

ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
MAYOR

April 10, 2013

Honorable Members of the City Council
c/o City Clerk
200 North Spring Street, Room 395
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Re: Request to Report Results of the Gang Reduction and Youth Development Request for Proposals for Evaluation Services; Request to Negotiate and Execute a Contract with The Urban Institute for the Period April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014; Request to Execute a Contract Amendment for a No-Cost Extension with The Urban Institute with a Revised End Date of March 31, 2013

Honorable Members:

Since September 2008, the Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) has provided annual funding to support gang secondary prevention efforts, family case management intervention efforts, and crisis/ response/ proactive peacekeeping activities. A key part of the Mayor's Gang Reduction strategy is to fully evaluate all prongs of the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy. To date, three evaluation reports have been produced by an external contractor.

On June 29, 2012, per C.F. 12-0923, the GRYD Office was provided authority to release a Request for Proposals (RFP) to identify a contractor to provide a comprehensive evaluation and analysis of the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy and associated programs in an amount not to exceed \$900,000 over a 12-month period. In addition, C.F. 11-1879 identified an additional \$40,000 from the Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) funds provided by the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles to support the evaluation of the Watts Regional Strategy. This report serves to (1) provide the results of this RFP and a recommendation to negotiate and execute a contract with the selected provider and (2) request a no-cost extension with The Urban Institute (UI), the current evaluation contractor, for an additional four months in order to complete a Year 3 report.



I. BACKGROUND

Year 1

The Mayor's GRYD Office received authority to release a RFP and subsequently issued a document soliciting evaluation services on November 5, 2008. As a result of the procurement process, the GRYD Office executed a contract with the UI for the period April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010 in an amount not to exceed \$900,000 to conduct a multi-year comprehensive evaluation study of the GRYD program (C.F. 08-0178-S12). UI would later be granted a no-cost extension thereby revising the end date to June 30, 2010. This allowed the contractor additional time to compile and analyze data and complete the Year 1 report (Attachment A).

During Year 1 of the evaluation, UI was able to conduct Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) data collection and analysis, GRYD Information System (GRYDIS) data verification and analysis, design development and modifications, provider and community data collection and analysis, crime data acquisition and analysis and overall reporting of management of data. As a result of ongoing data collection and on the ground work (i.e. interviews, surveys) with numerous service providers and community stakeholders, UI produced a Year 1 report (Attachment A).

UI completed a total of forty-five (45) evaluation site visits to GRYD prevention and intervention providers. Research staff held independent meetings with site directors and program staff to collect data on client recruitment, client characteristics, community demographics, collaboration and partners, and site coordination with the GRYD Office. Information gathered from these site visits led to the development of comprehensive reports on each GRYD Zone to better inform the GRYD Office and the overall evaluation design. In addition, the evaluation team began collecting quantitative and qualitative data on the program individuals. They developed a modified retest instrument for prevention clients, in collaboration with researchers at the University of Southern California, now known as YSET-R.

Another important source of individual outcome data came from interviews with clients, their families, and other individuals knowledgeable about client's progress. UI also focused on community level outcome data in the first year of the evaluation. A Memorandum of Understanding was secured between the evaluators and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to acquire comprehensive citywide crime arrest and incident data, including all types of crimes and most notably those that are flagged by the police as gang-related. UI obtained LAPD data from 2007 to 2010, and conducted a baseline trend analysis. Data collection at the community level also included in-depth interviews with LAPD and Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) officers in each of the GRYD Zones.

There were challenges with the Year I evaluation including slow youth recruitment, the lack of a standardized gang prevention model which resulted in inconsistent and disparate service models within each GRYD zone, an evaluation methodology that could not be applied, and difficulties and delays in data acquisition (GRYDIS and LAPD).

Despite initial challenges, the Year 1 Report yielded the following findings and recommendations (not comprehensive):

1. Gang prevention and intervention contracts will be more explicit with program definition and evaluation requirements.
2. Emphasis will be placed on data collection as it relates to service provision and crime data.
3. Adaptation of the YSET-Retest is possible and will take place across all GRYD zones and non-GRYD zones (*now recognized as Secondary Areas*) to measure client progress as it relates to risk behaviors. The pilot retest results showed fairly consistent improvements in risk for prevention youth across sites and within most of the individual zones. There was some variability across risk factor scales and individual zones, although antisocial/prosocial tendencies demonstrated improvement consistently across sites.¹
4. Impacts of intervention will be assessed during Year 2 at the community level, rather than at the individual level; and
5. Evaluation of the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA) and Summer Night Lights (SNL) program will be incorporated into Year 2.

Year 2

In July 2010, the GRYD Office received authority to execute a second contract amendment with The UI thereby extending the contract for an additional twelve months, for the period July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011, in an amount not to exceed \$900,000 (C.F. 08-0178-S18). As a result of this contract amendment, UI was able to produce the Year 2 Final Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (Attachment B). The report cited incremental decreases in the negative behavior of prevention's at-risk clientele. Below is a list of behavioral changes among gang prevention clients, ages 10-15²:

- 23% decrease in antisocial behavior
- 29% decrease in the lack of parental supervision
- 35% decrease in critical life events
- 21% decrease in impulsive risk taking
- 19% decrease in neutralization
- 23% decrease in negative peer influence

¹ Year 1 Evaluation Report by Urban Institute (page 92), Dunworth, Terence, Ph.D., David Hayeslip, Ph.D., Megan Denver, Morgan Lyons, August 2010.

² Enrolled clients were reevaluated six (6) months after the initial YSET was administered.

- 12% decrease in peer delinquency
- 47.3% decrease in gang fights
- 35.0% decrease in hanging out with gang members
- 48.0% decrease in participation in gang activities
- 53.2% decrease in hitting someone to hurt them
- 8.1% decrease in attacking someone with a weapon
- 26.3% decrease in used force to steal
- 33.1% decrease in carrying a hidden weapon

Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a sample of youth receiving prevention services and parents of such youth. These disclosed largely positive views about program effects. Respondents reported improvements in youth attitudes and indicated a link between these positive changes and strengthened family bonds and interactions. Behavioral changes were attributed to either increased parental involvement or to positive youth attitudinal changes.³

As a result of crisis response conducted by both Mayor's GRYD office staff and community intervention workers, 53.3% of stakeholders strongly agreed that the interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and intervention workers increased the dissemination of information to dispel rumors throughout the community. In addition, 55.3% of stakeholders rated the effects of GRYD intervention and proactive peacekeeping in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident as "very high" (33% as "high"); stakeholders rated the effect of GRYD in reducing the likelihood of retaliatory incidents as "very high" (34.8%) and high (25%). As it related to the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy, 44.3% of stakeholders surveyed strongly agreed that the training improved the intervention worker's role in responding to crisis.

Year 3

In late June 2011, members of Council approved a third amendment with the UI to continue evaluating the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy (C.F. 11-0984). This third amendment extended their contract period an additional twelve months, beginning July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012 for an amount not to exceed \$910,000. A fourth amendment requesting a no-cost extension was granted in August 2012 (C.F. 12-0923). This approval extended their contract for an additional three months with a revised end date of September 30, 2012.

Although the Year 3 Preliminary Report is still in draft format, the program has yielded the following results in the GRYD Prevention component:

³ Year 2 Evaluation Report by Urban Institute (page 46); Dunworth, Terence, Ph.D., David Hayeslip, Ph.D., Megan Denver, July 2011.

- When considering incoming referrals to the GRYD prevention program over time, new baseline referrals peaked in 2009-2010 and eligibility rates continued to grow as the program evolved. Approximately 60% of referred youth were found eligible at baseline across all years combined.
- Referrals most commonly come from school staff (40%) or family, friends, and peers (41%).
- Of the 3,613 youth found eligible at baseline, 34% (n=1,232) were enrolled youth with analytically suitable retests at the end of May 2012; of the 2,429 not-eligible youth, approximately 15% (n=354) of their YSETs could be compared.
- Youth that were found eligible and enrolled in GRYD office prevention programs improved significantly on average across all seven risk factor scales from the time of initial screening until the most recent retest. Far less improvement was observed for youth found to be not-eligible at the time of the YSET-I screening.
- Large majorities of the enrolled youth group improved over the course of enrollment in the GRYD program, while a small majority of not-eligible youth worsened.
- Enrolled youth who acknowledged engaging in gang-related activities generally declined from the initial screen until the last retest. There was a very small increase in gang membership reported but this was so small as to not be statistically significant. Few not-eligible youth reported participating in any gang-related activities.
- Participation in criminal activities of a violent nature declined significantly for enrolled youth from initial screening to retest. While all the behaviors decreased, most notable was the substantial drop in assaultive behavior. The numbers of not-eligible youth saying they had engaged in violent crimes was very small and while responses to admitting to hitting someone dropped as it did for enrolled youth, this decline was modest and not significant.
- Of all retested youth, slightly more than half of enrolled youth switched from an eligible to not eligible status at the time of their most recent retest (which was a little over a year, on average). For those youth found not eligible at baseline, most (82%) remained not eligible.

A final report is anticipated to be released in April 2013.

II. REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

In June 2012, the Mayor's GRYD Office received authority to release various RFP to identify providers to implement and support the GRYD Comprehensive Gang Strategy. This report describes the competitive bid process and a recommendation to negotiate and execute a contract with the recommended evaluation contractor. On September 12, 2012, the GRYD Office released an RFP seeking a contractor to conduct a full evaluation of the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy. Over a 12-month period, up to \$940,000 would be made available for distribution through this RFP.

In order to assist potential applicants, the Mayor's Office held a Proposer's Conference on September 26, 2012. In addition, the Mayor's Office provided technical assistance by posting answers on the Los Angeles Business Assistance Virtual Network (LA BAVN) internet site to questions posed during the Proposer's Conference and/or received via e-mail or fax. Proposals for the Evaluation RFP were due November 16, 2012, by 5:00 PM PST. The table below lists the proposals received by the designated deadline:

Table 1: Evaluation RFP Applicants

Applicant:
RAND Corporation
The Urban Institute

1. Proposal Review Process

In order to ensure a fair and equitable review process, the Mayor's GRYD office followed standard City proposal review procedures as outlined in the RFP. The Mayor's GRYD office staff performed a first level review of each application for minimum eligibility requirements. Points were not awarded or deducted as part of this review. All applicants passed this desk review.

A separate review panel was formed to score and rank the written proposals. The review panel consisted of four members from the following disciplines: academia and research and evaluation. Each reviewer was provided detailed instructions on the review process and was required to sign a Conflict of Interest / Non-Disclosure Statement form indicating they had no direct or indirect financial interest in reviewing the proposals.

Reviewers assigned scores to each proposal with a maximum 100 points possible. After discussing the proposals in a group, the average of the reviewer's scores was calculated to determine the final written score. A total of 100 possible points were given in this portion of the procurement process and were weighted at 100% of the entire total score. Final scores and rankings for both applicants are provided in the table below:

Table 2: Final Scores

Applicant:	Applicant:
RAND Corporation	67.3
The Urban Institute	92.3

2. Appeals Procedure

Upon completion of the review process outlined above, applicants were notified of their final score and rank in written correspondence from the Mayor's GRYD Office. Applicants were additionally provided notice of the proposal Appeal Procedures.

Applicants desirous of filing an appeal concerning the RFP review process were required to submit the appeal in writing and transmit via e-mail to the GRYD Office. The GRYD Office did not receive any requests for appeals.

III. AMENDMENT OF CONTRACT

As stated above, members of Council approved a third amendment with the UI to continue evaluating the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy (C.F. 11-0984). This third amendment extended their contract period an additional twelve months, beginning July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012 for an amount not to exceed \$910,000. A fourth amendment requesting a no-cost extension was granted in August 2012 (C.F. 12-0923). This approval extended their contract for an additional three months with a revised end date of September 30, 2012. Due to unanticipated delays, the GRYD Office seeks to amend the contract with the UI (C# 115573), with a revised end date of March 31, 2013 to complete the data analysis required for completion of the Year 3 report.

The additional delay has been due to a mutual agreement that the analysis of the crime data originally submitted by UI needed re-analyzing with more attention to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) data. Additionally, UI was required to conduct a re-analysis of SNL data inclusive of GRYD Zone service areas. The reanalysis of both of these components required additional time because of the complexity of the analysis. The reports have been submitted to the GRYD Office and are responsive to the concerns brought to their attention. In sum, UI conformed to the contract and submitted the final reports per the contracted dates. We anticipate that the final report will be issued in April 2013.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is THEREFORE requested that the City Council:

- 1. AUTHORIZE** the Mayor, or designee to negotiate and execute a contract with The Urban Institute to conduct a full evaluation of the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy, for the period April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014, in an amount not to exceed \$940,000 from the FY 12-13 adopted budget, subject to approval of the City Attorney, as to form and legality and compliance with City contracting requirements;
- 2. AUTHORIZE** the Mayor, or designee to negotiate and execute a contract amendment for a no-cost extension with The Urban Institute with a revised end date of March 31, 2013, subject to the approval of the City Attorney as to form and legality and compliance with City contracting requirements and availability of funding.

Honorable Members of the City Council


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3. **AUTHORIZE** the Mayor, or designee, to prepare Controller's instructions and/or make technical adjustments that may be required to implement the actions approved by the Mayor and Council on this matter, subject to the approval of the City Administrative Officer, and authorize the Controller to implement these instructions.

The recommendations in this report comply with City Financial Policies in that the proposed funding is balanced against established revenue approved in previous Council actions and from state and federal grants. All funding is subject to the availability of grant funds and funding determinations by Mayor and Council.

Very truly yours,



ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

ARV: mml

Attachments:

- A. Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Year 1 Report (August 2010)
- B. Year 2 Final Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (July 2011)
- C. Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Year 3 Final Report (April 2013)
- D. Evaluation RFP: Notification Letters to Applicants and Appeals Procedure
- E. Evaluation Contract: Scope of Work (*DRAFT*)

ATTACHMENT A

Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Year 1 Report (August 2010)

Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Y1 Report

Terence Dunworth
David Hayeslip
Morgan Lyons
Megan Denver

research for safer communities



URBAN INSTITUTE
Justice Policy Center

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community research

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The evaluation of the Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program is sponsored by the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development. The authors are grateful to the current and former GRYD office Directors, Guillermo Cespedes and Reverend Jeff Carr respectively, and their staff for their guidance on this evaluation. A special thanks to Rommel Hilario who was the primary liaison between the GRYD office and the evaluation team throughout the first 15 months of the initiative. In addition, we would like to thank the members of the Evaluation Advisory Committee for their thoughtful and in depth critiques of the evaluation design and proposed methodologies. Others deserving acknowledgement are the leadership and staff of all of the zone prevention and intervention providers as well as LAPD gang detectives from each zone, who contributed important perspectives on GRYD implementation. Of particular note are those prevention providers who volunteered and assisted in the risk factor retest pilot. Finally, the authors gratefully acknowledge the research staffs of both the Urban Institute and Harder+Company Community Research for their significant contributions to this report.

Executive Summary

Introduction

This Executive Summary presents the main findings from the Year 1 report of the Urban Institute/Harder+Company evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). The report describes in some detail the considerable progress and challenges associated with implementing the GRYD program and the difficult but successful creation of a strong research design, data collection systems and initial data sets for an ongoing evaluation of the program's impact over the next year.

GRYD Program Structure and Organization

GRYD is a multi-year initiative managed by the Los Angeles Mayor's office through its GRYD office (established in 2007). Program objectives are to reduce crime and violence associated with street gangs through the implementation of three core program components:

1) Prevention

Inhibiting gang-joining through the provision of prevention services to youth ages 10-15 who are not already gang members

2) Intervention

Providing services to gang members ages 14-25 to assist leaving the gang life

3) Crisis Management

Engaging in immediate reaction to gang conflicts and other street level incidents as they arise and conducting ongoing peacekeeping activities in gang communities to help keep retaliations and flare-ups under control.

In 2008, the GRYD office issued competitive solicitations for service providers in each of these three components; 18 organizations were awarded contracts to provide services in 12 locations (designated "zones") throughout the city: 77th II, Baldwin Village, Boyle Heights, Cypress Park, Florence-Graham, Newton, Panorama City/Mission, Pacoima/Foothill, Rampart, Ramona Gardens, Southwest II, and Watts. A map depicting the location of each zone is provided in Appendix A. All 12 GRYD zones are included in the evaluation.

Evaluation Objectives and Procedures During Y1

The evaluation, per the April 2009 contract with Los Angeles, has two primary objectives: first, to conduct an implementation evaluation of the GRYD program and provide the GRYD office with feedback so that it can adjust its program approach if warranted; second, to conduct an outcome evaluation that assesses changes over time in at-risk levels for prevention youth, document the extent to which youth in the intervention program exit the gang life, and review the community level changes in violence and criminality that can be attributed to the GRYD program.

Implementation process data have been collected throughout Y1 through direct observations of GRYD planning activities, collection and review of relevant documents from service providers in each zone, cross-zone provider and GRYD office meetings and forums, interviews with GRYD office staff, on-site interviews with provider organizations, interviews with local gang detectives and other gang officers, and on-site observations. During the year, the evaluation team has provided GRYD management with regular feedback on its activities and on those of the providers. The team has contributed to the development of information gathering practices and systems that are a prerequisite for the GRYD program to avoid the same end result as LA Bridges – failure to be able to demonstrate what has been done and what effect it had.

The intent at the outset of the evaluation was to begin compiling outcome data as quickly as possible and report on initial results in this report. Even under the best of circumstances, the scope of any outcome evaluation would, of necessity, have been very limited and comprehensive outcome findings were not anticipated by the GRYD office until at least the second year. When the evaluation began in April, 2009 the GRYD program was operating at a very modest level, with very few clients and virtually no systematic information gathering. Over time, the number of clients increased, though not to GRYD's target levels, but developing information systems turned out to be very challenging. The consequence was that the evaluation was significantly handicapped during Y1 with respect to the outcome component. This will change in Year 2, due to the progress made by the GRYD office on critical support factors.

Program Complexity, Program Model Deficiency, and Diversity of Service Provision

The GRYD program is considerably more complex and varied than portrayed in either the program or evaluation request for proposals (RFPs). This is perhaps the biggest reason why

the comprehensive implementation evaluation conducted in Y1 was so time intensive, as well as a factor in why design decisions and data systems for outcome evaluation have taken so long in developing. In many ways, there has been no single GRYD program, but rather 36 different contexts (12 zones, 3 program components in each zone). In addition, for much of the time since GRYD began up to June, 2010, GRYD service providers operated without a well-specified program design or model beyond the statements of general principles and recommended activities outlined in the original GRYD RFPs. This independent operation has resulted in the implementation of a wide array of services across the GRYD zones, some of which were similar to other zones, and some of which were different. Several providers continued the same kind of service provision they had offered under LA Bridges, or which they had normally engaged in previously. This inter-zone variability is summarized further in the main body of the report and reported in detail in individual zone profiles.¹ This had a profound impact on what the evaluation has been able to accomplish with respect to outcomes, since there has been no unified strategy.

By the end of Y1, the GRYD program had reached a more developed statement for the prevention program focusing on three components – the individual, the family, and peer groups. A formal statement of this revision was produced with the intent of integrating it into Y2 prevention provider activities. For intervention, the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA) was established and provided standardized training to the first cohort of GRYD intervention staff in March 2010. The advantage of this for the evaluation is that it will permit a more thorough assessment of provider services and their effects.

Recruitment and Enrollment

The pace of program development, and the ability to fully evaluate, is mirrored in the pace of GRYD client recruitment. Recruitment of youth into both prevention and intervention case services programs proceeded more slowly than initially anticipated. By the end of Y1, for example, most prevention providers had not yet reached the 200 client target levels. Intervention providers were mostly at or close to their 50 client target. The zones and the number of youth they have enrolled in the GRYD program are displayed below.

¹ Available separately from the GRYD office.

Zone	Enrollment by March, 2010	
	Prevention	Intervention
77 th II	200	39
Baldwin Village	158	55
Boyle Heights	147	58
Cypress Park	79	74
Florence-Graham	23	50
Newton	134	48
Panorama City/Mission	118	51
Pacoima/Foothill	128	40
Rampart	113	43
Ramona Gardens	145	44
Southwest II	131	75
Watts	42	40
Total	1418	617

By the end of the year the pace of recruitment has been increasing and it appears that original target levels will be reached early in the next contract year.

GRYDIS Challenges

The Gang Reduction and Youth Development Information System (GRYDIS), which was designed to be the foundation for program activity monitoring by the GRYD office and for dosage measurement for both the providers and the evaluation, did not become operational in Y1. This resulted in a lack of standardized activity data for both the GRYD office and the evaluators for this start up year. While GRYDIS has been rolled out and training will be provided to prevention providers for full implementation during the early stages of next year, it is still unclear whether this or another automated activity tracking system will be implemented for intervention providers. It is critical both for GRYD management and for the evaluation that GRYDIS be fully implemented.

Because of the provider training required to implement GRYDIS, the GRYD office and the evaluation team jointly determined that no parallel and duplicative information collection system should be imposed on providers while GRYDIS was being developed. It was considered

that the burden would be unreasonable and could well impede program activities. Assuming that providers will find GRYDIS sufficiently useful to their operations and client management and that data input to GRYDIS will be comprehensive, the system should provide, in Y2, the information on prevention provider clients and services that the evaluation needs. It is not yet certain that GRYDIS can or will be adapted to intervention provider needs.

The Impact Of Summer Night Lights

During the summer of 2009 a substantial investment was made by the GRYD office in Summer Night Lights (SNL), a program of community activities in parks serving zone residents that include gang prevention and outreach. SNL has been substantially expanded for the summer of 2010 and the level of effort for Program Managers and provider staff will expand accordingly. This made it difficult for GRYD Program Managers to meet both zone and SNL demands on their time. SNL was not originally conceived as the major component of GRYD that it has become. In fact, it was not even mentioned in initial program materials or solicitations, and was not built into the evaluation solicitation. However, because of its growing importance and the resources committed to it by both GRYD office staff and zone prevention and intervention providers, a greater emphasis will need to be placed on SNL and on its community-level outcomes by the evaluation in the future. The GRYD office and the evaluation team have agreed that beginning in Y2, SNL will become a formal component of the evaluation work plan.

Weak Provisions in Y1 Provider Contracts

Service providers' first priority is of course service. Adequate attention to the added demands of evaluation typically requires a clear and enforced contractual obligation. The first provider contracts lacked effective language that spelled out provider responsibilities with respect to the evaluation. This made it difficult for either the GRYD office or the evaluation team to insist on provider compliance with evaluation requirements. It also contributed to GRYD office decisions to cancel scheduled group meetings for prevention and intervention providers and to disband a working group of intervention practitioners organized by the evaluation team to provide input to evaluation requirements. Provider resistance, particularly from intervention providers, was considered too strong to overcome.

Though providers (informally in discussions with the evaluation team), and the GRYD office (contractually in the award and in subsequent meetings) agreed that a strong evaluation is

necessary to avoid the LA Bridges I and II lack of accountability, and to clearly identify which provider services have the most beneficial effects, the contract structure for accomplishing this was not in place during Y1. The contract language in the Y2 awards is expected to correct this problem.

Slow Processing of the LA-LAPD-UI MOU

The slow processing of the UI-Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) memorandum of understanding (MOU) at the LA City level, and subsequent technical difficulties in obtaining geo-coded data from LAPD after the MOU was signed, impeded the evaluation's ability to process gang and crime data at the zone level. It has in fact taken 15 months to get to the point where geocoded LAPD data are being provided. Nevertheless, after all the legal difficulties were overcome, the cooperation level from LAPD has been excellent and, going forward into Y2, we anticipate being able to fully document law enforcement activities in the GRYD zones and in comparison areas in other locations in the city. With the support of a designated point of contact for the evaluation, LAPD's Compstat section is producing crime, arrest, and call-for-service data going back to 2004/2005. Ongoing data provision will be conducted at six month intervals through the end of the evaluation.

Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) and Retest Results

The outcome evaluation and its piloting of change measures are intimately tied to the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). YSET is an interview protocol developed by gang researchers for the GRYD office to measure levels of risk across a number of domains among youth referred for prevention services. Levels of risk are calculated by researchers at the University of Southern California (USC) in order to decide whether or not referred youth are eligible for services.

From the commencement of GRYD through mid-June 2010, the City of Los Angeles and USC were unable to agree to a contract for the performance of YSET eligibility tests. Though this did not prevent the USC team from conducting the YSET eligibility screening reviews or from returning the eligibility decisions to the prevention providers, it did complicate the provision of individual client YSET information to the evaluation team. This delayed the commencement of the YSET retest process, which at intervals of six months after date of enrollment the evaluation plans to administer to all prevention clients. This key evaluation

component permits an analysis of the changes, if any, in risk factor scores, delinquent and criminal behaviors and gang involvement of each client, and provides individual client information to service agencies so they can adapt their service approach to particular youth. However, with the cooperation of the USC team in providing initial client responses to the YSET interview in the Spring of 2010, the evaluation team was able to successfully conduct a pilot implementation of 150 client retests in five GRYD zones and two non-GRYD zones in April and May of 2010. Though not representative of the entire GRYD program (because of the small number of participants and the fact that seven GRYD zones were not engaged), the results for the 150 clients were encouraging. On average there was statistically significant improvement in risk levels and some behaviors. The YSET retest process will be implemented in all zones for all clients beginning in September, 2010.

Conclusion

The evaluation and the GRYD program have made great progress during Y1 despite being confronted by many challenges. In this report, we have identified these and delineated the responses to them by both the GRYD office and the evaluation team. The situation at the end of Y1 is encouraging in a number of critical areas.

First, the service provider contracts are expected to be much more explicit with respect to formal program and evaluation requirements. This will enhance programmatic monitoring and management, as well as the interface between the evaluation and providers.

Second, the GRYD office has made major forward movement in both the prevention and intervention areas. Program definition has occurred, and training is being provided. This will increase the strength and consistency of service provision and should result in superior client experiences.

Third, a necessary information system, GRYDIS for prevention agencies, is now on-line for data entry, and should assist providers in day-to-day management of clients and activities. To the extent that it does, the evaluation will benefit by being able to electronically derive client and service details in a simple and ongoing process.

Fourth, LAPD data provision problems are now solved and city-wide, geo-coded data sets will shortly be available. These will support in-depth analysis of crime and gang activity both in GRYD zones and elsewhere.

Fifth, the pilot of the YSET retest process has demonstrated that providers are able to effectively conduct retests of their clients. This will enable the evaluation team to set up and implement the retest process across all zones and for all clients in Y2. The feedback to providers about individual client progress will permit adjustment and adaptation of service provision on a case-by-case basis. The process will also permit, by the end of Y2, outcome assessment of the GRYD program with respect to client changes in risk scores and delinquent or criminal behavior.

Finally, at a Los Angeles meeting on June 23-24, between the GRYD office, the Evaluation Advisory Committee and the Evaluation team, the following important design decisions were reached:

- It was agreed that a randomized experimental design has a low probability of being successfully implemented for the prevention component, and that a failed experimental design would be worse than a successful, though somewhat less rigorous, alternative. Consequently, it was decided that the prevention evaluation would employ what is called a “regression discontinuity” design, coupled with other analytic techniques (for factors not suited to regression discontinuity – e.g. self-reported delinquency/criminality). This approach does not risk the “denial of service” ethical dilemma that would be a consequence of randomly assigning at-risk youth to a non-service control group. For that reason and others it is thus not likely to stimulate provider resistance.
- Intervention effects will be assessed during Y2 at the community level, rather than at the individual level. This decision was based on two factors. First, informed consent from intervention clients to share confidential information with the evaluators is not obtained by providers, as it is for prevention. This means that the evaluation team is barred by federal regulations from reviewing or analyzing individual intervention client data. Second, intervention agency staff members have expressed concern that their ability to effectively work with gang-involved clients would be compromised if those clients learned that they were being individually assessed by an external organization. During Y2, this issue will be revisited to explore alternate possibilities for individual level analysis.
- The evaluation team will enhance its working relationship with LAVITA staff and will develop procedures and techniques for assessing the impact of LAVITA on intervention activities in the GRYD zones.

- An evaluation of Summer Night Lights will be incorporated into the evaluation scope of work. During the 2010 SNL period (July-Sept), the evaluation team will cooperate and coordinate with SNL information gathering being conducted by the GRYD office (through surveys), and will subsequently develop an approach to measuring community response to SNL. In addition, the evaluation will analyze LAPD data to make an assessment of the effects of SNL on crime and delinquency.
- The YSET retest process will be initiated across all zones early in Y2 and will be conducted by prevention providers. All GRYD prevention clients will be retested at six month intervals after program entry. UI/Harder will randomly identify a sample of retested youth for one-on-one interviews with evaluation team staff. The purpose will be to check the retest responses for the interviewed youth and clarify/elaborate those responses as needed.
- The GRYD Cabinet and the GRYD Multi-Disciplinary Teams (MDTs) will not be included in the evaluation's Y2 scope of work. However, during Y2, Harder/UI will obtain information concerning Cabinet and MDT activities from the GRYD office in preparation for possible Y3 evaluation of those activities.

All of this bodes well for the GRYD program and its evaluation during Y2. There is more clarity of purpose and foundation for progress. Program implementation is much stronger than a year ago and there have been breakthroughs in design decisions and data systems serving both programming and evaluation. Some challenges with implementing new ideas remain but the prospect of reporting more solid program implementation and rigorous outcome results in the Y2 annual evaluation report appears to be quite strong.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AADAP	Asian American Drug Abuse Program (77th Division II)
AFS	Alma Family Services (Boyle Heights)
BRIDGE	Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement
CB	Community Build, Inc. (Baldwin Village)
CBCL	Child Behavior Checklist
CHLA	Children's Hospital of LA (Cypress Park)
CIS	Communities in Schools (Pacoima Foothill)
CLEAR	Community Law Enforcement and Recovery
EAC	Evaluation Advisory Committee
FFT	Functional Family Therapy
LACC	LA Conservation Corps (Watts Southeast)
LAM	LA Metropolitan Churches (Florence-Graham)
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LAVITA	Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy
LARRC	Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency Check-Up Assessment Tool
LAUSD	Los Angeles Unified School District
GRP	Gang Reduction Program
GRYD	Gang Reduction and Youth Development
GRYDIS	Gang Reduction and Youth Development Information System
Harder	Harder+Company Community Research
MDT	Multidisciplinary Team
NDY	New Directions for Youth (Panorama City)
NGC	National Youth Gang Surveys
OJJDP	Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (US Department of Justice)
RFP	Request for Proposals
SDQ	Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire
SEA	Soledad Enrichment Action (multiple intervention sites)
SNL	Summer Night Lights
UCI	University of California-Irvine
UI	Urban Institute
USC	University of Southern California
VIP	Violence Intervention Program (Ramona Gardens)
WLCAC	Watts Labor Community Action Committee (Watts)
YSET	Youth Services Eligibility Tool

Introduction

This report presents first year findings of the multi-year implementation and outcome evaluation by the Urban Institute (UI) and Harder+Company (Harder) of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). GRYD is a \$20 million per year initiative managed by the Mayor's Office in the City of Los Angeles to prevent at-risk youth from joining street gangs, intervene with individual gang members to help them leave gangs, and to respond to crisis situations associated with gang activities. Twelve geographic "zones" are targeted across the city for enhanced prevention and intervention services. The evaluation covers all 12 zones.

The report begins with an overview of the context of gang activity and crime in Los Angeles under which the GRYD program was conceptualized in 2007. The organization of the GRYD program is described and the process of implementation of a wide variety of prevention and intervention programs across all zones is documented from the origin of the GRYD office in 2008 through Y1. Key implementation challenges and successes are highlighted. In addition, the results of a pilot assessment of changes in risk factors and delinquent behaviors are presented for a sample of youth that received GRYD prevention services early in Y1. The report also discusses the methodological challenges to the evaluation encountered during Y1, describes how these challenges have been overcome, and plans for an enhanced implementation process evaluation and the measurement of intermediate and longer term individual and community level outcomes that may be associated with GRYD.

Chapter I

Gangs and Crime: A Review of the Literature

1.1. Overview of Street Gangs in the United States

1.1.1. Introduction

According to Howell and Moore (2010), street gangs² emerged in the United States about 1783, shortly after the end of the American Revolution. However, they question how serious a problem these early groups actually were and suggest that serious gang involvement in street crime did not actually develop until the early 1800's. These early gangs grew first on the East Coast and later in the Midwest consistent with population growth and migration patterns of the time. Gang growth was reportedly stimulated by European immigration to the United States where many groups settled urban areas and suffered from both poverty and discrimination by native-born residents (Howell and Moore, 2010, p. 1). The internal migration of poor and unskilled blacks to Northern cities from the South in the 1930's and after World War II led to the emergence of black gangs first in the Eastern and Midwestern areas of the country. Mexican immigration to these cities over the same period similarly led to the formation of large, violent Latino street gangs, such as the Latin Disciples and Latin Kings (Howell and Moore, 2010).

Organized street gangs did not appear in the Western part of the United States until the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Redfield, 1941; Rubel, 1965; Howell and Moore, 2010). These early gangs were largely comprised of young men of Mexican heritage (Latino and Chicano). Latino street gang growth was fueled by large waves of immigration from Mexico to the Southwest and California in the early 1900's. Poverty and discrimination were also important factors associated with gang growth in the West but physical and cultural "marginalization" also were major forces helping to shape the growth and characteristics of these groups (Howell and Moore, 2010, p. 9). Black migration following World War II also led to the emergence of black street gangs throughout the West beginning in the late 1940's (Howell and Moore, 2010).

For most of the 20th century, gang activity remained relatively local and disorganized with youth congregating to participate in illicit activities and then disbanding with little

² "Serious street gangs are typically characterized as having a multiple-year history, having a large membership (varies widely), being somewhat organized (having some sort of hierarchy and leadership roles), and being involved in violent crimes in the course of street presence (e.g., homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, use of firearms)" (Howell, 1999, 2006).

intervention on the part of social service agencies or law enforcement. However, the 1980's saw a rapid expansion in gangs and gang activity. While the cause of this gang explosion is not clear, some have speculated that the crack-cocaine epidemic, economic conditions limiting opportunities for youth, gang migration and glamorizing gangs by the media may all have been reasons (Howell, 1998; Miller, 2001).

More recently gangs across the United States have been influenced by the immigration of a wide array of other ethnic groups, most notably from Central America, South America and Asia. The implantation and evolution of transnational gangs has resulted since the 1970s and led to additional gang growth and increased violence over the 1950's (Howell and Moore, 2010). Currently there are many faces to youthful street gang members as whites, females and youth not living in poverty or the inner cities have become active gang members nationwide (Howell and Moore, 2010).

I.1.2. National Estimates of Street Gang Prevalence

There is a substantial amount of uncertainty about the prevalence of street gangs, as well as the numbers of active gang members, in the United States. As Sheldon et al. (2001, p. 26) observed, "there are as many estimates as there are estimators." For example, estimates of gang membership in the 1990s ranged from 660,000 to over 1.5 million (Esbensen, Winfree, He, and Taylor, 2004). One of the reasons for such varied estimates is the lack of consensus on what constitutes a gang, gang membership or gang activity. Even gang crimes are defined differently across jurisdictions. Moreover, systems for recording accurate data about gangs and gang members are sparse and inadequate (Violence Policy Center, 2009).

The most cited national estimates of gang prevalence and membership come from the annual National Youth Gang Surveys conducted by the National Gang Center (NGC - formerly the National Youth Gang Center). Under funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice, this survey polls law enforcement agencies across the United States about gang problems, gang prevalence and membership.

In its most recent survey the NGC reported that "approximately 774,000 gang members and 27,900 gangs are estimated to have been active in the United States in 2008" (Egley, et al., 2010, p. 1). These estimates are about the same as they were in 2007. However, the reported prevalence of gangs and gang members grew in larger cities, particularly in those with populations over 250,000. The NGC found this particularly significant as "these cities continue

to be the predominant location of both gangs and gang members in the United States” (Egley, et al., 2010, p.2).

In addition, the NGC also found that about one-third of the respondents reported serious gang problems in their jurisdictions and 45 percent reported that these problems were “getting worse” (Egley et al., 2010, p. 2). The reported incidence of gang problems is up substantially since 2001 when the annual survey found less than 25 percent of all study jurisdictions had significant gang problems. In contrast, from 1996 through 2001 the reported seriousness of gang problems among polled jurisdiction had been steadily declining. Of those reporting on gang-related crimes in 2008, 44 percent saw an increase in aggravated assaults, 41 percent reported increased drug sales, 41 percent noted an increase in firearms use and 20 percent reported an increase in gang-related homicides (Egley, et al. 2010, p. 2).

I.1.3. Gangs, Violence and Crime

I.1.3.a. Delinquency and Gangs

Although many teenagers exhibit problematic behaviors, including violence (White and Mason, 2006), research has consistently shown that, compared with other youth, gang members are more involved in delinquent behavior and crime. However, contrary to popular belief “the most common gang-related crimes are minor ones – thefts, vandalism, joy-riding, graffiti writing and drug use rather than drug sales” (Klein, in Reuters, 2007, p.2).

One longitudinal study in Denver revealed that gang members reported two to three times as much delinquency as non-gang members, often in the form of fighting with other gangs, but did not differ in their commitment to delinquent peers or their commitment to positive peers (Esbensen, Huizinga, and Weiher, 1993). Other longitudinal research on gang populations has found similar results, such as the Seattle Social Development Project, which determined that gang membership increases delinquent involvement even after controlling for the influence of delinquent friends (Battin, Hill, Abbott, Catalano, and Hawkins, 1998). Another pivotal longitudinal study tracking 4,000 young people in Rochester, New York across almost 10 years found that 30 percent of the sample joined a gang at some point before the end of high school. The gang-involved youth, about a third of the sample, accounted for the vast share of self-reported delinquency committed—65 percent of the delinquent acts, 86 percent of the serious delinquent acts, 69 percent of the violent delinquent acts, 70 percent of the drug sales, and 63

percent of the reported drug use. In addition, compared with youth who never joined a gang, the gang members were significantly more likely to drop out of school, become teenage parents, and have unstable employment (Browning, Thornberry, and Porter, 1999; Thornberry and Burch, 1997; Thornberry, Huizinga, and Loeber, 2004).

Importantly, the subjects who were gang members had higher rates of delinquency, especially violence, drug sales, and illegal gun possession, during the years they belonged to gangs than during the years they did not (Thornberry et al., 2004). Related findings from a Cleveland, Ohio study showed that gang-involved youth were more likely to commit a range of crimes than were other at-risk youth not involved with gangs (Huff, 1998). Interviews with high school students in Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Diego also revealed that gang members, both male and female, committed more delinquent acts and serious offenses than did non-gang members (Fagan, 1989). The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) showed that victims perceived perpetrators of violent crimes to be gang members in about 6 percent of victimizations (Harrell, 2005). Gang members are also more likely than other juveniles to carry firearms and in one study a third of gang members reported that “it was okay to shoot someone who disrespected them” (Howell and Decker, 1999, p. 6).

These studies offer several conclusions about the relationship between gang membership and crime. Gang membership increases the level of criminal and delinquent behavior on the part of its members. That is, while individuals are in gangs, their level of criminality increases compared to the period of time before they joined the gang. Equally important, the level of criminality declines once an individual leaves the gang. This reinforces the conclusion that the gang itself contributes to levels of crime, not just that gangs attract individuals already involved in crime. The group context of gang behavior provides support and opportunities for members to engage in more illegal behavior as well as more serious illegal behavior. According to Thornberry et al. (2004), the connection between gangs and delinquency is not simply a matter of gangs attracting the most delinquent youth, but rather the reality that “[t]he social processes of being an active gang member clearly facilitate or enhance involvement in delinquent behavior” (Thornberry et al., 2004, p. 10).

