



VIA EMAIL

August 16, 2011

Central Area Planning Commission
200 North Spring Street, Room 272
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Franklin Acevedo, President
Chanchanit Martorell, Vice President
Young Kim, Commissioner
Kevin Norton, Commissioner
Daniel Suh, Commissioner
Sheldred Alexander, Commission Executive Assistant

RE: ZA-2009-2026-ZV-ZAA-1A; 1100-1102 Stearns Drive

Honorable Planning Commissioners,

This letter is submitted with reference to the above-referenced Area Planning Commission case, which is scheduled to be heard on Tuesday, August 23rd, after 4:30 p.m. I am writing on behalf of Donna and Mathis Chazanov, the owners and occupants of the property located at 1108 Stearns Avenue—the house immediately adjacent to the Applicant's property --to oppose the appeal and to urge that the decision of Associate Zoning Administrator Sue Chang ("Zoning Administrator") be upheld.

Summary of Argument

This matter arose because the Appellants were knowingly using a portion of their property in an illegal manner; it was discovered by the Housing Department; and they then sought to legalize the use after the fact by applying for the set of variances and adjustments that are before you herein.

Specifically, when the Appellants purchased their property, the public records reflected that it was improved with a duplex with a recreation room. At some point after their purchase of the property, Appellants turned the permitted recreation room into an unpermitted rental unit, thereby operating a triplex on their R1-zoned lot. In early January 2008, the Housing Department issued a Notice and Order to Comply based upon their discovery of the Appellants' illegal use of the recreation room as a rental unit. Sometime later, the Appellants applied for variances and adjustments. Some of their requests were approved, and some were denied. They appealed those denials, which appeal is before you.

The Appellants contend that they had no idea the recreation room wasn't a legal unit; that their request to operate a triplex in an R1 zone is consistent with City precedent; and that it is compatible with the neighborhood. Finally, they contend that the community as a whole supports the requested legalization of the use. The facts do not support these statements.

Rather, as the Zoning Administrator set forth in her thorough and well-reasoned decision, any hardship brought about by the denial of the variance is self-imposed; granting the variance would convey a special privilege to the Appellants not generally available to other property owners in the vicinity; there are no special circumstances applicable to the subject property that

do not apply generally to other properties in the same zone and vicinity; the granting of the variance would be detrimental to the improvements in the same zone; and granting the variance would adversely affect the integrity of the General Plan.

In terms of the Appellants' contention that the community as a whole supports the variances, this is, as a matter of law, irrelevant. It is also false.

Background/History

The Appellants, Eric Hammerlund and Terrence Villines, purchased the property at 1100-1102 Stearns Drive ("Property") in 2006. At that time, as is the case today, the 7185 s.f. lot they purchased was zoned R1 and improved with a duplex constructed in 1931 and a recreation room constructed in 1991. This would have been reflected, most obviously, in the title report that was surely issued on the property prior to their purchase of it. Any purchaser of real estate, sophisticated or otherwise, would have received a title report and been put on notice of what was and was not permitted on the site for this reason alone.

In addition, at least one of the Appellants, Eric Hammerlund, has been working in architecture and design for years. (Please see Exhibit A, which is comprised of printouts related to Mr. Hammerlund's design studio, Paragon.) Like anyone practicing in the area, he would need to have a thorough understanding of the zoning code, an awareness of the detailed information that the City's website makes available to the public on-line (via Zimas or Navigate LA), an understanding of what it means for a property to be zoned R1, and the fact that one can ask City planners and building staff any questions one has about a property by going to one of the City's public counters such as the one at 201 N. Figueroa Street. No one in this field could practice in his or her profession without this kind of knowledge.

Nonetheless, Mr. Hammerlund and his partner proceeded to purchase the Property. They did so even though they must have known some basic facts about the property that are at issue here. Specifically, they knew, or should have known:

- that the 7,185 s.f., R1-zoned lot they were purchasing was not large enough for even a duplex under current codes;
- that the duplex was legally established many years ago and could only continue to exist by virtue of grandfathered rights;
- that the third unit would certainly not be permitted on a 7,185 s.f. lot in an R1 zone (minimum lot area 5000 s.f. per dwelling unit) absent either grandfathered rights or a variance;
- that the third unit could not have been legally established even under the prior R2 zone (2500 s.f. of lot area per dwelling unit);
- that the public records unambiguously reflected the property to be improved with a duplex and a recreation room, but not a triplex; and
- that the use of the recreation room as a third unit violated not only the R1 zone limitation but also triggered parking, setback, and other requirements with which the property did not and could not comply.

