general guidelines are followed, but can vary for a number of reasons. High levels of homicides is the primary indicator, although local support and often political considerations also are factors. As well, the order in which the various components are brought on line will depend on the local priorities. Funding, as well as existing networks and/or service providers, may take a part in determining whether each component is implemented up front. For instance, the community mobilizing is a difficult component because many residents may often be afraid to participate.

The Outreach Workers are typically full-time. The Project sets ranges for salaries and benefits, although ultimately the compensation is determined by the local partner. The Violence Interrupters, by comparison, are contracted through CeaseFire, for part-time work. By all accounts, the Interrupters do much more work for what they are compensated.

Coordination is maintained through a series of meetings. For instance, the Coordinators meet monthly, while the Supervisors and Violence Interrupters have separate weekly meetings.

A unique aspect of the project are the Violence Interruptions, or the number of times that the Interrupters kept violence from occurring. For 2005, there were 250 cases of Violence Interruptions, when Interrupters mediated potential violence. It is anticipated that the same number will be recorded this year. Drugs are behind much of the gang violence in the Chicago area. While the Violence Interrupters do not engage in mediating drug disputes, they do encourage the gangs to resolve their differences of face serious crackdowns by Chicago PD.

While the staff are not in the schools, the project has partnered with the Chicago School District to support a form of Safe Passage, based on parent participation. Typically, there is a high police presence around the schools at dismissal. Project staff also bring together the students from different schools to meet and interact.

Community Policing came up a couple of times. While overall it was felt that Chicago did not have a good record of community policing—primarily based on the experiences of senior command—it nonetheless provided some support to the work that CeaseFire staff are providing the targeted communities. Generally, the police do interact with other community programs and promote a network of services for the youths and their families.

Chicago PD also have Gang Details in each District. As noted, there is little public interaction between the two—as the Police are focused on making arrests. There are regular meetings between program staff and command staff, and some participation in officer training. However, there is a need to formalize relations with line staff. There is also a concern that the Police is mimicking the work of CeaseFire, particularly in establishing a Clergy Network to saturate scenes and conduct other forms of outreach.

Other community organizations are also copying the CeaseFire activities, but in those cases, the actions are seen as expanding the level of services, rather than competing or attempting to replace CeaseFire.
Reporting of gang violence is different from local policies. For instance, what is reported as gang-related is what locally is considered gang-motivated, that is, violence conducted to support the gang. Our gang-related is reported for what it is, e.g., drug-related, domestic violence, or other personal violence. Nonetheless, there are still enhancements based on crimes that are gang-related and/or include use of a gun (Extenuating Circumstances).

The role of the Violence Interrupters in mediating violence has increased, because the gangs are decentralizing, youngsters are coming into positions of power, and new sets are emerging. As mentioned, there are usually only a handful of gangs in a targeted area. Therefore, the Interrupters are constantly mediating between these sets, as compared to creating larger understandings across several areas.

There is a well-established system for collecting the work of project staff, and comparing it to outcomes. Report forms include:

- Homicide Shooting Responses
- Community Activities
- Conflict Mediations (primarily for the Interrupters)
- Shooting Incident Review, and Volunteer Activity Form

These reports are then collected on a Monthly Report.

An Intake Form, along with the Treatment Plan Outreach-Case Notes and File Review Forms are used as a form of Case Management for program clients who receive intensive individual treatments. Each Outreach Worker is expected to maintain a caseload of 25 to 20 clients, and have at least one contact weekly with each. These contacts are not always clinical, that is, they do not all focus on status of the Treatment Plan, but are mostly used to keep in touch and make themselves available to the clients. The caseload was higher, but was reduced because the Outreach Workers complained that the time commitments for case management kept them from other facets of the work.

Initially, the Project did more reporting, but since the State became the major fiscal source, the amount of reporting has declined. However, Project leadership recognizes the value of data analysis, and particularly of measuring outcomes, so activities by area are routinely compared to gang activities (homicides) in those areas. These measures are also compared to comparable areas and the City as a whole.

**Little Village Project**
In addition to staff of Chicago CeaseFire, time was also spent with Dr. Irving Spergel at the University of Chicago. Dr. Spergel was involved in the Little Village Project, one of the first attempts to create a systematic approach to managing gang violence. The program has since been used in the design of several projects nation-wide, under the direction of the US Department of Justice.

The Little Village model included both intervention and suppression. The project was designed to complement Community Policing, but never really did. Nonetheless, officers were able to establish
relationships with key leaders, supported by the activities of the Street Workers. The program included Probation Officers as active partners. In part, the program was weakened because the assigned officers were young, not long out of the Academy, and so not very experienced. Also, the Street Workers were unreliable at first, until the staff stabilized.

There were several commonalities identified at Little Village and the other national sites. First, gangs are decentralized and becoming more so, making prevention difficult. Mediation also had limited impact because of this characteristic. A noticeable predictor of recidivism was whether the individual (primarily male) entered into a serious relationship. Apparently, the relationship reflected a stabilizing in the individual’s life. A complementary characteristic was age—it seems that most gang members ultimately aged-out of the lifestyle. Helping kids return to school didn’t help, but getting them to reduce their drug use did. Finally, there was consistent findings that gang violence occurs in specific areas, not across entire communities.

A significant issue was that Law Enforcement was to run the program but didn’t. Lack of support from upper leadership kept the program localized. Still, the participating officers were able to establish rapport with the youths and their families and a number of service referrals did occur via the Youth Workers.