1.1.3.b. Risk Factors

While such group context models provide more support for gang members’ increased criminality than do so-called ‘kind of person’ models, certain types of individuals nonetheless

experience a greater risk of becoming involved in gang activity. Klein and Maxson (2006) note that “risk factors are grouped within the five ecological domains of individual, family, peer, school, and neighborhood” (p.139). However, their review of 20 studies disclosed a “large number of conflicting results” (p. 139), leading them to the conclusion that a major challenge for gang control programs is to identify the youth most likely to join gangs and then concentrate on them.³ Other researchers have documented that at risk youth are often characterized by low self-esteem, depression, early sexual activity, certain antisocial beliefs and behaviors (e.g., hyperactivity, aggression, tolerance for deviance), exposure to a significant number of serious negative life events, and, most importantly, early drug and alcohol use and delinquency—especially violent delinquency (Browning et al., 1999; Esbensen, 2000; Hill, Lui, and Hawkins, 2001; Howell, 1998; Thornberry, 2001; Thornberry et al., 2004). Low levels of commitment and attachment to school and teachers, poor school performance, and low expectations for educational success have also been linked to gang involvement. Youths are more likely to join gangs if they come from families that are poor, are structurally unstable, lack parental supervision, have low levels of communication between parents and children, or are dysfunctional in certain other ways (e.g., parents are accepting of violence and exhibit low levels of attachment to children; siblings exhibit antisocial behavior). Exposure to criminality may also put youth at risk for joining a gang. Association with delinquent peers and a history of gang activity in the family both have been shown to predict later gang membership. One study determined that formal criminal intervention and dealings with the juvenile justice system may cause youth to identify with deviance and become involved in deviant social groups, namely street gangs and delinquent peers (Bernburg, Krohn, and Rivera, 2006).

1.1.3.c. Communities and Gang Involvement

Risk factors for gang involvement tend to cluster within disadvantaged communities. Poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and overall economic isolation and lack of opportunity are commonly blamed for the emergence of gangs. Explanations for the high prevalence of gangs in minority communities include racism, political exclusion, and social marginalization. Further analysis suggests that African-American gang involvement is associated with exposure to gang members, while Latino gang involvement was associated with

³ This idea is the foundation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD), discussed below in Chapter II.

psychological variables and school peer groups (Curry and Spergel, 1992). Research has also shown that social disorganization, neighborhood violence, and local availability of drugs can encourage the growth of gangs (Esbensen, 2000; Hill et al., 2001; Howell, 1998; Thornberry, 2001). It is important to remember, as Esbensen (2000) points out, that the dynamics of gang environments are much more variable than stereotypes would lead us to believe, and many gangs are not located in poor, minority neighborhoods.

This clustering of individuals at risk for gang involvement often translates into community-wide problems. For example, a study of school crime found that a student who attended a school where gangs were present was more likely to have been physically attacked or been a victim of theft at school, including theft by force or threat, in the previous six months (Howell and Lynch, 2000). The NYGS reveals that a significant portion of participating law enforcement agencies reported at least one gang-related homicide from 1999 to 2000. This was true in 32 percent of cities with a population between 25,000 and 50,000, 55 percent of cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000, and 64 percent of cities with a population between 100,000 and 250,000 (Egley, 2002). In the two cities with indisputably the most serious gang homicide problems—Los Angeles and Chicago—more than half of all homicides in 2001 and 2002 were reported to be gang-related (Egley and Major, 2004). Gang-related homicides are heavily influenced by the ethnic composition of the community (Curry and Spergel, 1988) and tend to involve minority males whose crime involves the use of firearms in a public place and with a large number of participants (Maxson and Klein, 1985).

Although empirical research suggests incidents of gang violence are more often related to turf disputes than to drugs (Block and Block, 1993), the presence of gangs within a community will also likely increase drug-related activities, particularly drug sales. The nature of this association has come under debate within the research community. Some scholars argue that street gangs represent well-organized distributors of illegal drugs whose profits allow them to engage in increased gang activity; such gangs are described as formal-rational organizations with a leadership structure, roles, rules, common goals, and control over members. In order to effectively control drug sales, gangs should possess an organizational structure involving roles, rules and a hierarchy of leaders; forward group goals that all members endorse; promote stronger allegiance to the larger organization than to subgroups within it; and control and discipline members to produce compliance with group goals.

The image of gangs as well-organized groups sharing common goals in the sale of drugs stands in stark contrast to the alternative claim that street-level drug sales by gangs are seldom well-organized or cohesive; instead, drug sales represent the activities of individual gang members often acting independently of their allegiances. Researchers such as Klein, Maxson and Cunningham (1991) and Reiner (1992) argue that gangs lack the organizational structure and commitment to common goals to be successful in drug sales. In his extensive report, Reiner (1992) (at the time, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County) observed that gangs in Los Angeles did not control drug sales because they were disorganized and had a loosely confederated structure. He found that traditional street gangs were not well suited for drug distribution or any other business-like activity and that they were weakly organized, prone to unnecessary and unproductive violence, and full of brash, conspicuous, and untrustworthy individuals who drew unwanted police attention. Indeed, one of the most difficult issues in studying gangs is distinguishing between the activities of individual gang members and those of the gang.⁴ Individual gang members often act individually or in subgroups outside their gangs, a distinction that applies to the non-criminal and criminal activities of gang members, including drug sales.

I.1.4. Summary

Youth gangs have been in existence in America for over two centuries. Over time, gangs have changed and evolved, especially in response to immigration patterns. Gang membership has notably increased in cities, with perceptions of the gang problem growing among law enforcement agencies. However, our knowledge of the gang problem has also improved over time. Research on the connections between delinquency and gang membership, individual-level risk factors and community-level risk factors, and the impact of gang activity on communities has increased the ability to react to the gang problem on a national level. The next section explores street gangs in the specific context of Los Angeles, the “nation’s capital” for gang violence.

⁴ Gang-related crimes can be defined as those acts committed by a known gang member (individual-level definition) or those acts motivated by gang objective (gang-motivated definition).

1.2. Street Gangs in Los Angeles

1.2.1. Evolution of LA Gangs

The precursors of street gangs in Los Angeles were the *palomilla*, small groups of young Mexican men first observed in Texas in the early 1900s (Howell and Moore, 2010; Rubel, 1965). These groups reportedly migrated westward and later became known as “boy gangs” as they settled in the Los Angeles area (Howell and Moore, 2010; Vigil and Long, 1990). Membership in these early groups was augmented by the migration of young Mexican men to and from the area following the Mexican-American War and the ceding of what is now known as California to the United States by Mexico. From these early groups of youth Latino gangs grew over three distinct periods, according to Howell and Moore (2010).

The first period was during the 1930’s and 1940’s. During this stage young males formed groups based upon friendships as a means of social adaptation in the poor neighborhoods in which they resided and were marginalized. Of note is that in contrast with gangs in other parts of the country, these emerging gangs developed strong cultural ties to the neighborhoods where they lived. Indeed many gang names reflect this strong attachment to and identification with neighborhood. Territory-based conflict arose as a result, both with other gangs and with social and government institutions (Howell and Moore, 2010).

The second period began in the 1940’s and continued over several decades with the immigration of millions of Mexicans into the Los Angeles area and other parts of the southwest. This immigration led to growth in previously established territorial street gangs (some of which became inter-generational) and the emergence of new gangs as new poor Latino neighborhoods became settled. Conflicts grew as a result.

The last period is associated with the emergence of black gangs. As with eastern and northern industrial cities, there was a substantial migration of southern blacks in search of good paying urban factory employment following both World War I and World War II. However, instead of a better life, blacks encountered institutionalized segregation and inequalities. According to Howell and Moore (2010), the restrictive housing covenants that discriminated against black citizens in Los Angeles were particularly important for the formation of black street gangs. Challenges to these housing restrictions led to violent attacks by white groups and as a result, black youth formed their own defensive street groups. In addition, school-based gangs were formed for protection against white youth violence. As violence against blacks by

white youth diminished over time conflicts among black clubs grew within the context of street socialization of new immigrant youth from the rural south living in the ghettos of Los Angeles (Howell and Moore, 2010). By the 1960's these protective clubs evolved into large black-only street gangs that became organized into two primary camps – the Bloods and the Crips, both of which adopted territorial identities similar to those developed by earlier Latino gangs. Many of these gangs came to view each other as arch enemies and have engaged in ongoing blood feuds with one another to this day (Howell and Moore, 2010).


More recently, some gangs have rejected racial barriers to membership and recruited across ethnic lines and international gangs; one such gang is MS-13, which originated in El Salvador. The ongoing growth of Latino, Black and other racial and ethnic gangs in Los Angeles has been accompanied by increased violence and criminal activity, and the alienation of significant segments of the youth of the city from the rest of society.

1.2.2. Recent Prevalence Estimates in Los Angeles

The media regularly portrays Los Angeles as having the highest concentration of gangs, gang members and gang violence of any area in the United States. For example, Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca was once quoted by Reuters as saying, “Los Angeles County and City is, unfortunately, the *gang capital of America* (Reuters, 2007).” Brenda Walker (2008) calls Los Angeles “*Ground Zero* for gangs in the country.” Unfortunately, as with national statistics, accurate and reliable prevalence and membership estimates are quite limited and published figures vary widely. Complicating the understanding of the gang problem in the City of Los Angeles is that Los Angeles County as a whole is often included in prevalence estimates. For example, Reuters (2007) estimated countywide there were over 1,000 gangs and 88,000 members. Walker (2008) cites estimates of 1,200 gangs with 80,000 members, 23,000 of which are in Hispanic gangs in the city and another 16,000 that are in black gangs in the city.

The Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) reports on gang membership and crime are often cited as authoritative estimates of gang prevalence. According to their website (lapdonline.org) there are currently approximately 400 active gangs with about 41,000 members in the City of Los Angeles. For a number of years LAPD published monthly estimates of prevalence but these were discontinued in 2006. when the number of gangs was estimated to be over seven hundred.

Summaries of month-to-month estimates by LAPD on the number of gangs from 2004 through late 2006 are presented in Figure 1. Year end estimates from 1993 through 2004 generally were about the same as those presented for 2004 and consistent with the current published number of around 400 gangs. However, as can




be seen in the chart there was a slight increase in the number of gangs in early 2005 to well over 400 gangs through the early months of 2006.⁵ However, in the summer of 2006 the estimated number of gangs increased markedly and at one point was more than double the historical average and the current LAPD estimate.

LAPD's current estimated gang membership suggests that about 5 percent of all known street gang members in the United States reside in the City of Los Angeles. In addition, slightly over 1 percent of Los Angeles residents are thought to be active gang members. If correct, this suggests that youth are five times more likely to be in a gang in Los Angeles than in the United States as a whole.

As can be seen in Figure 2, past LAPD gang membership estimates indicated relatively stable levels around 40,000 each month from 2005 through late 2006 when city-specific estimates were no longer published. Prior to 2005 gang estimates were substantially higher with monthly memberships of over 45,000. An examination of year end estimates back to 1993 indicates that overall gang membership declined during the 1990's and early 2000's. LAPD

⁵ The monthly estimates were not available for April and July of 2005 and are shown as missing. These months should not be interpreted as periods of zero gangs.

reported over 61,000 members in 1993 and a peak membership at the end of 1997 of over 64,000 (lapdonline.org).



I.2.3. Gangs, Violence and Crime



Figure 3 presents the monthly totals of gang-related crimes⁶ published by LAPD (lapdonline.org) from 2004 through the middle of 2009. As can be seen in the monthly series, gang-related crimes have been characterized by notable spikes during the summer months and followed by reductions thereafter each year. In addition, the overall trend is one of gradually declining gang-related criminal incidents by gang members, particularly from the peak of about 700 a month in the middle of 2007. Indeed, recent LAPD summary incident statistics confirm this decline over the past three years. They report that total gang-related crime declined 15.8 percent from 2008 to 2009 and another 9.5 percent from 2009 to 2010. Part I serious crime also declined for the City of Los Angeles as a whole – down 12.4 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 7.1 percent from 2009 through 2010 to date (lapdonline.org). Nonetheless, gangs are responsible for a disproportionate share of serious violent crime in Los Angeles. A comparison of LAPD reported gang related Part I crimes in 2008 to those of the city as a whole shows that over 40

⁶ After July 2007 LAPD reported homicide, *aggravated assault*, attack on police officers, rape, robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, shots inhabited dwelling, arson, *criminal threats* and extortion in their gang crime summaries. Prior to that they counted homicide, *attempt homicide*, *felony assault*, attacks on police officer, robbery, shots inhabited dwell, kidnap, arson, *witness intimidation*, extortion and carjacking.

percent of all robberies and aggravated assaults are gang-related. Over 80 percent of homicides are labeled as gang-related.

The Violence Policy Center suggests that the majority of gang-related homicides in California – approximately 75 percent from 1981 to 2001 – took place in Los Angeles (2009, p. 9). Figure 4 presents month-to-month reports of

homicides labeled as gang-related by LAPD to illustrate trends in violence committed by gangs. As with all serious gang-related crimes, there have been cyclical peaks in homicides in summer



months, although curiously the highest numbers of homicides were reported in the early months of both 2004 and 2005 when incidents exceeded 30 per month. Homicides also gradually decreased from 2004 through 2009, although at a substantially sharper rate than all gang-related crimes. By the end of the reporting period monthly homicides were less than

a third of what they were at their peaks in the middle of the decade. LAPD reports that these declines for gang-related homicides were 19.6 percent from 2008-2009 and another 1.2 percent from 2009 to 2010. For the city as a whole, declines of 23.7 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 2.7 percent from 2009 to 2010 were reported for homicides by LAPD (lapdonline.org).

I.1.4. Summary

Street gangs in Los Angeles began to emerge in the early part of the 20th century. The immigration of Mexican youth into impoverished areas of the city gave rise to Latino gangs who adopted strong neighborhood attachments and territorial orientations. Migration of blacks from the south into the ghettos of the city gave rise to black groups organized for defense against attacks by white youth. These evolved into large black gangs which also became territorial and encountered conflicts with other groups, social organizations and the criminal justice system. Current LAPD estimates suggest that there are at least 400 active gangs with over 41,000 members in Los Angeles, although there is no external validation of these numbers. While gang crime and violence have been declining in recent years, gang members are still engaged in a disproportionate amount of serious violent crime across the city, most notably for firearm associated homicides. It was within this context that the Office of the Mayor in the City of Los Angeles developed a citywide gang prevention and intervention initiative, known as the Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program (conceptualized in 2007 and implemented in 2008 and 2009).

Chapter II

The Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program

II.1. Introduction

The Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program is a gang prevention and intervention program that was implemented in twelve geographically delimited neighborhoods in Los Angeles in 2008 with an annual budget in excess of \$20 million. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa's GRYD office selected these neighborhoods (known as GRYD "zones") in Central L.A. (one zone), East L.A. (three zones), South L.A. (six zones), and the Valley (two zones). The program is intended to inhibit gang joining by at risk youth, and to help gang-involved youth and young adults transition out. With suppression efforts already in place in Los Angeles when this program was implemented, GRYD has a strong emphasis on case management and wrap-around service provision. This section introduces the GRYD program, including the origins, framework, and organizational structure of the program.

II.2. Origins

GRYD developed directly out of L.A. Bridges (Building Resources for the Intervention and Deterrence of Gang Engagement), a \$44 million community-based gang prevention and intervention program funded by the City of Los Angeles.⁷ Bridges was implemented in 1997, and was a major city-wide initiative that covered 29 areas defined as high-crime. Although there were strong advocates for Bridges (most notably the city council), a long-term evaluation was never conducted.⁸ The office of the city controller conducted an audit and reported the findings in March 2000, with extremely pessimistic conclusions. In addition to lacking the intended gang prevention impact, the audit also pointed to ineffective fiscal management, a lack of coordination, and an unfocused strategy; the city controller's overall recommendation was to terminate the program.⁹ Although the mayor attempted to shut down Bridges, the city council overrode his decision in a 12-0 vote. As the program continued, two short-term (six month)

⁷ Bridges I is the prevention component, and targets middle school age youth for services; Bridges II is an intervention component that targets youth already involved in gangs.

⁸ As Klein and Maxson (2006: 115) recount, evaluators in the first year only collected baseline data, and after a "political hassle," did not bid on continuation funding. There was no formal evaluation in Year 2.

⁹ See <http://articles.latimes.com/2000/apr/01/local/me-14889> for commentary.

evaluations, which were unable to decipher much outside of a short process evaluation, produced heavy criticism in the media (Klein and Maxson, 2006). Following the skepticism and eventual public outcry of this expensive and broken program, the City Council and other advocates finally accepted that Bridges needed to be terminated.

Under the leadership of Mayor Villaraigosa, the GRYD office was established in July of 2007. The GRYD office began releasing its first prevention provider Request for Proposals (RFP) in April of 2008, and in June of 2008, the Mayor and City Council authorized the GRYD office to end the Bridges program. Then in October 2008, the first six GRYD prevention provider contracts were executed. While the GRYD office was releasing the subsequent sets of RFPs (for the six remaining prevention sites and all 12 intervention providers) and finalizing new GRYD contracts, the Bridges contracts were maintained (through December 31, 2008).¹⁰ Up until the spring of 2009, some providers were still finishing contracts under Bridges, and several GRYD providers reported smoothly transitioning from Bridges one month to GRYD the next.

Six targeted areas in Bridges (Baldwin Village, Boyle Heights, Cypress Park/Northeast, Newton, Pacoima-Foothills, and Ramona Gardens) transferred over to GRYD and became the first zones to be funded for prevention services. Six other areas were added subsequently (77th II Division, Florence-Graham, Panorama, Rampart, Southwest II, and Watts).. The following Los Angeles shows their locations. Nine of the twelve prevention providers selected for GRYD were previously contracted under Bridges I; several intervention providers were previously Bridges II contractors, and three providers were both Bridges I and II contractors. However, the GRYD office attempted to restructure the program in response to the L.A. City Controller's Citywide Blueprint for a Comprehensive Anti-Gang Strategy (City Controller, 2008). In a follow-up audit, the city controller determined that "some significant steps and progress have been made" as Bridges transferred over to the GRYD office, and recommended further fiscal and services coordination, a focused strategy, increased collaborations (especially among the City, County, and school districts), and a formal evaluation (Chick, 2009).¹¹ The next section documents the

¹⁰ These public documents are all available online: <http://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/>

¹¹ Although the GRYD office asked the evaluation team for reactions to this publically released report, UI/Harder decided not to formally respond in an effort to remain independent of the City Council's interactions with the GRYD office.

GRYD framework that developed in response to the criticisms and failures of L.A. Bridges and the recommendations of city auditors.

II.3. The GRYD Framework

II.3.1. Goals and Mission Statement

In the GRYD Action Plan for the City of Los Angeles,¹² the GRYD office drafted the following mission statement:

To establish safe, clearly identified places, in every community with a high level of gang crime, where youth and their parents can receive unconditional support, services and counseling. We need to meet these kids on their own turf — with programming based on their needs and interests — and connect them with positive adult and teen role models who can point the way to a productive future. To weave a web of relationships between community residents and existing institutions, working together toward shared goals. To unite all of L.A. to invest in our youth: City and County departments, community and faith-based groups, educational institutions, philanthropies, businesses, and individual donors and volunteers.

To achieve these public safety and collaboration goals, the City originally identified four main components of their community-based strategy: neighborhood-based gang prevention, neighborhood-based gang intervention, crisis response, and suppression. For the purposes of the evaluation, however, there are three main components of the GRYD program administered by the GRYD office. The first is prevention – the provision of services to at risk youth to prevent them from joining gangs. The second is intervention case services – programs to assist gang-involved youth to exit their gangs and lead productive lives in their communities. The third is crisis intervention – outreach activities designed to reduce gang conflicts and associated violence, including response to crisis situations in progress. Intervention case services and crisis response services are in some zones managed by a single provider and are sometimes categorized simply as intervention, instead of two different components. The remainder of this section describes these different program components, how the evaluation team understood the

¹² Mayor Villaraigosa's Gang Reduction Vision, entitled *Healing Our Neighborhoods: A Citywide Partnership to Combat Gang Crime*. Available online: <http://www.ci.la.ca.us/mayor/villarajosaplan/PublicSafety/GangReductionStrategy/index.htm>

early GRYD “models” based on RFP solicitations, and how the GRYD office was organized to administer the wide variety of services across the three components.

II.3.2. Program Components

Prevention services are meant to provide a comprehensive resource center for youth, and to target those who are at the highest risk of joining a gang. Working with researchers from the University of Southern California (USC) and University of California-Irvine (UCI), GRYD implemented a screening tool for prevention services. Known as the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), this interview instrument asks youth a series of questions about behaviors, friends, family, important life events, and other potential influences in a youth’s life (or risk factors) to determine program eligibility. YSET originally contained two screens (or two separate administrations of the interview) with 146 questions; this was reduced to one combined instrument (and only one interview session) with 90 questions at the end of 2009.¹³ With an emphasis on placing the right youth into services that are intended to inhibit gang joining, the GRYD office had a strong emphasis on the prevention component of the GRYD model from the early planning stages.


The intervention component of the GRYD program was designed by the Los Angeles City Council’s Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development’s Community Engagement Advisory Committee and ultimately adopted by the GRYD program.¹⁴ This is a two-pronged strategy; the “street” aspect consists of activities such as crisis intervention, peacemaking, and outreach, while the second component involves individual and family rehabilitative services. In addition, several services (such as reentry, mentoring, and training) are designed to overlap (see logic model below). As implemented though, case services and crisis outreach/response were conceptualized as unique and separate GRYD program components.

¹³ These numbers refer to labeled questions, but multiple questions also have subsets (where youth may be asked additional questions if applicable). In total, a youth could potentially be asked 186 questions in the initial YSET and 131 in the new YSET.

¹⁴ This committee was commissioned in the spring of 2007 and released a report detailing this community-based intervention model in November of 2009. At the same time the report was released, the committee announced that the GRYD office had adopted this intervention strategy. However, the GRYD office never formally released documentation claiming this as their (full or partial) program model.

Figure 5

Community-Based Gang Intervention Model




The Community Engagement Advisory Committee's "Community-Based Gang Intervention Model: Definition and Structure" (2008)

Although the GRYD office's Action Plans for the City of Los Angeles mentions two other elements of the program model – crisis response and gang suppression – the former is part of the intervention component, and suppression (including police suppression, buy-back programs, and a gang unit) was already in place before GRYD was implemented. In addition,

although the GRYD office may have adopted the intervention model displayed above, there was never a clear prevention model or a framework that combined all of the GRYD components.

II.3.3. The Role of Requests for Proposals (RFPs)

Based on an interpretation of the local context, service plan, and desired impacts of GRYD (as listed in the GRYD RFPs), UI/Harder designed a preliminary logic model in the evaluation proposal to conceptualize the GRYD framework (see below).



As the project progressed, it was clear that there were serious issues with identifying and implementing a model, and various descriptions of the “model” have been disseminated.¹⁵ For

¹⁵ By “program model” we mean a clear, written set of distributed guidelines that translate program goals and objectives into appropriate, specific standards and procedures, including services, training, and monitoring.

example, the GRYD office has described the approach as a “four-part neighborhood based strategy” encompassing prevention, intervention, uniform crisis response, and suppression (Mayor Villaraigosa's Gang Reduction Vision, 2008); a comprehensive strategy inspired by and based on the Gang Reduction Program's (GRP) model, which highlights prevention, intervention, re-entry, and suppression as the main components (a March 2010 bulletin provided to the evaluation team); and as a program that is “complementing suppression with data driven prevention and intervention services” (<http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/GangReduction/index.htm>).¹⁶ The affect this confusion had on the evaluation is elaborated in Section III; the impact on providers and service provision is further discussed in Section IV, Program Development. For the purposes of this report, the GRYD program is considered to have three major components: prevention, intervention services, and crisis intervention.

In light of the various program descriptions, the RFP process used to select and fund providers for each of these components played an important role in developing the nature of GRYD programs and activities in Y1. The gang and crime problems were defined by Needs Assessment Reports the City contracted for in 2008 and high crime areas were pre-selected (most of them were areas under a preexisting police suppression program, CLEAR¹⁷). The RFPs for prevention, intervention case services and crisis intervention providers described or suggested only general program activities for providers within the context of a limited number of individual and community risk factors. The vague nature of these initial RFPs resulted in the proposal and subsequent funding of a wide variety of sometimes similar and often disparate activities, particularly for prevention and case services. As a result, there was little in the way of what might be called a standardized GRYD model across the zones. It wasn't until later in 2009 that the standardization of practices was encouraged by the GRYD office. For example, the introduction of the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA) RFP in September 2009 and its award to the Advancement Project in early 2010 sparked a new focus on

¹⁶ On the Mayor's website, Summer Night Lights, YSET, prevention, and intervention are highlighted as main aspects of the program; reentry and crisis response appear to be grouped within intervention. Accessed June 1, 2010.

¹⁷ The Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) program aims to reduce gang activity in Los Angeles by collecting intelligence, increasing visibility in the community, and using specific enforcement strategies that target gang crimes. See http://www.lapdonline.org/special_operations_support_division/content_basic_view/1013 for more information.


guidelines and training for intervention workers.¹⁸ By June 2010 almost a third of the gang intervention enrollees had graduated from the Academy.

II.4. GRYD Office Organization

In a 2009 report, the city controller made an explicit recommendation to the GRYD office to form a strong, centralized leadership for the GRYD program. Although finances were initially scattered across city departments, pulling the former Bridges program into the GRYD office led to restructuring and a tightening of roles and strategic planning. This section discusses the various divisions within the GRYD organizational structure and the primary roles of key players, in addition to an overview of the budgetary issues that threatened to dismantle part – or all – of the program. The organizational structure the GRYD office proposed for 2009-2010 is displayed below.

¹⁸ Intervention workers are sometimes referred to as Gang Intervention Specialists (GIS) or Crisis Intervention Workers (CIW), but this varies among providers in Los Angeles. Throughout this report, GIS and CIW will be generally referred to as intervention workers.

Figure 7
GRYD Office Organizational Chart, 2009-2010



II.4.1. GRYD Leadership

The original director left the program in September of 2009 to become the Mayor’s Chief of Staff and was no longer intimately involved in GRYD after his departure. The new Director emphasized evidence-based research and, along with the Associate Director, was interested in defining a model based on proven or promising practices. The Director and Associate Director worked closely together, with at least one of them in attendance for major GRYD program events (such as forums for providers). There were four key divisions in the GRYD

organizational structure: SNL, Programs, Planning and Administration, and Research and Evaluation. In addition to these divisions, a side component of the GRYD program was an Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC), consisting of prominent academic researchers.

II.4.2. Summer Night Lights (SNL)

Summer Night Lights (SNL) is contained in the GRYD office's organizational chart, although it was never clearly linked to the rest of the GRYD program. On June 30, 2008, months before the first GRYD provider agencies were selected, the Mayor's office launched the SNL program in eight parks within seven GRYD zones. Although not included in the RFP or contract for evaluation, SNL has been a critically important GRYD component. SNL was designed to have "expanded programming, after-school activities, athletic leagues, arts initiatives and family programs" from 7pm to midnight, Wednesdays through Saturdays from the first week in July to the first week in September.¹⁹ In 2009 SNL expanded to include 16 parks in all 12 GRYD zones and Hollywood. In 2010, SNL has expanded yet again – to 24 parks in or near GRYD zones.

Although the Mayor's Office reported promising findings from the first year of SNL,²⁰ the program also presents challenges to the GRYD office and service providers, the primary issue being staffing. SNL consumes an extraordinary amount of time (five hour shifts four days per week) and both GRYD office and provider agency staff struggled to balance other duties associated with GRYD. In addition, the GRYD office was often distracted by the high intensity of the SNL program, which is problematic for the development of other GRYD program elements. These issues are further discussed in Section IV, Evaluation Findings.

II.4.3. Programs

There are 12 Program Managers (PMs), one for each GRYD zone. PMs are responsible for the day-to-day implementation and management of GRYD zones. This includes leading coordination and collaboration efforts, assisting providers with contractual goals and progress, and the planning and implementation of SNL. As discussed in the zone profiles (see Chapter IV. for more information), PMs had high turnover and temporary leave rates during the first year and

¹⁹http://www.ci.la.ca.us/mayor/villaraigosaplan/PublicSafety/GangReductionStrategy/LACITY_004757.htm

²⁰ See <http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/GangReduction/SummerNightLights/index.htm> for a summary of these findings, which were drawn from LAPD statistics. The GRYD office Status Report, Number 3 (Period January 1, 2009 - June 30, 2009), pages 11-13, also provides information on SNL. Available online at <http://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/>.

a half of the program implementation. There are also two non-GRYD zone PMs, although their role was outside the scope of the evaluation, so it is unclear what they did within those zones or how they related to GRYD zone PMs. An intervention coordinator was also specified for this division, although this role was vacant. However, the intervention component grew during the first year of the evaluation, with a temporary intervention working group meeting to discuss training intervention workers and performance measures (this group dispersed but was rumored to begin again in the next cycle of funding).

II.4.4. Planning and Administrative Services

The Manager in the Planning and Administrative Services division was an especially important liaison for the evaluation team. Although he did not have full decision making powers, he acted as a project coordinator in many ways and was able to move the project forward for both the evaluation team and GRYD office. Among other tasks, the Policy Analysts in this division provide administrative and logistical support, ensure that contractual obligations are fulfilled, work with PMs to determine needs in the GRYD zones, provide technical assistance to providers when needed, and analyze and report on GRYD program outcomes.

II.4.5. Research and Evaluation

The Director of Research and Evaluation position was vacant, and there were no staff members in this division during the first year of the evaluation period.

II.4.6. Evaluation Advisory Committee

Finally, in addition to the core GRYD office roles there were a voluntary group of academics who comprised an Advisory Committee. This group initially consisted of three gang researchers who designed the YSET interview instrument for prevention eligibility (Dr. Karen Hennigan, Dr. Malcolm Klein, and Dr. Cheryl Maxson) and two additional well-known gang researchers (Dr. Scott Decker and Dr. Finn Esbensen). Subsequently, the group was expanded to include Dr. David Huizinga and Dr. Michael Katz. This group provided advice and feedback to the GRYD office and evaluators throughout the first 15 months of the evaluation (Y1).²¹

II.3.7. Budgetary Issues

Throughout 2009 and 2010 Los Angeles, like many cities, was heavily impacted by the economic crisis. This led to a cycle of budget cuts in a variety of city departments and services.

²¹ Throughout this report, Y1 designates the first 15 months of the evaluation.

The media speculated on which city services would be reduced, with a special focus on the GRYD program. By the spring of 2009 – after Los Angeles had already cut back on employees’ salaries and reduced the employee payroll by 2,400 jobs through early retirement programs, saving an estimated \$300 million – the LA Times announced that the City was over \$200 million in debt, with a projected \$1 billion deficit by 2013.²²

While Mayor Villaraigosa accepted fiscal negotiations for other city programs and services, he vetoed attempts to amend the GRYD budget plan and a provision that would allow the City Council to have authorization rights on the GRYD budget. The Council accepted this veto, and GRYD funding – while modestly reduced – stayed intact overall.²³ At the time of this report, there had not been any major structural or programmatic changes to GRYD in the midst of the budget crisis.

²² <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/04/despite-getting-new-revenue-la-budget-shortfall-deepens-to-2224-million.html>; <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/11/la-faces-1-billion-deficit-by-2013-budget-chief-calls-for-pension-reforms.html>

²³ <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/06/villaraigosa-vetos-budget-provision-giving-council-control-of-some-antigang-money.html>; <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/06/la-council-supports-villaraigosas-veto-of-antigang-portion-of-budget-bill.html>

Chapter III

The Y1 GRYD Evaluation

III.1. Introduction

As the GRYD office moved towards a new gang prevention and intervention strategy (and sought to remove itself from the unfavorable reputation of LA Bridges), a major priority was a formal, long-term process and outcomes evaluation. The GRYD office's Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC) played a large role in the scoring and ranking of the proposals received, and also conducted phone interviews with the three highest scoring proposal teams to determine the evaluators for the GRYD program. The Urban Institute (UI) and Harder+Company Community Research (Harder) were awarded an initial twelve month contract in April of 2009 for a multi-year evaluation planned by the GRYD office. This section discusses the research objectives and goals of the evaluation, reviews the initial overall proposed methodology for the actual Y1 implementation process and outcome/impact designs and methodologies, and details the research challenges that were encountered.

III.2. Research Goals and Objectives

Determining the effectiveness of GRYD involves both a process and outcome evaluation. The GRYD office noted four specific research questions in the evaluation RFP:

1. Implementation fidelity to strategic plans: are the strategies and programs in the GRYD zones doing what they are intended to do?
2. Did GRYD program components result in the hypothesized outcomes: how effective are the gang-reduction strategy and its components?
3. Formative performance measurement, benchmarking and feedback: are there early indicators to guide program modifications or required funding changes?
4. Lessons learned, zone-specific and pooled zone-wide evaluation findings: what are the indicators of success in the program and how are they measured?

In addition, UI/Harder proposed two additional primary research areas:

5. How do the program and its outcomes change over time throughout the life of the

strategy? What are the levels of collaboration and partnerships among service providers and other stakeholders prior to strategy implementation and how does it change during the program period? What is the role of the community in GRYD and what is their influence on the success of the strategy?

6. How cost-effective is GRYD overall, by individual zone and by each strategy component?

In other words, the process evaluation was designed to understand whether the providers and GRYD office are faithful to the program model; which components should be modified during the process; how success is operationalized; and the continuous development of partnerships and collaboration, while the outcome/impact evaluation was designed to determine which strategies and specific services are effective and whether GRYD is cost-effective. These goals guided the following research objectives:

- Working with key provider staff in each zone to establish timelines and benchmarks in the implementation process.
- Identifying the data collection sources such as forms or logs that are filled out regularly by each provider and documenting events such as staff meetings, trainings, and networking efforts. UI/Harder will also collect relevant program documents such as financial statements and case management files to assess dosage levels, client contact levels, case management loads, and program costs.
- Conducting periodic staff member interviews on program implementation successes and challenges. UI/Harder will also conduct focus groups with staff members to gather their perceptions on the strategy and implementation process.
- Gathering information on the perspectives of program participants and including process questions in all interviews, including questions about the program and dosage levels.
- Conducting periodic program observations in each zone, using a standard observation protocol. These observations will take place at least once per quarter in each zone. UI/Harder will also schedule observations of individual case management efforts (e.g., intake assessment interviews, discharge interviews) quarterly in each zone with each provider.

- Reviewing LAPD records - incident, arrest, and calls for service data and information on CLEAR activity in each zone. Additional data will include information from case files and the LAPD gang unit. UI/Harder will also conduct interviews with officers who work in each zone to gather their perceptions on youth behavior and gang activity.
- Collecting school-level information such as graduation and college attendance rates and school safety measures to assess overall changes in educational outcomes.

The objectives described above are broken into three tables to display the process data sources and measures, individualized (or case managed) data sources and outcomes, and crisis intervention data sources and outcome measures. The first table displays the proposed data sources and measures for the implementation/process evaluation.

Table 1: Process Data Sources and Measures

Data Sources	Measures
Evaluation forms	Number of clients enrolled Number of face-to-face contacts with clients, family members
Program files (financial reports, activity reports, case management files)	Number of clients exiting program Amount spent on each activity
Interviews with providers, case managers, outreach workers	Level of completion of required data elements (e.g., intake assessment and re-assessments)
Focus groups	Implementation benchmarks met
Participant interviews, surveys	Technical assistance received Problems encountered with implementation
Program observations	Changes in leadership/personnel
Partnership survey (based on GRP survey)	Communication levels among providers Perceived levels of partnership among providers

The following table displays the data sources and individual and community-level measures for outcomes/impacts for prevention and intervention. Prevention and intervention are combined in this table due to the similarities in necessary data collection.

Table 2: Individualized Services Data Sources and Outcomes

Data Sources	Control variables	Outcome measures
LAPD records	<u>Individual level</u>	<u>Individual level</u>
Police intelligence (from case files, gang unit)	Demographics	Overall risk score(s)
Client records of services received	Length of treatment/dosage	Educational outcomes
Standardized risk assessments	Prior involvement in gangs	Gang association/associates
Victimization surveys	Siblings in gang	Involvement in gang incidents
LA Unified School District (LAUSD); Probation, Parole records	Substance use/abuse	Victimizations and gang joining prevented
Self reports (surveys, focus groups, interviews)	Risky sexual behavior	Employment status
Intelligence from others (outreach, case managers, families/siblings)	Risk assessment scores	Health/life skills
Community surveys and focus groups	Participation in pro-social and alternative activities	<u>Community level</u>
Monitoring of community physical attributes	GPA, truancy, arrests, delinquency at school	Incident levels
	<u>Community level</u>	Gang-related calls for service prevented
	Racial/ethnic population	Crime, gang incidents prevented
	Number of gangs in zone	Educational outcomes
	Type of gangs in zone	Cost effectiveness
	Physical indicators	
	Other services available	

The final table, displayed below, lays out the data sources and community-level measures for crisis intervention.

Table 3: Crisis Intervention Data Sources and Measures

Data Sources	Control Variables	Measures
LAPD records	<u>Community level</u>	<u>Community level</u>
Police intelligence	Racial/ethnic population	Incident levels
Incident reports, follow up plans for each incident	Number of gangs in zone	Arrest levels
Self reports (interviews, focus groups)	Type of gangs in zone	Crime, gang incidents prevented
Incident observations (by violence interrupters)	Resident investment in community	Crisis incidents prevented
Community surveys and focus groups	Physical indicators of gangs, safety	Level of violence in crisis incidents
		Fear of crime, perceptions of safety among residents
		Intelligence collection methods
		Cost effectiveness

III.3. Original Proposed Methodology

To achieve the process objectives outlined above, UI/Harder proposed a longitudinal descriptive design to document zone-specific and pooled performances and implementation fidelity. The emphasis was on a formative research approach, with regular interaction, feedback, and guidance with the GRYD office and with service providers.

For outcomes of the prevention and individualized intervention services components, an individual level experimental research design was proposed, if feasible. This design would incorporate the random assignment of at-risk youth to an experimental group, which would receive GRYD services, or to a control group, which would not. Successful implementation of such a design would depend on the acceptance by the GRYD office and service providers that youth designated at-risk, and so in need of services, would be randomly assigned to one of the two groups. Those assigned to the control group would not receive GRYD support. This was initially considered satisfactory by the GRYD office, when it was believed that the number of referred youth in each zone would exceed the GRYD service targets (200 for prevention and 50 for intervention²⁴) because the random assignment would then not deny service to more youth than would have been denied anyway due to service provider capacity constraints.

However, based on the past research, including most recently under the evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program in Boyle Heights, the UI/Harder team recognized that even experienced service providers with established recruitment techniques might have difficulties recruiting enough youth participants for their programs, thus putting a randomized design in jeopardy. As a fall back alternative if this were to turn out to be the case, we proposed to implement quasi-experimental designs – either through propensity score methods or regression discontinuity. Propensity score methods would involve matching individuals who participated in GRYD services (treatment group) to those who did not participate (control group) on one or more key covariates measured prior to participation. Under a regression discontinuity design, participants are assigned to a treatment or control group using a cutoff point on a single scale or score derived from an instrument such as the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). Whereas the strength of the random assignment design stems from the independence of the assignment mechanism (completely random and unpredictable) and the subsequent equivalence for each group of factors other than GRYD services, the regression discontinuity design's strength is

²⁴ GRYD Request for Proposals, 2008, p. 12.

based on full knowledge of the assignment mechanism (completely deterministic or predictable). Under this design, control groups will be made up of youth living in the targeted zones who were tested on YSET but who did not score above the at-risk cutoff point.

For community outcomes, we proposed a pre-post comparison zone design. Comparison communities were to be chosen on the basis of zone characteristics (demographics, crime, gang types, etc.) that were used in the GRYD baseline needs assessments and with input from GRYD leadership to ensure comparison areas have characteristics as comparable as possible to the zones.