All these facts are clear from the title report, the County tax assessor records, the Zimas report, the Certificate of Occupancy and building permits on file with the City, Navigate LA, and Section 12.08 (R1) of the Zoning Code. (Please see Exhibits B-E, which contain, respectively, a printout from the County tax assessor's website; a printout of the Zimas report, a copy of the Certificate of Occupancy and building permits on file with the City, and a printout of Section 12.08 (R1) of the Zoning Code.)

In light of Appellants' sophistication and the clarity of the public records regarding the property, it defies credulity that Appellants did not know what they were purchasing when they proceeded to buy the property and operate it as a triplex. In any case, they are charged with constructive notice of facts pertaining to their property when such facts are readily ascertainable by readily available public records.

Nonetheless, at some point subsequent to purchasing the property, the Appellants began renting out the recreation room as a dwelling unit. On or about January 8, 2008, the Housing Department became aware of the illegal use and issued a notice and order to comply. (Please see attached.) Over a year and a half later, on June 29, 2009, the Appellants filed a collection of variances and adjustments. The case was heard before the Zoning Administrator on January 10, 2011. On May 25th, 2011, she issued her decision letter granting the request for an adjustment to maintain the over height fence and wall in the front and side yard, but denying all other parts of the request. The Appellants thereupon appealed the denials on or about June 9th, 2011. It is that appeal which is before you.

The Variance Request

The Applicant requested the following collection of variances and adjustments:

- Variance to allow the legalization of a 3rd dwelling unit in a single-family zone;
- Adjustment to allow a rear yard 3 ½ - 5 ½' deep in lieu of the 15 feet required – in other words, less than 1/3 the depth required;
- Variance to allow the 3rd dwelling unit to be legalized without the required parking space;
- Variance to allow a driveway serving more than two dwelling units on a street that is not a major or secondary highway;
- Determination to allow an overheight fence in the required front and side yard of the property.

The variance case was heard before the Zoning Administrator on January 10, 2011. At the hearing, the Zoning Administrator heard testimony from all interested parties, the Applicant, the Applicant's representative, Mathis and Donna Chazanov, their representative, and a planning deputy from Councilmember Paul Koretz's office. In addition to the materials submitted in advance to the Zoning Administrator, various materials were submitted by both sides the day of the hearing. These materials reflected both support for and opposition to the request.

At the close of the public hearing, the Zoning Administrator took the matter under advisement. On May 25th, 2011, she issued her decision, which approved the request to allow the continued maintenance of the over height fence in the front and side yard, and denied all of the other requests.

For the reasons set forth below, as well as the reasons set forth in their submissions to the Zoning Administrator prior to and at the public hearing, and testimony and oral argument that day, my clients respectfully submit that none of the required variance findings can be made in this case. This is consistent with the conclusions of Ms. Chang. As a result, we respectfully submit that the ZA Decision must be upheld and the appeal denied.

Required Variance Findings

As set forth in L.A.M.C. §12.27 D, the Zoning Administrator must make five separate findings in order to grant the variance. Specifically, the Zoning Administrator must find that a variance to

permit a third dwelling unit in the R1 zone without code-required parking must satisfy the following requirements:

- 1) The strict application of the provisions of the Code would result in practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships inconsistent with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations;
- 2) That there are special circumstances applicable to the subject property that do not apply generally to other property in the same zone and vicinity;
- 3) That the variance is necessary for the preservation and enjoyment of a substantial property right or use generally possessed by other property in the same zone and vicinity but which, because of the special circumstances and practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships, is denied to the property in question;
- 4) That the granting of the variance will not be materially detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the property or improvements in the same zone or vicinity in which the property is located; and
- 5) That the granting of the variance will not adversely affect any element of the General Plan.

Furthermore, L.A.M.C. §12.27 D provides: "A variance shall not be used to grant a special privilege or to permit a use substantially inconsistent with the limitations upon other properties in the same zone and vicinity. The Zoning Administrator may deny a variance if the conditions creating the need for the variance were self-imposed."