Overall, the Little Village project measured a 40% decline in gang violence, and a 60% decline among targeted youths. Community surveys tended to complement these findings, that is, where residents felt more secure, Police data reflected declines in violence.

According to Spergel, they never attempted to eliminate the gang problem, only to reduce the violence. The biggest change seemed to be at the individual level. Group changes was accomplished mostly through Street Workers helping Police to control the gangs.

Findings also suggest that the peace process benefits from involving a wide network at the community level, including Law Enforcement, service providers, families, businesses, Clergy and others. Lots of times, it proved difficult to get gang members and their families actively involved because of other pressures, including low wages, domestic violence, teenage pregnancies, and a constant struggle over providing the bare necessities to the family.

Illinois Violence Prevention Initiative
Finally, we met with Barbara Shaw of the Illinois Violence Prevention Initiative. This program of the State is designed to promote healthy lifestyle, and thereby lessening a reliance on violence, by providing appropriate treatments at all ages.

A primary guideline for determining the appropriateness of specific treatments is relative brain development. Programs link both social and emotional health to childhood developmental stages. As a result, the State has adopted social and emotional learning standards. New York has recently adopted similar standards. Illinois is now institutionalizing teacher training in the role of these standards.
In addition to exploring a variety of way to fund youth programs, the IVPI is also involved in helping agencies understand how to evaluate their own programs.
Report on Chicago Site Visit

Day one was spent with the Chicago CeaseFire Project (CCF): a gang intervention project. We first met with Norman Kerr, Director of CeaseFire, who gave us an overall view of the program; the ongoing evaluation and we had a general discussion. We had lunch with Gary, Candace, and Norm, two of the police officers involved in the program from one of the reporting districts. The officer is a Crime Analyst from the 9th District. We also met with two Outreach Workers, attended a meeting of the project Outreach Workers, met with the Project Evaluator, learned about the hospital project, and spent time with the hospital coordinator, and two violence interrupters. In the evening we went to the site of a recent shooting and participated in a candlelight vigil, and to one of the district sites.

My comments are as follows. The CeaseFire Project itself follows the recommendations of Spergel’s findings on intervention with some exceptions. It is something that with sufficient support would work in LA as part of a comprehensive prevention, intervention strategy. It is supported primarily by state funding with little city funding. The annual budget for the project is currently $8,000,000. In addition, CCF has received funding from the State Health Department, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and other private foundations. Also, the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority funds the project in the amount of $250,000 - $300,000 per year for data collection and in house evaluation activities. There are about 15 in house staff housed at the headquarters site. Currently, Gary believes that the program is under funded. In addition to the 19 sites currently operating in 1 to 2 CPD beats, there are 9 sites outside of the city. The program began six years ago, in response to the shooting deaths, particularly those of “innocent bystanders.” Gary estimates that Chicago needs about 300 Outreach Workers and Violence Interrupters, and they currently have 50 intervention workers. Each site regardless of size receives approximately $450,000 annually to conduct the program. Funds are used to hire Outreach Workers and a coordinator, and to pay for church or other facility use for midnight basketball etc.

Outreach is to 70% male clients. The Outreach Workers and Violence Interrupters mirror the community population. 70% of the Outreach Workers are ex-felons, and 99% of the Violence Interrupters are ex-felons. Hiring is done by interviewing panels. Schools are seeing an increase in on-campus violence but the CCF philosophy is to let the schools deal with their own problems. Ideally each site should have one Violence Prevention Coordinator, or manager, one Outreach Supervisor, threes Outreach Workers and several Violence Interrupters. We received copies of their data collection forms, and looked at the evaluation measures they are using which are primarily process with the addition of the police data which is picked up weekly by the evaluator from each site.

CCF is run out of the University of Chicago, School of Public Health, manages the program. CCF acts as a pass through to CBO’s who hire the Outreach Workers who act as liaisons in the individual projects with the community coalition formed in each project. The violence interrupters are all part-time, without benefits and hired by the University. Salaries for the Outreach Workers include medical, vacation and other benefits, with money from the Illinois Department of Corrections. The Outreach Workers in concert with the violence interrupters are essentially case managers and try to provide through the community network the needs of the
client. Such as: job training, jobs, high school graduation or GED completion. Also the project makes connections and arrangements for housing, mental health services, court accompaniment, probation requirements, anger management, and drug treatment, etc. Domestic violence counseling and child abuse prevention services are provided as needed along with other services through the community network or coalition. Each Outreach Worker has approximately fifteen clients. Many of the clients are re-entering the community from prison. The violence interrupters are hired at approximately 15 hours for 15 to 20 hours per week. The two that we spoke with indicated that they work full time sometimes more and mentioned an hourly rate of something like $6. This may be the reason that the rumors about unfair wages being paid. Although the two violence interrupters that I spoke with found the work rewarding and attributed their own success in staying out of the “life” to the work they were doing. The violence interrupters do receive training, but the two we met were very much still street people, with the knowledge to talk to the current gang members.

CCF estimates that there about 25 gangs under two nations, with 150,000 gang members. Similarly to LA there are varying estimates on the number of gangs, sets, cliques, and members and there is not an official estimate. It is estimated that 90% of the murders in Chicago are gang related. The program is looking at providing technical assistance to other locations contemplating programs. Currently they are: Baltimore, Irvington, and Newark. There are five components of the program at each site. They are: 1) Street Outreach, 2) Clergy, 3) Community, 3) Materials, 4) Police. The theory is that the five components working in concert change community norms, provide on the spot alternatives to violence, and thus aids in changing the risk perception, which then produces less of the violent behavior.