III.4. Y1 Evaluation Challenges/Caveats

As anticipated in the original proposal submission, we faced numerous evaluation challenges. The primary obstacles included a slower pace than expected of youth recruitment into GRYD, the lack of a standard service model (and therefore, inconsistent implementation), challenges to the proposed methodology, and difficulties in data acquisition.

III.4.1. The Program Model

It became apparent during the kick-off meeting and from subsequent meetings during the first quarter that the implementation of GRYD in the 12 zones raised more complex issues for the evaluation than envisioned when the proposal was written. There are twelve prime contractors in each of the two components, with crisis intervention activities primarily covered under the prime case-management intervention agency. In some zones the providers in these three areas are either from the same organization or have pre-existing relationships with each other, but in most they do not. There are different provider teams, with different objectives, and different protocols and practices in each zone. All of them have previously established procedures and routines and it seemed likely that they would continue such practices as a part of GRYD. In this sense, it appeared that there was no common GRYD model of service that was being implemented in a consistent fashion across all zones.

At the provider meetings held in May 2009, it appeared there was not a consensus for a GRYD model, and although providers were adjusting well and altering practices to increase recruitment or eligibility rates, these practices varied. This posed a serious challenge to the evaluation, which was conceived in the solicitation and proposal as an evaluation of a single program being implemented in standardized fashion in multiple locations. In fact, the evaluation

encountered numerous zone-specific programs, each of which might have to be evaluated separately. The evaluation team and advisory group initiated discussions regarding the lack of a single, comprehensive program model with the GRYD office, and the three groups worked together towards developing a model. Although elements of a model were coming into place by the end of the first year of the evaluation, there was still no clearly defined or standardized program model. See Section IV., Evaluation Findings, for a discussion of how the concept behind the GRYD model changed and evolved throughout the first year of the evaluation period, and next steps towards finalizing a GRYD model.

III.4.2. Challenges to the Proposed Methodology

First, there were immediate issues with randomly assigning which youth could receive services. There was a reluctance of the part of the GRYD office to deny services to eligible youth. It was also unclear whether providers would follow a random assignment protocol and that they might well provide services to the control group youth in much the same way as they would to the experimental group. This was also complicated by the relatively low numbers of YSET eligible youth – there were not enough youth recruited and eligible for GRYD to fill all of the slots. Therefore, randomly selecting out youth presented political (among other) issues and was ruled infeasible by the GRYD office, at least during the first year.

Similarly, there was an issue with comparing GRYD eligible and non-eligible YSET-tested youth. Providers often served youth who were determined by YSET to be ineligible for services with similar – if not identical – programs. Even if a client was excluded from GRYD through the YSET interview, several providers said they expected to provide services to that client anyway. As a consequence, sufficiently uncontaminated comparison groups were not seen as likely to be developed within zones. In addition, the GRYD policy of letting agencies re-test ineligibles and enroll those whose YSET scores made them eligible was a potential problem for maintaining a useful comparison group. An alternative design, identifying and testing comparison youth in other similar areas in Los Angeles, was considered but did not seem feasible given the resource constraints of the program and the evaluation. Further, it is not clear that there are such areas, or such youth, since the GRYD zones were intentionally chosen because they represented the areas in Los Angeles that most need a gang prevention and intervention service.

III.4.3. Data Acquisition

There were several challenges with data acquisition as well. First, a GRYD Information System (GRYDIS) was to be designed from scratch for the purposes of this program. GRYDIS was intended to serve as a central data system for most program data elements, including information on providers, service programs, activities, and clients. GRYDIS for prevention agencies was to be launched in the fall of 2009, but encountered programming issues (such as altering the interface and upgrading the software version), data element considerations (i.e., adding components to GRYDIS that were necessary for the evaluation and concerns about standardization across zones), staffing issues (for much of the first year there was only one GRYD office staff member responsible for GRYDIS training sessions in all 12 sites for both the prevention and intervention providers), delays in the GRYD office obtaining human subjects privacy/protection for the data, and contractual issues between Los Angeles and Athena, the GRYDIS vendor. The contract was not finalized until the end of the summer in 2009.

For these (and possibly other) reasons, initial GRYDIS training for prevention programs were delayed to January 2010. GRYDIS was rolled out to prevention agencies in the first quarter of 2010 and individual on-site training was provided by two GRYD office staff members during the second quarter of 2010. Full entry across all prevention sites of available data since January 2010 is expected to begin during July 2010, but, even then, is not expected to immediately be comprehensive or totally accurate. Programming a version of GRYDIS for intervention sites has not begun and is awaiting further definition and preference information from provider agencies.

These late start-ups for GRYDIS have had serious implications for the evaluation, since individual level information could not be obtained. Although using providers' existing files was considered halfway through the first year of the evaluation (when it became clear that GRYDIS would not be operational for an undefined amount of time), this option proved infeasible. Most providers do not have a viable type of electronic record system and there was a range in the type of data elements collected varied across the sites. The data collected at the sites did not usually include specific client level information such as services received and length of services (dosage). Therefore, the GRYD office and the evaluators agreed to rely on the consistent and standardized data that was to be captured for both performance monitoring and evaluation purposes.

Second, there were delays in obtaining LAPD data. The first memorandum of understanding for LAPD data acquisition was submitted in the summer of 2009, but not executed until October of 2009. Incident report data were not received until near the end of the first year of the evaluation period, and because of the lateness of acquisition, along with the fact that X,Y coordinates were missing in the initial data transmissions (thus preventing geocoding of data by GRYD zone), it was not possible to process LAPD data in time for this end of year report. However, new data are in the process of being provided by LAPD and, assuming timely delivery, baseline analyses will be completed for submission with the evaluation's next quarterly report.

III.5. Actual Y1 Implementation Process Design and Methodology

Although evaluators were unable to obtain individual record files (due to the delays in GRYDIS, as discussed above), interviews, focus groups, and program observations were conducted during Y1 of the evaluation. These detailed discussions and observations provided information on the basic structure and operations of the GRYD office and service providers (including staffing, outreach, services provided, and communication within the agency and with other agencies, changes in staffing, and challenges and successes perceived). In addition to document reviews and site visits, Harder staff was in frequent telephone and email communication with providers to gather information about site activities.

Second, UI/Harder conducted semi-structured focus groups with police detectives from the LAPD gang unit (see Section IV.3.2.a. for a discussion of these findings).

In addition to the detailed qualitative data obtained, all providers are required to submit GRYD office monthly reports, which detail the number of clients they have, the number of clients who have exited the program, and demographics about the youth enrolled in their program. This information is documented by zone in zone profiles.

III.6. Actual Y1 Outcome/Impact Design and Methodology

Because of the nature of GRYD program model development and implementation delays, along with data acquisition challenges described earlier, the primary focus of Y1 outcome assessment activities was on the prevention component of GRYD. The overall goals and objectives of the prevention component of GRYD are to implement a variety of evidence-based programs that are designed to improve factors that past research has shown to be associated with

an increased risk of joining gangs and thereby reduce the incidence of youth engaging in delinquent and criminal activities associated with gang membership. Therefore, during Y1 the evaluation methodology concentrated on developing methods of assessing short-term risk factor and behavioral changes that might be attributable to GRYD.

All youth referred or recruited for participation in GRYD prevention services are first screened for eligibility with the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). As is described in more detail under the implementation findings section of this report, YSET was developed by researchers at the University of Southern California and is administered by prevention providers upon referral to all youth. Although YSET provides important data for the evaluation, it was designed to determine eligibility for the GRYD program (and specifically, prevention services). The instrument has undergone revision during Y1, with the final version being rolled out into the field in the fall of 2009. The evaluation team developed a retest tool based upon YSET in early 2010. It is designed to measure changes in individual level risk factor scores over the course of participation in GRYD at intervals of approximately every six months. It also captures self-reported delinquency, crime and substance abuse indicators for individual youth. A copy of this instrument was delivered to the GRYD office and a more detailed description of its development is offered in Section IV.8., Risk Factor Pilot Retest.

In order to prepare for risk factor and behavioral change measurement for all GRYD prevention youth and similar comparison youth beginning in Y2, the reassessment instrument was pretested during May and June of 2010. One hundred and sixty-six youth across five GRYD zones and two "Non-GRYD" zones were administered the reassessment instrument by volunteer providers in these zones. Changes in risk factor scores and self-reported behaviors were compared to those reported on initial YSET screens (N=150 because of missing initial screen data). The pilot retest was very successful and lessons learned have been integrated into Y2 plans for repeated measures of individual prevention youth risk factor and behavioral changes for the duration of the evaluation. The specific risk factor results for all prevention youth involved in the pilot retesting are presented in Section IV.8. These results are illustrative of future measurement and analytic plans, but should not be interpreted as definitive outcome findings given the limited sample sizes and a lack of comparison youth at this stage of the evaluation.

Chapter IV

Y1 Evaluation Findings

IV.1. Overview of Evaluation Findings

The previous sections of this report have established the basic context for understanding the evaluation's findings to-date. These are inextricably connected to key features of the GRYD program's origins, the model's general framework and the structure and operations of the GRYD office. Among the most important implications for the evaluation of earlier sections of this report are:

1. Origins: the shaping of the GRYD concept by several public documents; the potential program "default factor" for several GRYD agencies that had Bridges I or II contracts; and the impact on program development of GRYD office and provider staff resource commitments to SNL;
2. GRYD framework: variability in GRYD program development at the provider level due to the role of eligibility testing in prevention and reliance on existing intervention models; and the shaping of programming emphasis by the RFP and award process; and
3. GRYD office organization: the program consequences of the way GRYD office field staff were deployed; the effect of changes in GRYD leadership on model specification; and the consequences of being in a development mode with respect to program structure.

Although there were multiple challenges to the evaluation (as described in Section III), the evaluation team was able to address research questions regarding program fidelity, early indications of necessary program modifications, how the program goals and strategy changed over time, the recruitment and enrollment of zone youth in the GRYD program, and lessons that can be taken away from the first year and a half of GRYD. This chapter reviews how the GRYD program developed and evolved; the prevention, intervention, and crisis intervention program components; the levels of recruitment and services delivered to GRYD youth, development and

implementation challenges and successes; lessons learned; and pilot results from a reassessment of GRYD program youth.

IV.2. Y1 Program Development

IV.2.1. GRYD Guidelines

During the first year of the GRYD program client eligibility guidelines, with strong service implications, were present in the YSET for prevention service providers. However, service guidelines for GRYD providers in all three components (prevention, intervention case management, and crisis intervention and management) were limited. Some of the reasons for slow and uneven progress toward model articulation that have been derived from interviews with both site and GRYD office staff include:

- The lack of a written program manual for any component that could guide program development, training and technical assistance and ensure accountability across sites.
- The lack of client, community or incident-based data systems for recording characteristics, activities and outcomes. Prevention GRYDIS was brought online toward the end of Y1 (though it has not yet generated GRYD-wide documentation), but, so far, there have been no cross-zone data systems developed by the GRYD office for intervention providers (integration of intervention provider information into GRYDIS is being considered at the time of writing).
- Early requirements that providers “hit the ground running” at the same time that they were engaged in start-up tasks such as staffing, recruiting clients, establishing partnerships and subcontracts – all with the assistance of GRYD office staff. Although not officially a planning or start-up year, much planning work was done, and will continue with the creation of the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Academy (LAVITA), the implementation of the new GRYD Prevention Model outlined in June 2010, and with the expansion of SNL during the summer of 2010.
- A commitment of GRYD office and provider staff resources in the summer of 2009 to SNL, represented by both pre-event planning and intense participation during the two months of SNL (four days per week, long-night operations). A side effect of this commitment was reduced engagement of Program Managers in GRYD zones and with


- GRYD providers. In contrast to Y1, when SNL was not included in the evaluation contract, SNL will be an important component of the Y2 GRYD evaluation.
- GRYD office and intervention provider staff resources focused primarily on managing and responding to crisis events. There was less focus on development of case management intervention services.
 - Limitations on the acceptance of formative program feedback from the evaluation team; provider reluctance or inability to accept and meet evaluation information needs; and GRYD office discontinuation or cancellation of forums and working groups considered necessary by the evaluator team.
 - GRYD office staff turnover, especially at the top, which changed programming focus and initially introduced uncertainty about GRYD model development, but which, by year's end, had led to positive and constructive developments for the GRYD program through the development of evidence-based program models.

There are a number of program consequences resulting from the slow development of a comprehensive program model. They include the defaulting by service providers – within their GRYD contract obligations – to their existing dominant programming activities including, whether appropriate or not, practices learned by many of them as Bridges I or II contractors. In any case, the lack of a written program manual or clear comprehensive standards have contributed to the diversity of program practices already mentioned. The consequences for evaluation have been more resources required to record and assess disparate implementation practices and procedures, and, going forward, less ability to attribute impact to specific or well-implemented practices.


IV.2.2. Program Referrals and Enrollment

The strategies for recruiting youth and obtaining referrals from community agencies and organizations evolved throughout Y1. As discussed in the zone profiles, providers often had difficulty obtaining the minimum enrollment levels for both prevention and intervention case management services. The figures below depict the total number of referrals prevention providers received; the number of referrals received from the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), the top referral source for 10 of the 12 zones; the total number of youth enrolled in the prevention GRYD program; and the total number of youth enrolled in the

intervention (case management) GRYD program. Intervention referral information was not available. Figure 8a contains referral and enrollment information for 77th II, Baldwin Village, Boyle Heights, Cypress Park, Florence-Graham, and Newton. Figure 8b contains referral and enrollment information for Pacoima-Foothills, Panorama Mission, Ramona Gardens, Rampart, Southwest II, and Watts-Southeast. These figures were obtained from the GRYD office's monthly reports.²⁵



²⁵ These reports were designed by the GRYD office before UI/Harder+Company were contracted to evaluate GRYD. The documents ask providers to report basic figures for certain program services, youth eligibility and enrollment, and other general information.



According to these figures, zones varied in referral levels, referral sources, and enrollment. Watts, which had one of the lowest prevention enrollment rates, received about one and a half the amount of referrals as the number of youth they enrolled. Three zones had approximately three times the number of prevention referrals compared to those enrolled (Ramona Gardens, Rampart, and Southwest II). Four zones had approximately four times the number of prevention referrals compared to those enrolled (77th II, Boyle Heights, Newton, and Panorama-Mission), two had close to five times (Cypress Park and Pacoima-Foothills), and Florence-Graham (which had a very low prevention enrollment total) had approximately 11 times. It is clear that many of the youth who are referred to the GRYD prevention program are not enrolled. Providers attributed this to ineligibility, as determined through YSET interviews. Specifically, providers frequently reported that they needed to explain the program in more detail to their referral sources (such as who the program is designed for) to improve their enrollment rates. More detailed information on the challenges providers faced with eligibility and referral sources is described in the zone profiles.

An important caveat should be noted about these data. The figures that providers reported to the GRYD office varied even within zone report submissions (with different numbers of enrolled youth reported for age, race/ethnicity, and other categories). Since actual enrollment numbers were sometimes unclear, enrolled youth who were found eligible after taking the YSET were reported for all zones. Therefore, the total number of prevention and intervention youth officially *enrolled* into GRYD YTD through March 2010 is reported.²⁶ These numbers do not speak to the number of *active* youth, or the length of time a youth was enrolled. In general, all statistics reported should be considered close estimates, but due to a lack of a standardized data management system, the reliability of the monthly report figures is unclear.


IV.2.3. Program Services

While referrals and enrollment varied across zones, the amount of variation in service provision was even more striking. Figure 9 (below) displays the average number of sessions per enrolled prevention youth. In other words, the total number of services for different categories (case management, individual counseling, and family counseling) was divided by the number of enrolled youth in each zone. Individual counseling was selected due to its popularity among GRYD providers, and family counseling was selected because of the Y2 focus on family-based services (which is discussed in later sections). However, the types of services (and the frequency of the most popular services) vary greatly among zones. Therefore, the total number of all services provided was also considered.

The source for Figure 9 is also the GRYD office monthly report, and data include all services reported through March 31, 2010. The data inconsistencies become more apparent here. Three sites (77th II, Florence-Graham, and Watts) marked data fields as “TBD” (to be determined), “on-going,” or otherwise missing. The numbers reported should all be treated as rough estimates, since there was not a standardized data management system in place during the reporting period. Since providers use different systems (excel databases, paper files, etc.), some may report more accurate figures than others. In other words, it is unclear whether providers recorded the actual number of service sessions offered to youth, or whether they estimated what they may (or should) have provided (i.e., multiplying the number of services they intended to

²⁶ March 2010 is used as the cut-off point in all of these data figures for two main reasons. First, there was a delay in providers reporting to the GRYD office, and a subsequent delay in the GRYD office’s transfer of files to the evaluation team. In addition, these figures match the month of the final evaluation team site visit as reported in the zone profiles.

provide with the number of clients). The lack of standardization also raises issues of measurement, and what constitutes a “session.” However, in lieu of GRYDIS, these statistics provide the best data available at the current time and are at least suggestive of actual service levels.



As shown in Table 9 above, the average number of services reported to be provided per enrolled youth varies greatly. While this may be due to data issues (as described above), it is known that some providers deliver more service units than others. For example, while Rampart reports an average of 68 service sessions per youth in the all services category, the other zones (excluding 77th II, Florence-Graham, and Watts, due to data issues) range from 16-39 sessions on average per youth over the course of a year and a half when considering all service and program types.

A similar zone comparison was conducted for intervention programs and services. The GRYD office monthly reports ask intervention providers to quantify the number of services provided to clients in four general areas: education/training placement, job placement, employment-related referrals and FamilySource Center referrals,²⁷ and supportive services.²⁸ Figures 10a and 10b (below) display the average number of sessions per enrolled youth for all 12 zones.

²⁷ This is a program sponsored by the City's Community Development Department. FamilySource has an interdepartmental agreement to reserve service slots for GRYD clients. For more information on this center, see: http://mayor.lacity.org/PressRoom/PressReleases/LACITYP_008757.

²⁸ It is unclear what this encompasses, or whether this term was ever defined to the intervention providers.

Figure 10a
Average Number of Sessions per Enrolled Youth YTD as of March 2010
(Intervention)





Figure 10b
Average Number of Sessions per Enrolled Youth YTD as of March 2010
(Intervention)



In summary, the information presented in these charts, drawn from reports generated by the providers themselves, indicates widespread differences between sites not just in recruitment and enrollment practices, but also in services delivered. Drawing firm conclusions about the significance of these differences is complicated by the fact that GRYDIS, or any other standardized client information system, did not exist at the time reports on recruitment and services were being made. Consequently, there was no overarching synthesis of approach that would have led to greater confidence in the numbers. Thus, it is possible that a number of the differences are a by-product of idiosyncratic data gathering and compilation at the site level. It is also possible that the differences in service type and service level have been exacerbated by the lack of a standardized approach, based perhaps on best practices, to the issue of working with gang-prone or gang-involved youth. This issue will be explored in greater detail in the next stage of the evaluation.

IV.2.4. Variations and Similarities Across Zones

Evaluation findings for the GRYD program's first contract period with its service providers (approximately 1-1/2 years of operation through June 2010) are primarily about the implementation of GRYD at multiple levels and how the program evolved at these 24 sites over time. The evaluation team constructed individual zone profiles for each of the 12 targeted neighborhoods, which have been delivered to the GRYD office separately from this Y1 report.²⁹ While summary information is provided throughout this chapter, each profile contains site-specific information on the area (including demographics and a brief history of the location); baseline gang prevalence and activity; and a discussion of the Y1 implementation period for prevention, intervention, and crisis intervention, including challenges and successes.

The similarities across zones are noticeable in these zone profiles, but the differences in implementation are also readily apparent. Early on, the evaluators observed and reported to the GRYD office that program development might be too agency-specific to support a useful aggregate all-GRYD evaluation. The alternative of conducting 12 separate prevention and 12 or even 24 separate intervention evaluations was and is considered infeasible. The reality of program coherence across zones and components is of course somewhere between full standardization and total disparity. It is also important for this report to address an earlier "finding" expressed in the Six-Month Evaluation Report and elsewhere, including verbally to the GRYD office: the lack of a fully articulated GRYD program model and the consequences of that condition for providers and for the evaluation.

In reality, all programs like GRYD have both formal and informal structures. Formal structure, including written purposes, objectives and procedures, while always somewhat idealistic and never fully interpreted, is essential for ensuring overall direction and stability and for comparing an organization or program with explicit standards, and with other entities. Informal structure, which includes beliefs and practices that may even "work around" formal structure, while more volatile and difficult to understand, is essential for motivation, creativity and simply getting things done. The formal structure of GRYD programming is revealed in RFPs, agency proposals and workplans and in the examination of program components that have explicit GRYD office endorsed standards. GRYD informal program structure is revealed in

²⁹ The 12 Zone Profiles document GRYD recruitment, activities, and service provision for each of the zones. They can be obtained from two sources: the GRYD office, or the Urban Institute Web Site (after release in early September, 2010) – <http://www.urban.org>.

interviews and observations about actual systems and operations at the GRYD office and site levels. Findings at the site level are described in the sections below.


IV.2.5. Program Components

In the remainder of this chapter, four questions are addressed for each of the three clearly distinct GRYD program components of Prevention, Intervention Case Management and Crisis Intervention:

1. What is the basic program model and its constituent services?
2. How has the model evolved since GRYD began?
3. What is the situation as of June 2010?
4. What future alterations in the model are planned at this time?

The answers are quite different across the three components and even across zones or agencies for a given component. Although the specifics of program development for each zone are found in some detail in the 12 zone profiles separately provided to the GRYD office, highlights from them and other observations that addressed the four questions are explored below. The evolution of each program component should be seen in the context of the general evolution of GRYD since its inception. Milestones for GRYD and the evaluation are presented in a general timeline on the following page.

Milestones in the Evolution of GRYD and the Evaluation: 2008-2010



Ongoing Program and Evaluation Activities include regular correspondence and meetings among the GRYD office, providers and the evaluation team and resulting documents, decisions and actions. The evolution of GRYDIS occurred throughout most of 2009 and 2010.

IV.3. The GRYD Prevention Component

IV.3.1. The Initial Prevention Model and Proposed Services

The basis of the GRYD Prevention model was the Prevention RFP issued October 1, 2008. This document presented the core concept of gang joining risk factors and offered general examples of how the selected agencies were expected to address them. However, the proposals and work plans of the 12 funded prevention agencies show little evidence of a common program model. As a consequence, as discussed above in Chapter III, the GRYD office gave a great deal of attention during Y1 to creating a more standardized approach.

A wide range of services have been provided by GRYD prevention agencies. Early service documentation by the evaluation, taken from provider proposals and verified in field visits, demonstrates diversity (primarily in dosage and service type) in the five following areas:

Case management

- Arranges services for client within provider's programs
- Arranges services for client outside of provider's programs (i.e., referrals)
- Tracks academic performance
- Meets with clients 3 times/wk or more
- Amount of time spent with clients
- Involves family (meetings; case plan)

Individual focus

- Counseling
- Mentoring
- Tutoring
- Substance abuse
- Anger management
- Life management skills
- Delinquency, gang prevention, violence prevention, leadership, and/or development workshops
- Career exploration/vocational training/internships
- Re-entry opportunities for HS dropouts

Family focus

- Family counseling (by a licensed provider)
- Parenting programs/classes

Social activities

- Recreational outings/activities/field trips
- Group counseling
- School assembly presentations
- Sports

Community/environment

- Community programs
- Safe passages (volunteers patrol streets to/from school or programs)

Of note is the perceived promotion of mental health-related services such as counseling and therapy in the RFP. Interviews with providers and independent grant writers revealed that the bidding agencies responded to the RFP’s table of Program Elements (p.10) and discussion of evidence-based models (pp.12-14) by noting that five of the six Elements and four of the six “models” offered highlight counseling, therapy or clinical treatment. In fact, as shown in the following table, there was considerable variation in the “counseling and therapy” complexion of actual services provided across the 12 prevention contractors.

**Table 4
Prevention Counseling and Therapy Services**

Zone/Agency	Prevention Contractors’ Counseling and Therapy Services
Baldwin Village Community Build, Inc. (CB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Case managers offer counseling▪ Subcontracted licensed mental health providers provide one-on-on cognitive behavioral therapy▪ Intensive or specialized mental health services are referred out as needed
Boyle Heights Alma Family Services (AFS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ In-house therapy provided by licensed therapists at MA level and a clinical supervisor▪ AFS’s partners initially approached them to lead the GRYD project because of their strong mental health background, juvenile justice experience, and established infrastructure to provide clinical and administrative supervision and oversight.

Zone/Agency	Prevention Contractors' Counseling and Therapy Services
Cypress Park Children's Hospital LA (CHLA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CHLA has a psychology fellow (Ph.D. level) and a bilingual clinical therapist on staff to provide mental health services
Florence Graham LA Metropolitan Churches (LAM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LAM expressed that they were beginning to refer clients to Community Build's Family Resources Center for services which they do not have
77th Division II Asian American Drug Abuse Program (AADAP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A licensed therapist is on staff to provide individual and family therapy
Ramona Gardens Violence Intervention Program (VIP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ VIP has a program manager and a staff member who are MSWs. They provide clinical supervision to the case managers and provide mental health services. VIP has a close relationship with the USC medical center's mental health services located next door to them and refer youth to them. ▪ VIP is the lead for GRYD in Ramona Gardens because of its financial stability and their mental health component. ▪ Legacy LA (subcontractor) does not have a therapist on site but they can refer youth to VIP for mental health. It is unclear how often Legacy LA actually refers youth to VIP. They tend to refer out for mental health services. ▪ Barrio Action (subcontractor) has in-house mental health resources and appears to be utilizing them.
Pacoima Foothill El Nido Family Centers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In-house counseling offered by MA level Counselors. ▪ El Nido has 2 MA level Counselors and 1 Program Supervisor/Counselor.
Panorama City New Directions for Youth (NDY)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Counseling provided by sub-contracted agency, El Centro de Amistad.
Rampart El Centro del Pueblo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In-house counseling offered by MA level Counselors trained in FFT. ▪ Children's Institute, Inc., one of the sub-contractors, also provides a Clinical Director who supervises the clinical work of the FFT trained therapists. Clinical Director was described as providing time as an "in-kind donation" to the GRYD program.
Newton People Coordinated Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Case managers offer counseling
Southwest II Brotherhood Crusade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Case managers offer counseling ▪ Subcontracted mental health services – background of providers unknown
Watts Southeast Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Case managers offer counseling ▪ Subcontracted licensed mental health providers provide one-on-one and family therapy

All prevention agencies' proposals and work plans addressed reducing the youth's gang joining risk through a variety of services meant to focus on the six risk factors described in the RFP: poor parental supervision, early childhood aggression, delinquent beliefs, negative life

events, delinquent peers, and commitment to street-oriented peers. There were a few examples listed for each of the six risk factors in the RFP, all of which suggested evidence based strategies. These examples included parent training, therapy, counseling, mentoring, tutoring, and other “program activities designed to reduce client’s involvement and commitment to street-oriented peers.”

However, there were more risk factors considered for prevention services eligibility than were outlined in the original RFPs upon which many providers developed their proposals and services. Eligibility for gang prevention services was based upon the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), developed for the GRYD office by a team of academic gang experts. Under YSET, the original 6 risk factors were reorganized and expanded to a total of 10 areas of risk that could be targeted. These 10 risk factors are described in detail below, based on informal conversations with Dr. Karen Hennigan, one of the YSET development team members and the lead USC data manager.

Antisocial tendencies / Lack of prosocial

The first section in the YSET has items based on two subscales of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), which is frequently used in clinical settings. The SDQ refers to certain questions as conduct disorder, which the YSET team renamed the antisocial scale. The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) also influenced this risk factor category, but the YSET team noted that the assessment would have been expensive and difficult to use. Instead, the lack of prosocial tendencies was combined with antisocial tendencies after the YSET team found high correlations between the two.

Weak parental monitoring

This scale, which asks whether respondents’ parents or guardians are aware of where they are, who they associate with, and their activities outside of the home, was included because it has been extensively used in prior research that links risk factors and delinquency.

Critical life events

This risk factor category was originally derived from strain and delinquency research, incorporated from questions used previously by Terry Thornberry and Cheryl Maxson, and narrowed down to gang-related indicators. Although this was originally called

“negative life events,” the YSET team felt that not all significant life events were negative, and the category was renamed.

Risk taking

Based on concepts of an individual characteristic, risk taking has been included in prior delinquency research related to risk factors. The specific scale in YSET was previously used in the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) evaluation (see Esbensen, 2003).

Impulsivity

This risk factor scale was also previously used in the GREAT evaluation (Esbensen, 2003) and other delinquency research, and refers to acting before thinking through the consequences.

Neutralization

The neutralization risk factor questions are related to justifying or rationalizing delinquent behaviors.

Negative Peer Influence

This scale asks youth about the decisions they would make when they are in certain situations. Specifically, respondents answer whether they believe they would hang out with or go along with friends who would get them into trouble with their parents, in school, or with the police.

Peer Delinquency

The peer delinquency scale asks youth to describe the types of delinquent behaviors friends engage in and the number of friends that participate in these behaviors.

Self Report Delinquency

The self report delinquency scale is a more extensive list of the types of behaviors listed in the peer delinquency scale, and asks whether the youth has ever done certain activities (in a graduated list from minor to major delinquent acts) in the past six months or ever. This risk factor is also frequently used in delinquency research, and the YSET team adapted these questions from Esbensen (2003).

Self Report Substance Use

Youth are asked to report their history of substance use. Esbensen also reduced this list from his GREAT survey.

It should also be noted that the shift from the original YSET interview to a combined YSET instrument (discussed in more detail in Section IV.8) changed the number of questions in each section (primarily deleting or combining questions), but none of these main risk factor categories were deleted. Instead, self report delinquency and substance use were combined into one category and questions in the previous YSET were rearranged to form a new topic area, Family Gang Influence. Family Gang Influence simply asks questions related to the family's involvement in gangs. Based on the language used (and examples provided) in the RFP, providers designed their program services around the original six risk factors although some providers expanded referrals or services throughout the implementation period to meet additional client needs (such as substance abuse). Findings from an assessment of these activities, conducted by the evaluation team in December 2010, are displayed in the following table.

Table 5
Prevention Service Elements for Risk-Reduction

YSET Risk Factor For Gang Joining	Specific elements of program services that are explicitly related to reducing the risk factor
<p>A. ANTISOCIAL TENDENCIES</p>	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Anger Management is taught as a module of Brotherhood Crusade's Life Skills Class, but the agency feels that it would be more effective to have a stand-alone extensive Anger Management Class in which youth complete an entire Anger Management curriculum that will: Define anger, describe the sensations of anger; identify various reasons for anger; teach techniques & activities for controlling aggressive anger; teach appropriate alternatives; use role-play to demonstrate antisocial and pro-social ways of dealing with anger; conflict resolution, etc. ▪ For youth that do not do well in groups, or who miss classes, they can be taught Anger Management concepts on a one-on-one basis by the Instructor or the Case Managers. ▪ Life/Social Skill Curriculum: Teaches pro-social behaviors such as empathy, the social norms of reciprocity, responsibility, equity and remorse. The curriculum should also identify the antisocial behaviors and their consequences (i.e. violence towards others, dangerous & thoughtless behavior, selfishness, dishonesty, and breaking the law). ▪ Multi-systemic Therapy (MST): Goal-oriented treatment that specifically targets those factors in each youth's social network that are contributing to his or her antisocial behavior. Thus, MST interventions typically aim to improve caregiver discipline practices, enhance family affective relations, decrease youth association with deviant peers, increase youth association with pro-social peers, improve youth school or vocational performance, engage youth in pro-social recreational outlets, and develop an indigenous support network of extended family, neighbors, and friends to help caregivers achieve and maintain such changes. Specific treatment techniques used to facilitate these gains are integrated from those therapies that have the most empirical support, including cognitive behavioral, behavioral, and the pragmatic family therapies. <p>Community Builds (Baldwin Village)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cognitive Based Therapy: Empirically grounded therapy using problem focused, directive and practical approach to the treatment of conduct problems, association with antisocial peers, and trauma induced maladaptive responses. <p>El Centro del Pueblo (Rampart)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Life Skills Classes: The client will be given a curriculum of life skills by targeting behaviors and the consequences that would create a sense of guidance of self control and responsibility towards once actions by providing the youth the adequate tools to reduce antisocial tendencies. <p>El Nido Family Centers (Pacoima Foothill)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Case Management/Mentoring (Heart of Champions and Girls Support Group, Unusual Suspects, Heroes of Life): Mentors promote and role model pro-social skills by enhancing youth's social relationships, improving their cognitive skills through instruction and conversation and providing a positive development of Self.

YSET Risk Factor For Gang Joining	Specific elements of program services that are explicitly related to reducing the risk factor
B. WEAK PARENTAL SUPERVISION	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parenting Training: parental supervision, assertive discipline, role-modeling desired behavior, active listening, improving school involvement, using positive reinforcement, using praise for good behavior, contracting, improving emotional bonding. <p>El Centro del Pueblo (Rampart)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parenting class: Parents learn about the importance of youth being supervised even though they are not elementary school aged children. ▪ Recreational Services: Youth enrolled in structured recreational activities are supervised and therefore family members do not need to worry about the youth during those hours. ▪ Juvenile Intervention Prevention Program: Parents through the parenting classes learn about their legal responsibilities and how best to set up parameters at home for times when they are not present. <p>El Nido (Pacoima)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Family therapy: Counseling session addresses family systems and patterns in order to disrupt dysfunctional patterns <p>New Directions (Panorama City)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parenting Education Curriculum: Getting parents involved with workshops and other activities. Empowering parents with tools/programs to increase financial stability. Mentor/Tutors fill the void in the interim; they help correct some of the youth's views on adults and supervision.
C. CRITICAL LIFE EVENTS	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Life/Social Skills curriculum for youth that teaches them coping strategies to deal with critical life events. ▪ Anger Management: Dealing with the anger that result from critical life events. <p>El Centro del Pueblo (Rampart)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Anger Management: This is a curriculum that addresses critical life events that could cause anger problems that could continue be manifested through the youth's behavior. This service provides the youth a support group. ▪ Teen group: This group is a life skills group focused on anger management and gang involvement. Youth also view it as a support group where they can share about their experiences and seek out peer support. <p>El Nido Family Centers (Pacoima)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Individual and Family Psychotherapy: To address grief and loss issues and challenge the youth/parent's belief system and irrational thoughts and to replace them with more appropriate forms of self expression. ▪ Anger Management Classes/ Heart of Champions and Girl Support Group: To address critical life events and assist the youth/parents enhance their decision making skills along with developing pro-social belief systems and relationships and enhance their ability to communicate events effectively.

YSET Risk Factor For Gang Joining	Specific elements of program services that are explicitly related to reducing the risk factor
DE. IMPULSIVE RISK TAKING	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Life Skills Curriculum that addresses: Poor and beneficial peer choices, decision making, responsibility, and role-play activities. <p>EI Nido Family Centers (Pacoima Foothill)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Case Management, Adolescent Support Groups (Heart of Champions, Girls Support Group, Unusual Suspects, Heroes of Life): Addresses character building, action and consequence dilemmas and scenarios; assist the youth spotlight on long term consequences as opposed to the immediate future and/or "instant gratification" syndrome, and develop healthy coping strategies amongst the youth and parents. ▪ Case Managers/Mentors are developing relationships with the youth/parents and addressing impulsive behaviors along with presenting the youth with better decision making skills so that they can learn to deal with life's issues in healthier ways. ▪ Individual/Family Counseling: Address impulsive risk taking issues and their significance; enhance the development of self control, impulse control and self-direction. <p>New Directions for Youth (Panorama City)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Anger Management/Conflict Resolution: This will help them to find non-aggressive solutions to problems, increase youth's problem solving skills and train them to make a commitment not to contribute to aggression and violence that can trigger impulsive risk taking.
F. GUILT NEUTRALIZATION	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Life Skills Curriculum: Identifying dysfunctional beliefs and values. <p>EI Nido Family Centers (Pacoima Foothill)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Heart of Champions: Address the youth's and parents' values and virtues. The program asks the youth to compare and contrast their current values and tackles justifications for the maladaptive values. The youth are exposed to positive character building virtues and asked to "ponder the future with such positive values".
G. NEGATIVE PEER INFLUENCE	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Life Skills Curriculum: recognizing and alternative to negative peer influence, role-play, expression activities using journaling, poetry. ▪ Recreational Diversion Activities: such as chess, using arts as a positive form of expression, sports, educational & cultural field trips that promote pro-social environments and affiliations with positive peer networks. <p>EI Nido Family Centers (Pacoima Foothill)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Case Management, Adolescent Support Groups (Heart of Champions, Girls Support Group, Unusual Suspects, Heroes of Life and Youth Speak!Collective): Address negative and positive peer influences and the value of each, youth and parents

YSET Risk Factor For Gang Joining	Specific elements of program services that are explicitly related to reducing the risk factor
	<p>will learn about empowerment, respect and engaging in positive social activities and the benefits derived from them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adolescent Support Groups (Heart of Champions, Girls Support Group): Addressing the significance of involving positive peer influences into their daily lives as opposed to negative influences; involving the youth and parents with other positive social group activities in order to role model. <p>LAM (Florence Graham)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban Technology Group, We Care Ministries: Helps youth identify the existence of negative peer influence in relation to its negative effect on their goals and aspirations while showing youth tactful ways to avoid such influences without being ostracized by their peers. <p>WLCAC (Watts SE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engaging youth in community sports league through 1 of 3 local recreation and parks community centers; field trips during the summer months that engage youth 3 times weekly, allowing youth to develop relationships with peers outside of their neighborhoods; youth employment.
<p>H. PEER DELINQUENCY</p>	<p>Brotherhood Crusade (SWII)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Life Skills: Dealing with peer pressure, and alternatives to peer delinquency, responsibility, consequences, etc. <p>EI Nido Family Centers (Pacoima Foothill)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adolescent Support Groups (Heart of Champions, Girls Support Group): Address youth's decision making, development of pro-social belief systems, relationships, and provide positive alternatives to replace poor decision making skills in order to reduce involvement and commitment to negative peers. <p>LAM (Florence Graham)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban Technology Group, Solid Rock/Boys2Men – Helps youth identify negative effects of peer delinquencies on their immediate wants and perceived needs while providing them with alternatives to such association. <p>WLCAC (Watts SE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reducing negative peer involvement using a point system for attendance and interaction with peers; giving youth leadership roles at the facility (i.e. task oriented responsibility); promoting youth employment; encourage peer leadership and positive influence (i.e. peer mediation); using field trips to promote positive interactions among the youth.

YSET Risk Factor For Gang Joining	Specific elements of program services that are explicitly related to reducing the risk factor
T. FAMILY GANG INFLUENCE	<p>EI Nido Family Centers (Pacoima Foothill)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parent Support Group: On-going parenting support group that acknowledges the parents barriers to the ongoing process of raising children along with addressing and empowering parents to continually assert their parental role within their families and discuss "stopping the cycle" of family gang influence. ▪ Parent Council: Parents making themselves more visible in the programs and role modeling the importance of positive family unity and involvement. ▪ Case Managers/Mentors are developing relations with parents and addressing concerns such as familial gang influence; enhancing parents ability distinguish between positive and negative familial influence. ▪ Family Therapy: Family counseling session addresses family systems and multi-generational patterns and dysfunction in order to disrupt such patterns.

IV.3.2. Evolution from 2008 to present

As indicated in the timeline and discussed above, the evolution of GRYD prevention programming was stimulated across all zones by all-site forums during the spring and fall of 2009 and by the introduction of Multidisciplinary Team (MDT) training in January 2010 and start-up a few months later. MDT is a multidisciplinary partnership of key stakeholders who know about the youth in the community and collaborate towards common goals. GRYD office examination of the Functional Family Therapy (FFT) model and communication with providers about the importance of family intervention was also beginning to move thinking and planning toward new and more standard prevention strategies. FFT essentially takes a family-based approach to prevention and intervention services. The involvement of prevention providers in a beta test of GRYDIS also promoted coherent model development and generated input to decisions about services to code and training to provide to each site.