In this case, none of the required findings can be made. Rather, granting of the variances would constitute just the sort of "special privileges" specifically prohibited by §12.27 D. Finally, any hardship that might occur here is entirely self-imposed. None of Appellants' arguments to the contrary have merit, and therefore, we respectfully submit that the Decision of the zoning administrator must be upheld and the appeal denied.

A. Application Of Code Requirements To Deny The Variance Would Not Result In "Unnecessary Hardships" Inconsistent With The Intent Of The Code.

With respect to the first finding, Appellants argued before the Zoning Administrator that they had purchased the property without knowing that the third dwelling unit was not legal or permitted. They repeat this argument in their letter to the APC dated June 7th ("Appeal Letter").

As set forth in the Summary of Facts below and in Exhibits A-E hereto, Appellants almost certainly knew what were and were not permitted uses of their property. If they remained willfully ignorant of such, such ignorance is no excuse – they are charged with the knowledge of facts which are a matter of public record, particularly when those facts would have been reflected in their title report.

The Appeal Letter makes a few other arguments in this regard. First, it cites City of Los Angeles Case No. ZA-2000-4130(ZV)(A1), which is a 2002 decision of the East Los Angeles Area Planning Commission (Appeal Letter p. 3). Appellants argue that this case provides dispositive precedent, even though elsewhere in the Appeal Letter they state that the cases cited by the Zoning Administrator as providing precedent are "not comparable and inappropriate in this case" for reasons that directly contradict their use of the 2002 decision. (Appeal Letter, p. 5.) That is, according to Appellants, the 445 N. Croft Avenue decision is not an "appropriate example as it is not the same neighborhood as the Property. It is located far north of Olympic Boulevard, more than 1 mile from the Property." (Appeal Letter, p. 5.) Yet Appellants urge that a case from 2002

in the Silver Lake/Echo Park area, perhaps 10 miles from the property, is dispositive. Logically, then, the precedent can be viewed in one of two ways. Either the nearby variance cases provide the applicable precedent, and the case from a completely different part of town does not, and the appeal should be denied. Or, the variance cases conflict with one another such that they cannot be used to determine the outcome here. Either way, Appellants' discussion of precedent does not advance their appeal.

Appellants make even less sense when they next state that "no precedent would be set by granting the variance. The Property is unique in terms of size, shape, topography, and location...." (p. 4.) Thus, Appellants would have this Commission find, on the one hand, that a variance granted for an irregularly shaped, hillside lot across town is compelling precedent for their variance. (Please see attached Zimas report for 1727-29 Webster Street, Exhibit F hereto.) And, on the other hand, that granting a variance to Appellants would provide no precedent because of the "uniqueness" of their lot. If granting a variance in this case won't set a precedent because the lot is not the exact shape, size, and configuration of many other lots in Los Angeles, it is hard to follow the logic of finding a variance granted miles away on an irregularly shaped, hillside property to constitute compelling precedent to support Appellants' variance request.

Furthermore, Appellants' statements about the uniqueness of their property conflict with the facts. The Property is not particularly unique. It is a relatively level, corner lot that, like most corner lots, is slightly larger than the adjacent lots. There are probably hundreds of lots that are similarly configured throughout Los Angeles. In fact, the Chazanovs' lot, at 6504 s.f., is only 600 s.f. smaller than Appellants' 7181 s.f. lot. Two lots catty-corner from Appellants' lot, those at 1081 Stearns and 1081 S. Point View, are 7,090 s.f. and **7,184** s.f. in size, respectively. It is clear that Appellants' lot is by no means unique and the grant of a variance here could easily lead to at least two more triplexes on R1-zoned lots within a half-block of the Site.

In fact, the precedent that would be set if Appellants' variance were granted was obvious to the Zoning Administrator and many others. As stated on page 10 of the Decision Letter:

Numerous inquiries, via phone calls and review of the subject file, regarding the subject application were received indicating that other property owners in the area are aware of the subject application. If a variance application is approved to allow illegally converted dwelling units to remain without the required parking space, similar results will follow resulting in cumulative impacts on traffic, parking and infrastructures and the 1990 zone change ordinance to R1 Zone in the project area will become moot.

Finally, the arguments Appellant has put forth in support of the required "unnecessary hardships" finding go only to the issue of the number of units on the Property. They do not address the variance findings required to allow a third unit without associated parking or to allow a driveway to serve more than two dwelling units. The Zoning Administrator was not able to make findings in support of either of those variance requests in her denial, and Appellants have not suggested any. As a matter of law, they have therefore failed to meet their burden of persuasion.