Although the Chicago PD at the administrative and Captains level in the beats seems to be supportive, CCF still deals with similar problems as those in LA with the rank and file not always being cooperative with program and particularly with the violence interrupters, who have been arrested on several occasions. The suggestion is that training will be provided on the CCF program at the academy to reduce this ongoing phenomenon.

At the outreach meetings a discussion centered on 24-hour hotlines for the clients to reach the workers or for others to contact the project if they felt that they were in danger of being shot or harmed. This discussion was very reminiscent of the of the CYGS methodology.

In addition, CCF has just begun a hospital outreach program very similar to Youth Alive or Teens on Target in Los Angeles, in which Outreach Workers go to the hospital to talk to victims, their families and their homies to reduce the likelihood of retaliation and to try to get the victim into the project as a client.

CCF has monthly steering committee meetings. Each project must have a monthly community meeting, there are a weekly coordinators meeting, and a weekly violence interrupters meeting. The most common age of clients at program entry is 17-25 years of age, but they have clients as young as 13 and some are older. The Outreach Workers work with the PD and other CBO’s, there is cops and parents component. They work with faith leaders, and with the ATF. There are approximately 40,000 Police Officers in Chicago. The program is currently being audited by the State.
They would like to form a national partnership, hold an annual meeting and work with 4-6 sites in an intensive way. Gary and Candace believe that there’s going to be funding to do this, in other cities. They told me whom they are working with in each of the cities. The responsible partners are primarily: the Mayor’s Office, the Health Departments, and Universities.

The evening event that we attended was a candle light vigil. However the gang members who were at the site did not interact with the CeaseFire staff at all or participate in the prayer led by the clergy. The gang members were very angry and very loaded and so we really didn’t observe the working between the project and the gang.

On day two we had two meetings with Irv Spergel at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and with Barbara Shaw of the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority.

Meeting with Irv Spergel. He primarily talked about the Little Village Project, which has been testing the Spergel model. The project workers include 2 cops, 3 probation workers, 5 gang leaders; The LE officers are the same ethnicity as the gang members. This project involves approximately 200 kids 17-25 years of age, but some are as young as 14-16. In addition to the Little Village Project, the model is being tested in five locations, including Riverside, CA; Mesa, AZ; and three Texas locations. Spergel believes that prevention doesn’t work with kids in gangs. 15-17 year olds are most vulnerable to the gang life style; he believes that mediation doesn’t work, and that girlfriends are generally a positive influence in getting boys out of gangs. Girl gang members come in later and leave earlier than boys. He thinks that younger gang members benefit more from counseling. He thinks the model has been successful in reducing serious violence and drugs. As an evaluation tool, police records have been made available so that they can look at arrest records. A primary finding is that the youth workers should not show themselves with the PD. One of the evaluation tools they used were community surveys, they surveyed 100 residents and two points in time, and based success on community perception of the level of community and gang violence. He sees the biggest change at the individual level, and at schools. The model educates cops, kids, schools and the community about how to stop violence. The most crucial factor for success according to Spergel is “real community involvement” and understanding each other’s approach. Parents are problematic, because they often do not recognize the involvement of their own children.

Meeting with Barbara Shaw at the Illinois State Health Department in Chicago. I believe that this meeting provided the greatest number of practical suggestions for Los Angeles. In addition, to the violence prevention authority which primarily provides funding for violence prevention activities within the state, an Illinois Children’s Mental Health Partnership has been formed with the leadership from the VP Authority. In addition the Department of Mental Health, and the statewide office of Education are part of the partnership. A statewide act was passed and charged with developing a plan to provide comprehensive prevention and intervention for mental health promotion for children from birth through age 18. In addition the partnership has developed state standards for mental health services and promotion for children in Illinois. The partnership has been able to provide funding to the schools so that they can implement the recommendations; The IVP has also attracted funds for grants to schools to encourage their participation in the activities required by the Children’s Mental Health Plan. Barbara mentioned
that with the opportunity to link Violence Prevention to mental health in LA we might be able to acquire funding from the mental health funding recently being made available at the state level. They have involved pediatricians in mental health screening for children, and are working on acquiring new DSM coding for childhood mental/and emotional diagnoses, which will provide reimbursement for diagnosis and treatment of such disorders in children.

The Illinois Attorney General and the Head of the State Health Department chair the VP authority. A state license plate was created which provides approximately $600,000 per year, since the start of the license plates 10 years ago the fund has raised $7 million. While Barbara stated that the IVPA license plates opened doors for VP activities, what is more important is that it institutionalized their mission and the inter-disciplinary nature of doing effective prevention and intervention. The majority of their funding is from general funds, and a grant from the “Safe to Learn” initiative which provided, $14 million a year for 3 years. Evaluation is handled by hiring outside evaluators for the authority, and partnering with the funded programs to provide technical assistance to teach them how to evaluate their own programs.

Some suggestions Barbara had for us for funding in LA, was licensing firearm owners in the City and County for $1.00 a year or $5.00 for five years for a license to own a firearm. I am currently inquiring whether the State Pre-Emption about firearms would allow the city and county to conduct a licensing program. She also mentioned a surcharge for violent video games to raise funds. The Authority is like a governor’s board or commission, with the AG’s office providing in kind by taking care of human resources, and infrastructure, while the Health Department provides space, phones, communications, mail etc.