Program evolution of course occurred in different forms and paces at different sites, but several site-specific experiences were fairly typical. The development of staffing and services was one common experience across all sites, if easier at some sites than others. Some examples follow.

Prevention: Evolution in staffing and services

77th-II – AADAP

A new Program Manager was assigned to this GRYD zone in July 2009. Additionally, AADAP hired several new staff. Two full time case managers were hired in October 2009 and an additional full time case manager was hired in February 2010. A part time case manager was also hired in February 2010.

AADAP also added an additional service site in February 2010. Staff expressed that mixing middle school students with elementary school students in group counseling was not good. For that reason case managers began running group sessions at Western Elementary.

Outreach activities were most intense during Spring and Summer 2009 when the program was focused on recruitment. As enrollment grew the program began to focus more of its attention on service delivery.

As services to families took on more emphasis after September 2009, a number of agencies responded with important adaptations.

**Prevention: Evolution toward enhanced family services
Baldwin Village – Community Build**

Community Build staff agreed that the YSET effectively identifies troubled youth. Serving these youth comes with a set of challenges. For example, staff found that many of their clients' parents/caregivers also need assistance and plan to enhance their parenting services. The agency plans to develop a program for parents called "Creating Lasting Family Connections" as well as a parent group.

A number of others services, from one-on-one mentoring to group workshops changed and took shape during Y1. Some of the shaping, as discussed in provider forums, was toward a tighter relationship between a youth's risk factors and his or her individual service plan.

IV.3.2.a. Relationships with LAPD Gang Units

GRYD's relationships with LAPD has primarily been with regard to how to interface for gang crisis intervention, which ties together the polar opposite strategies of suppression and intervention, both part of the Mayor's anti-gang strategy. However, the role of LAPD in the referral of youth to prevention programs and participation in zone MDTs has also evolved. As part of the evaluation, UI/Harder conducted interviews with CLEAR officers and gang detectives in districts responsible for law enforcement services in all 12 zones (resulting in 12 interviews in total). Interviews revealed that these detectives generally feel like a part of the GRYD program and are supportive of the goals and mission of GRYD. The detectives also reported that they believe CLEAR and gang injunctions are a significant component for gang reduction and deterrence. Although there have been tensions between intervention workers and LAPD, due to the often contrasting ideologies and goals, the two groups have also made considerable progress in bridging these differences.

Prevention: Evolving relationship with LAPD
SW-II – Southwest LAPD

During the evaluation team interview for the SW-II zone, the sergeant expressed satisfaction with GRYD and particularly with his GRYD Project Manager, who is PM for both Southwest zones. He meets often with her regarding the MDT and now Summer Night Lights. She picks up GRYD youth referral notes every week from a box at the station detective area.

Ramona Gardens – Hollenbeck LAPD

On the prevention side, the police are active partners with the GRYD office reaching out to at risk youth on the fence. They have piloted a ticket system in the zone for referrals where the youth gets a copy and the other goes to the GRYD office. The gang unit here is the only one doing this at present but they hope it will expand.

The GRYD program has clearly evolved since its inception and has been moving toward more definition and coherency. Progress in 2010 in that regard outpaced and was more directed than changes occurring in 2009, the first program calendar year. The termination of a very few contracts and subcontracts does not diminish the quality of learning and accomplishment experienced by current GRYD agencies over the last year-and-a-half. GRYD appears poised to enter Y2 with a sharper model and increased capacity to implement it.

IV.3.3. The Prevention “Model” and Proposed Activities at the End of Y1

At this writing the evaluation team has not been privy to Y2 contracts being offered to GRYD providers or the related workplan specifics, including amendments to Y1 practices and procedures. However, it is clear that some sites are now staffed and experienced to take on requirements of the new prevention model unveiled in June 2010. The Rampart zone, for example, has built its capacity to work with families and specifically with services related to Functional Family Therapy (FFT). FFT was identified in El Centro del Pueblo’s initial proposal and became the conceptual model for GRYD family services during the first few months of 2010.

Prevention: Programming for family therapy**Rampart: El Centro del Pueblo**

The Rampart Prevention program is unique in that they have divided the GRYD into four quadrants and designated an agency to lead efforts within each quadrant. The Program Director from El Centro del Pueblo, the lead agency, oversees all operations of the program and serves as the primary contact for the GRYD office. Each of the four agencies that are leading efforts within a quadrant is staffed with a Family Advocate (i.e., Case Manager), a Youth Advocate, and a Therapist (clinician trained in FFT). The Program Director, four Family Advocates, four Youth Advocates and four Therapists are staffed full time on the GRYD project. In addition, Children's Institute, Inc., one of the subcontractors, provides a Clinical Director who supervises all of the FFT therapists.

The GRYD-wide MDT program (including both prevention and intervention) was also becoming established at some of the sites, although full participation of member agencies such as Probation, LAUSD and LAPD (a necessary component of the MDT strategy), was still not achieved by June 2010.

IV.3.4. Planned Future Alterations to the Current GRYD Model

While the YSET and MDT will continue to promote substantial cross-site structural consistency for GRYD prevention agencies in Y2 – with comprehensive YSET retesting as a core measure of success (defined as decreases in levels of risk for gang-joining and in delinquent/criminal behavior) – the new GRYD Prevention Model outlined by the GRYD office in June 2010 is expected to be the backbone of prevention planning and services for Y2. The new model's prevention strategy targets three levels: individual youth, his or her family, and peer groups. The emphasis to-date has been predominant on the individual youth at risk for gang joining. As documented in an assessment of sites developed by the evaluators and implemented by GRYD Program Managers in December 2009, prevention agencies have already been engaged in a number of activities that involve families. A more focused emphasis on the concepts and principles of FFT is now required. The new model's third focus, on peer relationships, is currently the least well defined. Creating opportunities for clarification and written documentation of the GRYD model, including training, technical assistance and evaluation is critical and should proceed with greater intensity after the end of SNL in September.

IV.4. The GRYD Case Management Intervention Services Component

IV.4.1. The Initial Intervention Services Model and Proposed Services

Although the GRYD RFP for gang intervention services provided a framework for services, major issues such as client eligibility and intake criteria were not well articulated. This situation continues. In late 2009 the evaluators worked with the GRYD office to draft a set of service categories that could be incorporated into GRYDIS. The objective was to define and operationalize a standard set of services across sites. This service list was shared with the intervention providers with the objective of obtaining provider input and modifying the service provision list accordingly. However, no further progress was made on getting provider input or advancing the design of GRYDIS for intervention case management. Nonetheless, the draft service list, presented below, is an initial representation of the types of service activities engaged in by GRYD intervention case management programs, and constitutes a prototype set of service categories for entry into GRYDIS.

IV.4.2. Proposed GRYDIS Services List for Intervention Case Management

IV.4.2.a. Services for Youth

Anger Management

- This refers to any workshop or session where youth are exposed to non-violent conflict resolution strategies or a reduction in violent or aggressive outbursts. Such sessions occur in group settings focusing specifically on anger management, not group counseling.

Academic Assistance

- This category refers to any school-specific skills or training the youth receives. This can include tutoring, after school programs that specifically target academic enrichment, assistance with re-entry into school, and GED assistance. This does not include career exploration or job skills training.

Mentoring

- This refers to a relationship between a client and an adult role model where the overall goal is positive youth development and/or improved life skills. However, this should be a formal relationship (where the youth and adult acknowledge one another as mentor/mentee). In other words, while a case manager could also be a formal mentor to a client, the role of the case manager alone (providing services, tracking program progress, etc.) does not constitute mentoring. If the primary role of an adult/youth relationship is based on a different service, select that service instead - e.g., if the main purpose of the relationship is to improve the youth's grades, "Academic Assistance" should be selected.

Recreational Activities

- This service may include field trips and peer and/or family outings. Activities could also include educational events or sports activities if these are aspects of the program and are not being offered as separate services.

Individual Counseling (Formal)

- This service refers to formal one-on-one therapeutic counseling sessions that typically seek to provide youth with pro-social behavioral skills, coping strategies, or related advice. This includes, but is not limited to, cognitive behavioral therapy, grief counseling, and trauma counseling. Counseling is provided by a licensed clinician.

Individual Support/Counseling (Informal)

- This service covers informal one-on-one support/counseling sessions between the youth and case managers or intervention workers with the objective of providing youth with pro-social behavioral skills, coping strategies, or related advice.

Case Management/Wrap-around Services

- This refers to the coordination of services for clients based on individualized service plans. A formal, client-specific procedure is established to ensure delivery of services, progress tracking, and redirecting of services when appropriate.

Sports

- This refers to any program that emphasizes sports activities as the *main* component of a service. In other words, if a program is primarily recreation-based with an occasional sport activity, select “Recreational Activities” only, not “Sports.” Sports services could involve a team that meets regularly (such as a league), but could also include introducing youth to a variety of different sports throughout the program.

Substance Abuse Treatment

- Any program that attempts to reduce drug and/or alcohol use among participants. This could resemble an Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous program, or a school-based program or workshop. Even if these sessions occur in group settings, only select this service type if substance abuse treatment is involved (i.e. not “Group Counseling”).

Violence Prevention Workshops

- Violence prevention or anti-gang sessions typically provide strategies for avoiding more violent lifestyles, in addition to educating youth about gangs and violence, and domestic violence. Methods may include small group workshops, classroom settings, or larger school assemblies.

Job Training/Placement

- This service focuses on helping youth to develop job readiness skills and prepare for and find jobs. This may include interview preparation, job skills training, professional development, internships, and/or obtaining and maintaining employment.

Leadership and Youth Development

- This refers to positive development of youth's attitudes, behaviors, and skills. Leadership skills, personal goals, and values are often emphasized. This could include workshops or a series of events.

Group Counseling

- This service refers to programs where the main purpose is collective counseling or therapy. This may have a pro-social or positive peer interaction focus, but does not include more specific types of counseling (such as anger management or substance abuse).

Arts and Enrichment Activities

- This refers to programs that help youth develop new and useful skills that do not fall into other categories. Examples could include learning to drive mini-bikes, music, poetry, fine arts, photography, writing for a newspaper or being involved in the production of various types of media, etc. This could also include programs where the primary focus is cultural understanding and appreciating diversity.

Community Appreciation/Mobilization

- This category refers to programs that involve youth in their communities. This may include beautification projects, environmental programs, participating in community events, peace rallies and other related projects.

Tattoo Removal

- This service refers to providing assistance by helping to erase the visible signs of gang involvement so that youth will not experience the negative consequences of visible tattoos.

Legal Aid

- This service includes providing guidance and support for criminal and immigration status issues, helping clients clear warrants, expunge records, and working to resolve child custody issues.

Life Skills Workshop

- Workshops that cover general life skills topics such as coping skills, communication, sexuality, cultural awareness, and financial management.

Teen Parenting

- Service provided to youth who are teen parents. Services can be provided in class sessions or workshops to emphasize parenting skills. Includes program such as Babies and Me.

IV.2.4.b. Services for Family

Family Counseling (Formal)

- This service refers to formal family counseling sessions provided by a licensed clinician that focuses on improving healthy family interactions. Emphasis is often placed on communication among family members and may be directed towards clients who have emotional or behavioral problems in school or in social settings. Although these sessions are designed to be in group settings, only select this service (not group counseling) if the primary service is family counseling.

Family Support/Counseling (Informal)

- This service refers to informal family support or counseling provided by case managers or intervention workers that focuses on improving healthy family interactions.

Parenting Classes

- This refers to any class sessions or workshops that specifically emphasize parenting and supervisory skills for parents of the youth. This does not include personal treatment programs that may have an indirect effect on parenting, such as substance abuse treatment or anger management for parents.

Basic Needs Assistance

- This service refers to assisting youth obtain housing, health care, general relief, emergency food or clothing, etc. This can be done directly through taking youth to appropriate agencies and walking them through the process to access these services or providing a referral and following up with the youth.

Additional evidence of the variety of structures and services found across GRYD zones is indicated in the following table, which shows the diversity of agency contractual arrangements across zones and for the two intervention sub-components of case management and crisis response. (Crisis response is addressed in the next section).

Table 6
Intervention Services

Zone/Lead Provider	Intervention Service	
	Case Management Provider/s	Crisis Intervention Provider/s
Baldwin Village Community Build, Inc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community Build ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community Build ▪ No sub-contracted agencies
Boyle Heights Soledad Enrichment Action (SEA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ No sub-contracted agencies
Cypress Park Public Health Foundation Enterprises/Aztecs Rising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aztecs Rising ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aztecs Rising ▪ No sub-contracted agencies
Florence Graham SEA/Chapter Two	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chapter II ▪ SEA
77th Division II HELPER/Venice 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HELPER ▪ Developing Options (sub) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HELPER ▪ Developing Options (sub)
Ramona Gardens SEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ Barrio Action (sub) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ Aztecs Rising (sub) ▪ Legacy LA (sub)
Pacoima Foothill Communities in Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communities in Schools ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communities in Schools ▪ No sub-contracted agencies
Panorama City Communities in Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communities in Schools ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communities in Schools ▪ No sub-contracted agencies
Rampart Public Health Found Enterprises/Aztecs Rising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aztecs Rising ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aztecs Rising ▪ No sub-contracted agencies
Newton SEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ No subcontracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SEA ▪ Going Beyond Boundaries (sub)
Southwest II HELPER/Venice 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HELPER ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HELPER ▪ TEAMWorks (sub)
Watts Southeast Kush, Inc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ KUSH ▪ No sub-contracted agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ KUSH ▪ No sub-contracted agencies

IV. 4.2. Evolution from 2008 to present

Intervention sites reported a number of changes in structure and services over their first year of operations. The experience at Ramona Gardens, presented below, related to their special organization of subcontractors but indicated other issues as well.

**Intervention: Programming for family therapy
Ramona Gardens: SEA**

The first three months of implementing the GRYD program was especially challenging for the providers of intervention services because staff reported receiving very little orientation and direction from the GRYD office and, internally, SEA did not have a program director until September. Also, case management had “three personalities” because each agency (SEA and its subcontractors) had their own referral, assessment, and intake forms, which Barrio Actions case managers then had to decipher and fit into their own forms. In September, the intervention providers streamlined all forms so that all the agencies are utilizing the same standardized forms. The program director came on board in September and now the GRYD staff meets as a team once a week to discuss individual clients and plan events together.

Unlike GRYD prevention agencies, intervention agencies do not have a common assessment tool to determine eligibility for services. The Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency Check-Up Assessment Tool (LARRC) was specified as an intake tool in the RFP but was never enforced. It has only been used by one or two intervention agencies. For example, Community Build uses LARRC as an assessment tool to develop individual service plans. However, other agencies have invented their own intake and assessment procedures, and Aztec’s Rising has devoted considerable staff time in designing and testing its own assessment tool for determining client case management. It is also important to note that informed consent procedures have not been instituted to date by the GRYD office for intervention clients. As a result providers have not been able to share confidential case intake or service data with the evaluators.

Intervention: Assessment system development**Rampart: Aztecs Rising**

Eligibility requirements established by the GRYD office include: age, residence or significant time spent within the zone, gang membership or affiliation, and desire to leave the gang life. During the first year of the program, Aztecs Rising developed an agency-wide Eligibility Assessment Form to help determine eligibility for potential case management clients. To be accepted as a case management client, the potential client needs to demonstrate a total of at least eight risk factors in three sub-sections: (1) education or employment, (2) family, and (3) gangs. The Eligibility Assessment Form was piloted by staff beginning in October 2009 and was fully implemented with incoming potential case management clients by January 2010. Scoring of risk factors on the Eligibility Assessment Form in combination with information from intervention workers are used to determine eligibility for case management services.

IV.4.2.a. Relationship with LAPD

The GRYD office's relationship with LAPD, which represents the suppression component of the Mayor's anti-gang strategy, has also evolved (predominantly toward cooperation and even productivity). LAPD gang officers interviewed at each of the GRYD zones this past spring shared with the evaluators stories of varying relationship quality but definite evidence of progress, particularly with regard to Gang Intervention Worker roles and the sharing of incident information. GRYD providers report more regular contact and communication and "figuring out" how to work better together or avoid areas of conflicting interest. KUSH staff reports that their relationship with LAPD has grown substantially as a result of the GRYD program. In addition to working with the program manager, LAPD officers approach and share information with GIS directly. The Ramona Gardens, Cypress Park, and Baldwin Village experiences with LAPD are briefly summarized below.

**Intervention: Evolving relationship with LAPD
Ramona Gardens – SEA**

Working with LAPD was reportedly difficult, especially in the beginning of the project. There was a reported lack of communication and competing goals between LAPD and the GRYD program; LAPD wanted to arrest while intervention workers were trying to move youth away from the gang lifestyle. Intervention providers have been working well with upper management of LAPD but the line officers were not getting the message from their bosses, and as a result the intervention workers felt they have been mistreated.

However, their relationship has improved such that the intervention providers now make an effort to let LAPD know which youth are in the GRYD programs; in turn, LAPD makes an effort to help those youth.

Cypress Park – Northeast LAPD

The Northeast Area police report working effectively with the intervention services provider. These efforts are longstanding (they pre-date GRYD) and focus on basic services for reentry. Of note is that intervention, prevention and the police meet at the police station every two weeks to share information – when queried the detective responsible for law enforcement activities in this zone reported no mistrust between the police department and GRYD providers. Indeed the police, including patrol, regularly make referrals to prevention.

As with prevention agencies, intervention agencies also found that some services were needed in order to solve dominant problems that went beyond their core objective – gang reduction for intervention. Two of these macro problems encountered by intervention providers are substance abuse and homelessness. (Substance abuse is addressed in the YSET for prevention agencies).

**Intervention: Evolving services for substance abuse
Baldwin Village – Community Build**

Community Build, which is the only agency contracted to provide both prevention and intervention components, decided to increase substance use services to intervention clients. A number of clients' substance abuse or chemical dependency conditions were seen as an obstacle to creating a non-gang alternative lifestyle, as intervention workers often lose people to recidivism because of drug dependency. Late in the program year, Community Build was searching for a partner to provide substance abuse services. A number of Community Build's clients are also homeless and resources in the area are limited, which has presented a challenge for the agency.

IV.4.3. The Intervention Services Model at the End of Y1

At the end of the first contract year, the GRYD office still lacks a standard service model for intervention case management. The failure of at least two efforts in the fall of 2009 to organize agencies for the development of standard approaches – an open conference led by an external consultant and later a working group of selected intervention agency representatives – hampered progress toward a standard case management or crisis intervention model, and inhibited the engagement of intervention service providers with the evaluation. The evaluation team plans to work with LAVITA staff during Y2 in an effort to overcome these obstacles.

IV.4.4. Planned Future Alterations to the Current Model

Y2 intervention contracts and their associated work plans may identify a more standardized intervention model for case management (these have not been made available to the evaluation team at the time of writing). The GRYD office has noted that the evolving curriculum for LAVITA includes training on case management and its integration with violence intervention practices. At present, only two gang intervention workers from each zone have gone through LAVITA training. By the end of Y2 it is expected that perhaps three times that many will have been trained, resulting in a critical mass of new and shared thinking among intervention workers from different zones about case management and crisis management. The GRYD office believes the LAVITA program has helped pave the way for more cooperation and involvement of intervention agencies in model development in the coming year. A planned re-start of GRYDIS design and programming for intervention case management should also promote the specification of client identification, service categories and selected individual level outcomes. On the other hand, the evaluation of prevention outcomes has recently shifted focus from individual clients to community level impacts.

IV.5. The GRYD Crisis Intervention Component

IV.5.1. The Initial Crisis Intervention Model and Proposed Activities

As with intervention case management services, the intervention RFP also provided a framework for crisis intervention and its companion service, community gang peacekeeping. No manual has been developed, although the gang member approach has

been widely practiced in Los Angeles for years, and several seasoned gang member programs were tapped for GRYD contracts or subcontracts. The formal training of gang workers has come from many quarters but it was not until the spring of 2010 that LAVITA codified and presented formal, consistent training to GRYD gang intervention workers across all GRYD zones. Before then, crisis intervention work was guided only by the traditional practices of existing programs, bracketed by GRYD requirements for targeting age and geographically defined GRYD zones.

IV.5.2. Evolution from 2008 to Present

The evolution of crisis intervention has many sources, including the experiences of GRYD staff that have been on-call for crisis incidents, unevenly developing relationships with LAPD gang officers, and the acquisition of technologies to improve crisis response.

**Intervention: New structure for crisis response
Watts Southeast: Kush, Inc.**

During an interview with the evaluation team at LAPD's Southeast gang unit, the respondent gang officer noted that the GRYD crisis intervention approach had some positive aspects but also believed effectiveness depended on the individual outreach worker. A flaw with the rapid crisis response is that retaliation actually takes a lot longer than anticipated. However, this also could be due in part to the calming effects of the outreach workers. This calming also is advantageous to the detectives because it gives them more time to solve a case. Communication between the police and intervention workers were reportedly positive except for cases where line patrol officers do not know the intervention workers. But they do cooperate with each other, which may be due to the fact that the captain is supportive and informal intervention activities pre-date the GRYD program in this zone. GRYD has provided a structure and organization to crisis intervention.

**Intervention: Razor notification
Cypress Park – Aztecs Rising**

The GRYD office has reportedly been slow in getting certain program components together. For example, the agency had not received the Blackberry devices needed to facilitate coordination of intervention services. Consequently, staff initially used their personal phones to respond to the intervention crisis incidents. Staff started receiving the needed equipment in January 2010, when they obtained LiveScan clearance, which gives gang intervention specialists (or outreach workers) access to information about incidents from LAPD and GRYD Program Managers. As of the end of January about four to five gang intervention specialists had Blackberries.

IV.5.3. The Crisis Intervention Model at the End of Y1

A coherent crisis intervention model is evolving out of the LAVITA training. As noted above, only two gang intervention workers from each zone have gone through the Academy, although that number is expected to approximately triple during Y2. The impact of LAVITA on actual crisis intervention work or success is not currently known, but measurement of its effects has been incorporated into the objectives of the GRYD evaluation going forward.

IV.5.4. Planned Future Alterations to the Current Model

Any alterations to the crisis intervention model going forward will depend on both what is learned and applied by gang intervention workers at the Academy and by an anticipated revival of an intervention focus group early in Y2. It is expected by the GRYD office that those two factors will result in program standardization, worker professionalization, crisis response efficiency and effectiveness, closer tie-ins with intervention case management and better relations with LAPD.

IV.6 Y1 Program Development and Implementation Successes and Challenges

IV.6.1. Successes

At the end of Y1, there is both accomplishment and movement toward cross-site program consistency. That development bodes well for an increase in the scope and utility of the evaluation. Nonetheless, the Y1 evaluation has for most of the past contract period faced large differences across Prevention site programs and very large differences across Intervention, for both the case management and crisis intervention components.

A set of general findings applies to all GRYD provider agencies, or to all prime contractor agencies within each of the two major components, including the following:

- 1) All contracted and subcontracted agencies were experienced youth development and/or gang reduction service providers who could demonstrate an understanding of GRYD purposes and had the capacity to provide the services that GRYD requires; all exhibited an appropriate level of community relevance for GRYD; and all worked to improve these qualities, including shuffling subcontractors when required by performance considerations.
- 2) Though prevention agencies mostly conducted their activities on the basis of programs with which they were already familiar (i.e. pre-GRYD practices adapted to some extent to the YSET risk factors), they were also influenced by new service model elements put forward by GRYD. Towards the end of the program year (June, 2010), such influences were increasing, particularly in the prevention area. The program year ended with a new Prevention program strategy that the GRYD office expects to implement in the program year beginning July 2010.
- 3) Intervention services were originally determined by existing LA interventionist experience and cultures, and appeared resistant to change. However, the creation of the LAVITA program and the first round of formal training that has been conducted seems likely to increase the level of cross-zone standardization and professionalization.
- 4) All agencies from both components, including the mid-year replacement agency, have stabilized much of their individual operational practices, which makes them both more conducive to separate evaluations but in some ways less amenable to aggregate evaluation, at least at the end of Y1. Nevertheless, if the Y2 awards to providers (not yet available) have incorporated the performance standards that the GRYD office has embedded in the new Prevention Strategy and the LAVITA curriculum, the prospects for positive impacts and the effective measurement of such impacts will be greatly enhanced.

Some positive illustrations are presented below.

77th-II – Prevention: AADAP – YSET administration successes

In response to some of the challenges of YSET, staff reported implementing several strategies. First, to make youth feel comfortable, staff began to meet with youth for 30 minutes before administering the YSET to build rapport. This also served as a way to determine whether or not the youth would fit the criteria needed to get into the program.

Another successful approach has been holding case management meetings once every week to discuss their best practices and develop strategies to help alleviate some of the barriers related to the YSET. Some staff also shared that they ask referral sources to send documentation (i.e. documentation of suspensions or behavioral issues) to provide support that the youth should be in the program along with the referral.

The GRYD office found several programmatic ways to encourage cross-component collaboration between prevention and intervention providers, including a) referrals to intervention services of youth identified by YSET testing as gang-involved, b) co-participation in SNL, and c) co-participation in the MDT. Apart from referrals, SNL and the MDT, common zone prevention and intervention agencies such as WLCAC and Kush have begun to work more closely together. For example, in April and May 2010, a Kush case manager conducted a presentation with WLCAC prevention clients at WLCAC's site. Other cross-component collaborations are presented below.

**Collaboration between Prevention and Intervention Providers
Across providers in two GRYD zones**

In February 2010, Communities in Schools (CIS) began holding meetings with the prevention providers for the two GRYD zones that they serve, El Nido Family Centers for the Pacoima/Foothills GRYD and New Directions for Youth (NDY) for the Panorama City/Mission GRYD. During these meetings, staff from CIS and the prevention agencies discuss clients that they would like to refer to one another's program.

Sometimes USC will ask NDY to confer with the intervention provider about YSET results. Therefore, they began meeting with CIS to discuss cases that have been referred to intervention. NDY reports that approximately 15 youth have been referred to the intervention program. CIS sends NDY status updates for those youth who have been referred to the intervention program. When asked if CIS had referred any youth to the program at NDY, one respondent stated that a few had.

**Collaboration between Prevention and Intervention Providers
Within the single two-component GRYD contractor**

Community Build prevention and intervention collaboration: Towards the end of 2009, Community Build began holding meetings that integrated both prevention and intervention staff. Interviewed staff reported the process has created synergy between the two programs and enhanced their services. For example, the programs have referred potential clients and clients' siblings to one another. Intervention workers often know prevention clients and their families, which has been helpful in locating prevention clients and providing prevention providers information about their clients' families.

IV.6.2. Program Implementation Challenges

IV.6.2.a. General Challenges

Specific challenges experienced by GRYD service providers varied a great deal across agencies and program components. For example, several intervention sites have noted the challenge of staying within GRYD-prescribed geographic boundaries.

GRYD boundaries – Intervention

- **Boyle Heights** - SEA staff expressed some frustration with the concept of working within a geographical zone because they were not restricted geographically in their previous intervention work under the Bridges contract. At times GIS may respond to crisis incidents that occur outside of the GRYD zone but follow-ups to these incidents are not conducted typically.
- **Ramona Gardens** - The intervention staff indicated that the current GRYD boundaries do not make sense to them. Since they felt that many of the problem gangs are not covered by the target area, they reported wanting some flexibility and the ability to cover a greater geographical area.

For intervention agencies, a key challenge was providing employment opportunities to the older gang-forsaking clients.

Intervention: Rampart – Aztecs Rising
A challenge to find jobs for clients

One of the challenges initially described by staff was working with the WorkSource and OneSource Centers. The provider said that some of their clients were not ready for this type of service and that those programs were not used to serving the type of clients that the GRYD intervention program serves. Initially, there was some miscommunication about the type of services that would be available through the WorkSource Centers; Aztecs Rising staff thought that slots for jobs had been secured for GRYD clients but later found that the program was just offering some training, resources, and job postings. Aztecs Rising expressed that paid trainings leading to high quality jobs or internships were needed for working with this population.

A challenge that has been expressed by prevention and intervention agencies, the GRYD office, LAPD gang officers and other stakeholders, is getting formal MDTs up and running with full participation of MDT member agencies. This challenge is neither unexpected nor considered to be overwhelming. However, not getting an MOU signed with the Department of Probation has been a serious impediment. Other dissatisfactions have come from not having parents at MDT meetings (a frustration expressed by LAUSD personnel) and not having youth in attendance (noted as a problem by some LAPD officers).

The transportation of clients to services is a persistent challenge for human services in large low income metropolitan areas, particularly those where gang boundaries present an even bigger barrier. Transportation problems are illustrated below in three of the GRYD agencies.

WLCAC

Staff reported that they are doing what they can to run the program, but sometimes feel blocked in moving forward. WLCAC reported that they would occasionally need urgent assistance but “red tape” presents time-consuming obstacles. For example, they requested permission to purchase vans, but staff turnover at the City and lack of pricing guides for van purchases have slowed the process. Staff had been using their personal vehicles to transport clients. As of the February 2010 site visit, WLCAC was waiting for a memo from GRYD on how to move forward. The issue had been resolved by the March 2010 visit, but planning for transportation remains a challenge.

Brotherhood Crusade

BHC staff noted in the April 2010 site visit that transportation has become an increasing challenge for them. Clients need transportation to avoid encounters with rival gangs or potential recruitment into gangs. Staff mentioned they had originally proposed a larger transportation budget, which the GRYD office did not approve.

Community Build

A growing concern is transportation for GRYD clients. The agency did not anticipate the number of clients who moved homes or changed schools. As a result, CB staff have requested to extend the two van drivers’ hours and are working to organize groups of clients to walk from Audubon Middle School to the program site.

IV.6.2.b. Unusual or Extreme Challenges

Extreme Challenge #1: Prevention Agency Performance

The GRYD office and prevention provider for the Watts Southeast GRYD zone terminated the Prevention contract by mutual agreement in January 2009. They were replaced in December 2009 by the agency that provided and continues to provide GRYD Prevention services for a nearby non-GRYD zone.

Problems with staffing, training, subcontracted services, client recruitment and GRYD office communication were noted by agency staff interviewed by the evaluator. According to agency staff, bringing in and training GRYD staff took longer than expected. One staff member noted that YSET training took place later than they would have liked.

The original provider had proposed a GRYD program that offered mental health services (subcontracted to another agency), family services and life and leadership skills development. Clients were enrolled in prime provider agency internships, some receiving stipends, and attended team building/group work classes. Few, if any, clients ever received mental health counseling from the subcontractor.

Although staff reported outreach to numerous locations and screened large numbers of youth, their eligibility and enrollment rates remained low (24% - 44 eligible out of 181 screened). LACC staff reported good communication with GRYD staff, but felt they could have used more support from the GRYD office. Staff also felt that GRYD policies, procedures, and formal communications could be improved.

Extreme Challenge #2: Alleged Prevention Provider Malfeasance

All funding for prevention services in the Florence-Graham zone was halted due to questions surrounding the legitimacy of reported YSET interviews. USC reported that the cases submitted looked very similar, which prompted an investigation on every YSET interview submitted by all organizations. No irregularities were found at other GRYD prevention providers, but USC discovered 29 manipulated cases sent from Florence-Graham. As a result the GRYD office suspended funding and meetings were conducted with the agency, the City Attorney and GRYD upper management.

After a one month suspension in October 2009, the agency was reinstated as the GRYD prevention provider in the Florence-Graham GRYD zone. As a requirement of their reinstatement the agency was required to hire all new staff except for the Executive Director. Complicating the re-start, not all original subcontractors were willing to return due to issues with timely payment of services. The provider indicated that payment issues were the result of delays at the GRYD office and that they do not have the funding reserves to pay their subcontractors while they wait for city payments.

These events resulting in a five month hiatus in prevention services in Florence-Graham, from October 2009 through February 2010, and staff stated that these events caused the loss of a whole year's worth of work. Although there were approximately 55 legitimate youth enrolled in the program before services were halted, staff was able to reconnect with only four youth by the time prevention services re-started in March 2010.

Extreme Challenge #3: Intervention Agency Performance

The GRYD service contract with Unity Two in the 77th-II zone was terminated in August 2009; the contract with the HELPER Foundation for 77th-II intervention services was signed two months later. Unity Two's subcontract with SEA in the Newton zone was also terminated in August. SEA chose to subcontract with Going Beyond Boundaries in September, reportedly feeling that the new agency had a better chance of handling the intensity of the contract, among other reasons.

It is noteworthy that these three extreme challenges all had positive conclusions: the rehabilitation of LAM, the assumption of prevention services to Watts Southeast by WLCAC, and the assumption of intervention services by HELPER and crisis intervention services by Going Beyond Boundaries.

IV.7. Y1 Program Development and Implementation Lessons Learned

The first year experience with creating the GRYD program was about creative learning – what and how to implement in a difficult and changing environment. GRYD providers had a general framework within which to proceed, and some measure of relevant service experience to draw on. However, no operations manual or other comprehensive, detailed, written document regarding services was available for training or reference. As expected, the new (and then reorganized) GRYD office, at both leadership and field staff levels, was also learning to develop and implement a service model during Y1.

Typical of a new initiative, much of what was learned by GRYD prevention, intervention, and crisis intervention service providers falls into aspects of infrastructure, which is of course critical for program development and operations. Providers, in varying degrees of difficulty and success, learned a great deal about each of the following:

- 1) Adapting prior practices. Coming into GRYD with experience serving one specific population or in one type of environment (such as only serving at-risk youth or gang-involved youth or providing services at a school site or only for particular gangs) was not enough. Sometimes simply relocating services to an unfamiliar neighborhood resulted in problems of community connection.
 - a. Prevention: focusing on the risk of gang joining was a major adaptation from working with youth who were simply at risk of other outcomes such as school dropout or even delinquency. Some providers had to adjust staff hiring to look for those who were experienced in working with at-risk youth. CHLA ended their contract with a subcontractor because they could not adjust to this change.
 - b. Intervention: restricting crisis response services to the GRYD zone or, in some cases, being asked by the GRYD office to go outside the zone, was sometimes a challenge to deployment.

- 2) Working with new service partners. Prevention providers were able to keep most services in-house; most intervention providers required not only referrals but subcontracting to cover certain service types and geographic areas. This was especially true of intervention sites, where learning how to do this sometimes meant re-staff or renegotiating subcontracts with new providers.
- 3) Working with institutional partners. In many cases, prior productive relationships existed with LAUSD, although there were fewer with LAPD. These had to be invented and learned. Working with institutional partners was promoted in 2010 by the MDT and learning that service model is ongoing. Building relationships with LAPD was often successful because of a Program Manager's facilitation.
 - a. Prevention: providers and the USC researchers had to learn to work together on YSET administration and related communications and services.
 - b. Intervention: relations with WorkSource have progressed with clearer expectations.
- 4) Collaborating across components. Prevention and intervention deal with different age populations, different school and work situations, different services needs and different orientations to gangs. This tends to restrict opportunities for collaboration to client referrals or to certain families where different siblings might be available for each program. Facilitated by the MDT program, some prevention and intervention providers are clearly realizing the value of greater collaboration between them.
- 5) Working with the GRYD office. The key link to GRYD-provider relationships has been the Program Manager.
 - a. Prevention: PMs helped several sites to develop community connections, particularly for recruiting eligible youth and establishing advisory councils.
 - b. Intervention: GRYD office personnel, gang intervention workers and LAPD have had to co-invent systems for crisis response.

- 6) Working with the evaluator. Encounters at forums and in the field have advanced critical working relationships between provider personnel and evaluation team members.
 - a. Prevention: sites have come to expect and accommodate regular visits for data gathering and special systems for delivering consent forms and retests.
 - b. Intervention: perhaps understandably but not productively, sites learned to resist and reject substantial involvement with evaluators in certain program development activities.

IV.8. Risk Factor Pilot Retest

IV.8.1. Youth Prevention Risk Factor Screening

A unique feature of the implementation of the prevention component of GRYD is that providers in each of the zones are required to screen referred or recruited youth before enrolling them in gang prevention services. This screening process involves the use of the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), developed by researchers at the University of Southern California for the GRYD office. YSET was designed to measure individual and environmental factors that past research has shown are associated with the likelihood of youth joining street gangs. As previously mentioned, YSET was originally structured to elicit responses from screened youth on ten gang-joining risk factors: antisocial/lack of prosocial tendencies; weak parental monitoring; critical life events; risk taking; impulsivity; neutralization; negative peer influence; peer delinquency; self report delinquency; and self report substance abuse. Each risk factor domain was measured by four or more questions, each of which was assigned an unweighted numerical score. Summations across the questions for each domain constituted the scale score for each risk factor.

When first implemented in 2008, YSET included two separate screening instruments (YSET 1 and YSET 2). In the early stages of GRYD all referred youth were to receive YSET 1. Those found to be eligible and those with borderline risk factor³⁰ scores were then administered the YSET 2 to explore more closely their individual risk

³⁰ Having high scores on five or more risk factors meant youth were eligible. Three or fewer resulted in a determination of not being eligible. Four risk factors was considered marginal or borderline.

levels. But by November 2009 the two YSET screening instruments were merged into a single one (YSET Combined) for all referred youth. The number of risk factors was reduced to nine by combining several scales and adding Family Influences as another risk factor category.

Since one of the goals of the evaluation is to track changes in individual level risk factors among participating youth over time, the evaluation team developed a reassessment tool based upon measures incorporated into both YSET 1 and YSET Combined during Y1. Repeated assessments of both serviced and comparison youth will take place approximately every six months across all zones beginning in Y2 of the evaluation, as discussed in Chapter V below.

Individual scale items were slightly different in YSET 1 and YSET Combined. Some items were dropped and several were merged. UI conducted a factor analysis on shared items responses from the YSET 1 database, which covered screens through July 2009. A similar factor analysis could not be performed on the YSET Combined since individual items responses were not entered into the YSET database following YSET Combined roll out. The factor analysis and comparisons of the YSET 1 and YSET Combined items led to the development of a reassessment instrument by the evaluation team. This risk factor reassessment tool focuses on the risk factor domains measured in both YSET 1 and YSET Combined and the Family Influence risk factor added to YSET Combined. The reassessment domains are also consistent with those emphasized as being particularly important to GRYD prevention provider services in a GRYD office provider workshop held in the fall of 2009.

IV.8.2. Reassessment Pilot Retest

A pilot retest (May-June 2010) was conducted in five GRYD zones and two non-GRYD zones where prevention providers volunteered to participate. The participating GRYD zones were Boyle Heights, Pacoima Foothill, Panorama City, Rampart, and Southwest II. The non-GRYD participants were Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC) and Child and Family Guidance Center (CFGC). A total of 166 youth were retested using the shortened Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). The number retested by zone ranged from eleven to thirty-eight. These youth were selected by the Urban Institute starting with those who were enrolled earliest in GRYD prevention

programming and still were enrolled in the program at the time of the retests. All retests were administered by each zone's prevention provider staff.

The primary purpose of the pilot retest was to determine the optimal approach that will be undertaken GRYD-wide in Y2 and beyond and to identify adjustments that will need to be made in our planned retest procedures. The pilot is not an outcome assessment and the reported findings should not be used to make judgments about the general effects (outcomes) of the GRYD program. The findings should also not be used to compare performance of providers across participating zones. The number of youth tested was relatively small in comparison to the total number of at-risk youth enrolled in prevention programs and the sample is not necessarily representative of all GRYD youth. Furthermore, only GRYD youth were retested and comparisons could not be made to youth not receiving services.

The Risk Factor Table (Table 7) summarizes the changes in YSET risk factor scores for all youth retested and for each one of the participating zones. Changes were examined across seven risk factors measured on the YSET. These were: antisocial/prosocial tendencies; parental supervision; critical life events; impulsive risk taking; neutralization; negative/positive peer influence; and peer delinquency.³¹ Item specific responses for all pilot sites and each zone or non-zone are attached.