For all of the above reasons, along with those set forth in the Decision Letter and the materials submitted in opposition to the variance below, denial of the variance would not result in unnecessary hardships inconsistent with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations, but would effectuate its purpose and intent. Thus, we respectfully submit that this required

variance finding cannot be made, the denial of the variance should be upheld, and the appeal denied.

B) There Are No "Special Circumstances" Applicable to the Subject Property That Do Not Apply Generally to Other Property in the Same Zone and Vicinity.

To attempt to justify the variance request in regard to the required "special circumstances" finding, Appellants first reiterate their argument that the property is unique. As stated above, it is not unique. There are two lots catty-corner from Appellants' lot which are, respectfully, 91 s.f. smaller and 1 s.f. larger than Appellants' property. The massive, 4-foot "plateau" upon which the property is "perched" is likewise similar to the "plateau" upon which the neighboring properties are "perched." Appellant's lot is very similar to other lots in the same zone and vicinity and there are no "special circumstances" here.

Appellants next argue that the third unit "has existed for more than two decades and has not caused a parking issue on a street where there is no on-street parking issue." Once again, Appellants play fast and loose with the law and the facts. There is no evidence that the third unit has existed "for more than two decades." In fact, this portion of the property has only been used as a rental since Appellants took over the property in 2006.

Moreover, it is the Chazanovs' experience that it can frequently be difficult to find parking in the area. Most of the properties in the immediate vicinity are improved with single-family homes, consistent with the R1 zoning, but there are grandfathered duplexes, triplexes, and fourplexes on neighboring R2-zoned streets which were constructed in the 1930s and which do not provide parking for their tenants consistent with current requirements. Stearns Drive and Whitworth Avenue often provide spillover parking for the underparked uses on Crescent Heights, Packard, and Hi Point.

In fact, Whitworth Drive is permit parking only. Presumably, the neighborhood and the City felt that there was a problem with parking in the immediate area, or the parking district would not and could not have been formed. But in any case, it is Appellants' burden to show that there is adequate parking in the area. Appellants have had ample time to commission a parking study to substantiate their claims that there is plenty of parking in the area. They chose not to do so. Absent such a study, we have only Appellants' bare assertion that there is plenty of parking – an assertion that the Chazanovs' contest.

Finally, Appellants reiterate their argument before the Zoning Administrator that "there are many multi-family properties in the area." (Appeal Letter, p. 4.) There are, in fact, multifamily properties in the area, but almost all of the examples they cite are, unlike Appellants' property, located in the R2 zone. Thus, Appellants direct this Commission's attention to the duplexes or multi-unit buildings 1) on Stearns Drive south of Packard; 2) on Point View Drive, one block east of the property, between Whitworth and Packard; and 3) corner triplexes at 1178 Hi Point Street and 1167 Crescent Heights Boulevard. (Appeal Letter, p. 4.) **All** of these areas are zoned R2. The sole exceptions are the two grandfathered uses on Stearns Drive which were already brought to the Zoning Administrator's attention and which failed to persuade her to allow Appellants to operate a triplex in an R1 zone.

Thus, for the reasons set forth herein and in prior submissions to the Zoning Administrator, the Chazanovs' respectfully submit that there are no special circumstances applicable to the subject property that do not apply generally to other property in the same zone and vicinity, and the variance findings cannot be made in this regard either.

C) The Requested Variance Is Not Necessary for the Enjoyment of a Property Right Generally Possessed by Other Property in the Same Zone and Vicinity.

With respect to the above-required finding, Appellants insist that the presence of various multifamily properties in the R2-zoned areas near the Property somehow compel this body to allow them to operate a triplex in the R1 zone. The uses in other zones are irrelevant. The variance finding requires Appellants to show that the right they seek is available to others in the same zone, but all they have argued here is that they deserve a property right that is available to those in a different zone. As set forth above, Appellants' requested variance would grant them a special privilege with respect to other property in the same zone or vicinity, which conflicts with the required finding.