In all, it was a worthwhile trip and we learned a great deal. I would recommend that for LA we design something that incorporates an intervention program like CeaseFire, with a stronger and larger prevention strategy with greater emphasis on healthy children, communities and families, particularly in high-risk areas. If we only do intervention, in another ten years we will be facing the same problems as we have been in past decades.
Gangland Colonoscopy

Civil rights attorney Connie Rice gets funding for a major new study to determine whether any gang abatement programs really work

~ By PERRY CROWE ~

Last month, Los Angeles civil rights attorney Connie Rice sat before the City Council and vowed to give the city’s gang problem a “colonoscopy.” The council liked the sound of that and approved a hefty $500,000 price tag for Rice’s Advancement Project to develop a Citywide Gang Activity Reduction Strategy. The project, with an initial report due in September, has its work cut out for it, though, as the very definition of a gang is subject to interpretation.

Some groups commonly called “gangs” are relatively peaceful and loosely affiliated neighborhood groups. Other gangs are elaborately structured with eyes on criminal enterprise. The L.A. Police Department puts the citywide gang population at 39,000, while others lower the number to 19,000 and still others push the number to nearly 80,000. Even compiling a list of the city’s current gang-abatement programs is hard to figure. Depending on the definition, there could be as many as 100 programs and as few as 20. And that’s not even getting into the more complicated issue what exactly constitutes a gang? Our Gang, circa 1930s
of whether or not any of those programs are actually working.

“There’s no one effective way to evaluate these programs,” says Rice. “Is it simply counting the number of meetings [a program holds], or is it whether the gang ends its existence? Are you evaluating them like you evaluate an Alcoholics Anonymous program, or are you evaluating them the way you evaluate a soup kitchen delivering meals?”

To answer these questions, Rice has assembled a team of 14 experts from the realms of academia, philanthropy, law enforcement, and social services, as well as unpaid consultants Rice terms “street Ph.D.s” – current and former gang members. The study breaks the gang problem into nine clusters including Individual Development Factors, Safe and Healthy Families, Demographics, Governmental Structures, and Funding Analysis.

As the study progresses, the Advancement Project will provide a “menu from which [the city can] choose strategies and solutions” to combat the gang problem.

While the scope of the study is staggering, a similar study has already been conducted at the state level. In 2000, state assemblymen Tony Cardenas and Adam Schiff introduced what would become the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA), which set aside funds for juvenile programs that had “been proven effective in curbing crime among at-risk and young offenders.” Now a city councilman and chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development, Cardenas is trying to bring that same focus on accountability to the city level.

The JJCPA utilized “quasi-experimental” tests to evaluate programs’ effectiveness, which consisted of taking a group from a program under evaluation, constructing a comparison group (using matching or similar techniques to the program), and then comparing the two. But such evaluations are open to the criticism that differences in performance are due to differences between the groups, not due to the program itself.

Despite its potential flaws, experimental testing is still the only viable way to truly gauge a program’s effectiveness, suggests Dr. Malcolm Klein, professor emeritus of Sociology at the University of Southern California. Klein, a world-renowned expert who has studied gangs for 40 years and has written 17 books on the subject, recently undertook an analysis of 60 gang prevention, intervention, and suppression programs nationwide.

“Almost none of the [60 programs] had been evaluated independently to see whether they were successful or not,” says an annoyed Klein. “They were just out there doing things. They may have been doing good, they may have been doing harm, and we have no way of knowing because nobody is evaluating them.”

Klein suggests a serious danger lurks in not properly evaluating whether or not these gang programs really work. If one looks simply at the number of clients served by a program, a high number would seem like a positive sign, but it could be negative. Some anti-gang programs actually strengthen gang cohesiveness when gangs react as an “oppositional culture.”

Robert Aguayo, a former gang member and deputy director of El Centro Del Pueblo (a substance-abuse center that services many L.A. gang members), suggests the importance of reaching at-risk youth on their own terms. At a recent panel discussion on AIDS in the gang community, Aguayo said: “One of the most difficult things is understanding [gang] lifestyle, understanding [gang] language, understanding how to communicate with them. If you cannot do that, it doesn’t matter how good your message is, you’re not going to be able to get it across to them. My sense is that although we’re struggling with gang activity, [gangs are] a segment of the community that needs to be addressed and, to some degree, needs to be served.”
“Serving” gangs – instead of exclusively criminalizing them – is a recent move, but not a new one. Diego Vigil, professor of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California at Irvine, says there was a concerted effort to reach gang members through intervention during the zoot-suit era. Though President Lyndon Johnson declared a “war on poverty” in the 1960s, America at the same time also declared a war on crime. Police departments took a militant attitude toward the problem, and funding for gang programs tilted in favor of suppression, leaving prevention and intervention with the short end of the stick.

Today, the scales have tipped again, especially following the 1992 Rodney King riots in L.A. At the time, LAPD Chief Daryl Gates and L.A. County Sheriff Sherman Block acknowledged suppression and law enforcement alone wouldn’t be able to effectively combat the gang problem.

“We have a number of advisors,” says Rice of her newly assembled group, “a number of veterans of the wars on gangs, and it’s important that they’re now agreeing that the rest of the spectrum has to be developed. Because they can’t arrest their way out of it.”

John Chavez, director of L.A. Bridges (a gang intervention and prevention program implemented by the city’s Community Development Department), is pleased with the amount of money he gets from the mayor. “We’re just glad to be in the sandbox playing with city law enforcement,” he says.

But while the Bridges program seems to have all the right elements, combining parental involvement, schools, law enforcement, jobs, and economic development to combat youth interest in gangs, Vigil suggests the program suffered from politicization almost immediately. As a member of the original committee that formed L.A. Bridges in the mid-’90s, Vigil says the program’s resources were defused by a fragmented city council whose members were only interested in how gangs affected their specific districts.