³¹ Delinquent and substance abuse items were not scaled, but instead self-reports for six months prior to initial screen and six months prior to retest were compared as indicators of potential behavioral outcomes, rather than predictive risk factors. Family risk, as measured by the number of family members in gangs, was not included in the pilot as well since it was not part of the original YSET instrument.

**Table 7 - Summary of Risk Factor Scale Changes
GRYD YSET Pilot**

Zone	Scale A Antisocial	Scale B Parental Supervision	Scale C Critical Life Events	Scale DE Impulsive Risk Taking	Scale F Neutralization	Scale G Peer Influence	Scale H Peer Delinquency
All (N=150)	- 3.24*	- 1.18 *	- 1.30	- 2.95 *	- 3.02*	- 1.21*	- 1.41*
Boyle (N = 10)	- 4.60 *	- .50	- 1.30	- 2.72	- 4.84 *	- .80	- 1.00
Pacoima (N=22)	- 1.77	+ .68	- 1.00 *	- .91	+ 1.55*	+ 1.27	+ .89
Panorama (N=20)	- 4.83 *	- 1.45	- 4.30 *	- 5.60 *	- 5.35*	- 2.45 *	- 5.00 *
Rampart (N= 16)	- 3.08*	- .75	- .93	- 1.50	- 2.31	- 2.31	- 1.32
Southwest (N=37)	- 2.05*	- .36	- 1.94 *	- 3.43 *	- 3.48 *	- .17	- 1.32
Non- GRYD WLCAC (N=16)	- 4.81*	- 3.81*	- .31	- 3.40 *	- 3.50 *	- 2.50	- 2.25
Non- GRYD CFGC (N=29)	- 3.62 *	- 2.31 *	- 1.76 *	- 2.52*	- 3.83 *	- 2.36*	- 1.31

- is a decline in risk factor scale scores
 + is an increase in risk factor scale scores
 * p < .05 on paired t-tests

The figures in this table are the pre-post changes in average risk factor scale scores, where a score preceded by a minus sign (-) indicates a decline in gang-joining risk. Such declines are supportive of what the GRYD office hypothesized would result from participation in prevention services. – a reduction in client propensity to join gangs and engage in delinquent or criminal behavior. On the other hand, a score preceded by a plus sign (+) indicates that the risk factor became worse for the average youth. Those cells highlighted in the table are where changes were statistically significant (p<.05) on paired mean t-tests. The only statistically significant change that was inconsistent with what was hypothesized was for neutralization in Pacoima, which is highlighted in orange.

Across all retest youth (N=150)³² risk factor scale scores declined in each of the measured domains. Of note is that, with the exception of critical life events, risk factor score changes were also statistically significant. Of these improvements in youth retested, the largest improvement was found in antisocial/prosocial tendencies. The next most improved risk factor domain was neutralization.

Similar results were found in Boyle Heights with risk factor improvements across all of the scales. While the direction of change was consistent with pooled results, in Boyle Heights risk factor improvements were only significant for antisocial/prosocial tendencies and neutralization. Panorama City showed the largest improvement changes of any of the retest sites and was well above the averages of all retested youth. The improvements were particularly large in Panorama City for impulsive risk taking, neutralization and peer delinquency. Only the changes in parental supervision were found to be not statistically significant. In Rampart, the changes were also consistent across all of the risk factor scores, but with more modest improvements than those found in the other sites. Only antisocial/prosocial tendencies changes were found to be statistically significant in this zone. In Southwest, the largest improvement in risk factor scores came under neutralization. This change was statistically significant as were improvements in antisocial/prosocial tendencies, parental supervision, and impulsive risk taking. For the non-GRYD WLCAC youth significant risk factor improvements were reported for antisocial/prosocial tendencies, parental supervision, impulsive risk taking and neutralization. However, while the changes were more modest for the other categories, they were still in the hypothesized direction. Similar findings were reported for the non-GRYD CFGC with the largest improvements being in neutralization and antisocial/prosocial tendencies. There were also significant improvements in critical life events and peer influence for CFGC youth.

In contrast to the generally improved changes in risk factors found in most of the pilot sites, in Pacoima Foothill only three domains, antisocial/prosocial tendencies, critical life events and impulsive risk taking showed improvements, with critical life events being statistically significant. All of the other scales showed increases in risk, the largest being for neutralization where the change was statistically significant.

³² Missing data from initial YSET screens precluded the inclusion of all retested youth in the pilot analyses.

In general, however, the pilot retest results showed fairly consistent improvements in risk for prevention youth across sites and within most of the individual zones. There was some variability across risk factor scales and individual zones, although antisocial/prosocial tendencies demonstrated improvement consistently across sites.

Table 8 shows the changes in youth self-reported delinquent and substance abuse behaviors. These figures were calculated by summing the number of self-report behavior items showing improvements in the last six months as compared to self-reports of the same behaviors in the six months prior to the initial YSET screen. The instruments seek responses from youth about whether they engaged in twenty separate behaviors during these time periods.

As can be seen in the table, there were reported improvements in 13 anti-social behaviors and negative changes in 6 behaviors for all pilot retest youth – a margin of more than a 2 to 1 improvement. Panorama City and Boyle Heights showed the largest number of self-reported behavior improvements and both also had no behaviors with negative changes. In Rampart, WLCAC and CFGC the number of behaviors with positive changes outweighed negative ones. However, while there were some behaviors that positively changed in Pacoima Foothill and Southwest, there were many more with negative changes.

Table 8 - Summary of Self-Reported Delinquency/Substance Abuse Behavioral Change Six Months Prior to Initial YSET Screen Compared to Six Months Prior to Retest

Zone	Number of Self Report Behaviors Showing Positive Change	Number of Self Report Behaviors Showing Negative Change
All	13	6
Boyle	16	0
Pacoima	6	9
Panorama	18	0
Rampart	11	5
Southwest	3	15
Non GRYD WLCAC	9	4
Non GRYD CFGC	14	2

Therefore, for self-reported delinquent and substance abuse behaviors, the pilot retest showed variability across zones. In most cases positive changes outweighed negative changes, but in two zones the findings were in the other direction. It is important to understand that these results are from a small pilot retest, and that they may not be replicated when YSET retesting is extended to all zones and all prevention clients.

Chapter V

Challenges and Solutions

V.1. The Program and Evaluation Context

V.1.1. Background

When reviewing Y1 activities within the GRYD program and the accompanying evaluation, it is critical to note that GRYD is particularly complex compared to most community based public safety programs. It has twelve primary geographic zones, three distinct components (prevention, intervention, and crisis management), and 18 provider agencies, all operating independently and at differing stages of implementation (to date). Of course, all programs face implementation challenges and it is common for significant amounts of time (generally more than expected) to be needed for full implementation to take place.³³ However, the complexity and geographic scope of the GRYD program make it more susceptible to implementation difficulties than most similar programs. That many of these challenges were in fact encountered (and documented during the year in evaluation reports provided to the GRYD office) is to be expected.

These factors have profound consequences for the evaluation of the program (as well as for the management of the program.) During the first year, they have influenced a wide range of decisions about evaluation design and activities and have shaped what it has been possible for the evaluation team to do and achieve to this point in time. For example, the plan to implement a rigorous experimental design (resting on the assumption made in the evaluation proposal that the GRYD program would be more or less fully operational when the evaluation began) was, for a variety of reasons, deferred at an early stage by the GRYD office. Subsequently it was agreed that outcome evaluation in general – that is, an assessment of whether the GRYD program was producing the desired results or not – would not be feasible or appropriate during the first year because the fluidity of the program was too great.

³³ For example, OJJDP's Gang Reduction Program, in which Boyle Heights participated, required almost two years after commencement before effective implementation was realized. LA Bridges I and II experienced similar difficulties.

Consequently, the primary emphasis of evaluation activities during Y1 has been on program implementation issues. In accordance with the solicitation and the terms of the award, the evaluation team has provided the GRYD office with continuous formative feedback. This has been codified in formal activity reports to the GRYD office (available separately).³⁴

V.1.2 The Dominant Issues and Responses to Them

Most of the challenges arising from the GRYD program context have been discussed in some detail in earlier Chapters of this report. To frame this concluding discussion brief summaries of different aspects of the context within which the GRYD program and the evaluation were implemented are listed below:

1. The initial absence in the formulation of the GRYD program of a well-specified program design/model (over and above the statement of general principles and recommended activities contained in the RFPs) that providers in each of the three components (prevention, intervention case management, and crisis intervention) were required to follow.

³⁴The following reports were submitted to the GRYD office:

GRYD Evaluation Progress and Activity Report – Y1, Quarter 1, August 25, 2009

GRYD Evaluation Interim Findings Report – Y1, First 6 months, November 3, 2009

GRYD Evaluation Progress and Activity Report – Y1, Quarter 3, February 9, 2010

The consequence of this was that the evaluation and the program were potentially confronting up to 36 different contexts (12 zones, 3 components in each zone), an unmanageable configuration. By the end of Y1, however, the GRYD program had reached a more developed statement for the prevention program focusing on three components – the individual, the family, and peer groups. A formal statement of this revision was produced with the intent of integrating it into Y2 prevention provider activities. For intervention, the LAVITA academy had been established and was providing training to a first cohort of intervention staff. The advantage of this for the evaluation is that it will permit a more rational and thorough assessment of provider services and their effects.

2. A lack of enforceable language in provider contracts requiring provider cooperation with the evaluation.

This made it difficult for either the GRYD office or the evaluation team to insist on provider compliance with evaluation requirements. It also contributed to GRYD office decisions to cancel scheduled group meetings for prevention and intervention providers and to disband a working group on intervention practitioners organized by the evaluation team to provide input to evaluation requirements. Provider resistance, particularly from intervention providers, was considered too strong to overcome. Y2 provider contracts are intended to address this issue.

3. Not initially creating GRYD more akin to a standardized demonstration project that would necessarily trade off some pre-existing provider preferences for a clear and defensible demonstration of achievements.

Though providers (informally in discussions with the evaluation team), and the GRYD office (contractually in the award and in subsequent meetings) agreed that a strong evaluation is necessary to avoid the LA Bridges I and II lack of accountability, and to clearly identify which provider services have the most

beneficial effects, the infrastructure for accomplishing this was not in place during Y1. Y2 awards are expected to correct this problem.

4. The slower than anticipated level of recruitment of youth to the prevention program, and the difficulties or absence of recruitment procedures in the intervention program.

Though it was to be expected that some time would be needed to build up youth participation levels, the pace of recruitment was much slower than expected. By the end of Y1, for instance, a number of providers had not yet reached the target levels. This constrained the evaluation's ability to establish and begin implementation of a scientifically rigorous design. By the end of Y1, however, the pace of recruitment was such that all zones can be expected to have reached their target levels during the first few months of Y2.

5. The unexpectedly slow development and implementation of the program's information system (GRYDIS), which was still not fully operational by the end of Y1 (June 2010).

Initial estimates by the GRYD office were that GRYDIS would be operational late summer 2009. This would have made it possible for the evaluation team to document provider activities and summarize service delivery to GRYD clients. The process in fact consumed the entire year. This is a not uncommon characteristic of automated information systems that are being developed from scratch, but it seriously hampered what it was possible for the evaluation team to report about the program. The GRYD office and the evaluation team jointly determined that no parallel and duplicative information collection system should be imposed on providers while GRYDIS was being developed. It was considered that the burden would be unreasonable and could well impede program activities. Assuming that providers will find GRYDIS sufficiently useful to their operations and client management and that data input to GRYDIS will be comprehensive, the system should provide, in Y2, the information on prevention provider clients and

services that the evaluation needs. It is not yet certain that GRYDIS can or will be adapted to intervention provider needs.

6. The slow processing of the UI-LAPD MOU at the LA City level, and subsequent technical difficulties in obtaining geo-coded data from LAPD after the MOU was signed.

It has taken 15 months to get to the point where geocoded LAPD data are being provided. After all the legal difficulties were overcome, the cooperation level from LAPD has been excellent and, going forward into Y2, we anticipate being able to fully document law enforcement activities in the GRYD zones and in comparison areas in other locations in the city. With the support of Captain Kevin McCarthy, Chief Beck's designated point of contact for the evaluation, LAPD's Compstat section is producing crime, arrest, and call-for-service data going back to 2004/2005. Ongoing data provision will be conducted at six month intervals through the end of the evaluation.

7. The failure of LA City and USC to sign a contract for the conduct of YSET (still not in existence at the end of Y1).

Though this did not prevent the USC team from conducting the initial YSET eligibility screening reviews or from returning the eligibility decisions to the providers (but only because USC and the USC YSET team agreed to do the work even though there was no contract), it did complicate the provision of YSET information to the evaluation team. This delayed the commencement of the YSET retest process that is a key component of the evaluation. However, with the cooperation of the USC team in providing initial client responses to the YSET interview, the evaluation team was able to successfully conduct a pilot implementation of the client retest process in April and May of 2010. Results are presented earlier in this report. In addition, negotiations between the City and USC are reported to be concluded, and an ongoing contract is expected to be signed by July, 2010.

8. The unexpected (by the Evaluation team) time commitments to Summer Night

Lights (SNL) by provider and GRYD staff during critical start up periods of program implementation (summer, 2009) and the evaluation's need to engage in field work at the same time.

During Y1, evaluation of SNL was not incorporated into the solicitation, the proposal, or the award. Consequently, no preparation for its effects was built into the evaluation work plan, and evaluation activities in other areas were slowed when SNL began consuming program manager and provider time. The exclusion of SNL from the evaluation has now been corrected, and documenting and measuring SNL activities and effects are an important component of Y2 work.

V.2. Conclusion for Y1

The evaluation (and the GRYD program) have been confronted by many challenges during Y1. In this report, we have identified these and delineated the responses to them by both the GRYD office and the evaluation team. The situation at the end of Y1 is encouraging in a number of critical areas.

First, the service provider contracts are expected to be much more explicit with respect to formal program and evaluation requirements. This will enhance programmatic monitoring and management, as well as the interface between the evaluation and providers.

Second, the GRYD office has made major forward movement in both the Prevention and Intervention areas. Program definition has occurred, and training is being provided. This will increase the strength and consistency of service provision and should result in superior client experiences.

Third, a necessary information system, GRYDIS for prevention agencies, is now on-line for data entry, and should assist providers in day-to-day management of clients and activities. To the extent that it does, the evaluation will benefit by being able to electronically derive client and service details in a simple and ongoing process.

Fourth, LAPD data provision problems are now solved and city-wide, geo-coded data sets will shortly be available. These will support in-depth analysis of crime and gang activity both in GRYD zones and elsewhere.

Fifth, the pilot of the YSET retest process has demonstrated that providers are able to effectively conduct retests of their clients. This will enable the evaluation team to set up and implement the retest process across all zones and for all clients in Y2. The feedback to providers about individual client progress will permit adjustment and adaptation of service provision on a case-by-case basis. The process will also permit, by the end of Y2, outcome assessment of the GRYD program with respect to client changes in risk scores and delinquent or criminal behavior.

Finally, at a Los Angeles meeting on June 23-24, between the GRYD office, the Evaluation Advisory Committee and the Evaluation team, the following important design decisions were reached:

- It was agreed that a randomized experimental design has a low probability of being successfully implemented for the prevention component, and that a failed experimental design would be worse than a successful, though somewhat less rigorous, alternative. Consequently, it was decided that the prevention evaluation would employ a regression discontinuity design, coupled with other analytic techniques (for factors not suited to regression discontinuity – e.g. self-reported delinquency/criminality). This approach does not risk the “denial of service” ethical dilemma that would be a consequence of randomly assigning at-risk youth to a non-service control group. For that reason and others it is thus not likely to stimulate provider resistance.
- Intervention effects will be assessed during Y2 at the community level, rather than at the individual level. This decision was based on two factors. First, the fact that informed consent by intervention clients is often not obtained has the consequence that the federal prohibition barring access to individual youth data in the absence of informed consent would prevent review and analysis of client-specific information by the evaluation team. Second, intervention agency staff have expressed concern that their ability to effectively work with clients would be compromised if those clients learned that they were being individually assessed by an external organization. During Y2, this issue will be revisited to explore alternate possibilities for individual level analysis.

- The evaluation team will establish a working relationship with LAVITA staff and will develop procedures and techniques for assessing the impact of LAVITA on intervention activities in the GRYD zones.
- An evaluation of Summer Night Lights will be incorporated into the evaluation scope of work. During the 2010 SNL period (July-Sept), the evaluation team will co-operate and co-ordinate with SNL information gathering being conducted by the GRYD office (through surveys), and will subsequently develop an approach to measuring community response to SNL. In addition, the evaluation will analyze LAPD data to make an assessment of the effects of SNL on crime and delinquency.
- The YSET retest process will be initiated across all zones early in Y2 and will be conducted by prevention providers. All GRYD prevention clients will be retested at 6 month intervals after program entry. UI/Harder will randomly identify a sample of retested youth for one-on-one interviews with evaluation team staff. The purpose will be to check the retest responses for the interviewed youth and clarify/elaborate those responses as needed.
- The GRYD Cabinet and the GRYD Multi-Disciplinary Teams (MDTs) will not be included in the evaluation's Y2 scope of work. However, during Y2, Harder/UI will obtain information concerning Cabinet and MDT activities from the GRYD office in preparation for possible Y3 evaluation of those activities.


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Appendix A




ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
MAYOR

Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD)

Office of the Mayor
CITY OF LOS ANGELES

-  77th Division (II)
-  Baldwin Village/Southwest
-  Boyle Heights/Hollenbeck
-  Cypress Park/Northeast
-  Florence-Graham/77th
-  Newton
-  Pacoima/Foothill
-  Panorama City/Mission
-  Ramona Gardens/Hollenbeck
-  Rampart
-  Southwest (II)
-  Watts/Southeast



ATTACHMENT B

Year 2 Final Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (July 2011)


Y2 Final Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program

Terence Dunworth, Ph.D.
David Hayeslip, Ph.D.
Megan Denver

research for safer communities



URBAN INSTITUTE
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Executive Summary

Introduction

The Urban Institute in partnership with Harder+Company has been contracted by the Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles to conduct a multi-year evaluation of the Mayor's Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). This Executive Summary describes the key findings of the second year of the evaluation. The Year 2 evaluation builds upon the previous process and preliminary outcome findings reported in 2010.¹ In this Executive Summary, we first identify the main components of the GRYD program and then describe the sources and scope of data that comprise the foundation for the main report. Key findings are then presented. A brief conclusion follows.

The full report is organized around the primary components of the GRYD program. For detailed support of the key findings presented in the Summary, the reader is referred to the analyses that are presented in the main report, and the appendices that accompany it.

The Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program

The Los Angeles Mayor's GRYD program was established in 2007. The two goals of the GRYD program are to increase communities' resiliency to risk factors for gang membership and violence, and to reduce gang violence in select high gang crime areas of the city. To achieve these goals the GRYD office has developed and implemented or coordinated a range of programs across five components:

- Primary prevention;
- Secondary prevention;
- Intervention case management;
- Intervention violence interruption (crisis intervention); and
- Law enforcement engagement².

Needs assessments were commissioned by the Mayor's office in 2008 to identify the geographic areas in Los Angeles where gang prevalence and violence were documented to be most prevalent. Twelve zones were selected.³ Contracts with private sector prevention and intervention service providers were competitively selected for each of the zones during 2008 and 2009. The contracts have been re-competed or renewed on July 1 of each year since then.

¹ Dunworth et al. (2010). *Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Final Y1 Report*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Available online: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412251.html> See also individual zone profiles, available at: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412274.html>

² The Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development draft *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence* (May 2011).

³ The 2008 needs assessments are available online: <http://mayor.lacity.org/index.htm>

Service delivery for prevention programs began in early 2009; intervention programs commenced later that spring. Since commencement the programs have been in continuous operation and the number of youth receiving services and assistance is steadily growing.

In addition to the prevention and intervention programs, the GRYD office, in collaboration with other agencies and organizations, sponsors and organizes the Summer Night Lights (SNL) program, which addresses all five components of the GRYD program. SNL operates each summer from July 4th through Labor Day. Financial support for SNL comes from private sector contributors as well as from Los Angeles' city funds. Under the SNL program, for four evenings each week of the two month period, local parks and recreation centers across the city host a range of activities including free meals, recreation, and other activities that are open to all members of the community. GRYD office Program Managers and teams of gang and violence intervention specialists are present at each location during the SNL hours of operation, working to extend the reduction of inter-gang conflict and violence beyond the two months of SNL. Los Angeles Police Department officers also participate, not only to help maintain security, but also to engage in non-law enforcement group activities with attendees.

SNL began with eight locations in 2008 and added new locations each year since then, resulting in a total of 32 by 2011. Further expansion is contemplated for 2012.

Scope of the Year 2 Evaluation

The long term goals of the evaluation are to address each of the components of the GRYD program, and make assessments of the effectiveness of the GRYD program with respect to its objectives in each of those areas. The evaluation also seeks to measure crime longitudinally and geographically in order to document trends in gang activity and gang violence in GRYD zones, SNL locations, and the city at large. To accomplish these goals, the evaluation team focuses primarily on information drawn from GRYD's prevention and intervention programs, and on geographically-specific incident level crime data that is extracted from the Los Angeles Police Department's data records.

GRYD's primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention programs are at different stages of development with respect to data systems and documentation of their activities. Generally speaking, the secondary prevention program is more extensively documented than either the primary prevention program or the intervention program. It has therefore been possible to conduct quantitative analysis of secondary prevention activities, but not of the activities in primary prevention or intervention. The chapters of the report covering primary prevention (Chapter III) and intervention (Chapter V) are therefore primarily qualitative.

To develop that qualitative information, the evaluation team conducted interviews, focus groups and surveys with 689 individuals who were participants or stakeholders in the GRYD program. Respondent groups include: GRYD Program Managers; GRYD service providers in the primary and secondary prevention programs and in the intervention program; LAPD officers; school teachers and officials; community leaders; youth in the secondary prevention program; and parents of such youth. All aspects of the GRYD program, including SNL, were

included in the topics covered across these surveys. More detail on the scope of these evaluation activities is provided in Chapter II. The opinions and views expressed are reported in Chapters III, IV and V. In addition, surveys were conducted directly by the GRYD office of GRYD's Gun Buy Back program and SNL. Salient points from these surveys are also reported.

The secondary prevention program, focusing on at-risk youth aged 10-15 who are not already gang members, had received more than 5,000 referrals by mid-April 2011. Three thousand of these referred youth (60%) were considered sufficiently at-risk to be eligible for GRYD services on the basis of GRYD's Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). A sample of more than 900 of this group was given a retest, using a process developed and administered by the evaluation team. An additional sample of 248 youth, drawn from the 2,000 referrals that were below GRYD's eligibility threshold, also took the retest. The retests were administered not less than six months after the initial test. Changes in self-reported gang risk factors and delinquent/criminal behaviors were measured at both points in time. The results and comparisons between the two groups are detailed in Chapter IV.

LAPD crime data records from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2010 have been provided to the evaluation team by LAPD, and trend analysis of more than 1.2 million recorded criminal incidents is presented in Chapter VI of this report. The chapter reviews Part I, Part II, and gang crime trends for the 12 GRYD zones, the 24 SNL areas that were in operation in 2010, and the city at large.

Key Year 2 Findings

The evidence to date on the extent to which the GRYD program achieved its objectives, as outlined in the GRYD office's *Comprehensive Gang Reduction Strategy* are presented for each of the primary components of the initiative. In addition, crime and gang crime trends for the GRYD zones and SNL areas compared to the rest of the city outside these area boundaries are summarized below. Readers are urged to refer to Urban Institute/Harder+Company's *Year 2 Evaluation of the GRYD Program: Final Report* for additional information, evaluation methodology details and interpretation caveats and cautions.

Primary Prevention

- GRYD stakeholders reported positive views about the effects of GRYD zone programs on community perceptions of community safety.
- GRYD stakeholders reported positive views about the effects of SNL programs on improving safety in parks during the operation of the summer activities, but views of park safety were not as strong after SNL concluded.
- GRYD stakeholders were positive about the effects of SNL on improving the quality of life in parks during the operations of SNL, but views of the quality of life were not as strong after SNL concluded.
- GRYD stakeholders felt that GRYD programs had the effects of increasing both prevention services and intervention services in the targeted communities.

Secondary Prevention

- GRYD stakeholders were affirmative about the prevention program, asserting improvements in the key objectives of the secondary prevention program, including the availability of gang prevention services, the communication of alternatives to the gang life, and the increase of resistance by youth to pressures to join gangs.
- More than sixty percent of enrolled youth who were retested on YSET scored at levels that were below the at-risk threshold for admission to the program. In other words, more than half of the eligible at-risk youth who were enrolled in GRYD and retested six months later now had risk levels that would be considered ineligible.
- On average, enrolled youth showed substantial and statistically significant improvements on all seven attitudinal risk scales.
- Enrolled youth reported some reduction in delinquent, criminal, or gang related behavior but these reductions were not statistically significant for all behavioral items. Thus, behavior change did not exhibit the same level of improvement as attitudinal change.
- Comparisons at retest between enrolled youth and youth who had not received services indicated that enrolled youth had greater positive change than the not-eligible youth, but that the differences in reported risky behaviors were not significant.

Intervention

- From July 2010 to April 2011 there were joint responses by the GRYD office, LAPD and program community intervention workers to 321 violent crisis incidents, of which the majority were gang-related.
- GRYD stakeholders reported that they were in agreement that rumors had been dispelled following crisis incidents by dissemination of information by LAPD, GRYD staff and intervention workers.
- GRYD stakeholders felt that GRYD staff has been able to effectively communicate with LAPD and intervention workers in response to crisis situations.
- GRYD stakeholders reported that LAPD officers have been able to effectively communicate with intervention workers during crisis situations.
- A large majority of surveyed stakeholders felt that the intervention training (LAVITA) improved intervention workers' roles in responding to crises.
- Perceptions were high among stakeholders about the effectiveness of LAPD, GRYD office and intervention workers on reducing community tensions, the likelihood of retaliatory incidents and gang conflicts following crises.
- Most of those surveyed were positive about the effects of SNL on presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs.

Gang Violence and Crime

- Part I and Part II crimes in GRYD zones and SNL areas generally decreased from January 2005 through December 2010, with declines being steeper following GRYD program implementation. However, areas in the rest of the city outside the zones and SNL locations saw the same general trends during the period.
- Gang-related crime was quite seasonal throughout the past six years with increases through early each summer when gang crimes peaked, followed by a decline through the end of each year.

- The overall six-year trend for gang-related crime in GRYD zones and SNL locations was curvilinear with the peak occurring in mid-2007 after which gang crimes dropped steeply. A similar trend was observed in areas outside the zones and SNL areas but the post-implementation declines were not quite as sharp as what transpired within program areas.
- GRYD stakeholders generally attributed changes in gang violence that they had observed to GRYD and SNL programs.

Conclusions

In summary, the evidence reported in the Year 2 GRYD Evaluation Report points toward positive outcomes for the achievement of GRYD program component objectives. While outcomes for all component objectives have not yet been examined due to data limitations, those that were examined were in the direction of what would be anticipated from GRYD program success.

The observed outcomes for crime were more mixed. While gang-related crimes declined somewhat more steeply following implementation of GRYD prevention and SNL programs in those areas than the rest of the city, the overall crime trends since 2005 have been quite similar in targeted areas and areas in the rest of the city beyond their boundaries. In addition, gang crimes were rising and then peaked in 2007 before the implementation of GRYD programs and have been on the decline since that peak, although it does appear that the declines accelerated somewhat following program implementation. This suggests that there are forces at work in Los Angeles that are having city-wide effects on crime levels and these effects were intensified around the same time the GRYD program began. It is also possible that the positive changes in risk levels for youth in the prevention program may to some extent be related to these unobserved city-wide factors.

While participant and stakeholder opinions are affirmative and at-risk youth have shown great improvements, unequivocal attribution of cause and effect to the GRYD program is currently unwarranted. Nonetheless, much of the evidence to date is quite positive and consistent with hypothesized GRYD program effects:

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August 16, 2011

Mr. Guillermo Cespedes
Deputy Mayor
Director of GRYD Office
200 N. Spring St.
Room 303
Los Angeles, CA 90012

RE: Y2 Final Report - LA Agreement No. C-115573; UI No. 08379
Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program

Dear Mr. Cespedes,

The Urban Institute (UI) is pleased to submit Y2 final report for contract number C-115573 entitled "Y2 Final Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program".

Should you have questions of technical nature, please direct them to Terry Dunworth at TDunworth@urban.org or (978) 270-0685. Questions of a contractual nature should be directed to Don Spencer at (202) 261-5396.

Sincerely,

Valeria Roman

Valeria Roman

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List of Acronyms

CIW	Community Intervention Workers
CM	Case Manager
GRYD	Gang Reduction and Youth Development
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LAVITA	Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy
RACR	Real Time Analysis and Critical Response
RD	Reporting District
RDD	Regression Discontinuity Design
SNL	Summer Night Lights
UI	Urban Institute
USC	University of Southern California
Y2	Year 2 (of the evaluation)
YSET-I	Youth Services Eligibility Tool – Initial
YSET-R	Youth Services Eligibility Tool - Retest

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Urban Institute in partnership with Harder+Company has been contracted by the Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles to conduct a multi-year evaluation of the Mayor's Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). This Executive Summary describes the key findings of the second year of the evaluation. The Year 2 evaluation builds upon the previous process and preliminary outcome findings reported in 2010.¹ In this Executive Summary, we first identify the main components of the GRYD program and then describe the sources and scope of data that comprise the foundation for the main report. Key findings are then presented. A brief conclusion follows.

The full report is organized around the primary components of the GRYD program. For detailed support of the key findings presented in the Summary, the reader is referred to the analyses that are presented in the main report, and the appendices that accompany it.

The Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program

The GRYD program was established in 2007. The mission of the GRYD office, as documented in its Comprehensive Strategy² is to reduce gang violence within the Los Angeles communities with the most need by:

- Promoting positive youth development;
- Addressing the root causes that lead youth to join gangs;
- Reducing gang involvement among young people already engaged in gangs;
- Improving the relationships between the community and law enforcement;
- Responding to gang violence when it occurs to decrease the likelihood of retaliation; and
- Increasing information-sharing, the coordination of services, and collaboration between communities and the GRYD Office.

To achieve these goals the GRYD office has developed and implemented or coordinated a range of programs across five components:

- Primary prevention;
- Secondary prevention;
- Intervention case management;
- Intervention violence interruption (crisis intervention); and
- Law enforcement engagement.

¹ Dunworth et al. (2010). *Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Final Y1 Report*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Available online: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412251.html>
See also individual zone profiles, available at: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412274.html>

² The Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development draft *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence* (May 2011)

Needs assessments were commissioned by the Mayor's office in 2008 to identify the geographic areas in Los Angeles where gang activities and violence were documented to be most prevalent. Twelve zones were selected.³ Contracts with private sector prevention and intervention service providers were competitively selected for each of the zones during 2008 and 2009. The contracts have been re-competed or renewed on July 1 of each successive year.

Service delivery for prevention programs began in early 2009; intervention programs commenced later that spring. Since commencement, the programs have been in continuous operation and the number of youth receiving services and assistance is steadily growing.

In addition to the prevention and intervention programs, the GRYD office, in collaboration with other agencies and organizations, sponsors and organizes the Summer Night Lights (SNL) program, which addresses all five components of the GRYD program. SNL operates each summer from July 4th through Labor Day. Financial support for SNL comes from private sector contributors as well as from Los Angeles' city funds. Under the SNL program, for four evenings each week of the two-month period, local parks and recreation centers across the city host a range of activities including free meals, recreation, and other activities that are open to all members of the community. GRYD office Program Managers and teams of gang and violence intervention specialists are present at each location during the SNL hours of operation, working to extend the reduction of inter-gang conflict and violence beyond the two months of SNL. Los Angeles Police Department officers also participate, not only to help maintain security, but also to engage in non-law enforcement group activities with attendees.

SNL began with eight locations in 2008 and added new locations each year resulting in a total of 32 by 2011. Further expansion is contemplated for 2012.

Scope of the Year 2 Evaluation

The long term goals of the evaluation are to address each of the components of the GRYD program, and make assessments of the effectiveness of the GRYD program with respect to its objectives in each of those areas. The evaluation also seeks to measure crime longitudinally and geographically in order to document trends in gang activity and gang violence in GRYD zones, SNL locations, and the city at large. To accomplish these goals, the evaluation team focuses primarily on information drawn from GRYD's prevention and intervention programs, and on geographically-specific incident-level crime data extracted from the Los Angeles Police Department's data records.

GRYD's primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention programs are at different stages of development with respect to data systems and documentation of their activities. Generally speaking, the secondary prevention program is more extensively documented than either the primary prevention program or the intervention program. It has therefore been possible to conduct quantitative analysis of secondary prevention activities, but not of the activities in primary prevention or intervention. The chapters of the report covering primary prevention (Chapter III) and intervention (Chapter V) are therefore primarily qualitative.

³ The 2008 needs assessments are available online: <http://mayor.lacity.org/index.htm>

To develop that qualitative information, the evaluation team conducted interviews, focus groups and surveys with 689 individuals who were participants or stakeholders in the GRYD program. Respondent groups include: GRYD Program Managers; GRYD service providers in the primary and secondary prevention programs and in the intervention program; LAPD officers; school teachers and officials; community leaders; youth in the secondary prevention program; and parents of such youth. All aspects of the GRYD program, including SNL, were included in the topics covered across these surveys. Chapter II provide more detail on the scope of these evaluation activities. The opinions and views expressed are reported in Chapters III, IV and V. In addition, surveys were conducted directly by the GRYD office of the Gun Buy-Back program and SNL and salient points from these surveys are also reported.

The secondary prevention program, focusing on at-risk youth aged 10-15 who are not already gang members, had received more than 5,000 referrals by mid-April 2011. Three thousand of these referred youth (60%) were considered sufficiently at-risk to be eligible for GRYD services on the basis of GRYD's Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET). A sample of more than 900 of this group was given a retest, using a process developed and administered by the evaluation team. An additional sample of 248 youth, drawn from the 2,000 referrals that were below GRYD's eligibility threshold, also took the retest. The retests were administered not less than six months after the initial test. Changes in self-reported gang risk factors and delinquent/criminal behaviors were measured at both points in time. Chapter IV details the results and comparisons between the two groups.

LAPD provided crime data records from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2010 and trend analysis of more than 1.2 million recorded criminal incidents is presented in Chapter VI. The chapter reviews Part I, Part II, and gang crime trends for the 12 GRYD zones, the 24 SNL areas that were in operation in 2010, and the city at large.

Key Year 2 Findings

The evidence to date on the extent to which the GRYD program achieved its objectives, as outlined in the GRYD office's *Comprehensive Gang Reduction Strategy*, are presented for each of the primary components of the initiative. In addition, crime and gang crime trends for the GRYD zones and SNL areas compared with the rest of the city outside these area boundaries are summarized below. The main report contains additional information, evaluation methodology details and interpretation caveats and cautions.

Primary Prevention

- GRYD stakeholders reported positive views about the effects of GRYD zone programs on community perceptions of community safety.
- GRYD stakeholders reported positive views about the effects of SNL programs on improving safety in SNL areas during the operation of the summer activities, but views of park safety were not as strong after SNL concluded.
- GRYD stakeholders were positive about the effects of SNL on improving the quality of life in parks during the operations of SNL, but views of the quality of life were not as strong after SNL concluded.

- GRYD stakeholders felt that GRYD programs had the effects of increasing both prevention services and intervention services in the targeted communities.

Secondary Prevention

- GRYD stakeholders were affirmative about the prevention program, asserting improvements in the key objectives of the secondary prevention program, including the availability of gang prevention services, the communication of alternatives to the gang life, and the increase of resistance by youth to pressures to join gangs.
- More than 60% of enrolled youth who were retested on YSET scored at levels that were below the at-risk threshold for admission to the program. In other words, more than half of the eligible at-risk youth who were enrolled in GRYD and retested six months later now had risk levels that would be considered ineligible.
- On average, enrolled youth showed substantial and statistically significant improvements on all seven attitudinal risk scales.
- Enrolled youth reported some reduction in delinquent, criminal, or gang-related behavior but these reductions were not statistically significant for all behavioral items. Thus, behavior change did not exhibit the same level of improvement as attitudinal change.
- Comparisons at retest between enrolled youth and youth who had not received services indicated that enrolled youth had greater positive change than the not-eligible youth, but that the differences in reported risky behaviors were not significant.

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- From July 2010 to April 2011 there were joint responses by the GRYD office, LAPD, and program community intervention workers to 321 violent crisis incidents, of which the majority were gang-related.
- GRYD stakeholders reported that they were in agreement that rumors had been dispelled following crisis incidents by dissemination of information by LAPD, GRYD staff, and intervention workers.
- GRYD stakeholders felt that GRYD staff has been able to effectively communicate with LAPD and intervention workers in response to crisis situations.
- GRYD stakeholders reported that LAPD officers have been able to effectively communicate with intervention workers during crisis situations.
- A large majority of surveyed stakeholders felt that the intervention training (LAVITA) improved intervention workers' roles in responding to crises.
- Perceptions were high among stakeholders about the effectiveness of LAPD, GRYD office and intervention workers on reducing community tensions, the likelihood of retaliatory incidents and gang conflicts following crises.
- Most of those surveyed were positive about the effects of SNL on presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs.

Gang Violence and Crime

- Part I and Part II crimes in GRYD zones and SNL areas generally decreased from January 2005 through December 2010, with declines being steeper following GRYD program implementation. However, areas in the rest of the city outside the zones and SNL locations saw the same general trends during the period.
- Gang-related crime manifested seasonality throughout the past six years, with increases through early in the summer when gang crimes peaked, followed by a decline through the end of the year.
- The overall six-year trend for gang-related crime in GRYD zones and SNL locations was curvilinear, with the peak occurring in mid-2007 after which gang crimes dropped steeply. A similar trend was observed in areas outside the GRYD zones and SNL areas but the post-implementation declines were not as sharp as what transpired within program areas. Overall, however the trends were quite similar.
- GRYD stakeholders generally attributed changes in gang violence that they had observed to GRYD and SNL programs.

Conclusions

In summary, the evidence reported in the Year 2 GRYD Evaluation Report points toward positive outcomes for the achievement of GRYD program component objectives. Outcomes for all component objectives have not yet been examined due to data limitations, but those examined were in the direction of what would be anticipated from GRYD program success.

The observed outcomes for crime were more mixed. Although gang-related crimes declined somewhat more steeply following implementation of GRYD prevention and SNL programs in those areas than the rest of the city, the overall crime trends since 2005 have been similar in targeted areas and in the rest of the city beyond GRYD program boundaries. In addition, gang crimes were rising and then peaked in 2007 before the implementation of GRYD programs and have been on the decline since that peak, although it does appear that the declines accelerated slightly following program implementation. This suggests that there are forces at work in Los Angeles that are having city-wide effects on crime levels, and that these effects were intensified around the same time the GRYD program began. It is also possible that the positive changes in risk levels for youth in the prevention program may to some extent be related to these unobserved city-wide factors.

Although participant and stakeholder opinions are affirmative, at-risk youth have shown great improvements, and gang crime has declined, unequivocal attribution of these findings to the GRYD program is currently unwarranted. The qualitative information in particular must be interpreted cautiously since a good deal of it is derived from GRYD program staff and service providers. Nonetheless, much of the evidence to date is positive and consistent with hypothesized GRYD program effects. During the third year of the evaluation, additional evidence will be gathered from residents of GRYD zones and SNL areas.