Furthermore, while it may be that there are properties in the nearby R2 zones, and a handful in the R1 zone, that are developed at a density greater than permitted by the applicable zone designation, most of these buildings were constructed in the 1930s. Appellants' duplex was constructed in the 1930s, and their right to continue operating this use based on grandfathered rights is undisputed. It is the additional building constructed in the 1990s and converted to a residential use in 2006 which is at issue. Appellants have failed to point to any use in the vicinity which is inconsistent with current zoning but is not a grandfathered use.

Finally, Appellants dispute the precedential value of the variance cases pertaining to 1124-1126 Hi Point and 445 N. Croft Avenue, both of which were cited by the Zoning Administrator. In fact, the factual situation underlying the decision denying the variance request for 445 N. Croft Avenue ("Croft Denial") is strikingly similar to the one at issue here. In that case, the Applicant owned a 6,500 s.f., R1-zoned lot that had been improved with a duplex in 1931. The Croft Applicant's predecessor in interest constructed a storage space and a carport in 1962, pulling permits when doing so. At that time, the property was zoned R2. (Please see Zimas report and Decision Letter denying the variance, Exhibits G and H, respectively.)

At some point between the time the storage space was built and January 2009, when the Housing Department cited the owners for illegally renting the space, the zone was changed from R2 to R1 and the storage space was illegally converted to a rental unit. The Croft Applicants sought variances to permit the 3rd unit and to allow 0 parking spaces for the third unit, and an adjustment to permit a rear yard of 3.3 feet in lieu of the 15 feet otherwise required and a reduced side yard setback. The Croft Applicants made many of the same arguments that Appellants made here, but the Zoning Administrator was unpersuaded. Rather, she observed, the Croft Applicant's property was the only property in the immediate area that contained "three dwelling units including the illegally converted unit, which is equivalent to 300 percent of the allowable density." (P. 4.) In light of the many similarities between the Croft Denial and the issues here, the Chazanovs respectfully submit that the Croft Denial provides compelling precedent here.

With regard to the parking variances, the Appellants have failed to offer any justification with respect to this required finding. In this respect as well, they have failed to meet their burden of persuasion.

Thus, the requested variance is not necessary for the enjoyment of a property right generally possessed by other property in the same zone and vicinity. Rather, granting a variance would mean granting a special privilege to Appellants, and would permit a use substantially

inconsistent with the other uses in the vicinity. For these reasons as well, we respectfully submit that the variance findings cannot be met and the Appeal should be denied.

D) The Granting of the Variance Will Be Materially Detrimental to the Public Welfare and Injurious to the Property or Improvements in the Same Zone or Vicinity in Which the Property Is Located.

Regarding the next required finding, Appellants again make various statements which are unsupported by the evidence. They state that there is always sufficient street parking. But there is evidence before this Commission that there is not sufficient parking. First, the Chazanovs have cited their experience to the contrary—experience which stretches back to 1991, when they purchased their home. Second, the fact that the area is a permit parking area suggests otherwise. In order for an area to become a restricted parking area, a majority of the property owners need to request it and the City needs to find that parking supply is insufficient.

Appellants have the burden of proof that parking is not a problem, and they have nothing but their bare assertions of such. The Chazanovs believe it to be a problem and have lived in the area much longer. A parking study would provide objective evidence, but Appellants have declined to provide one. Finally, Appellants state that there have been no complaints nor problems regarding the backing out from the driveway in twenty years. Appellants have only owned the property since 2006, so they have no knowledge of how the property was used or whether there were any complaints or problems between the time the recreation room was built and the time they bought the property.

Appellants then state that the neighborhood supports the use. The neighborhood does not support the use. Some neighbors support the use – neighbors who do not live adjacent to it. The Chazanovs live directly next door and they oppose the use. So does the neighbor to the rear. A handful of other neighbors have indicated both support of and opposition to the use. Most want to stay out of it. If Appellants wanted to show the community's support, they should have gone to the applicable neighborhood council, the P.I.C.O. Neighborhood Council. Apparently they never did so.

Appellants have submitted a support letter from the Chair of the Steering Committee of the Carthay Square Neighborhood Association, which Appellants urge represents the neighborhood in general. But in fact, there is no reason to suppose that the letter expresses the opinion of anyone other than the Chair herself. Mr. Hammerlund is a member of this association, so it cannot be considered a neutral body. Moreover, the Association's website does not reveal who its other members are; when its meetings are held; how one becomes a member; what its procedures are for determining its position on a zoning matter; or whether the meetings are open to the public. (Please see Exhibit I, which contains printouts from the CSNA's website.) If there had been a meeting at which Appellants' request was discussed, the Chazanovs have no knowledge of such, as they were not invited to it. As a result, they had no opportunity to contradict any of Appellants' assertions regarding the variance requests. In light of these facts, this letter does not provide any evidence of how the neighborhood as a whole feels about the variance.