Fragmentation is an issue Rice’s group will be looking into as well. “There are a lot of institutions involved,” she says. “Are the [gang] programs coordinated? Do they work across departments? Is planning done in a synergistic and comprehensive way or is it silos within silos? What’s the larger context of how these programs operate? And obviously they’re going to involve a lot of issues that have nothing to do with city programs and a lot of institutions, including the school district, the county programs. We’ve got to look at this as a regional issue.”

And so this giant task seems to only get bigger. But that’s no reason to shy away from it, says Herb Wesson, councilman and vice-chair of the Gang Violence and Youth Development Committee.

“Peck, peck, peck,” he says. “Take some components out [of the problem]. That’s how you take a 15,000-foot mountain and make it into an 8,000-foot one.” ★

04-13-06
Council hires consultant for gang review

By Josh Kleinbaum, Staff Writer
LA Daily News

In the first step toward possibly creating a gang czar - a position the Valley's former top cop might want - the City Council voted Tuesday to spend $465,000 to hire a consultant to help organize Los Angeles' anti-gang resources.

In a 13-0 vote, the council chose to bring in a group headed by activist attorney Connie Rice. Over the next six months to a year, the group will study all of the city's anti-gang programs and look at ways to determine how productive they are and how to hold them accountable.

Rice told the council her group will provide council members with charts showing what organizations exist, what they are doing, how they are working - or not working - together and how much they cost.

"From there, you will be able to make the right choice and go for the big solution," she said. "We've been fighting gangs for 30 years. There are five times as many gang members now as there were 30 years ago. We're doing something wrong."

Rice is not recommending a new department yet, but many city officials - including Police Chief William Bratton and Councilman Tony Cardenas - said they believe the city needs one to focus on gang violence.

"Whenever I talk to individual programs, the room gets kind of quiet when I ask about coordination and working with other organizations," Cardenas said. "If you had a department head, someone everyone answers to, the buck stops there. We should have done this a long time ago. This is long overdue."

If such a department is created, Cardenas, who chairs the council's ad-hoc committee on gang violence, said former LAPD Deputy Chief Ron Bergmann would be perfect for the job. And Bergmann is interested.

"It's come up in more than a couple different conversations, and it's been brought up in City Council by more than one council person," said Bergmann, who retired from the LAPD in July after 32 years on the force. "It's not something I would want to do until the day I die, but there is interest on my part."

As the top cop in the San Fernando Valley for more than four years, Bergmann understood that fighting crime involved intervention and prevention as well as enforcement. He formed the San Fernando Valley Coalition on Gangs, which tried to improve communication among anti-gang programs within the area.

"He'd certainly be a strong candidate," Bratton said. "During his time with the department, he was creative in creating a number of key initiatives in the Valley, including the Jeopardy program and some of the better programs we have."

There are 38,811 gang members from 463 gangs documented in the county's CAL/GANG system, according to LAPD statistics. In 2005, gang members countywide were responsible for 244 homicides, 579 attempted homicides and 2,620 felony assaults.

The city spends about $26 million on anti-gang programs, although city officials do not know how much bang they're getting for their buck. With little accountability, they don't even know exactly where all of the money goes.

Once Rice's group finishes its report, the decision on whether to create a new city department headed by a gang czar becomes a political football. Cardenas, who said he has mentioned the idea to Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa's office, said he believes he can put together a strong enough coalition to make it happen.

Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security and Public Safety Maurice Suh said the Mayor's Office had not decided yet whether to push for a separate department.

"I don't want to presage what Connie Rice is doing by saying we are either for or against the gang department," Suh said. "We're going to value her opinion and not prejudge."

"The big issue for us is whether the gang department would receive a constant, steady stream of funding it would need to remain effective. That's the big issue."

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Study: Effort to Rid L.A. of Gangs Is Failing

A nonprofit says anti-gang programs lack focus and that the city should target the problem's root causes.

By Patrick McGreevy
Times Staff Writer

August 3, 2006

The city of Los Angeles is losing the battle against street gangs because it has failed to properly fund and focus efforts to keep youngsters from joining gangs in the first place, a study released Wednesday has found.

The study by the Advancement Project, a nonprofit group, suggested that the 23 antigang programs spread throughout various city departments and costing $82 million annually be put under a single authority.

"You've had a pretty ad hoc, scattered, incoherent approach to the problem," civil rights attorney Connie Rice, co-author of the study, told the council's Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development. "Somebody needs to be responsible. There needs to be centralized accountability."

Rice said the last phase of the study, to be completed by the end of the year, will look at possible models for better coordination of anti-gang programs, including appointing a gang czar at City Hall, creating a city department, reorganizing an existing city office or convening a task force.

The Los Angeles City Council commissioned the study in response to a continuing plague of gang violence in recent years, despite increases in spending on anti-gang efforts.

"We frankly haven't gotten gang violence under control at all," said Councilwoman Janice Hahn, a committee member.

Bureaucratic problems that have stymied the efforts were highlighted Wednesday when the council had to take emergency action in response to reports that more than 40 anti-gang workers in the L.A. Bridges program have not been paid for a month.

The study cited city reports that the vast majority of anti-gang funding, $56 million, has gone to suppression programs aimed at the arrest, incarceration and containment of gang members, with only a small amount going to prevention and intervention programs.