Chapter I

Introduction

Overview of the GRYD Program

The Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) program was established within the Los Angeles Mayor's Office in the summer of 2007 to address the problem of gang crime and gang violence in Los Angeles in a comprehensive, collaborative, and community-wide manner. GRYD was also designed to build upon previous approaches and to integrate existing public and private sector services, not just to implement new programs to address gang issues. Early steps taken by the program produced community-based assessments that identified those locations where gang problems were endemic. This led to the establishment of 12 GRYD zones for full prevention and intervention activities, four additional "non-GRYD zones" for prevention, and five additional "non-GRYD zones" for intervention.⁴ In 2008 and early 2009, competitive solicitations resulted in awards to gang prevention and gang intervention service providers in those zones, and to the program's current evaluation team. In the summer of 2008, eight locations were identified for the Summer Night Lights Program (SNL), which has since that time become a major element in the GRYD program. Additional SNL locations were added in 2009 (six), and in 2010 (10), making a total of 24 locations. Another eight locations were added in July 2011.

Further activities of the GRYD program include a Gun Buy-Back program, a GRYD Cabinet, Community Action Teams, a Community Education Campaign, a Violence Intervention Training Academy, interdisciplinary teams to work on individual cases, and the coordination of community-based activities involving law enforcement and other agencies.

To document and formalize this increasingly complex program, the GRYD office has developed a *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence*⁵ which explains the key underlying assumptions for its multi-faceted model, specifies goals and objectives, documents the agencies and organizations are responsible for each component, incorporates how program element performance will be measured, and defines how "success" will be determined. The plan is also designed to broadly link the various components together in a comprehensive manner.

GRYD has seven major components as outlined in the GRYD Office's Comprehensive Strategy:

- **Primary Prevention**
Community oriented activities intended to build resistance to gang activities. The Gun Buy-Back program, Community Action Teams, and the Community Education Campaign are examples of activities within this component.

⁴ The 12 GRYD zones are each allocated \$1,000,000 for prevention and \$500,000 for intervention. The four non-GRYD prevention zones receive \$375,000, and the five non-GRYD intervention zones each receive \$225,000. The evaluation is limited to the 12 GRYD zones.

⁵ The GRYD Office's draft *Comprehensive Strategy* is briefly summarized in this chapter.

- **Secondary Prevention**
Youth and family oriented services intended to inhibit gang-joining in at-risk youth 10 to 15 years of age, who are not yet gang members. Services are provided by GRYD-funded provider agencies in each zone.
- **Intervention Case Management**
Activities by intervention specialists are focused on youth 14 to 25 years of age who are already in gangs, the objective being to encourage them to disengage from the gang life.
- **Community Intervention**
Immediate responses to gang-related violent incidents in GRYD communities are provided by Community Intervention Workers on a 24/7 basis. The objective is to help communities deal with the incidents, reduce the number and severity of retaliatory responses to incidents, promote inter-gang peace-making, and provide victim services.
- **Law Enforcement Engagement**
GRYD seeks to promote increased and more effective cooperation and coordination between LAPD patrol/gang unit officers with GRYD intervention staff and GRYD Program Managers, and to expand police-community interaction to generate greater trust and co-operation.
- **Suppression**
The GRYD office does not engage directly in suppression activities conducted by police, or collaborate with police in suppression, but seeks to coordinate prevention and intervention activities with police actions.
- **Summer Night Lights (SNL)**
SNL takes place in parks and recreational centers and provides free activities for community residents. It operates four nights a week from July 4th to Labor Day. SNL is technically not a separate component of GRYD, but rather it integrates elements of prevention, intervention and law enforcement into its summer park activities.

These seven main components are intended to address the mission of the GRYD Office and Comprehensive Strategy to reduce gang violence within the Los Angeles communities with the most need by:

- Promoting positive youth development;
- Addressing the root causes that lead youth to join gangs;
- Reducing gang involvement among young people already engaged in gangs;
- Improving the relationships between the community and law enforcement;
- Responding to gang violence when it occurs to decrease the likelihood of retaliation; and
- Increasing information-sharing, the coordination of services, and collaboration between communities and the GRYD Office.

Objectives and Scope of This Report

This evaluation report focuses on GRYD program activities from July 2010 through mid-April 2011. It is a supplement to earlier reports.⁶ It expands previous process evaluation and preliminary outcome findings with additional information and evidence collected from July, 2010 through mid-April 2011. An assessment is made of the contribution that the growing body of evidence makes towards determining whether the GRYD program is working, but the report should not be interpreted as a final assessment of that issue. The evaluation is ongoing, and additional evidence is being gathered on the topics covered in this report.

Organization of the Report

This report does not address all areas of the GRYD program in equal depth because information development is not yet sufficiently advanced in some areas for full evaluation assessments to be justified. The following topics are covered:

Chapter II Data and Methods

This chapter reviews the data collection processes and statistical methods used throughout the report. More detailed method discussions are included within each chapter's content and supplemented by technical explanations on select topics in the Appendixes.

Chapter III Primary Prevention

The primary prevention chapter provides an overview of the objectives of primary prevention and brief descriptions of the Gun Buy Back program, the GRYD Cabinet, Community Action Teams, the Community Education Campaign and SNL. Outcome indicator findings associated with community perceptions of safety and improved access to gang prevention and intervention services are also presented.

Chapter IV Secondary Prevention

This chapter includes an analysis of the GRYD program's procedures for determining which at-risk youth will receive services, an assessment of the effects of the services on the attitudes and behaviors of a sample of youth enrolled in the program, and a comparison of those effects with a sample of youth not involved in the program. Also included is an overview of youth and parent perceptions of their experiences in the GRYD prevention program. Perceptions of stakeholders about gang membership, joining and leaving are also presented.

⁶ Dunworth et al. (2010). *Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Final Y1 Report*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Available online: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412251.html>. See also individual zone profiles, available at: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412274.html>.

Chapter V Intervention

The intervention chapter provides an overview of the objectives of this component of the GRYD strategy and brief descriptions of Gang Interruption activities, the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), and Intervention Case Management. Outcome measures explored are community response activity, stakeholder perceptions concerning rumor control, improved working relationships, improved intervention worker roles due to LAVITA, and peacemaking.

Chapter VI Crime Trends

This chapter includes longitudinal analyses of Part I, Part II, and gang crime in Los Angeles by GRYD zones and SNL areas from January 2005 through December 2010. Comparisons are drawn between GRYD and SNL area crime and other parts of Los Angeles. Summaries of stakeholder views of the effects of GRYD and SNL on gang violence are also provided.

Chapter II

Data and Methods in Y2 Evaluation

A variety of qualitative and quantitative data were collected over the course of the second year of the evaluation. These can be categorized as: individual-level participant data, GRYD stakeholder perception, and macro-level crime incident data. In addition, where relevant, program administrative records and GRYD office internal assessment reports are cited.

The individual-level data consists of an analysis of the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) data at baseline and approximately six months later. As Chapter IV details, the analysis considers both youth enrolled in GRYD prevention programs (n=902) and those that were deemed as not eligible for enrollment (n=248). Measures include changes in risk factors associated with joining a gang and delinquent/criminal behaviors over time.

The crime analysis data were obtained from LAPD’s crime incident records management system and includes city-wide crime incident records from January 2005 through December 2010. See Chapter VI and Appendix I for a more detailed methodology of this analysis.

Finally, the perception data were obtained from prevention program participants, parents of program participants, service providers, GRYD office Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, Intervention Case Managers (CMs), Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) and several agency and organization representatives who interact with the GRYD program to varying degrees (including school officials and community leaders). Interpretations of these data are found throughout the report and are summarized in the relevant chapters. A summary of the data sources is presented in Table 2.1. For more detailed information, such as response rates for a specific data source or question-specific responses for individual stakeholder groups see the appropriate Appendix.

It should be noted that not all stakeholder groups were asked the same questions and therefore different totals will be observed for different outcome indicator findings across

Table 2.1 – Information Sources for Community Perspectives

Sources of Information	Who participated	Type of data collected
Prevention Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ A random selection of youth who had completed a YSET initial and retest interview (n=125) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ In-person interviews were conducted in English or Spanish, as appropriate

Table 2.1 (continued)

Sources of Information	Who participated	Type of data collected
<p>Parents</p> <p>GRYD Office Program Managers</p> <p>LAPD officers</p> <p>Provider Surveys</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Prevention agencies assisted in recruiting 6 to 12 parents/guardians of enrolled GRYD clients to participate in focus groups in each zone. The first set of focus groups involved convenience sampling from providers; for the second set, the evaluation team randomly selected enrolled clients and prevention agencies were asked to recruit the parents from that selection. Overall, 125 parents participated in 20 focus groups ■ This included eight GRYD Office Program Managers and one supervising Program Manager ■ LAPD gang unit officers (n=40) who worked with the GRYD and SNL programs; contact information was provided by the GRYD office ■ 197 prevention and intervention provider staff (primary and subcontractor) in GRYD zones. Those surveyed include Executive Directors, Case Managers, Program Directors, Program Coordinators, Community Intervention Workers, Program Assistants, Counselors/Therapists, Psychologists, Youth Advocates, Family Advocates, Data Coordinators/Administrators, Teachers, and Instructors/Coaches 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Focus groups were conducted in English and Spanish, as appropriate. ■ All nine participated in a focus group and short surveys ■ Online survey ■ Online survey
<p>Intervention Case Management</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The evaluation team requested interviews with two Case Managers from each lead intervention agency in all 12 GRYD zones; 23 intervention Case Managers participated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The 23 participants were surveyed in teams of two (where applicable) in their respective GRYD zones; they also participated in short surveys

Table 2.1 (continued)		
Sources of Information	Who participated	Type of data collected
Community Intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The evaluation team requested interviews with two Community Intervention Workers from each lead intervention agency in all 12 GRYD zones; 23 Community Intervention Workers participated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The 23 participants were surveyed in teams of two (where applicable) in their respective GRYD zones; they also participated in short surveys
School Officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ School personnel who have worked directly with GRYD Office or program staff (n=60); this included principals, assistant principals, deans, counselors, teachers, probation officers, social workers, parent and community representatives, liaisons, office technicians, school police officers, and coordinators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Phone or in-person interviews (depending on the respondent's preference)
Community Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Community leaders interviewed (n=48) included non-GRYD service providers in the community, parent liaisons,⁷ local business owners, active residents,⁸ and/or faith leaders who were identified through GRYD service providers or GRYD Program Managers as key players in the community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Phone or in-person interviews (depending on the respondent's preference)
Guy Buy-Back Participants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Postcard surveys were piloted at two Gun Buy-Back sites through convenience sampling (n=289) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The postcard surveys were completed in person or by mail

chapters. In addition, given the volume of perception data, not all items are presented or discussed in the main text of the report. However, full survey findings are presented in the Appendixes for reader reference.

The number of interviews and surveys conducted in each GRYD zone are listed in Table 2.2. Note that three respondent types are not included in the chart below. First, GRYD

⁷ None of the community leaders identified themselves as the parents of GRYD youth. Instead, this category refers to those who connect community organizations or institutions (such as schools) with parents in the community.

⁸ "Active residents" includes social workers, those affiliated with local media, those involved in community recreation centers, those on community advisory boards, and other liaisons.

Program Managers sometimes transferred from one GRYD zone to another, so they have experiences from multiple sites. Some also covered non-GRYD zones and one was a supervisor for the Program Managers. All 12 zones were represented by the nine Program Manager respondents. In addition, the Intervention CM and CIW focus groups and surveys are not reported in Table 2.2. However, each zone had two respondents except for Southwest II (which had one). Third, Gun Buy-Back participants were targeted in two Gun Buy-Back program sites, not across GRYD zones.

Table 2.2 – Focus Groups, Interviews and Surveys

Zones	Youth Interviews	Parents (focus group sessions)	LAPD Surveys	Provider Surveys	School Official Interviews	Community Leader Interviews
77 th Division II	9	17 (2)	8	15	4	4
Baldwin Village	15	14 (2)	4	10	4	3
Boyle Heights	10	7 (2)	1	15	6	4
Cypress Park	13	6 (1)	2	19	6	6
Florence Graham	5	0 (0)	5	5	4	3
Newton	11	6 (2)	4	8	4	4
Pacoima Foothill	14	23 (2)	3	38	5	5
Panorama City	9	8 (2)	2	20	6	4
Ramona Gardens	9	7 (2)	2	20	6	3
Rampart	10	10 (2)	2	21	7	5
Southwest II	6	6 (1)	4	12	4	4
Watts Southeast	14	21 (2)	3	14	4	3
TOTAL	125	125 (20)	40	197	60	48

Note: When more than one focus group was conducted in a zone, different participants were involved in each group. One Intervention CM and one CIW per zone participated in interviews and short surveys.

The following chapters contain multiple sources of information in an attempt to create a holistic understanding of perceptions of changes in GRYD zones, impacts of the GRYD program, and impacts of SNL. Each data source is separated into its own section for the reader's convenience and some sections cover source-specific themes, but they are generally structured similarly. When respondents were involved in GRYD or SNL in more than one zone, they reported separately for each zone in which they worked. Because of this, the number of responses tallied in the tables presented will sometimes exceed the total number of respondents.

Chapter III

Primary Prevention

Introduction

The *Primary Prevention* component of the comprehensive gang reduction and youth development strategy is oriented toward communities. In particular, this component seeks to provide activities and services that are designed to build community level resistance to gang membership risk factors and gang violence.

This chapter provides an overview of the objectives of primary prevention and descriptions of the basic activities of each of its four main components: the Gun Buy-Back Program, the GRYD Cabinet; GRYD Community Action Teams, and the Community Education Campaign. In addition, SNL is discussed because of its community orientation. It should be noted, however, that SNL is inclusive of all GRYD strategy prongs, not just primary prevention but also secondary prevention, intervention, and law enforcement engagement.

Relevant evaluation findings are then presented for the primary prevention component. Outcome indicator findings are drawn from two sources. The first source was local stakeholder surveys that were conducted in GRYD zones and SNL locations. Those surveyed included GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, program service providers, Intervention CMs and CIWs. The second source was interviews of staff and teachers in GRYD zone schools and community leaders. Some of the same questions about primary prevention outcomes were asked in both the interviews and the surveys. However, more wide-ranging topics were discussed in the interviews given their interactive framework. These have been separately reported to the GRYD Office.

Responses to common questions across these groups were aggregated and are presented as summary outcome indicators for primary prevention. Item-specific responses for each group are presented in this report's appendixes. Changes in Part I/II crime⁹ and gang-related crime occurring in GRYD zones and SNL locations are presented separately in Chapter VI. In addition, the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy for the coming year calls for surveys of community residents to supplement the kind of survey/interview results that are presented in this report.

Primary Prevention Objectives

As noted above, the overarching purpose of primary prevention is to increase community resiliency to risk factors associated with gang membership and violence. To do so this component seeks to achieve the following objectives (some of which are also objectives of other GRYD components);¹⁰

⁹ Throughout this report, Part I and Part II crimes refer to crime types categorized in the Uniform Crime Reports. See the Federal Bureau of Investigation's website for more information: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr>.

¹⁰ Program goals, objectives and activities descriptions include material from the draft (May 2011) GRYD Office *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence*.

- Improved community perceptions of safety.
- Improved access to gang prevention/intervention services.
- Improved perceptions of trust and credibility between the police and the community.
- Improved community resident levels of trust and shared values/identity with others in the community.
- Improved community residents' connection to other community residents along the family life cycle.
- Improved communication and collaboration among community Service Providers.

Primary Prevention Components

The Gun Buy-Back Program

The Gun Buy-Back Program is designed to engage communities throughout Los Angeles by providing an opportunity for local residents to anonymously turn in firearms to the police. GRYD Office staff partner with the LAPD to operate drop-off locations throughout the city each year on Mother's Day. GRYD contracted prevention and intervention agencies also partner with the GRYD Office and LAPD. The local media outlet KCBS/KCAL 9 is a program sponsor and a community-wide education campaign calling for the end of gang and gun violence features nightly media segments that examine the effects of gang and gun violence prior to the start of the program.

These yearly events mark the beginning of the GRYD summer violence reduction effort and serve as the kick off for the SNL program each summer.

The GRYD Cabinet

The GRYD Cabinet is made up of key leaders from county and city agencies as well as representatives from each GRYD zone. It is charged with targeting zone communities by coordinating and collaborating to provide services and programs that engage all residents across the family life cycle. It also seeks to provide positive developmental opportunities for youth and young adults, match agency resources to the magnitude of gang problems in the zones, and attempts to renew hope for communities troubled by gang problems.

GRYD Community Action Teams

GRYD Community Action Teams are led by GRYD Office Program Managers and are intended to create and support community-based working groups that target GRYD zone communities with primary prevention activities. In particular, they seek to strengthen protective factors associated to preventing gang membership and violence, ranging from pre-natal care to death.

Community Education Campaign

The Community Education Campaign targets community members and school professionals and staff at elementary, middle, and high schools in and around the GRYD zones. Through school-based forums GRYD staff present information to the community and schools to increase knowledge and awareness of gang risk factors and gang-joining. School staff and

community members are urged to refer youth they believe are at risk for gang-joining to their local gang prevention provider and referral forms to do so are distributed during these community education forums. Over two phases in 2010 and 2011, presentations were made to 44 schools in the GRYD zones.

Summer Night Lights

As noted above, SNL is not limited to primary prevention; rather, it is designed to incorporate all of the elements of the GRYD comprehensive approach. However, because of its community-wide focus and the fact that many of its outcome indicators overlap with the four primary prevention programs, it is discussed in this chapter. It should be pointed out that the GRYD Office recently conducted its own internal evaluation of SNL, the results of which are available from the GRYD Office (*Summer Night Lights Evaluation: 2010 Evaluation Report*).

SNL is based upon the 2003 "Summer of Success Baldwin Village Program" at Jim Gilliam Park. SNL integrates gang prevention, intervention, community, and law enforcement strategies to address violence in parks and recreational centers for eight weeks during the summer (July 4th through Labor Day). Programming is extended to communities and their residents from seven P.M. until midnight, Wednesday through Saturday when potential for violent crime is at its highest in the city. SNL began in 2008 at eight recreation and parks facilities, expanded to 16 sites in 2009, to 24 in 2010 and most recently to 32 locations in 2011.

Numerous organizational partners participate in SNL including city agencies, non-profits, the faith-based community, local foundations, and businesses.

As stated in the GRYD Office *Comprehensive Gang Reduction Strategy*, the core SNL components are:

- Extended Programming: Includes a variety of activities such as the provision of meals, cooking classes, athletic programming, arts programming and other skill-based programs (primary prevention).
- The Youth Squad: At-risk youth from the community are hired to help plan and implement SNL summer activities and to act as community liaisons in 10 person teams (secondary prevention).
- Intervention: CIWs engage in proactive peace-making activities as well as violence interruption throughout SNL (intervention)
- Law Enforcement/Community Engagement: LAPD is an active participant at SNL through sports, cooking, and arts activities as well as community interactions (enforcement).

According to the GRYD Office, an estimated 710,000 visits were made to the 24 sites in 2010 and on average almost 11,000 people were served meals each night. In addition, SNL created more than 1,000 summer jobs for youth, community members, leaders and businesses in neighborhoods within and surrounding the park sites.

Primary Prevention Outcome Indicators

Community Perceptions of Safety

In 2011, 2,066 firearms were turned in across six Gun Buy-Back locations. Drive-up participants were handed a survey by GRYD staff about their experience with the program and asked to fill out the survey while they waited or to mail in the pre-paid postcard within the next week. There were 289 respondents to the survey. The GRYD office reports that 90% of those responding felt that the community would be safer because of the event. In addition, 98% felt “very comfortable” or “somewhat comfortable” participating in the event and 97% felt that it was “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to participate. Most participants (89%) said they learned about the program from the local media.

In the stakeholder surveys and interviews conducted in GRYD zones by the evaluation team, two questions specifically addressed GRYD program effects on the community’s sense of safety and what changes had taken place from 2009 to 2010, two that asked about perceptions of SNL programming on improving safety in the parks and two that asked about how SNL may have affected the quality of life in the community. The summary results of responses across stakeholder groups (GRYD Program Managers, Prevention Providers, CIWs, LAPD, community leaders, and school officials) are presented in Table 3.1. Not all groups were asked every question, hence the different total number of responses presented in the tables.

When asked about the effects of GRYD on the community’s sense of safety, over three times as many respondents indicated “high” (29.3%) or “very high” (10.9%) effects as said “low” (9.1%) or “very low” (1.8%). Moderate effects were suggested by 39.5% of all respondents. Within these aggregates, GRYD Program Managers were most affirmative about improvements in the community’s sense of safety (81.9% “high” or “very high”) compared with 35% to 45% of LAPD gang officers, Service Providers, Case Managers and CIWs responding “high” or “very high.”

Table 3.1 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of GRYD on Community Sense of Safety

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Don't Know
Effects of GRYD on Community Sense of Safety in 2010 (N=276)	5 1.8%	25 9.1%	109 39.5%	81 29.3%	30 10.9%	26 9.4%
Changes in Community Sense of Safety 2009-2010 (N=384)	25 6.5%	61 15.9%	108 28.1%	108 28.1%	45 11.7%	37 9.6%

Of the 384 respondents to the question about changes in community sense of safety between 2009 and 2010 28.1% said that the effects of GRYD were “high” and 11.7% responded “very high.” About half as many (22.4%) responded “very low” or “low.” Again Program

Managers had the most positive perceptions (54.5% “high,” 27.3% “very high”) whereas CMs tended to be more negative (9.5% “very low,” 28.6% “low”). In summary, across all respondents, 39.8% reported high or very high effects, 22.4% reported moderate effects, and 22.4% reported low or very low effects.

Results for the survey questions on changes in perceptions about SNL effects on community safety are presented in Table 3.2. A large majority of all respondents felt that SNL programs had “high” (37.6%) or “very high” (30.8%) effects on safety in the parks during the summer of 2010. CIWs were overwhelmingly positive about SNL effects on safety (52.2% “high” and 43.5% “very high”) and LAPD Gang Officers, Service Providers, CMs and Community Leaders also have large majorities indicating positive effects. School staff generally reported not knowing whether there was an effect (54.5%).

Respondents were not as positive in their views of the effects of SNL after the summer was over, however. For outcomes after SNL 2010, the “very high” or “high” responses together declined to 36.1% of the total. Those holding “very low” or “low” views increased to 10.2% of the total. CIWs held the most affirmative perceptions and 65.5% school staff indicated that they did not know whether SNL effects continued after the programs ended or not.

Table 3.2 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of SNL on Improved Safety in SNL Parks

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Don't Know
SNL Improved Park Safety During 2010 (N=364)	5 1.4%	6 1.6%	51 14.0%	119 37.6%	112 30.8%	71 19.5%
Improved Park Safety Following 2010 (N=363)	12 3.3%	25 6.9%	104 28.7%	102 28.1%	29 8.0%	91 25.1%

Respondents were also asked about their views of how SNL may have affected the quality of life in SNL parks, the results of which are presented in Table 3.3. A majority of all respondents were affirmative about the impacts of the programs offered during the summer of 2010 on the quality of life (33.0% “high” and 27.2% “very high”). CIWs were overwhelmingly positive in their views (91.3% responded “high” or “very high”) followed by CMs (77.8% for “high” or “very high”). Majorities of all the other groups were also positive, with the exception of school staff where over half responded that they did not know.

Views of the effects of SNL on quality of life after the summer 2010 programs declined somewhat. Only 27.6% rated the effects on the quality of life as “high” and 8.5% said “very high.” However, this was nearly three times the number that ranked the effects as “low” or “very low.” Nearly a quarter of all respondents felt that the effects were “moderate” and a quarter did not know. CIWs once again held the most positive views (47.8% “high” and 4.3% “very high”). Over 58% of school staff responded that they did not know.

Table 3.3 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of SNL on Improved Quality of Life in SNL Parks

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Don't Know
SNL Improved Quality of Life During 2010 (N=364)	6 1.6%	9 2.5%	59 16.2%	120 33.0%	99 27.2%	71 19.5%
Improved Quality of Life Following 2010 (N=366)	16 4.4%	31 8.5%	98 26.8%	101 27.6%	31 8.5%	89 24.3%

Improved Access to Gang Prevention/Intervention Services

GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders were also asked about their views on the effects of GRYD programming on access to prevention services and intervention services in 2010. The summary findings are presented in Table 3.4. Nearly the same proportions suggested that GRYD programming had resulted in “high” or “very high” effects on the provision of both prevention services (39.0% and 20.5%) and intervention services (39.3% and 21.5%). More than 70% of the Program Managers and CIWs felt that the effects on access to prevention services were either “high” or “very high.” The majorities of all the other groups were similarly positive. In contrast, over 80% of all of the Program Managers, CMs and CIWs rated as either “high” or “very high” the impact of GRYD on access to intervention services. Sixty-three percent of community leaders and about half of LAPD gang officers and school staff were similarly positive about GRYD effects on intervention access.

Table 3.4 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of GRYD Programming on Access to Services

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Don't Know
Impact on Increasing Access to Prevention Services (N=200)	5 2.5%	10 5.0%	43 21.5%	78 39.0%	41 20.5%	23 11.5%
Impact on Increasing Access to Intervention Services (N=211)	5 2.4%	11 5.2%	40 19.0%	83 39.3%	46 21.8%	26 12.3%

Conclusion

GRYD stakeholders, including Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, service providers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders consistently reported high positive effects of primary prevention GRYD programs on the community. These included community perceptions of safety and quality of life, as well as improved access to both prevention and intervention

programming in the community. Surveys of participants in the Gun Buy-Back program also suggested improved perceptions of community safety have resulted. During the coming year, community residents will also be surveyed to obtain their views of the GRYD program.

Chapter IV

Secondary Prevention

Introduction

This chapter reviews GRYD's secondary prevention program, which provides services to at-risk youth aged 10 to 15 and the families of those youth.

We focus first on the youth who were referred to the prevention program between the program's inception in 2009 and mid-April 2011. The Youth Services Eligibility Tool - the program's method of determining which referred youth will be offered services and which will not - is described. The results of the program's measurement of gang-joining risk for these youth are documented, along with the program's decisions concerning which youth would be offered services and which would not.

We then present an analysis of changes in risk levels for a sample of 902 youth who did receive services. Comparisons are made for those outcomes with a sample of 248 youth who did not receive services. That section concludes by reporting on the views of the program held by participating youth and parents, as developed in interviews and focus groups.

We then report the views on the effects and effectiveness of the program expressed in interviews and surveys conducted in each of the GRYD zones with GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang unit officers, GRYD service providers, school personnel, and community leaders.

A concluding section summarizes the findings.

The Youth Services Eligibility Tool

Youth 10 to 15 years of age are referred to prevention service providers in each GRYD zone from a variety of sources; schools, law enforcement agencies, social service agencies, and parents. From the start of the GRYD prevention program in 2009 to May 2011, more than 6,000 at-risk youth had been referred to the program. The sources of referrals in each of the 12 GRYD zones are presented in Table 4.1.

The table illustrates that 42% of the referrals were made by school staff, and 6% were made by police or probation officers. This is to be expected since those sources have personal involvement with youth that are having difficulties. What is perhaps surprising is that 40% of the youth coming to the program were referred by family members, by peers, or decided on their own to approach the GRYD service agency directly. This suggests a high level of community awareness of the prevention program, across all of the zones.

Table 4.1 – GRYD Prevention Program Referral Sources as of May 2011

GRYD Zone	Referral Source				Total
	School	Family, Self, or Peers	Law enforcement or probation	Other	
77th Division II	312	137	18	23	490
Baldwin Village	76	179	81	54	390
Boyle Heights	272	134	21	37	464
Cypress Park	211	164	26	69	470
Florence-Graham	142	67	1	7	217
Newton	118	500	3	105	726
Pacoima/Foothill	225	194	46	75	540
Panorama City	143	142	75	52	412
Ramona Gardens	129	152	26	42	349
Rampart	287	62	10	143	502
Southwest II	170	94	5	33	302
Watts/Southeast	141	313	8	28	490
Totals N	2501	2409	379	719	6008
%	42%	40%	6%	12%	100%

Referred youth are all believed to be in need of help by those making the referrals. However, GRYD program resources are finite and a program decision was made at the outset that services could be offered only to those youth who are at highest risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal or delinquent behavior. To make this determination, GRYD gang prevention agencies in each of the 12 zones interview referred youth. A key component of this process is the administration by the GRYD provider of YSET, an attitudinal and behavioral survey developed by researchers at the University of California (USC).

YSET utilizes nine measurement scales. Seven are attitudinal; two are behavioral. Each scale consists of a number of items to which youth are asked to respond during an introductory interview.¹¹ The scales, the number of items in each scale, and the range of possible responses to the items in a scale are presented in Table 4.2

¹¹ There have been some adjustments to the factors and the items in YSET since the program commenced, but the general principles and structure of the risk measurement approach have been consistent.

Table 4.2 - Structure of the YSET Risk Scales

Risk Scales		Scale Structure			
		Number of Items	Low-High Range of Responses	Maximum Possible Risk Score	Risk Threshold Score if 12 yrs old or younger
A	Anti-Social/Pro-Social Tendencies	6	1 - 5	30	16
B	Parental Supervision	3	1 - 5	15	7
C	Critical Life Events	7	0 - 1	7	4
DE	Impulsive Risk Taking	4	1 - 5	20	14
F	Neutralization	6	1 - 5	30	19
G	Negative/Positive Peer Influence	5	1 - 5	25	10
H	Peer Delinquency	6	1 - 5	30	12
IJ	Self-Reported Delinquency or Substance Abuse	17	0 - 1	17	4
T	Family Gang Influence	2	0 - 2 ¹²	2	2

Most scales consist of questions with five response options on each question, rank ordered from low to high risk. A value of 1 is assigned to the lowest risk response and a value of 5 is assigned to the highest risk response. To obtain a score for a respondent on any scale, the responses to the items on that scale are summed. The result is then compared with the risk threshold for the scale to determine if the youth is at-risk with respect to that scale. On Scale A, for instance, which has a maximum possible risk score of 30 (6 items, with 5 being the highest risk response on each item), a youth between the ages of 10 and 12 is considered at risk with a score of 16 or more. The same approach is used on each scale that has items with a risk range of 1 to 5 (Scales B, DE, F, G, and H).

Thus, the score for each youth on each item is calculated by assigning 1 to the lowest risk response for a single item within a risk scale (e.g., “Strongly Agree” on Item 2 – “I do as I am told”) and 5 to the highest risk response (e.g., “Strongly Agree” on Item 6 – “I take things that are not mine from home, school, or elsewhere”).

For scales that have questions with Yes/No responses, the range is 0 (no) to 1 (yes). This produces a lower maximum risk score but the logic of the risk decision is the same. On Scale C, Critical Life Events for instance, a score of 4 puts a 12-year-old above the at-risk threshold.

There are modest upward adjustments in the risk threshold for older youth (13 to 15 years of age) on some of the scales. However, the same decision rules are applied.

¹² The two items in this scale are open-ended quantitative questions; however, the scoring structure assigns 0, 1, or 2 points for this scale overall, based on responses to the two items.

A youth is deemed Eligible or Not-Eligible for GRYD services based on the number of scales for which the youth has scores above the at-risk threshold. A youth who is at-risk on four or more scales is deemed Eligible.

To get to the decision point on each youth who takes the YSET interview, the provider agency sends the responses given by the youth to a USC team for scoring. The USC team calculates the scores, makes the eligibility determination, and returns the information to the originating provider agency using a feedback report that identifies for each scale whether the youth is above or below the at-risk threshold.¹³

The provider may challenge the USC decision and submit evidence supporting the challenge to an independent review team. The review team has the authority to change the eligibility classification made by USC. This has resulted in some youth being offered services even though their YSET results were below the risk threshold. The provider then seeks to enroll Eligible youth in the GRYD prevention program, develops a case plan for those who do enroll, and begins service delivery.

The Retesting Process

To measure change, if any, in risk propensity for each Eligible youth as services are being provided, prevention agencies began re-testing youth in late 2010 using the same YSET scales contained in the initial eligibility interview. To distinguish between these two tests from this point on, the initial YSET is termed YSET-I and the retest YSET is termed YSET-R.

The intent of the GRYD office is for providers to administer the YSET-R to all youth at six-month intervals after enrolling in the GRYD program. Providers have not yet reached that goal but are currently working through retests of the backlog of youth who have been in the program longer than six months. The YSET-R forms are sent to the evaluation team for analysis and scoring. This is conducted in exactly the same manner as the USC initial scoring. Results are then returned to the originating provider. This information is expected to aid providers in determining how to adjust service provision on a case-by-case basis on evidence-based grounds, and has the potential to help determine which types of services are or are not effective.¹⁴ In addition, this measurement of change in risk can help to decide when a youth can be “graduated” from the GRYD program.¹⁵

Table 4.3 presents counts of the number of youth tested for GRYD eligibility for each of the 12 GRYD zones. From program inception through approximately April 15th, 2011¹⁶, more

¹³ Youth who are already gang members are considered Not-Eligible for prevention services and are referred to GRYD’s intervention program (discussed below in Chapter 5).

¹⁴ Assessment of services requires information on which specific kinds of services each youth receives and how much service is provided. The program plans to collect this kind of information next year (beginning July 1, 2011), and it will be incorporated into future evaluation reports.

¹⁵ Beginning July 1, 2011, the GRYD program is implementing a structured process to assess whether youth receiving services manifest a sufficiently reduced risk level to move out of the program.

¹⁶ To permit analysis by the report delivery date, April 15th was selected as a cut-off point for retests that would be included. This accounts for the difference in total youth tested for eligibility in Table 4.3.

than 5,000 youth had been screened for eligibility, with almost 3,000 being deemed Eligible and slightly more than 2,100 being deemed Not-Eligible.

The table also presents zone-by-zone counts of the retests conducted between November 2010 and mid-April 2011, a total of 1,150 (902 originally declared Eligible and subsequently Enrolled in the GRYD program, and 248 declared Not-Eligible).¹⁷ Initial testing (YSET-I) and retesting (YSET-R) are ongoing processes and the cumulative number of tests/retests is increasing steadily. Future reports will integrate these additional tests.

Table 4.3 – Summary of Eligibility Testing by GRYD Zone

Zone	# of Youth Tested for Eligibility Through April 15 2011	# Deemed Eligible for Services	# Deemed Not-Eligible for Services	# of Enrolled Youth Re-tested by April 15 2011	# of Not Eligible Youth Re-tested Through April 15 2011
77th Division II	483	379	104	97	41
Baldwin Village	378	248	130	97	47
Boyle Heights	453	233	220	86	8
Cypress Park	458	272	186	115	6
Florence-Graham	214	116	98	10	5
Newton	713	360	353	82	34
Pacoima/Foothill	520	250	270	160	40
Panorama City	379	188	191	30	12
Ramona Gardens	372	220	152	28	3
Rampart	478	286	192	71	52
Southwest II	308	215	93	65	0
Watts/Southeast	452	251	201	61	0
TOTAL	5,208	3,018	2,190	902	248

The following section analyzes the aggregated changes in the nine Risk Scales for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth who had completed a YSET-R by mid-April 2011.¹⁸ The Attitudinal Scales and the Behavioral Scales are discussed separately. To avoid the possibility of misinterpretation and/or distortion that might occur due to the low numbers of completed YSET-Rs in some GRYD zones, results have been aggregated and are presented as a composite for the GRYD program as a whole. In future reports, as and when providers in low-reporting

¹⁸ Some youth declined to respond to some YSET questions, resulting in counts below 902 and 248 in some of the charts.

zones increase their retest numbers, zone-specific analyses of risk change will be conducted (targets for each zone of 100 retests of Eligible youth and 50 of Not-Eligible youth were established as the threshold for zone-specific analysis in this report).


Youth Enrolled in the GRYD Prevention Program

The average YSET-I and YSET-R scores on the seven Attitudinal Risk Scales are depicted in Figure 4.1 for the 902 GRYD Enrolled youth who had been re-tested by mid-April.

The upper bar for each scale presents the average score on the YSET-I; the lower bar presents the average score on the YSET-R. The differing lengths of the two bars depict the change from initial test to retest.

The data presented in the figures permit comparison of average YSET-I and YSET-R scores for Enrolled youth and whether the amount of change is statistically significant (an asterisk presented with the percentage change numbers indicates statistical significance at the .05 level, the common standard for concluding that observed change is not due to chance).

Figure 4.1 - Average Change in Self-Reported Risk Scale Scores For 902 GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R



*Statistically significant, $p < .05$
 Source: Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET-I= initial, YSET-R=re-test)

Figure 4.1 demonstrates not only that the risk level changes reported for youth receiving services are not due to chance, but also that they are substantial for every scale. Risk levels on nearly all scales declined by more than 20%. The average YSET-I score on the antisocial/prosocial risk scale, for example, was 18 and at re-test the same set of youth averaged a score of 14, which represents a 23% reduction in antisocial tendencies. The change would also put the average youth below the at-risk threshold for the scale. There were similar reductions in all the other attitudinal scales, and all were statistically significant.

Comparison of Enrolled Youth to Not-Eligible Youth

The calculations displayed in Figure 4.1 for enrolled youth were replicated for the 248 Not-Eligible youth who were retested. The changes in risk scores from YSET-I to YSET-R are presented in Figure 4.2, which permits a direct comparison of risk change for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible groups. The results are striking.

Not-Eligible youth also showed improvements across six of the seven scales presented, the exception being the peer influence scale where there was a very small deterioration. However, across all of the YSET Risk Scales the improvements for Enrolled youth are far greater than for Not-Eligible youth, generally of a magnitude of three to five times larger. Further, most changes for Not-Eligible youth were below acceptable statistical significance levels, indicating that the observed changes could have been the result of chance variation.

Caution is needed when considering how to interpret this comparison. Not-Eligible youth of necessity have lower scores than Eligible youth on these scales (else they would not be deemed Not-Eligible). They therefore have less room for improvement and a simple comparison of the magnitude of change may be misleading. We return to this issue below in the section entitled Regression Discontinuity.

Changes in Reported Behavior – Enrolled Youth

In addition to the seven scales discussed above, both the YSET-I and YSET-R contained 20 items that asked youth to report previous involvement in delinquency and use of illicit or prohibited substances. Each item was asked in three ways: whether the youth had *ever* engaged in the given behavior; whether the youth had engaged in the given behavior in the *past six months*; and if the youth was a gang member, whether the youth had engaged in the behavior *with other gang members*. These questions were repeated at re-test to determine if the youth consistently engaged in delinquency or if, after receiving services, reduced the level of such behaviors.

The behavioral response items can be grouped into the following four categories:

- Gang related activities (four questions);
- Violent criminal behavior (four questions);
- Substance Use or Abuse (four questions); and
- Non-violent delinquent behavior (nine questions).

Here we look at the self-reported responses of violent and gang-related behaviors occurring in the six months prior to each interview.

The figures below compare these categories between the YSET-I and YSET-R for Enrolled youth. Within each chart, the specific YSET items for the given category are presented. The bars depict the number of youth reporting that they engaged in the stated behavior during their initial interview (YSET-I, or top bar) and at re-test (YSET-R, or bottom bar). The difference between YSET-I and YSET-R percentages is noted in the charts.


Comparisons between Enrolled youth and Not-Eligible youth are more problematic for the Behavior Scales because of the low numbers of Not-Eligible youth who reported engaging in

the different kinds of behaviors. We have established a response level of 25 youth as the criterion for inclusion of responses by Not-Eligible youth.

Changes in Gang-Related Behavior

Figure 4.3 presents the changes in self-reported gang-related behaviors. Nearly 150 of the 902 Enrolled youth reported that they had engaged in gang fights prior to GRYD participation, but this number declined by 47.3% on the retest. Almost half of Enrolled youth said that they had hung out with gang members on the initial screen, but 35% fewer reported doing so on the retest. Only about 10% of all Enrolled youth said that they had participated in gang activities in the six months prior to the initial interview, and this dropped by almost half on the retest. In contrast, reports of being a member of a gang increased between the initial screen and retest but this change was very small in comparison to the total number of youth screened – a change from nine to 14 youth out of over 900.