Thus, the statement that the neighborhood supports the project is, like so many of Appellants' statements, simply untrue. In any case, the community's support – and even the Councilmember's support – is beside the point. A variance request is not a popularity contest. If the neighborhood and the City want to permit more density, that is a decision that should be decided through the front door – by changing the zoning to allow for greater density in the

neighborhood as a whole, and not by granting a special privilege to someone who chose to go through the process backwards – in other words, to seek forgiveness, rather than permission.

E) The Granting Of The Variance Will Adversely Affect An Element Of The General Plan.

The Applicant cites the general statement in the Housing Element of the General Plan to the effect that more rental housing is needed in Los Angeles. But the Housing Element was never intended to trump other, more specific, aspects of the General Plan. The applicable portion of the General Plan, the Wilshire Community Plan ("Plan"), "designates the property for low density residential with corresponding zones of RS, R1, RD6 and RD5 and Height District No. 1." However, the density the Applicant seeks to legalize, three units on a 7185 s.f. lot, would be consistent with RD2 zoning (one unit per 2000 s.f. of lot area), a much denser zone designation than is permitted within the Plan. The property is legally developed (because of grandfathered rights) at an R2 density, a density that already greatly exceeds this Plan designation. To permit a third unit here would create a land use that is inconsistent with the Plan, contrary to this finding. Indeed, it may be that an Exception from the General Plan would be required in order to grant a variance here. No such Exception has been requested. For these reasons as well, we respectfully submit that the requested variances should not be granted.

Proposed Adjustment

The Applicant has also appealed the denial of the adjustment needed in order to allow a rear yard varying in depth from 3'6"-5'6" in lieu of the 15 feet required, in conjunction with the third dwelling unit. The Appeal Letter does not discuss why Appellants believe that this denial was in error. For the reasons set forth in the Chazanovs' submittals to the Zoning Administrator, as well as the reasons the Zoning Administrator set forth in denying the adjustment, the Chazanovs respectfully submit that the Decision Letter denying the adjustment should be upheld and the appeal denied in this regard as well.

Baseline Mansionization Ordinance


The Baseline Mansionization Ordinance, Ordinance Number 179883, went into effect in June of 2008. That Ordinance provides that, in R1-zoned lots less than 7500 s.f. in size, the maximum **residential** floor area contained in all buildings and accessory buildings is not to exceed 50% of the lot area. (L.A.M.C. §12.08 C 5-6). The existing improvements on the property are significantly in excess of this percentage. This is more evidence that the property is already far too dense for the neighborhood. However, insofar as the recreation room is used as an "accessory building" rather than a dwelling unit, the improvements on the property, all of which were constructed before this ordinance went into effect, would be grandfathered in.

However, if Appellants' variance were to be granted, this accessory building would become residential floor area as of 2011. Because the structures on the property already exceed the limits set forth in the ordinance, the use of the recreation room not as an "accessory structure" but as "residential floor area" would trigger the need for yet another variance – a variance from the limitations set forth in the Baseline Mansionization Ordinance. Appellants did not apply for such a variance, and accordingly, the Zoning Administrator did not specifically consider nor address whether such a variance would (or would not) be justified. Therefore, the Chazanovs respectfully submit that Appellants would be required to apply for an entirely new variance before they could legally use the recreation room as a rental unit in any case.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, my clients, the neighbors immediately adjacent to the Applicant's property, object to the Appeal in its entirety. The Zoning Administrator carefully considered the requests, but was unable to make any of the findings required to grant these very significant departures from the Code in the affirmative. Moreover, even if the Appeal were granted, this would still not excuse Appellants from complying with the Baseline Mansionization Ordinance, or from seeking a variance from its requirements. For all of the above reasons, along with the reasons set forth in the Decision Letter and the written and oral submissions made by and on behalf of the Chazanovs, my clients respectfully submit that the appeal should be denied and the Zoning Administrator's decision upheld.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Valerie Sacks".

Valerie Sacks
On behalf of Mathis and Donna Chazanov