"What you are saying is if you have a better balance of intervention and prevention, what you have is less need for some dollars in suppression," Councilman Tony Cardenas, committee chairman, said to Rice during Wednesday's hearing on the study. "So what you are doing is you are being much more efficient and effective in utilizing public funds."

The use of injunctions to limit gang activity has resulted in "over-broad enforcement" and an "unclear exit strategy" for former gang members to be removed from an injunction.

Researchers mapped out neighborhoods where gang violence is greatest and found a correlation in many cases with high school dropout rates and poverty.

City efforts must better address those root causes, the study said.

"It is about the conditions in the neighborhoods that allow the gangs to dominate," Rice said.
Copy of Report: Gang fighting efforts too disjointed

3-part study to examine effectiveness

BY SUSAN ABRAM, Staff Writer
LA Daily News

Although public and private groups have spent $82 million to fight gangs in Los Angeles, the programs have had only limited success because of disjointed funding, a lack of accountability and poor coordination, a report released Wednesday says.

The first in a three-phase study by The Advancement Project said organizations have thrown money at gang programs - $26 million on prevention or intervention and $56 million on suppression - without gauging the effectiveness of the programs.

"The city does not have any entity to address youth violence and gangs," said Connie Rice, a noted civil rights attorney and co-director of the project. "While you have great individuals doing tremendous work, you have no entity, no department assessing the problems."

In March, the city allocated more than $450,000 to fund the report by the nonprofit consulting group. An additional $123,000 was approved Wednesday by the City Council's Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development to continue with the report, the second phase of which will be released in the fall.

Police estimate there are 463 gangs with 38,811 members in Los Angeles County. In 2005, gang members were responsible for 244 homicides, 579 attempted homicides and 2,620 felony assaults countywide.

As of May, gang-related crime in Los Angeles was down 13 percent from the comparable period five years earlier, according to Los Angeles Police Department statistics. Police say programs like Jeopardy, geared toward at-risk youth, are working.

But the report presented to the City Council committee said more research is needed to determine if those types of programs are effective.

Meanwhile, violent crime dropped between 3 percent and 7 percent in areas where gang injunctions - which allow gang members to be arrested for meeting in certain neighborhoods and limit their ability to loiter - have been enforced.

There were eight injunctions filed in 2001; the 30th was recently filed.

"The city attorney has said this a very important tool for the LAPD to use, but it's only one component in the battle against gangs," said Jonathan Diamond, spokesman for City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo. "We don't argue that it's a silver bullet. It's a piece of the enforcement puzzle."

The report also found that, based on 2005 statistics, gang hot spots are more likely where the per-capita income is less than $30,000; where fewer than 30 percent of the population have high school diplomas; and where more than 80 percent of the neighborhood is rental housing.

Councilman Tony Cardenas, who formed and chairs the committee, said he wants city leaders to be held accountable for not reaching their goals.

Once Rice's group finishes the report, the decision on whether to create a new city department headed by a gang czar will be discussed. Cardenas, who has said he has mentioned the idea to Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa's office, said he believes he can put together a strong enough coalition.

"Every politician talks about getting tough on gangs, but what I'm doing is getting tough on our own departments," Cardenas said. "Suppression isn't where the money needs to go. It needs to go toward prevention."

L.A.'s latest gang-related shooting was Tuesday night, when a 20-year-old man was killed during what appears to have been a revenge attack in Westchester, police said.

The San Fernando Valley's latest gang shooting was Saturday, when a 20-year-old Reseda man was fatally shot at a house party in Canoga Park.

"I've had five homicides in the last two months in my area," said City Councilman Bill Rosendahl, whose district includes Brentwood, Marina del Rey, Pacific Palisades, Venice and Westchester.

"This is not about being soft on crime, or soft on youth," he said of the need to direct more funding toward prevention. "This is about holding everyone accountable. If we're going to get tough on gangs, we have to be tough on ourselves."

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Bratton Wants a 'Gang Czar' to Coordinate Efforts

By Patrick McGreevy
Times Staff Writer

August 5, 2006

Citing a study critical of Los Angeles' anti-gang efforts, Police Chief William J. Bratton called Friday for a "gang czar" and a new office to oversee the more than 20 existing, but scattered, programs.

"We spend over $80 million a year on gang prevention and intervention in this city, and it's a mess. Nobody coordinates it," Bratton said in his regular appearance on KTLA-TV Channel 5.

At a news conference later, Bratton said he agrees with the findings of a report released earlier this week by the Advancement Project, a nonprofit group that called for centralizing the oversight of the 23 intervention and prevention programs operated by various city departments.

"I support the idea of the creation of the position of gang czar, somebody we in the Police Department could go to: one person, one place to really coordinate our police operation with those prevention and intervention operations," Bratton said.

The chief added that the LAPD would remain in charge of suppression efforts.

Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa plans to appoint a gang advisory group and bring in an expert to help him determine whether the czar idea has merit, according to Deputy Mayor Maurice Suh.

Among the questions to be answered: how much power and authority should such an official have, to whom should that person report and should a new department be formed, officials said.

"It is unclear what a gang czar would look like, but we will be studying that idea and others," Suh said.

The Advancement Project is also planning to report later this year on whether a czar should be appointed or whether the oversight should take some other form, according to civil rights attorney Connie Rice, a co-author of the report.

Bratton said some after-school programs aimed at keeping young people out of gangs are working, but he questioned whether others were worth the money.

"If somebody is not doing a good job, what the hell do you want to give them any money for?" he said to reporters.

The chief said his department has succeeded in reducing gang violence by 50% from the 1990s. In the early years of the last decade, he said, Los Angeles saw 500 gang-related homicides annually, and now the number is down to about 250.