Figure 4.2
Average Change in Self-Reported Risk Factor Scores
GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth,
YSET-I to YSET-R



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)
 * Statistically significant p<.05

Figure 4.3
Percent Change in Self-Reported Gang-Related Behavior
GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R

N=902




*Statistically significant, $p < .05$
 Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

Changes in Violent Criminal Behavior

The four items about violent criminal behaviors are presented in Figure 4.4. There were declines in the numbers reporting that they had engaged in violent activities in the six months prior to the initial screen and retest across all four behaviors. The largest change was for “hitting someone to hurt them.” Over half of the Enrolled youth reported “yes” to this question while only about a quarter did so on the retest, a 53.2% decrease. Very few acknowledged that they had “attacked someone with a weapon” or “used force to steal:” less than 20 out of the 902. Nonetheless there were decreases on both items – 8.1% for attacking with a weapon and 26.3% for using force to steal. 160 Enrolled youth reported they “carried a hidden weapon” in the six months prior to YSET-I but this dropped to 107 for the six months prior to YSET-R: a decline of 33.1%.

Figure 4.4
Percent Change in Self-Reported Violent Criminal Behavior
GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R




*Statistically significant, $p < .05$
 Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

The responses by Not-Eligible youth on the same items generally reported much lower levels of participation in gang activities, substance use/abuse, violent crimes or non-violent crimes, which contributed of course to their preclusion from the GRYD prevention program. Across all four groupings, there were only four YSET items where 25 or more Not-Eligible youth said that they had engaged in a particular behavior. Such low numbers mean that these items, and percentage change calculations, are unreliable. For example, a change from one youth saying "yes" on the YSET-I to three saying "yes" on the YSET-R yields a 200% difference. As a result of the inherent unreliability associated with such low response frequencies for Not-Eligible youth, only the five items with more than 25 responses are presented for comparison purposes.

Figure 4.5 indicates that there was a slight increase in the number of Not-Eligibles indicating that they had hung out with gang members in the six months prior to YSET-R compared with YSET-I: a 5.3% increase. There was also an increase in the number of Not-Eligibles reporting that they had skipped class: a 52.9% increase. The direction of change for this item was opposite of what was reported by Enrolled youth. For the other behavioral items, the numbers of responses for Not-Eligibles declined. "Hit to Hurt Someone" showed a 30.2% decrease, "Avoided paying for things such as movies or bus/subway rides" showed a 30.6% decrease and "Damaged Property" was down by over half.

Figure 4.5
Percent Change in Self-Reported Gang-Related Behavior
Not-Eligible Youth, YSET-I to YSET-R
Items with Over 25 Responses

N=248



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retest)

A comparison of the item changes noted in Figure 4.7 with those shown previously for Eligible youth is informative (negative scores indicate improvement, positive scores indicate deterioration):

- Hanging out With Gang Members -35% Enrolled +5.3% Not-Eligible
- Hit to Hurt Someone -53.2% Enrolled -30.2% Not-Eligible
- Skipped Class -29% Enrolled +52.9% Not-Eligible
- Avoided Paying -31.6% Enrolled -30.6% Not-Eligible
- Damaged Property -58% Enrolled -52.8% Not-Eligible

For each item, the Enrolled youth report substantially improved behavior. Not-Eligible youth also report improved behavior on three items (at levels roughly comparable to Enrolled youth on two of them), but on the other two items they move substantially in the other direction.

As noted earlier, it is difficult to be confident about this comparison because of the small numbers involved on the Not-Eligible side of the analysis, and because the Not-Eligible changes are not generally statistically significant. To further address this difficulty, we

conducted a more rigorous test which is reported below in the section on Regression Discontinuity.

Changes in Eligibility

The objective of the prevention program is to take youth who are at risk of joining gangs and participating in gang-related activities and, through the provision of services, help them to change. A key question therefore is whether youth considered Eligible on the initial YSET-I would also be considered eligible based on their scores on the YSET-R. In addition, it is important to know whether youth not receiving services because of low scores on the YSET-I have continued to score below the at-risk threshold or whether the retest indicates that they are above the threshold.

To assess these questions, each of the retests we conducted was scored using the USC at-risk standards (see above for details), and a determination of Eligibility/Non-Eligibility was made. For the Enrolled youth who were retested, the findings are presented in Table 4.4. Results for Not-Eligible youth are presented in Table 4.5.

Table 4.4 – Changes in Eligibility at Retest for Enrolled Youth

	Total Eligible on YSET-I	Still Eligible at YSET-R	Changed to Not-Eligible at YSET-R
77th II	95	31	64
Baldwin Village	96	20	76
Boyle Heights	77	20	46
Cypress Park	112	35	77
Florence-Graham	8	2	6
Newton	79	33	46
Pacoima/Foothill	138	69	69
Panorama City	27	7	20
Ramona Gardens	26	10	16
Rampart	67	24	43
Southwest II	65	28	37
Watts/Southeast	57	25	32
Total N	847	304	532
%	100.0%	35.9%	62.8%

Note: Thirty-one youth were flagged for gang membership across the 12 zones; since this section does not incorporate a discussion of the challenge process, these cases are removed from the table.

As the findings reported earlier in this chapter have intimated, a significant percentage of retested enrolled youth had at-risk scale scores on their retest that would have made them ineligible for GRYD prevention services had they scored at the same level on their YSET-I. More than 60% of the total retested at ineligible levels. Though there was variation between zones, no zone had less than a 50% improvement rate.

Table 4.5 – Changes in Eligibility at Retest for Not-Eligible Youth

	Total Not-Eligible on YSET-I	Still Not-Eligible at retest	Changed to Eligible at retest
77th II	40	35	5
Baldwin Village	47	46	1
Boyle Heights	8	6	2
Cypress Park	5	5	0
Florence-Graham	5	3	2
Newton	33	27	6
Pacoima/Foothill	39	31	8
Panorama City	11	10	1
Ramona Gardens	2	2	0
Rampart	51	40	11
Southwest II	0	0	0
Watts/Southeast	0	0	0
Total N	241	205	36
%	100.0%	85.1%	14.9%

Note: One youth was flagged for gang membership across the 12 zones; since this section does not incorporate a discussion of the challenge process, this case is removed from the table.

Changes from non-eligibility to eligibility were not as pronounced but 36 of the 242 youth - 15% of the originally Not-Eligible total - retested Eligible.

These findings raise obvious questions about the prevention program. Should enrolled youth who retest below at-risk thresholds be “graduated” from the program? Should Not-Eligible youth who retest above at-risk thresholds be admitted into the program? And how much time should pass before these changes become stable and reliable (as to not undo positive progress for a youth)? Such programmatic challenges are currently being explored through the GRYD program’s newly developed Reassessment Program. Future retesting is being built into that decision-making process.

A Regression Discontinuity Comparison of Enrolled and Not-Eligible Youth

This section describes findings from applying a Regression Discontinuity Design to assess the effects of GRYD’s Prevention Program on the attitudes and self-reported delinquency of youth who Enrolled in the program and were subsequently retested.

As noted earlier, a major challenge for the evaluation is to identify a group of youth who are similar in demographics and behavior to the youth receiving prevention services, but who are not themselves receiving such services. If such a group could be identified and if information about the youth in the group could be developed, comparisons between the two groups could help determine whether changes in the GRYD youth are a consequence of services received.

The optimal approach - a randomized design in which youth referred to the GRYD program would be randomly assigned to an experimental group (getting services) or to a control group (not getting services) - was declared infeasible for ethical reasons at the beginning of the GRYD Program. Further, because of insurmountable practical and privacy/security difficulties, finding such a group from the general population of Los Angeles youth was also ruled out. We have therefore focused on the possibility of comparing Eligible youth to Not-Eligible youth within the GRYD program.

The Regression Discontinuity design we report here is one possibility for doing that. Though not a perfect solution to the comparison group problem, it has the value of generating supplementary evidence that can contribute to our understanding of program effects.¹⁹ Thus, the results we present should not be considered dispositive of the question of attribution of GRYD effects.

Table 4.6 describes a sample of 1,119 youth who were either Not-Eligible or Eligible and Enrolled and who have been retested.²⁰

Table 4.6 – GRYD Enrolled and Not-Eligible Youth by Number of High-Risk Factors Identified by the Initial YSET Interview

Number of High-Risk Factors	Number of Youth in Category	Number Enrolled in GRYD	Percent Enrolled in GRYD	Number Not-Eligible	% Not-Eligible
0	69	4	6%	65	94%
1	70	7	10%	63	90%
2	88	18	20%	70	80%
3	93	62	67%	31	33%
4	125	119	95%	6	5%
5	201	200	100%	1	0%
6	212	210	99%	2	1%
7	142	141	99%	1	1%
8	76	76	100%	0	0%
9	43	43	100%	0	0%
TOTALS	1119	880	79%	239	21%

As discussed earlier in this chapter, referred youth who had 3 or fewer risk factors on the YSET scale or who reported being in a gang were deemed Not-Eligible for prevention services unless a successful appeal was made. Gang members are referred to GRYD's Intervention program. Youth who had four risk factors or more have been considered Eligible. However, an appeals process can facilitate changes in the initial eligibility finding. As Table 4.6

¹⁹ See Appendix H for an expanded discussion of the regression discontinuity approach.

²⁰ Missing data on some items caused the exclusion of 22 Enrolled cases and 9 Not-Eligible cases, resulting in a total number of 1,119 cases.

shows, some youth with scores less than 3 were enrolled and some youth scoring above 5 are recorded as being Not-Eligible.

To accommodate this discontinuity in the “probability” of enrollment at a total risk score of four, a variant of the standard regression discontinuity design can be applied to assess the effectiveness of GRYD at improving attitudes and behavior for Enrolled youth compared with Not-Eligible youth. The approach compares enrolled and Not-Eligible youth whose scores clustered around the four risk factor cut-point.

Findings

The effects of GRYD on a total of 10 attitudinal and behavioral scales were analyzed. These include the following:

Attitudinal Scales: Antisocial, Parental Supervision, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, Neutralization, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency.

Behavioral Scales: Self-report delinquency scales computed separately for Substance Abuse/Use, Gang-related Behavior, Violent Criminal Behavior, and Non-violent Criminal Behavior.

The criterion (outcome) measures of interest were changes in these scales between the YSET-I and YSET-R. If the GRYD services were helping the youth, then we should find that scores on the scales reduce between the initial and re-administration of the YSET. However, to confirm that any changes are more likely to be a result of GRYD and not any other factors (e.g., aging of the youth), the reduction, if any, must be larger in magnitude than is observed for the Not-Eligible youth. In other words, if the difference between the YSET-I and YSET-R for the Not-Eligible youth is found to be no different than for the Enrolled youth, then the GRYD program is performing no better than business-as-usual. Because the assignment of youth to the Eligible and Not-Eligible groups is based, in part, on these risk scales, and because there is a substantial variation in the degree of risk observed across youth (some are just above or just below the cut point while others manifest a much greater distance from the cut point) a simple comparison of their scale scores is not very instructive. However, if we can compare the change in the risk scores for Not-Eligible youth just below the cut point and for Enrolled youth just above the cut point, then we can derive credible inferences about the effectiveness of GRYD services—at least in improving the outcomes of the marginal youth.

For each of the outcomes considered, two different versions of change between the Initial YSET (I) and the Retest YSET (R) were constructed: a difference and a ratio. Because the scales are an additive sum of underlying responses, there is a natural range for each scale. The lowest possible value for any scale is 0. Therefore, individuals who score low on at the initial assessment cannot score much lower on the re-assessment. As a result, computing the difference between the R and I scores biases the analysis towards finding larger differences among those who are at higher risk than those at lower risk—precisely the groups who are Enrolled for GRYD. As a robustness check, therefore, we also created ratio measures of the

change in the score that measure the percentage change in the reassessment risk scale (relative to the initial assessment).²¹

Table 4.7 presents the estimates of the fuzzy regression discontinuity design analysis for changes in the six attitudinal scales analyzed. A total of 1,119 youth had comparable and available data on the attitudinal scales, enrollment/eligibility status, and their YSET-I based total risk score. The YSET-I based risk scores are used as the s_i variable and the cut-point is set at four in all of these analyses. A cut-point of four is appropriate because, as Table 4.7 shows, the probability of enrollment was almost 100% at a total risk score of four.

Table 4.7 – Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Attitudinal Scales

	Attitudinal Scales						
	Antisocial	Parental Supervision	Critical Life Events	Impulsive Risk Taking	Neutra- lization	Peer Influence	Peer Delinq- uency
Sample Size Used	1,119	1,119	1,119	1,119	1,119	1,119	1,119
Percent Enrolled	79%	79%	79%	79%	79%	79%	79%
Percent Not-Eligible	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%	21%
Average Change							
Difference (R-I)	-3.52 **	-2.32 **	-1.39 **	-2.88 **	-3.85 **	-2.33 **	-1.78 **
Ratio (R/I)	-0.18 **	-0.23 **	-0.30 **	-0.23 **	-0.19 **	-0.26 **	-0.14 **
Modeled Change							
Difference							
Unconditional	-5.48 **	-3.91 **	-1.79 **	-4.17 **	-5.42 **	-3.78 **	-2.84 **
RegDisc (Linear)	-3.10 **	-0.18	-1.19 **	-3.23 **	-4.01 **	-0.87	1.12
RegDisc (Flexible)	-2.69 **	-0.11	-0.98 **	-1.87 **	-2.89 **	-0.11	0.48
Ratio							
Unconditional	-0.29 **	-0.43 **	-0.39 **	-0.32 **	-0.28 **	-0.45 **	-0.25 **
RegDisc (Linear)	-0.20 **	-0.10 *	-0.31 **	-0.28 **	-0.26 **	-0.17 **	-0.04
RegDisc (Flexible)	-0.18 **	-0.09	-0.17 **	-0.16 **	-0.18 **	-0.06	-0.09 *

NOTE: ** indicates a statistical significance level of $p \leq .05$ and * indicates a level of $p \leq .10$

Of the 1,119 youth in the sample, 79% were enrolled in GRYD and 21% were Not-Eligible. The sample includes youth who may have scored above the cut-point but were not enrolled or scored below the cut-point and were enrolled. A direct comparison of the attitudinal scale differences and ratios between the enrolled and the Not-Eligible youth shows statistically significant decreases on all the scales. For example, the number -3.52 under the Antisocial column suggests that the decrease in risk as measured by the antisocial scale for the

²¹ The difference measures are computed as $\text{Difference} = R - I$ and the ratio measures are computed as $\text{Ratio} = R/I$. Because the scales can have a value of 0, the ratio versions were operationalized as $\text{Ratio} = (1+R)/(1+I)$ to avoid getting missing values because of dividing by 0.

Enrolled youth between R and I was greater than the decrease in the antisocial scale of Not-Eligible youth between R and I by an average 3.52 units. The mean Antisocial scale for the Not-Eligible youth dropped from 13.08 at YSET-I to 12.43 at YSET-R. The mean Antisocial scale for the youth Enrolled in GRYD, on the other hand, dropped from 18.07 at YSET-I to 13.90 at YSET-R. Therefore, the Antisocial scale of the Enrolled youth dropped by $(18.07 - 13.90) - (13.08 - 12.43) = 3.52$ units more than the drop in the Antisocial scale of the Not-Eligible youth. This number is the difference between *averages* for each of the two groups—Not-Eligible and Enrolled youth—where the members of each group have differing risk levels. Consequently, in a simple comparison of change between the two groups, there is a potential for confounding the effectiveness of GRYD with varying reductions in the Antisocial scales for youth at different initial risk levels. The Regression Discontinuity Design attempts to address the potential for confounding these competing effects.

The set of estimates presented under the Modeled Change part of the table accounts for the cross-overs and those denoted as RegDisc provide the effects of GRYD at the margin (point of discontinuity) where the Not-Eligible and Enrolled youth are more comparable.

As noted, the actual enrollment has cross-overs (some youth below the cut point are Enrolled, some above it are not), that may dilute the GRYD effects that can be derived from the analysis. This is evident from the fact that the unconditional estimates under the Modeled Change section are typically larger in magnitude than the Average Changes in the difference and the ratios. The Regression Discontinuity estimates (listed in rows labeled as RegDisc) are those that account for the cross-overs and compare youth at the point of discontinuity only. The difference between RegDisc (Linear) and RegDisc (Flexible) is merely the functional form of the $g(\cdot)$ function in the analysis—the linear form or a flexible form. The row presented in bold face font provides the most conservative estimates and is what we use to derive inferences about the performance of GRYD. This helps to guard against overstating GRYD effects. Nevertheless, several encouraging findings are worth highlighting.

- First, enrollment in the GRYD program typically reduces the attitudinal scales between I and R by a larger magnitude than the change for similar youth who did not receive GRYD services. The largest and most significant (statistically) reductions are in the Antisocial, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking and Neutralization scales. For the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency attitudinal scales, the effects are statistically insignificant (the reductions are indistinguishable between the GRYD Enrolled and the Not-Eligible youth at the margin).
- Second, there are few qualitative differences in the findings between the difference and ratio versions of the change between the YSET-R and YSET-I scales. Typically, when one is statistically and substantively significant, the other is as well.
- Third, though the flexible functional form versions of the models provide more conservative estimates of the effects of the GRYD program than the linear versions, the effects are still statistically significant for five of the seven non-behavioral scales – Parental Supervision and Peer Influence are the exceptions. Peer Delinquency under the

ratio model is another type of exception—the linear version provides a statistically insignificant finding but the flexible version provides the opposite. It is possible that Parental Supervision and Peer Delinquency are resistant to the effects of GRYD services because neither parents nor peers are likely to experience attitudinal changes simply because GRYD provides services to the youth.

Table 4.8 presents the same results for the self-report delinquency and substance abuse scales. The notations in this table are the same as in Table 4.7. Here, the results are less encouraging. The regression discontinuity analysis suggests that the GRYD Enrolled youth do not, in general, manifest statistically significant larger changes in their self-reported delinquent behavior than similar Not-Eligible youth. The one exception is a reduction in gang-related behavior using the difference measure with the flexible functional form specification. However, even this reduction is only statistically significant at a 90% confidence level.

Table 4.8 – Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Self-report Delinquency Scales

	Self-report Delinquency Scales			
	Substance Abuse/Use	Gang-related Behavior	Violent Criminal Behavior	Non-violent Criminal Behavior
Sample Size Used	600	1,032	1,046	1,028
Percent Enrolled	81%	78%	79%	79%
Percent Not-Eligible	19%	22%	21%	21%
Average Change				
Difference (R-I)	-0.09	-0.38 **	-0.33 **	-1.00 **
Ratio (R/I)	0.04	-0.16 **	-0.14 **	-0.25 **
Modeled Change				
Difference				
Unconditional	-0.18 *	-0.44 **	-0.48 **	-1.46 **
RegDisc (Linear)	0.41	-0.15	-0.06	0.34
RegDisc (Flexible)	0.26	-0.24 *	-0.06	0.12
Ratio				
Unconditional	-0.02	-0.16 **	-0.22 **	-0.42 **
RegDisc (Linear)	0.23	-0.05	-0.03	-0.11
RegDisc (Flexible)	0.14	-0.11	-0.02	-0.14

NOTE: ** indicates a statistical significance level of $p \leq .05$ and * indicates a level of $p \leq .10$

Upon closer examination of Table 4.8, these findings are not surprising. The number of youth in the analysis who had sufficient data to conduct the analysis for the substance abuse scale was only 600. Moreover, a larger proportion of this sample (82%) was Enrolled. This suggests that the missing data on the substance abuse scales came more from the Not-Eligible youth than the Enrolled youth. As a result, even a comparison of the average change between

the YSET-R and YSET-I do not yield a statistically significant difference between the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youths for this scale. For the remaining scales—Gang-related Behavior, Violent Criminal Behavior, and Non-violent Criminal Behavior—the average comparisons produce estimates that suggest Enrolled youth did better than the Not-Eligible. However, compared with the attitudinal scales in Table 4.6, the magnitude of the differences are very small. Indeed, after accounting for the cross-overs and making comparisons only at the margin (at the point of discontinuity), there seem to be no differences between the Enrolled and similar Not-Eligible youth in terms of the changes in their self-report delinquent scales.

A cautionary note should be interjected here. The regression discontinuity design is a localized design that provides estimates only at the point of discontinuity. Hence, unless one makes the assumption that the effects of GRYD are fixed across all risk levels (highly improbable in our view), one cannot definitively assert, based on the regression discontinuity design results generated from the 1,119 youth, that there is no effect of GRYD on all Enrolled youth for the self-report delinquency scales. It is possible that the GRYD program is effective in reducing delinquent acts among higher-risk youth (e.g., those with seven or eight risk factors). The regression discontinuity design does not permit us to answer that question as it only compares youth on or about the cut point level. As additional retest data is generated by providers, it will become more feasible to conduct analysis by risk level. At that point, further insight into the effects of the prevention program will be possible.

The reader should also be cautioned about the results reported pertaining to the Behavioral Scales. The regression discontinuity design analysis compares the change in R and I scale levels between the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth but the number of youth in the Not-Eligible groups are relatively small (239). In addition, few of them have responded positively to some of the individual items that comprise the scales, thereby making it difficult to construct robust differences between the R and I responses for all individual items/questions. However, combining the several questions to create scales provides sufficient data to produce differences between the R and I scales that are reported and to compare these changes with those for the Enrolled youth. In short, with the exception of the Substance Abuse Behavior Scale, the remaining three aggregated Behavioral Scales provide sufficient data to conduct the regression discontinuity design analysis.


Robustness Checks

As noted earlier in this section, the robustness of the regression discontinuity design method rests on a few assumptions that ought to be checked. Here we present robustness checks on two issues. First, we need to ensure that the probability of enrollment does in fact display a discontinuity at or about the four risk factors cut-point. Second, we need to ensure that other variables do not possess a discontinuity at that point. Violation of either of these conditions would render some of the findings reported earlier suspect.

Figure 4.6 plots the average of several series over the range of possible values for the number of risk factors. The %-GRYD Enrolled series (from Table 4.6) is the only one that displays a dramatic discontinuity. The other series included in this plot—percent male, percent Black, percent Latino, average age, and average grade of the youth—all appear to vary smoothly

across the range.²² This suggests that the results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, whether encouraging or discouraging, are not a result of sharp changes in demographic factors that might be related to the outcomes analyzed.

Figure 4.6 – Variation in the Percent of GRYD Enrolled and Demographic Factors Across the Range of Values of the Number of Risk Factors



Participant and Stakeholder Perceptions of the Prevention Program

To obtain information on the views of the families and youth who are receiving prevention program services one-on-one interviews were held with youth in the program, and focus groups were held with parents or caretakers of youth.

In addition, surveys and interviews were conducted with GRYD Program Managers, prevention service providers, Intervention CMs, CIWs, school teachers, and community leaders.

²² Percent male, percent Black, percent Latino, and the enrollment rate are measured on the left y-axis, while the average age and average grade variables are measured on the right y-axis of Figure 4.8.

We first present the views of the youth and parents, and then summarize the opinions of the other groups of respondents.

Youth and Parents in the Prevention Program

The number of interviews and focus groups are presented in Table 4.9. A total of 125 youth were interviewed by evaluation team staff, some from every GRYD zone. Twenty focus groups were held, at least one from every zone. The interviews and focus groups were arranged by provider agencies, but no provider staff were present when the interviews and meetings took place.

Table 4.9 – Youth Interviews and Parent Focus Groups

Zones	# of Youth Interviews	# of Parent Focus Group Participants (Sessions in parentheses)
77th Division II	9	17 (2)
Baldwin Village	15	14 (2)
Boyle Heights	10	7 (2)
Cypress Park	13	6 (1)
Florence-Graham*	5	---
Newton	11	6 (2)
Pacoima/Foothill	14	23 (2)
Panorama City	9	8 (2)
Ramona Gardens	9	7 (2)
Rampart	10	10 (2)
Southwest II	6	6 (1)
Watts/Southeast	14	21 (2)
TOTAL	125	125 (20)

*The Florence-Graham GRYD prevention provider stopped providing services in early 2011, and data collection for this zone ceased at this time.

Gang Activities and Perceptions of Safety in GRYD Zones

A large majority of interviewed youth reported that gangs cause problems for them individually and their communities, and “do nothing good for kids.” According to these participants, gang member activities include smoking, drinking, stealing, tagging (graffiti), using and/or selling drugs, fighting, shooting, and killing. There were a few exceptions; a handful of interviewed youth mentioned that they were not aware of gangs or had not seen them in their

neighborhood, and a few youth reported that gangs do not create problems for them personally. Several of the interviewed youth even reported on the benefits of gangs, primarily for protection. As one respondent noted, "They keep other gangs from coming into our neighborhood. They kind of protect the neighborhood."

Parent perceptions of gangs and safety in the GRYD zones and personal experiences with gangs varied widely; while some reported not knowing much about gangs outside of the media, others were conscious of the need for color neutrality in their children's clothing, had children involved in using or buying marijuana, and one respondent reported her son was shot in the neighborhood. There was a general consensus that most youth (both their own children and other youth in their communities) do not want to join a gang to engage in violence, but there are other specific reasons for doing so. As one respondent summarized, "I think that desire to be in a gang per se is not the thing, but it's about belonging to a group and they think it's fun, and maybe they are going to gain respect."

Prevention Services for Youth and Parents

According to interviewed youth, the vast majority have participated in GRYD field trips (including trips to the movies, theme parks, or sporting events). Other popular activities include tutoring or homework assistance in their programs, life skills classes or peer groups, and enrichment classes (such as dance, art, and chess games). In addition, the majority indicated that their parents/guardians were involved in GRYD. ("Involvement" usually included speaking with the youth's CM and attending events, although approximately 1 out of 10 youth also reported that a parent was involved in parenting classes and/or received counseling).

Programs the youth participated in, such as counseling, field trips, gender-specific sessions (such as Girls Today, Women Tomorrow), mentoring, or interactions with their CM were viewed by parents as positively shaping the youth's attitude, and subsequently their behaviors. Even when parents did not personally participate in GRYD programming, they expressed that their children were learning to build communication skills, improve their self-esteem, control their anger, and channel emotions positively, and overall had positive attitudinal changes, all of which strengthened their family interactions. Importantly, the GRYD prevention program was designed to not only help participating youth, but to also strengthen their families and provide family-based services. When asked about positive changes in their children, parents seemed to reflect the most on improved parent-child relationships in the focus groups.

Likewise, parents who participated in parenting classes or counseling felt they were provided valuable skills to help them communicate and interact positively with their children. Some parents reported learning how to motivate and teach their children through mutual respect and parenting strategies instead of the previous punishment tactics they previously used. These GRYD programs seemed to serve as a support system for parents struggling to connect with their children; for example, one focus group discussed the importance of learning how to recognize certain things about their children, such as how to know if they are becoming involved with drugs or gangs. Especially when both parents and youth reportedly had positive experiences in the GRYD program, there appeared to be increased trust, communication, patience, and bonding.

Views on GRYD's Impact on the Community

When asked whether GRYD has had any impact on their neighborhoods, there was a divide between youth who thought GRYD had a positive impact on their neighborhoods and those who did not. Youth indicating the program did not have an effect often reported that knowledge of the program is not widespread and that they have noticed low youth participation in their neighborhood (and therefore they felt the program itself could not have an effect) or youth expressed that although individuals might be positively impacted, they were skeptical that the overall community was benefiting. Youth who did report a positive community impact suggested that the attitudes and behaviors of participating youth are changing. Specifically, youth commented that “kids will stay out of trouble because [GRYD] is the place to be,” and that the program keeps youth “busy” and “off the streets.” These respondents noted that this shift in attitudes reduces fighting and violence and makes the neighborhood “calmer.”

Parents reported that because of the GRYD program, they are more knowledgeable and proactive when it comes to their community. Parents stated that “we have become more proactive and are not afraid to call the police” and “thanks to the program, we have become more aware of what is going on and what we can do about it.” In addition, parents noted that the GRYD program has provided an alternative to gangs for youth. Similar to the youth respondents, parents also indicated that GRYD gives youth a place to spend their time off the streets and engaging in positive activities.

Awareness of SNL

Youth in the GRYD program and parents who had children in GRYD were interviewed individually and in focus groups (respectively) to see how familiar high-risk youth and their families were with the program. Over half of interviewed youth indicated they were not familiar with SNL,²³ and of those who did hear of the program, a little over half reported attending. Those who were familiar with SNL reported that the benefits of the program were giving youth and residents something positive to do in the neighborhood (or “keep them busy”) and bringing neighbors together. As one youth described, “It kind of gives you a sense of who lives close to you and it is not all bad.”

Although some parents had reported hearing of SNL, many focus group participants had not. One parent reported that her daughter worked at one of the SNL parks and very few parents reported attending SNL (and when they did, it was often irregularly). Therefore, they did not have many opinions on the program or the program’s effect.

GRYD Prevention Youth and the Future

A common theme that arose in youth interviews and parent focus groups was the future of GRYD youth. When describing the program, interviewed youth often discussed immediate benefits of GRYD, such as helping them with their homework. However, many also noted that

²³ However, it should be noted that approximately 2 out of 10 interviewed youth also did not seem to recognize the term “GRYD.” Instead, they referred to the specific agency they received services from or the specific programs they attended. Therefore, this may be an overestimate of a lack of awareness.

GRYD was helping them prepare for high school or college. One respondent explained that “they focus on a positive future and help us figure out what we want to do with our lives.” When asked about changes in GRYD youth, parents also noted that their children seem to be thinking about the future more. Parents reported that CMs were providing youth with information on college options and the application process, advice on staying out of prison and staying out of gangs, and advice with reaching goals and finishing high school. One respondent in a focus group reported that after probing his great-grandson about his future, the youth announced “going to jail.” The respondent expressed relief that the youth was now exposed to positive activities that provided new options, opportunities, and norms.

Stakeholder Views of the Prevention Program

A total of 399 surveys and interviews were conducted with community leaders, members of city agencies involved in or with direct knowledge of the GRYD program, and school teachers/officials. A wide variety of questions and topics were covered. Item specific responses are reported in the Appendixes. Here we concentrate on three critical issues pertaining to the prevention program:

1. Has the program increased gang prevention services and improved access to those services?
2. Has there been an increase in the awareness of youth, family, and community of alternatives to gangs?
3. Has the program helped to deter and reduce gang joining?

The results are presented in Table 4.10. Each of the 12 GRYD zones was represented in the surveys and interviews. All respondents were asked to report their views on a 5-point scale: very positive, positive, moderate or neutral, negative, or very negative. We present the positive and negative responses in the table.

With respect to Access to Gang Prevention Services, and Increasing Awareness of Alternatives to the Gang Life, substantial majorities of respondents in every group reported positive or very positive views of the program’s effects. Opinions about Reducing the Risk of Gang Joining are also far more positive than negative for all groups except LAPD gang officers, who split evenly between the positive and negative ends of the scale.

Though some caution is needed in interpreting these results, given that many of the respondents are engaged in the program and so can be expected to have an “insider” view of its effects, the findings are still impressive. None of the groups were under any pressure to respond in any particular way, and the interviews and surveys were conducted by evaluation team members without the participation of any other GRYD officials. Respondent identities have not been connected to their responses in any record.

Table 4.10 – Stakeholder Perceptions of Prevention Program Effects on Gang Issues

Stakeholder Groups	Total Number of Surveys or Interviews	Improving Access to Gang Prevention Services		Increasing Awareness of Alternatives to the Gang Life		Reducing Risk of Gang Joining	
		Positive or Very Positive	Negative or Very Negative	Positive or Very Positive	Negative or Very Negative	Positive or Very Positive	Negative or Very Negative
GRYD Program Managers	8	8	0	8	0	7	0
LAPD Officers	40	16	8	15	7	8	8
Community Intervention Workers	23	17	1	13	1	5	1
Intervention Case Managers	23	14	0	15	1	9	1
Prevention Service Providers	197	n/a	n/a	116	8	81	15
Teachers	60	33	3	30	3	20	3
Community Leaders	48	26	6	29	5	20	8
Totals N	399	114	18	226	25	150	36
%	100.0%	56.4%	8.9%	56.6%	6.3%	37.6%	9.0%

NOTE: Prevention Service providers' judgments of their own service delivery are not reported. The 197 service provider respondents are therefore not included in the calculation of percentage figures for total responses under that issue.

Conclusion

YSET is the gatekeeper for the GRYD prevention program, determining which youth are at-risk of joining a gang and are eligible for prevention services. Changes in risk levels are therefore a key evaluative Scale for the prevention program.

When comparing average initial/retest scores for Enrolled youth, every Attitudinal Risk Scale had substantial and statistically significant declines. Enrolled youth also displayed changes on behavior scales, with some drops in reported gang activities, hanging out with gang members, being involved in gang fights, hitting someone to hurt them, and a few other items in the violent criminal behavior category. While selling drugs reportedly increased, other non-violent criminal and delinquent behaviors also decreased.

Not-Eligible youth also manifested drops in risk as measured by six of the seven attitudinal scales, but the declines were much smaller than evidenced by the Enrolled group, the latter showing improvements at three to five times greater levels. In addition scores for the Not-Eligible group did not generally meet acceptable statistical significance levels.

In both the original and the retest YSETs, Not-Eligible youth on average reported considerably lower frequencies than Enrolled youth for participation in gang activities, substance use/abuse, violent crimes and non-violent crimes (which, of course, contributed to the ineligibility decision in the first place). These low frequencies, combined with the fact that some youth in both groups scored at the extremes of either low risk or high risk, made a direct comparison with Enrolled results unjustifiable for most items.

However, a regression discontinuity design was employed to compare Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth whose YSET-I risk levels were clustered around the at-risk threshold, thus permitting a methodologically stronger comparison of more similar youth from the two groups. The findings confirmed that differences in risk reduction between the Enrolled and the Not-Eligible youth were statistically significant and substantial on the Antisocial, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, and Neutralization scales. The differences were not significant on the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency attitudinal scales, and Enrolled youth did not report changes in delinquent behavior that were significantly greater than reported by Not-Eligible youth, with the exception of a reduction in gang-related behavior. As was noted in the discussion, the Regression Discontinuity results should be considered as supplementary, not dispositive, with respect to considerations of attribution of effects. However, the analysis is consistent with the simple comparisons of change presented in the bar charts.

Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a sample of youth receiving prevention services and parents of such youth. These disclosed largely positive views about program effects. Respondents reported improvements in youth attitudes and indicated a link between these positive changes and strengthened family bonds and interactions. Behavioral changes were attributed to either increased parental involvement or to positive youth attitudinal changes.

GRYD program staff, service providers, LAPD gang officers, school officials, and community leaders all contributed observations about the GRYD prevention program through interviews and surveys. These were overwhelmingly positive.

Chapter V

Intervention

Introduction

The *Intervention* component of the comprehensive gang reduction and youth development strategy is primarily oriented toward two focal points for intervention. The first is gang-involved youth between 14 and 25 years old and the other is gang violence interruption and proactive peace-making in the community.

This chapter provides an overview of the objectives of the intervention component and descriptions of the basic activities of each of its three primary programs: Gang Violence Interruption, Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), and Intervention Case Management.

Relevant evaluation findings are then presented for the intervention component. The outcome indicator findings are drawn from two sources. The first is administrative statistics compiled by the GRYD office about intervention activities. The second is local stakeholder surveys that were conducted in GRYD zones and SNL locations. Those surveyed included GRYD Program Managers, LAPD officers, Intervention CMs and CIWs. It should be noted that intervention was not an evaluation priority for the GRYD Office during Year 2 and thus only limited preliminary survey information is available for this component. However, enhanced outcome data collection for intervention programs is planned for Year 3 of the evaluation, consistent with GRYD office priorities.

Responses to common questions across the surveyed groups were aggregated and are presented as summary outcome indicators for intervention. Item specific responses for each group are presented in this report's Appendixes. Changes in Part I/II crime and gang-related crime occurring in GRYD zones and SNL locations that might be associated with intervention activities are presented in Chapter VI.

Intervention Objectives

The overarching purpose of intervention is to disrupt gang-related violence and other effects on local communities, and to guide gang-involved youth to activities and community services that provide alternatives to the gang life. To do so this component seeks to achieve the following objectives:²⁴

- Respond as quickly as possible to violent incidents in the community.
- Engage in "rumor control" in the community following such incidents.
- Reduce the retaliation that often occurs after a gang-related incident.
- Improve relationships between law enforcement, CIWs and GRYD staff.
- Improve the knowledge base and professionalism of CIWs.
- Maintain and/or increase proactive peace-making activities between gangs.

²⁴ Program goals, objectives and activities descriptions include material from the draft GRYD Office *Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gang Violence* (May 2011).

- Identify services for gang-involved youth that will help to improve family relationships, increase the ability to solve problems without violence and criminal behavior, and promote behavior changes that result in less gang-involvement/violence and more pro-social activities.

Intervention Activities

Gang Interruption

Crisis intervention is defined as responding as quickly as possible to an incident to prevent further violence. Upon respond to a violent crisis, police call the GRYD office and CIWs are notified through the Real Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) Division of LAPD using BlackBerry devices. Regardless of the time of day, those contacted must respond within 30 minutes. After sharing information, joint decisions are made regarding the appropriate course of action to diffuse tensions, reduce further potential violence, and serve victims and their families.

Additional gang interruption activities are designed to build relationships and communication paths among GRYD staff, LAPD, and communities to control rumors and reduce the likelihood of retaliation following a violent incident. This is to take place through the dissemination of accurate information throughout a community as quickly and widely as possible after an incident. Although GRYD staff, LAPD gang officers and CIWs collaborate, they each have different roles in controlling rumors and intervening in violent crisis situations. For example, GRYD staff seeks to coordinate immediate services for victims' families and coordinate with city and neighborhood organizations, LAPD is responsible for crime scene stabilization and investigation, and CIWs engage in "street mediation" to diffuse or de-escalate further violence. To facilitate effective control and response all three meet bi-weekly to assess victim family needs and to monitor hot spots and other violence indicators. Proactive peacemaking activities, neighborhood interface and engagement, and serving on GRYD Community Action Teams are part of the triad's responsibilities.

Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA)

LAVITA is part of the Advancement Project's Peace Academy. It provides training for CIWs in five core areas: direct practice, program development, applied theory, concrete tasks, and broader policy implications. The goal of this training is to professionalize CIWs and to provide them with the necessary skills to communicate effectively with other responders, gang-members, victims, their families and the community.

LAVITA was launched in March 2010 and is currently offered to CIWs contracted through the GRYD program. It is a 14-week class totaling 140 hours of training.

Intervention Case Management

Gang-involved individuals between 14 and 25 years old are targeted for GRYD intervention case management services. The role of intervention CMs is to serve as a broker for services, not to actually provide services themselves. As such, they may make referrals for

counseling, career/job training or placement, educational activities, tattoo removal, arts and cultural events and other pro-social activities.

Intervention CMs interact with clients, families, other intervention workers (both other CMs and CIWs), schools and other referral agencies or community organizations. An important function for CMs is to also coordinate with prevention providers when working with at-risk youth for whom prevention services alone are considered insufficient, and who require special attention. The GRYD office has developed interdisciplinary teams to address such situations. The underlying premise of these interdisciplinary teams is that the joint efforts of different types of specialists will be more effective than acting alone. The teams can make decisions about how to best work with youth and whether prevention services or a transition to intervention case management (or some combination of both) is most suitable.

Intervention Outcome Indicators

Crisis Response

Between July 1, 2010 and April 30, 2011 a total of 643 LAPD notifications for shootings were sent to the GRYD office. Of these, 247 (38%) were gang-related shooting incidents in GRYD zones, 210 (33%) were gang-related incidents outside of the GRYD zones and 186 (29%) were non-gang related incidents in these areas. GRYD Program Managers and CIWs responded to 321 total incidents during this time – 50% of the total number of shooting notifications. Characteristics of the 643 incidents include the following:

- There were a total of 713 victims.
- There were a total of 75 homicides within the GRYD zones.
- There were 66 homicides outside of the GRYD zones.
- Twenty-two of the incidents were both domestic violence and gang-involved.
- Twenty-four of the incidents involved Black/Brown conflict.
- Seventy-one of the incidents involved minors.