"We are doing a pretty good job on the police side of it, but all the intervention/prevention which we can be part of in this city — quite frankly, it's all over the place," Bratton said. "It needs much better coordination."

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Valley gang violence soars

36 killings already equal to last year's total, according to police

BY BETH BARRETT, Staff Writer
LA Daily News

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Gang-related violence has soared in the San Fernando Valley, with 36 killings in the past 10 months and gang crime in some neighborhoods up 50 percent over last year, the Daily News has learned.

The killings account for half of all of the 72 Valley homicides reported through Wednesday and already equal last year's total, according to Los Angeles Police Department data.

While gang crimes in Central and South Los Angeles still lead the region, the Valley has had 915 gang-related crimes through the first week of September - up from 688 - and has had the highest rate of increase of any part of the city during that time.

"It's been pretty crazy," said William "Blinky" Rodriguez, executive director of Communities in Schools and a veteran of gang intervention efforts in the Valley. "I haven't seen a cycle like this. Here we are in October, and all our staff that deals with hard-core violence is beat up.

"We've helped a lot of mothers bury their kids."

The violence comes as officials say the number of documented gangs in the Valley has ballooned to 80 with about 20,000 members - up from 70 with about 15,000 members just five years ago.

Through the first week of September, gang-related crimes were up 39 percent in Van Nuys and 50 percent in West Valley.

There have been eight gang killings in Van Nuys to date, compared to five in 2005; six in the West Valley already match last year's total.

Valley police resources, from motor to vice cops, have been refocused on the violence and extra squads from south of Mulholland - where gangs got their first toehold - are being deployed in Valley hot spots.

While there are 87 gang-detail officers, supervisors, detectives and others dedicated to the effort, it's still only one officer for every 230 gang members in the Valley.

Some experts said the recent gang-crime spike may reflect the Valley's relatively stable statistics for the last few years, as well as spillover from other areas of the city that have stepped-up enforcement.

But Connie Rice, a civil rights attorney and co-director of The Advancement Project, said it reflects a "tipping point" where gangs not only are initiating members with violence but also are committing more sophisticated crimes aimed at the middle class.

"There are gang-dominated hot spots in the Valley where children are not free to walk," Rice said.

Limited success

Rice's project recently concluded $82 million in public and private money that has been spent on fighting gangs citywide has met with limited success.

Lacking in the Valley and throughout the city is a strategic approach to fighting gangs - from intervention efforts to coordination of neighborhood services and programs to keep kids from joining.

"There's not the resources to scale and they're not being used strategically," Rice said.

Gang hot spots

Among Valley gang-crime hot spots is North Hollywood, which has had seven gang-related homicides so far this year, up from just four last year.

North Hollywood Lt. Greg Baltad, in charge of the division's gang impact team, said the level of violence in the Valley is unprecedented.

"We have a propensity to violence I haven't seen in this division ... in 25 years on the job. I've never seen in the San Fernando Valley the readiness to use firearms on one another. It's a degeneration of value of life.

"They're the crop that we grew ... It's a societal problem."

Baltad said more resources are being used to combat the violence, including using property-crime officers and borrowing from Metro and other Valley divisions.

Rodriguez said there are more young boys on Valley streets and not enough resources to provide lifestyle alternatives.

"We have so much testosterone out there on the streets, there are kids all over the place and limited resources," Rodriguez said. "There's..."
obviously a bigger need for help out here in the Valley."

A dangerous time

Rodriguez said the assessment from gang intervention workers in the streets is that the violence has been escalating as gang members try to protect themselves or earn dangerous reputations.

"It's more dangerous than it's been," he said.

Deputy Chief Michel Moore, the Valley’s top commander, echoed the danger and called the trend troubling.

"The shootings are in public places, people walking up from a car to someone. And they're the more classic drive-by and vehicle-to-vehicle," Moore said. "Gang members are firing on other gang members, and in too many instances on people who are not gang members."

And there is anecdotal evidence that the rite of passage into a gang is becoming increasingly bloody, LAPD gang detail officers say.

"There's a recklessness on the part of these gang members," Moore said, noting some lack strong leaders and others may be destabilized by violent recruitment efforts. "It's a very dangerous time."

"One gang's effort to recruit will spark a rivalry; a retaliation occurs from another gang ... and they go tit for tat."

The trend marks a sharp contrast to previous Valley gang-crime trends. Through January, for example, Valley gang-related crime was down 14 percent compared to a year ago.

"We probably have more ground to lose than other parts of the city," Moore said.

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What's next

The San Fernando Valley Coalition on Gangs, Communities in Schools, the Los Angeles Police Department and other sponsors will hold a peace march Oct. 28 to draw attention to gang prevention efforts. Starting at 9 a.m. at North Hills Community Park, the march will end with a softball tournament, health fair and refreshments at Sepulveda Recreation Center.
November 18, 2006

Don't forget L.A.'s killing fields

We're aghast at videos of apparent police brutality on YouTube, but silent on the daily war zones of South L.A.

By Constance L. Rice

THERE IS A place where gunfire keeps children from playing in front yards or going to school and where 90% of them have witnessed or suffered serious violence. Armed tribes of unemployed men brutalize locals into silence and cleanse their neighborhoods of outsiders. And too few trust the police or other government enough to cooperate in investigations.

I'm not talking about Baghdad but about parts of Los Angeles. In just one of the city's high-crime zones, the Los Angeles Police Department's South Bureau, 100,000 people have been shot since 1976. The murder rate in that bureau was five times the national average, according to the Rampart Review Panel's 2006 report. And a single subdivision of that bureau — Southeast — racks up more homicides than six states combined. Research for a study coming out this winter found that the risk of being murdered in a terrorist attack in the United States is 1 in 800,000; in West L.A., the average risk of being murdered is 1 in 78,000; in South L.A., that risk is 1 in 2,000. The Army has sent its surgeons to South L.A. to learn how to repair war wounds.

South Bureau is a killing zone. Yet its catastrophic violence merits not an iota of the alarm and attention showered on recent videotapes of LAPD arrests.

Now, I'd be the last to deny that those videos raise serious use-of-force questions. In one, an officer shoots pepper spray into the face of a handcuffed, possibly deranged and ranting but apparently unthreatening suspect, and then encloses him in the squad car as the man screams and writhes in pain against the rolled-up windows. That an LAPD supervisor stood by like a tree stump while this was happening raises not just questions but hackles. I'd start with an inquiry as to what substance a district attorney was on when he concluded that this use of pepper spray was "compassionate," and why that supervisor failed to intervene.

And then there's the video that premiered to rave reviews on YouTube.com showing LAPD officers repeatedly punching a suspect in the face. It prompts the question of whether a reasonable officer could reasonably view the prone suspect's reactions as threats that warranted those punches.

Although our collective déjà vu is understandable, the investigations need to vet all the facts before judgment. The good news is that unlike 15 years ago when the words "LAPD use-of-force investigation" triggered laughter, today — depending on who is doing the investigating — there is a good chance that an actual inquiry and not an automatic exoneration will take place. And today there is at least a debate in some LAPD echelons about these videos; 15 years ago most of the force would have viewed these tapes and asked, "So what?"

That's progress, and so is realizing that what outsiders view as excessive force, many police view as good policing — or survival. One officer said about the videos: "Police work ain't pretty; get over it." No, we shouldn't "get over it." As LAPD Chief William J. Bratton said, we should investigate it, demand reasonable use of force by our officers and punish gratuitous cruelty.

But despite all that, the fact is that the videotapes are getting disproportionate attention. A much bigger travesty than these officers' actions is the fact that we Angelenos seem to ignore L.A.'s kill zones. Videos of two arrests should not command more public concern and media coverage than the hundreds of deaths yearly in these neighborhoods. But they do. No civilized people should accept such violence as the norm. But we do. It is past time to end that norm. And we know what it will take.

Every sector in L.A., from city and...
county government to the education, economic, law enforcement, civic, family and neighborhood sectors, must coordinate their efforts to reduce violence. It will take saturation strategies that don’t leave children to face gangs by themselves. It will mean the end of bureaucracy and ineffective expenditures as we know them. And it will require the end of the gang culture of destruction.

Most of all, it will require guts from political leaders who care more about ending this deadly scourge than the safe posturing needed for their next run for office.

We must tell bureaucrats, school officials and civic leaders to change their missions and how they do their jobs. And we must tell parents and families to get their acts together.

But above all else, we must stop leaving the children of the kill zones to dodge bullets and to just "get over it."
Gang czar needed

Strong leadership required to fix uncoordinated, underfunded and ineffective efforts

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Imagine trying to cook a single Christmas dinner with 20 chefs in 20 kitchens - and none with any idea what the others are doing or enough ingredients to produce anything worthwhile. The result is likely to be a disaster.

That's exactly how Los Angeles has gone about dealing with the city's serious gang crime problem. And the result, of course, has been a disaster.

Los Angeles scatters a paltry $25 million a year on various anti-gang programs and efforts. There are prevention programs to get kids before they join gangs, and there are intervention programs to get kids after they've joined gangs. There are police gang-fighting teams. There are 26 gang injunctions. And there are lots of other disconnected and equally ineffective efforts in place.

Earlier this year, the city hired civil-rights lawyer Connie Rice to figure out what resources exist and how well they are doing. The results of this study are expected out early next year.

The certainty is that she will sharply criticize the muddled and failed approach to the gang problem and offer a host of solutions.

What's needed first and foremost is a gang czar.

The concept of appointing one person to manage all of Los Angeles' multiple, though disconnected, anti-gang resources is not a new idea. But it is one that's gained currency recently among the city's top crime fighters. And it is the right time for it.

The Los Angeles Police Department already knows that coordinating resources helps fight gangs. In light of the alarming trend of racially motivated killings and the overall increase in gang violence in the San Fernando Valley this year, the LAPD has reached out to the FBI, youth clubs and community groups for help.

Having one person accountable for the city's many tools in the struggle against gangs is not just a good idea, it's essential.

True to its usual practices, City Hall has played politics with the gang issue for decades, even as thousands of lives have been lost. City Hall never provides enough money or leadership into into eliminating L.A.'s single biggest crime problem.

City Councilman Tony Cardenas and Police Chief William Bratton have both suggested the czar idea. It's time the rest of the city's leaders, including and especially Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, start getting serious about this problem.

To be sure, there's no magic bullet to suppressing gangs and gang crime in Los Angeles. The schools, churches, neighborhoods all have a role to play along with the police, probation officers and others who routinely deal with aspects of the problem.

There's no secret about what must be done. The gang culture must be destroyed, and that means a total and well-coordinated community effort to provide jobs, activities, education and hope to the thousands of youths who join gangs every year.

And that will never happen without strong, effective and coordinated leadership pulling together the entire retinue of anti-gang weapons available.
Los Angeles could use a gang czar, and fast

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Abstract (Document Summary)

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