Rumor Control

GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang detectives and CIWs were asked about their perceptions of the effects of GRYD programs on dispelling rumors in the community that surrounded violent crisis incidents. The summary results are presented in Table 5.1. The vast majority of the 94 respondents to this question agreed or strongly agreed that the interactions among LAPD, GRYD and CIWs had increased information dissemination to dispel rumors (34.8% “agreed” and 53.3% “strongly agreed”). These positive perceptions were strongest among Program Managers (100%) but the other three groups held only slightly less positive views (about 86% for each).

Table 5.1 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of Information Dissemination on Dispelling Rumors

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and intervention workers has increased the dissemination of information to dispel rumors throughout the community (N=92)	3 3.3%	3 3.3%	5 5.4%	32 34.8%	49 53.3%	0

Improving Relationships between GRYD Program Participants

Intervention engages personnel from three separate groups - Law Enforcement, Community Intervention Workers and GRYD Staff. A key requirement for effective operation of the intervention program is that these groups work well together.

Table 5.2 presents the results of surveys of Program Managers, LAPD gang detectives, CMs and CIWs about how well GRYD is able to communicate with LAPD and CIWs in crisis response situations, as well as how well LAPD is able to communicate with intervention workers. Respondents mostly agreed (28.6%) or strongly agreed (58.2%) that GRYD staff was able to effectively communicate and work with LAPD in crisis response. Little variation was displayed in the positive views across the four stakeholder groups.

Respondents voiced similarly positive views about the relationship between GRYD and intervention workers: 22.6% agreed and 62.4% strongly agreed. LAPD reported less positive views, but a majority still agreed or strongly agreed (67.5%). Almost four out of five respondents agreed or strongly agreed that LAPD is able to work effectively with intervention workers. The most positive support for this came from Program Managers, followed by LAPD gang officers.

Table 5.2 – Stakeholder Perceptions of Communications between Law Enforcement, CIWs, and GRYD Staff

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
GRYD staff is able to effectively communicate and work with LAPD in response to a crisis (N=91)	4 4.4%	3 3.3%	5 5.5%	26 28.6%	53 58.2%	0

GRYD staff is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to a crisis (N=93)	5 5.4%	0	2 2.2%	21 22.6%	58 62.4%	7 7.5%
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to a crisis (N=94)	5 5.3%	5 5.3%	9 9.6%	28 29.8%	47 50.0%	0

Improve Knowledge Base and Professionalism of Community Intervention Workers

The knowledge and professionalism of CIWs was not directly measured during this year of the evaluation. However, Program Managers, LAPD, and CIWs were asked about their perceptions of the effects that the LAVITA training had on improving intervention worker's role responding to violent crisis incidents. Most respondents either agreed (22.8%) or strongly agreed (44.3%) that LAVITA has improved the CIW's role, as seen in Table 5.3. Program Managers were strongest in their agreement (90.0%) while only 54% of the gang detectives felt the training had improved intervention worker response.

Table 5.3 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of LAVITA Improving Intervention Worker's Role

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
The LAVITA Training Academy has improved intervention worker's role in responding to crisis incidents (N=70)	4 5.7%	1 1.4%	5 7.1%	16 22.8%	31 44.3%	13 18.6%

Maintain and/or Increase Proactive Peace-Making Activities

Six survey items asked GRYD stakeholders about the effects of GRYD zone and SNL activities on reducing tensions, gang retaliation, conflict reduction, and opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs. The results are presented in Table 5.4. The large majority of respondents suggested that the effect of GRYD on reducing tensions in the community was either high (33.0%) or very high (55.3%). This view was strongest among CMs and not as strong among gang detectives, although 81% of them still rated the effects as high or very high. However, the views about the effects of GRYD on reducing retaliation were not as positive:

25.0% responded “high” and 34.8% said “very high.” CMs and CIWs were more negative about program effects, while conversely all of the Program Managers and 78.4% of the police responded that the effects on retaliation were high or very high.

A slight majority (53.7%) of respondents indicated that they felt gang conflict was reduced during the 2010 SNL program. However, a large proportion of school staff (60%) stated that they did not know. The rest of the groups generally had majorities responding high or very high. The perceived effect of SNL on gang conflicts after SNL fell to 19.0% in support across stakeholder groups (15.3% “high” and 3.7% “very high”) and none of them had a majority responding that effects were high or very high.

Table 5.4 – Stakeholder Perceptions of the Effects of Proactive Peacemaking

	Very Low	Low	Moderate or About the Same	High	Very High	Don't Know
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and Community Intervention Workers has been effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident (N=94)	4 4.3%	1 1.1%	5 5.3%	31 33.0%	52 55.3%	1 1.1%
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff, and Community Intervention Workers has reduced the likelihood of retaliatory incidents (N=92)	10 10.9%	10 10.9%	16 17.4%	23 25.0%	32 34.8%	1 1.1%
Effects of 2010 SNL reducing conflict between gangs (N=365)	13 3.6%	10 2.7%	66 18.1%	110 30.1%	86 23.6%	80 21.9%
Effects of 2010 reducing conflict between gangs afterwards (n=215)	12 5.6%	26 12.1%	44 20.5%	33 15.3%	8 3.7%	92 42.8%
Effects of 2010 SNL presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs during 2010 (N=129)	6 4.6%	11 8.5%	31 24.0%	38 29.5%	26 20.2%	17 13.2%
Effects of SNL presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs afterwards (N=127)	15 11.8%	23 18.1%	39 30.7%	21 16.5%	7 5.5%	22 17.3%

Similar results were found for perceived effects of SNL on opportunities for peaceful engagement. Approximately half of all respondents suggested there were high or very high effects on opportunities for peacemaking during the 2010 SNL, and only 22% of all respondents were positive about such effects after the 2010 SNL program concluded.

Provide Case Management Services to Gang-Involved Youth

Case management functions are intended to provide gang-involved youth with links and connections to services that will help to improve Family Relationships, enhance youth ability to solve problems, and promote behavior changes that will bring about a reduction in gang-involvement/violence and an increase in pro-social activities.

At present, there is limited information on the number and type of services that gang-involved youth have received through the GRYD intervention program. More formal data gathering systems are being implemented during the coming year, and these will be integrated into the evaluation as they are.

Conclusion

At present, only limited outcome intervention evaluation findings are available. However, surveys of GRYD stakeholders including Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, service providers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders provided some evidence of positive effects of intervention GRYD programs. These included crisis response; rumor control; communications between GRYD, LAPD and CIWs; effects of intervention worker training; and effects on reducing community tensions and retaliation. The effects of 2010 SNL activities on gang conflicts and presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement were also somewhat positive, but there was not as much consensus among stakeholders. In addition, the effects of 2010 SNL effects on gang conflict and opportunities for peaceful engagement were not viewed as positively after SNL summer activities ended.

Chapter VI

Gang Violence and Crime

Introduction

The key goal of the GRYD program is to reduce gang violence and crime. It is hypothesized that primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, and law enforcement suppression will in combination contribute to less violence between and within gangs and a decline in crime, most particularly gang-related crime, in and around the GRYD zones and SNL areas in the City of Los Angeles.

This chapter first examines crime trends from January 2005 to December 2010 and assesses whether there were demonstrated reductions in gang-related and other Part I/II crime after the commencement of SNL and GRYD programs in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Comparisons are made between GRYD/SNL and other parts of Los Angeles to assess whether the changes after implementation of GRYD and SNL were different in the program areas than elsewhere in the city. Second, the chapter considers whether GRYD stakeholders perceive that changes in the levels of gang-related violence might be attributed to GRYD zone and SNL programs.

Crime Data

The findings presented in this section are derived from analyses of LAPD's city-wide crime incident records from January 2005 through December 2010. LAPD reporting districts (RDs) for the 12 GRYD zones and the 24 SNL locations were identified and used to extract crime incident data from city-wide totals, producing separate counts for GRYD and SNL. However, it should be noted that there is substantial overlap of the boundaries of the GRYD zones and SNL areas as defined by the GRYD office.

It is also important to note that the numbers of gang crimes are derived from LAPD's system of identifying gang crimes, which is a matter of experience, judgment, and practice by LAPD officers and staff. In fact, despite the best good-faith efforts (which we believe characterize the LAPD approach to this issue), there are likely to be some incidents classified as gang-related that are not, and others not classified as gang-related that are. Our view is that the identified gang crimes are more likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate, but we have no satisfactory way of estimating the extent of the underestimation.

In addition, the extent of gang crime in communities is not fully captured by the number of reported crimes. It is highly probable that a significant though unknown number of gang-related crimes are not reported to the police due to fear of retaliation, a lack of faith that the police response will produce positive results, and other reasons (these factors also inhibit the reporting of other types of crimes as well). It is also the case that criminal acts are not the only source of negative influences on community perceptions of safety and wellbeing. For example, community residents interviewed as part of the evaluation reported that they and their children were threatened and intimidated by gang members in contexts where no reportable crime occurred.

Citywide Crime Trends: January 2005 – December 2010

The total number of Part I and Part II crimes reported to LAPD from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2010, was 1,272,651. A subset of 55,802 (4.4%) were designated gang crimes by LAPD. Of the citywide totals, the 12 GRYD zones and the 24 SNL areas together had 286,427 Part I and Part II crimes with 21,826 (7.6%) being designated gang crimes. In contrast, gang crimes were only 3.4% of all Part I/II crimes in all areas of the city outside the zone and SNL area boundaries. In addition, gang crime is more prevalent in the GRYD zones and SNL areas: 39.1% of all gang crime in the entire city.


Table 6.1 – Crimes Reported to LAPD from January 2, 2005 to December 31, 2010

Geographic Area	All Part I and Part II Crimes	Gang Related Subset of Part I/II Crimes	Gang Crimes as % of All Crimes
City-Wide	1,272,651	55,802	4.4%
12 GRYD Zones and 24 SNL Areas	286,427	21,826	7.6%
Areas Outside GRYD Zones and SNL Areas	986,224	33,974	3.4%
Source: LAPD Computerized Crime Incident Records System			

Figure 6.1 plots monthly frequencies of all Part I and Part II crimes reported in Los Angeles from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2010. At the beginning of the period, approximately 20,000 crimes were reported. Over time, this number gradually declined and by the end of 2010, the monthly numbers approximated 13,000. Although Part I and Part II crimes tend to increase each year in the early summer and then decline later in the year, the six-year trend is nonetheless one of a gradual linear decline in overall crime.

This pattern is consistent with the general reduction in crime levels that virtually all US cities have experienced over this period of time. The six years covered by the data coincide with a national trend of declining crime begun in the mid-1990s after crime of all kinds peaked between 1992 and 1994.

**Figure 6.1
City of Los Angeles
Part I and Part II Crimes
January 2005 to December 2010**



Source: LAPD citywide crime incident records January 2005 – December 2010

In July 2008, the city began the SNL program at eight locations in Los Angeles to provide activities, food and programs for children, youth, and families living in neighborhoods judged to have a history of high crime and violence. Six additional locations were added in 2009 and 10 more were added in 2010.²⁵ For eight weeks each summer, beginning in July, SNL provides programming in city parks and recreational centers, four days a week from 7 p.m. to midnight. We used July 2008 as the starting point for the SNL analysis.


Most of the 12 GRYD zones began the provision of prevention services in January 2009 and this served as the zone analysis starting point for the zone analysis. Intervention services for most zones were initiated in April 2009. These implementation milestones are highlighted in the following GRYD zone analysis figures.

Although the overall trend in Part I and Part II can be interpreted as generally declining one, modest yearly seasonal trends in Part I/II crimes were nonetheless present throughout the six-year period. In addition, there was a slight downward curvilinear trend over the entire period. A more detailed presentation of the seasonality and curvilinear trend are included in Appendix I.

²⁵ Locations in Parks and Recreation Centers by years of operation are as follows: 2008 to 2010 - Cypress, Glassell, Hubert Humphrey Memorial, Jim Gilliam, Mount Carmel, Ramon Garcia, Ramona Gardens, Ross Snyder; 2009 and 2010 - Imperial Courts, Jackie Tatum Harvard, Jordan Downs, Lemon Grove, Nickerson Gardens; 2010 - Costello, Delano, Highland Park, Lake Street, Martin Luther King Jr. Therapeutic, Normandale, Sepulveda, Slauson, South Park, Valley Plaza, Van Ness.

Figure 6.2 plots Los Angeles gang-related crime, as identified by LAPD. Approximately 800 such crimes on average were documented monthly in 2005. Though there were monthly fluctuations, gang crimes were relatively stable that year. However, starting in 2006, a seasonal pattern in gang crimes became evident with increasing crimes from the beginning of the year through the early summer followed by decreases until the end of the year. This pattern is repeated at different levels in all years. The largest numbers of gang crimes were observed in May 2006 and 2007, when nearly 1,000 were observed citywide. However, after the 2007 peak, gang crime declined each year. By the end of 2010 there were approximately 450 crimes per month.


Figure 6.2
City of Los Angeles
Gang-Related Part I and Part II Crimes
January 2005 to December 2010



Source: LAPD citywide crime incident records January 2005 – December 2010

Gang crime incident maps for 2007 and 2010 are presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. The year 2007 was chosen since the overall citywide trend data showed 2007 as being the peak of the six-year series. The year 2010 is the last year of LAPD data available to date for analysis. Each dot on the maps represents a single gang-related crime incident as reported to LAPD and identified in its records management system. They do not represent the overall “hot spots” for gang crime since multiple incidents can overlay each other in these representations. Nonetheless they do show a clear representation of the spatial distributions of gang crimes in the city and changes in those location distributions changed over time. Overlaid upon each map are the boundaries, as defined by the GRYD Office, of the 12 GRYD Zones and the 24 SNL areas implemented from 2008 to 2010. The specific areas are identified in the map legends.


Figure 6.3
City of Los Angeles
Gang-Related Crime Incidents
2007 Spatial Distribution



Data acquired from LAPD Crime Incident Records

The Urban Institute, 2011

Figure 6.4
City of Los Angeles
Gang-Related Crime Incidents
2010 Spatial Distribution



Data acquired from LAPD Crime Incident Records

The Urban Institute, 2011

As noted previously, a large proportion of gang crime incident locations for the City of Los Angeles are within the boundaries of either the GRYD zones, SNL areas, or both. In addition, many additional incident locations are within a mile of each area's boundaries. A comparison of the spatial patterns of 2007 to 2010 clearly shows that the number of places where gang crime incidents are taking place has diminished substantially. This is readily apparent for a number of the individual GRYD Zones and SNL areas, but probably more easily seen for areas outside. For example, in the southernmost part of the city the concentration of incident locations declined, as did those just north of Baldwin and to the northwest areas where gang incident locations were somewhat dispersed.

How to Interpret the Crime Trend Charts

For the GRYD zone and SNL crime charts the monthly frequencies of Part I/II and gang-related crimes are plotted from January 2005 through December 2010. These monthly frequencies are highlighted in red. On each chart, the monthly frequencies of Part I/II and gang-related crimes for all other areas outside of the zones and SNL areas are similarly presented and are highlighted in blue. The left vertical axes are the number of program area crimes per month and the right vertical axes are the number of crimes per month outside both the zones and SNL areas. Both scales have been standardized so that each interval represents approximately a 10% change in crime, and trend lines are comparable.

The solid straight lines on the graphs summarize the linear trends²⁶ of the fluctuating monthly crime frequencies and can be visually compared within graph and between graphs. For instance when the slopes of the pre- and post-implementation trend lines are different the rate of decline (or increase) is different.

As noted earlier, and detailed in Appendix I, there is clear seasonality for Part I/II crime and even more so for gang-related crimes over the study period. In addition, gang crimes rose until May 2007 and then began declining well before GRYD programs began. Because of this, the crime trend figures present three linear estimates. The first is from January 2005 through May 2007, the second is from May 2007 until program implementation, and the last is for post-implementation through December 2010. This was done to compare trends from 2007 to program commencement with those that were observed after program commencement.²⁷ The choice of linear estimates was made for ease of visual interpretation and the fact that on average the changes over the selected comparison periods demonstrated near linear characteristics despite the overall curvilinear trend for the entire six-year series.

Notes on each of the graphs state percentage changes between the start and end points for each trend line as well as the average monthly changes in either Part I/II or gang-related crimes for the period. These are also directly comparable within and between graphs.

²⁶ Calculated using linear regression, which is described more in detail in Appendix I.

²⁷ Selection of trend comparison points can greatly influence the results given the large month-to-month upward and downward spikes in crime and need to be interpreted with caution. See Appendix I for additional details.

GRYD Zone Crime Trends

Figure 6.5 documents that between January 2005 and May 2007, Part I/II crime in the GRYD zones increased 1.8%, from a monthly average of approximately 2,800 to approximately 2,900. The average number of crimes increased 1.8 crimes per month. This was followed by a sharp decline from May 2007 until January 2009, when GRYD programs commenced. Over the period Part I/II crimes declined 14.9% with an average monthly decrease of 21.8 crimes. After GRYD implementation, this downward trend continued with a negative change of 21.6% and an average reduction of 23.2 crimes per month.

In all Los Angeles areas outside GRYD and SNL, Part I and Part II crimes declined from January 2005 through May 2007 by 5.6% or 29.2 crimes per month on average. This decline continued at a smaller rate from May 2007 until the beginning of GRYD programs in January 2009. During the post-implementation period the rates of decline for GRYD zones and elsewhere, represented by the slopes of the trend lines, are very similar, although the percentage change is slightly higher for non-GRYD areas.

Figure 6.5
The Twelve GRYD Zones Combined
Part I and Part II Crimes – Pre/Post GRYD
GRYD Zones and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD
January 2005 to December 2010





Figure 6.6 shows a different picture for gang-related crime. From January 2005 through May 2007 gang-related crimes in GRYD zones increased 29.9% or on average two crimes per month. In areas outside GRYD and SNL, it increased 28.9% or 2.9 crimes per month. From May 2007 until the implementation of GRYD programs in January 2009, gang crimes declined at nearly the same rates. It declined by 18.7% in the GRYD zones and declined by 20.1% in the areas outside. After implementation, gang-related crimes declined sharply in the GRYD zones, with a 32% decrease observed, or about three crimes per month. Gang crime in areas outside GRYD and SNL also declined after the implementation of GRYD. However, the 29.5% decrease was not as large as it was in the zones and the slope of decline is steeper for the zones than for

other areas in the city. Nonetheless, the similar post-2007 trends suggest that numerous factors may be influencing gang crime patterns and may have in fact begun affecting gang crimes before GRYD programs were implemented.

Figure 6.6
The Twelve GRYD Zones Combined
Gang-Related Part I and Part II Crimes – Pre/Post GRYD
GRYD Zones and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD
January 2005 to December 2010



The left vertical axis represents GRYD gang crimes and the right vertical axis represents areas outside SNL and GRYD. Both have been standardized with each interval representing approximately a 10% change in crime.

SNL Area Crime Trends

Figure 6.7 presents Part I and Part II crimes in the 24 SNL areas and areas outside the GRYD zones and SNL locations. The trends from January 2005 through May 2007 depict declining monthly levels of Part I/II crime for both SNL areas and areas outside SNL and GRYD zones. The slopes of the trend lines are very similar, as are percentage changes: down 3.1% for SNL and down 5.6% for areas elsewhere in the city. From May 2007 until July 2008 when SNL began, the trend for areas outside of SNL was similar to the earlier period with a 7.3% decline. However, for SNL areas, after a spike in the early summer of 2007 Part I/II crimes dropped more steeply than elsewhere with an 11.8% decrease. After implementation Part I/II crimes went down at nearly the same pace for the two areas: 25% in SNL and 28.7% in other parts of the city.

Figure 6.7
Summer Night Lights
Part I and Part II Crimes – Pre/Post SNL
SNL Areas and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD
January 2005 to December 2010





Figure 6.8 also shows a different picture for gang-related crime in SNL areas. From January 2005 through May 2007, gang crimes were increasing in both the SNL areas and areas outside the zones and SNL areas, although it rose less steeply inside SNL areas (+11.2% vs. 18.3%). From May 2007 until the implementation of SNL programs in July 2008, gang crimes fell, but at a higher rate for the other areas of the city than in SNL areas (19.5% vs. 13.0%). However, after SNL implementation, the decline in gang crimes went from minus 2.1 per month to minus 2.9 per month. While the monthly average number of gang crimes also decreased post-implementation in other areas of the city, the proportional decline was larger in SNL than elsewhere (37.2% vs. 33.6%). But again, given the pre-implementation declines and similar trends since 2007, it also appears that other factors may have begun affecting gang crime before and after SNL.

Figure 6.8
Summer Night Lights
Gang-Related Part I and Part II Crimes
SNL Areas and Locations Outside SNL and GRYD Zones
January 2005 to December 2010



Stakeholder Perceptions of Gang Violence Reduction

GRYD Program Managers, LAPD gang officers, prevention service providers, CMs, CIWs, school staff and community leaders were asked about their perceptions of the impact of GRYD programs, including SNL, on gang violence in GRYD zones and SNL areas. Responses to common questions across the surveyed groups were aggregated and are presented as summary outcome indicators in the following tables.

Table 6.2 presents the results of asking stakeholders about the changes in gang violence levels in 2010. The responses were positive across all the groups surveyed. Of the 278 respondents, 22.7% felt that violence was “much lower” and 42.9% said it was “lower,” compared with 4.7% who thought it was “higher” and 1.1% who said it was “much higher.” The “about the same” category accounted for 23.0% of responses and 5.8% responded that they did not know. The most favorable views were held by GRYD Program Managers (100% “much lower” or “lower”) and CMs (90.5%), while gang officers responded “much lower” or “lower” in 71.5% of the cases.

Table 6.2 – Summary of Stakeholder Perceptions of GRYD Zone Changes in the Level of Violence in 2010

	Much Lower	Slightly Lower	About the Same	Slightly Higher	Much Higher	Don't Know
The level of GRYD zone gang violence in 2010 (N=262)	63 22.7%	119 42.9%	64 23.0%	13 4.7%	3 1.1%	16 5.8%

Table 6.3 presents the views of stakeholders about the effects that GRYD programs had on decreasing the level of gang violence in 2010. About a third of the respondents said they felt that GRYD effects were “very high” (9.7%) or “high” (28.1%) and slightly over a third (37.5%) suggested that the effects were “moderate.” Less than 12% responded with “very low” or “low” while 13.1% said they did not know. Program Managers and CMs were the most positive about the effects of GRYD on reducing gang violence while 41.4% of school staff replied that they did not know.

Table 6.3 - Stakeholder Perceptions of GRYD Zone Programs Effects on Gang Violence in 2010

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Don't Know
Effects of GRYD decreasing the level of gang violence in GRYD Zones in 2010 (N=381)	11 2.9%	33 8.7%	143 37.5%	107 28.1%	37 9.7%	50 13.1%

Table 6.4 presents findings on stakeholder views of the effects of SNL on gang violence both during the program in 2010 and following its completion. Among all respondents, 15.5% indicated that they thought SNL had “very high” and 27.4% said “high” impacts on gang violence during the summer of 2010, which was about three-and-one-half times the number that indicated “much lower” or “lower” effects. Moderate effects were cited by 26.8% and about one in five responded that they did not know. Majorities of CMs, CIWs and community leaders reported high perceived effects, but only 38% of the police surveyed held similar views.

Consistent with other outcome results associated with views of what happened following SNL, stakeholder perceptions were less positive about the longer term effects of SNL on gang violence. The proportion responding either “high” or “very high” dropped to 23.8% and those saying “very low” or “low” increased to 19.3%. Almost 10% more respondents indicated “moderate” for the effects after SNL compared with during SNL. The variation across the different stakeholder groups was similar to what was observed for the effects during 2010 SNL question.

Table 6.4 - Stakeholder Perceptions of SNL Programs Effects on Gang Violence

	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Don't Know
Effects on reducing inter-gang violence during 2010 SNL (N=310)	16 5.2%	19 6.1%	83 26.8%	85 27.4%	48 15.5%	59 19.0%
Effects on reducing inter-gang violence after 2010 SNL (N=306)	25 8.2%	34 11.1%	109 35.6%	57 18.6%	16 5.2%	65 21.2%

Conclusion

When interpreting the analysis of crime trends, it is important to realize that there is some geographic overlap in the locations of the GRYD zones and SNL areas in the City of Los Angeles, as illustrated in maps presented earlier in this chapter. In addition, these areas are generally located where gang crime is most concentrated. Given the overlaps and area locations, there may be synergistic impacts on gang activities that could make the combined effects of the two programs on crime greater than if they had been operating alone.

Part I and Part II crime citywide followed a yearly seasonal pattern of rising crime through early summer followed by decrease through the end of the year. There was also a very slight downward curvilinear trend from January 2005 through December 2010. This general declining trend was consistent with the general reduction in crime levels experienced in most U.S. cities during the same period. In the GRYD zones, Part I and Part II crimes increased modestly from 2005 through 2007 and then declined. However, post-implementation trends were similar to other areas in the city outside the zones and SNL areas. Trends for SNL Part I and Part II crimes more closely mirrored the overall citywide patterns with declines throughout the six-year period. Post implementation trends were also similar for SNL areas and locations outside the zones and SNL, although the decline was slightly steeper for the outside areas.

Citywide gang-related crime patterns showed month-to-month peaks and valleys and more marked yearly seasonality. Gang crimes consistently increased each year in the spring, peaked by early summer and then declined through the end of the year. A more pronounced curvilinear trend existed over the six year period for gang crimes. Gang crime rose through the late spring/early summer of 2007 when it peaked. Thereafter, gang crime declined sharply to levels well below 2005. Gang crime in the GRYD zones mirrored trends for the city as a whole, rising from 2005 through 2007 and then dropping steeply. Post-implementation trends showed that gang crime declined at a faster pace in the zones than in areas of the city outside the zones and SNL areas. Similar gang crime patterns were observed for SNL areas. Post-implementation declines for SNL areas were also steeper than for other areas of the city outside the zones and SNL areas. Spatial representations of gang crime incidents confirm the reductions of gang crimes in the GRYD zones, SNL areas and locations outside of them both.

The analysis of crime trends suggests that the declines, particularly for gang-related crime, began before the actual implementation of GRYD programs in either the GRYD zones or SNL areas. This suggests that other factors may have been affecting gang criminal activity. However, the declining trends that started in 2007 appeared to accelerate after GRYD program implementation in both the zones and SNL areas, which also suggests an additive effect associated with GRYD program activities.

It needs to be stressed that there are numerous caveats associated with the presented analysis of the trends in crime data in Los Angeles. Readers are referred to Appendix I for more details. Moreover, no unequivocal attributions of cause and effect between GRYD programs and crime trends can be made based upon the comparisons presented.

However, the analysis of GRYD stakeholder survey findings did reveal modest support for the view that GRYD zone and SNL programs were in fact instrumental in reducing gang

violence during 2010. Views of the effects of SNL after the conclusion of the program in 2010 showed the modal response to be moderate and the other categories nearly evenly distributed across other categories.

ATTACHMENT C

Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Year 3 Final Report (April 2013)

Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Laura Pacifici



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The Urban Institute in partnership with Harder+Company has been contracted by the Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles to conduct a multi-year evaluation of the Mayor's Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). This Executive Summary describes the key findings of the third year of the evaluation.¹ We first identify the main components of the GRYD program and then describe the methodologies and data that comprise the foundation for the main report. Key findings are then presented regarding:

- Program Implementation
- Gang Violence Levels in Los Angeles
- Attitudinal and Behavioral Changes in Prevention Program Youth
- Stakeholder Perceptions

THE GANG REDUCTION AND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The Los Angeles Mayor's GRYD program was established in 2007. The mission of the GRYD Office, as defined in its *Comprehensive Strategy*,² is to reduce gang violence within the Los Angeles communities with the most need by:

- Reducing gang joining among youth at high risk for gang membership;
- Reducing gang involvement among young people who have already joined a gang;
- Providing effective proactive peace-making in gang-affected communities;
- Responding rapidly to incidents of violence when they occur; and
- Improving communication and collaboration concerning gang activities within and across government agencies, community-based organizations, and community residents.

To achieve these goals, the GRYD Office has developed, implemented, and coordinated a range of programs across five components:

- Primary prevention;
- Secondary prevention;
- Intervention case management;
- Community engagement; and
- Suppression.³

¹ For the full report see Dunworth et al. 2013. "Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Y3 Final Report," Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.

² Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD): Comprehensive Strategy," page 6.

³ The GRYD program does not engage directly in suppression, but works closely with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) when LAPD is conducting its normal suppression activities.

In 2008, the Mayor's Office commissioned needs assessments⁴ to locate the geographic areas in Los Angeles where gang presence and violence were documented to be most prevalent. Twelve primary GRYD Zones were identified, each roughly 3.5 square miles. These contain about 8 percent of the Los Angeles population but have 30 percent of the violent gang crime. Subsequently, nine Secondary Areas where gang problems were also serious, though at a lower level, were also identified.⁵

During 2008 and 2009, private sector service providers were selected through a competitive bidding process to deliver the program's service components (as listed above). In the 12 GRYD Zones, providers are responsible for providing a full range of primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention services. In Secondary Areas, more limited delivery of services has been established. To accommodate these differences in service levels, funding for the 12 GRYD Zones is at a higher level than for the Secondary Areas. The contracts have been re-competed or renewed on July 1 of each year since then. Service delivery for prevention programs began in early 2009; intervention programs commenced later that spring. Since commencement the programs have been in continuous operation.⁶

In addition to the prevention and intervention programs, the GRYD Office helps to foster community engagement. In collaboration with other agencies and organizations, the GRYD Office sponsors and organizes the Summer Night Lights (SNL) program, which addresses all five components of the GRYD program. SNL operates each summer from July 4th through Labor Day in a number of parks and recreation areas in Los Angeles. SNL began with eight locations in 2008 and has expanded since then to a total of 32. Financial support for SNL comes from private sector contributors as well as from Los Angeles' city funds. Under the SNL program, for four evenings each week of the two month period, the SNL Areas across the city host a range of services that are open to all members of the community, including free meals, recreation, and other activities. GRYD Office Program Managers and teams of gang and violence intervention specialists are present at each location during the SNL hours of operation, working to extend the reduction of inter-gang conflict and violence beyond the two months of SNL. Los Angeles Police Department officers also participate, not only to help maintain security, but also to engage in non-law enforcement group activities with attendees.

⁴ The 2008 needs assessments are available online at <http://mayor.lacity.org/index.htm>.

⁵ At the outset of the GRYD program, there were four secondary zones; five other areas were subsequently added and the general term "Secondary Areas" was adopted by the GRYD Office.

⁶ For additional details see Cespedes and Herz, 2011, op. cit.; and Dunworth et al. 2013, op. cit.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION

The goals of the evaluation are to address both program implementation and impact issues. The Year 1 evaluation report focused primarily on program implementation; building on the Year 1 report, the Year 2 report considered program impact through an empirical examination of Part I and Part II gang crime, and an analysis of the progress made by youth in the secondary prevention program.⁷

The Year 3 report assesses the impact of the GRYD program by continuing the analysis of the secondary prevention program using additional data on new program clients, and by analyzing gang violence in GRYD program areas using seven years of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) data (2005 to 2011). Gang violence data for the same period were also obtained from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. These data are used to make an inter-jurisdictional comparison between GRYD areas and Los Angeles County locations that also have serious gang problems to help assess GRYD program impact.

GRYD's primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention programs are at different stages of development with respect to data systems and documentation of activities. Generally speaking, the secondary prevention program is more extensively documented than either the primary prevention program or the intervention program. It has therefore been possible during the third year of the evaluation to conduct evidence-based quantitative analysis of secondary prevention effects, but not of the activities in primary prevention or intervention. Consequently, the sections of the report covering primary prevention (Chapter V) and intervention (Chapter VI) are mainly qualitative. However, they do contain informative survey findings regarding LAPD officers', Community Intervention Workers, and GRYD Regional Managers' perceptions of and experiences in the GRYD program.

The secondary prevention program, focusing on youth ages 10 to 15 who are at risk for gang joining but are not already gang members, had received 6,390 referrals from schools, community organizations and other sources by May 2012. Of these, 3,840 (60.1 percent) were considered sufficiently at-risk to be eligible for GRYD services on the basis of GRYD's Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET).⁸ All youth who enrolled in the program after taking the initial YSET are retested at intervals of approximately six months. We retested 2,388 of them. A sample of 1,288, drawn from that group, comprises the youth whose progress is assessed in this report. A second sample of 397 youth, drawn from the 2,550 referrals that were below GRYD's eligibility threshold based on their YSET scores, were located by service providers and also given a retest. Changes in self-reported gang risk factors and delinquent/criminal behaviors were measured at both points in time for both groups. The results and comparisons between the two groups are detailed in the secondary prevention section of Chapter V.

⁷ Both reports are available on the Urban Institute website: <http://www.urban.org/publications>. Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., Lyons, M., and Denver, M. August 2010. "Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Y1 Report." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., and Denver, M. July 2011. "Y2 Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.

⁸ The YSET, developed by researchers at the University of Southern California, measures 7 attitudinal and 2 behavioral factors. It establishes a risk threshold for each youth. Those above the threshold are deemed eligible for GRYD services; those below it are not.

The report's analysis of gang violence levels in GRYD program areas uses LAPD's incident level crime data from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011. For the purposes of comparison, Los Angeles County data were obtained from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) for the same period of time. Homicides, robberies and aggravated assaults involving gangs were designated "violent gang crimes." A total of 38,793 city-wide violent gang crime incidents were extracted from the seven years of LAPD data; 22,703 of these occurred in GRYD program areas. A total of 12,344 violent gang crime incidents of the same type were extracted from an area of Los Angeles County to the east of the city

To structure the analysis, LAPD reporting districts were used to establish three geographic groups of data within the city; one comparison group was developed using LASD reporting districts in Los Angeles County. The four groups are defined as follows:

- *Primary GRYD locations.* This group consists of the 12 GRYD Zones and the 21 SNL Areas that either overlap or share a common geographic boundary with a Zone. These are the locations where GRYD's most intensive efforts are focused. The areas in this group contain 174 LAPD reporting districts.
- *Other GRYD locations.* This group consists of the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas, the 8 SNL Areas that are associated with them, and the 3 other SNL areas that share no boundaries with either Zones or Secondary Areas. GRYD is operational in these locations, but (with respect to the 9 Secondary Areas) not at the same level as in the 12 Zones.
- *Non-GRYD locations.* All parts of the city not in Primary or Secondary locations are included in this group.
- *County Comparison locations.* These are 174 county reporting districts that are most similar to the Primary GRYD locations in terms of gang violence levels; these are used as a basis of comparison to the Primary GRYD locations.

Comparisons of Primary GRYD locations to other parts of the city were conducted using tabular analysis of annual frequencies of violence from 2005-2011.

The comparisons between the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison locations also utilized tabular analysis based on annual levels of gang violence, but introduced three complementary methodologies: segmented regression, which was used to describe the monthly trends in gang violence from 2005 to 2011; interrupted time series analysis, which was used to make projections from 2009-2011 in order to see whether actual incident levels were higher or lower than predicted on the basis of trends from earlier years; and difference-in-differences analysis, which permitted a cross-jurisdictional examination of relative changes in gang violence before and after GRYD implementation in the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison locations.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION FINDINGS

Past evaluation reports by the Urban Institute/Harder+Company have highlighted the challenges that the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development has faced in implementing its highly ambitious and complex set of programs. During its third year of operation, the program has made substantial progress in addressing those challenges.

A significant program implementation improvement by the GRYD Office in year three was the development and dissemination of a *Comprehensive Strategy*.⁹ This plan was the result of an on-going dialogue with those most affected by and knowledgeable about gang violence in the City of Los Angeles. The GRYD Office obtained input from a variety of groups and individuals: prominent gang researchers; service providers working with at-risk youth; gang intervention specialists; and many people within the GRYD program itself. The result is a well-thought-out and far-reaching strategy for achieving reductions in gang and gun violence, and gang joining by Los Angeles youth. It not only provides theoretical justifications for program structures and objectives, but also establishes the management and organizational principles and procedures that are essential for a complex program such as GRYD. Program benefits are already observable, and we expect these to continue and expand during the coming year.

One benefit has been GRYD's ability to increase the accountability of service providers and prepare the way for performance measurement. These steps have included renewed efforts toward documentation of program progress and of individual prevention and intervention provider activities. Capturing these important pieces of information, and subsequently compiling them in searchable databases, is a noteworthy accomplishment, given the problems that impeded earlier efforts to do so. A key component of this is that systematic information is being developed on GRYD's Crisis Response System and the incidents to which responses are made. This is not yet at the point where it can be considered fully operational, nor is it at a level that will support quantitative evaluation, but all indications are that these shortcomings will be rectified during the coming year.

In addition, the Summer Night Lights program has been expanded to 32 parks and recreation centers across the city. There were many thousands of attendees during the two months SNL operated in 2011 and, as is noted below in the section on stakeholder perceptions, community residents' reactions to SNL have been very positive.

GANG VIOLENCE FINDINGS

This Year 3 analysis defined gang violence as the homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults that were considered by LAPD and LASD reporting officers to have gang involvement. City and county data on these crimes, provided by LAPD and LASD, were used to map violence trends in each jurisdiction from January 2005 to December 2011. Comparisons were made between Primary GRYD locations and other parts of the City of Los Angeles, and between the Primary locations and County Comparison locations. The findings are as follows.

Gang Violence within the City of Los Angeles

- Gang violence has substantially declined throughout the city since peaks that were reached in 2006 and 2007. City-wide, the drop was from 6,720 violent incidents in 2006 to 3,987 incidents in 2011, a decline of 41 percent.

⁹ Op. cit., December 2011.

- The Primary GRYD locations have historically had levels of gang violence that are several times higher than elsewhere in the city, even with respect to other locations that are within the GRYD program. From 2005-2011, the seven year average number of incidents per LAPD reporting district in Primary GRYD locations was 90.2; in Other GRYD locations it was 35.7; in non-GRYD locations it was 15.9. When gang violence was at its highest levels, in 2006, the annual averages were 15.4, 6.5, and 2.7, respectively. When it was at its lowest, in 2011, the averages had declined to 10.1, 3.8, and 1.5, respectively. The same relative patterns across groups existed in each of the seven years.
- Though declines have occurred every year since 2006, gang violence in Primary GRYD locations has persisted to a greater extent than elsewhere in the city. After increases in violence from 2005 to 2006, the declines from 2006 through 2011 were 34 percent in the Primary locations, 42 percent in the Other GRYD locations, and 46 percent in Non-GRYD locations.
- After GRYD commenced in 2009, gang violence in Primary GRYD locations continued to decline, but at lower rates than in other areas of the city. These levels in the Primary locations dropped 22 percent (from 2,256 incidents in 2008 to 1,762 in 2011). In Other GRYD locations, the decline has been 31 percent (1,074 to 742), and in Non-GRYD locations it has been 41 percent (2,532 to 1,483).
- Within the Primary GRYD locations, during the three years of GRYD's operation (2009-2011), year-to-year gang violence has declined at successively higher rates. From 2008-2009, the drop was 3.2 percent; from 2009-2010, it was 8.7 percent; and from 2010-2011, it was 11.7 percent.
Across the three years of GRYD's operation, actual levels of gang violence in Primary GRYD locations were 494 incidents less than predicted on the basis of the trends in existence before GRYD began operation – an 8 percent difference.

Comparisons with Los Angeles County

- From 2005 to 2011, annual gang violence patterns in the County Comparison locations were similar to the patterns in the Primary GRYD locations, though at lower levels. Both jurisdictions experienced increases from 2005 to 2006 and declines in each subsequent year through 2011.
- Annual gang violence levels in Primary GRYD locations declined more than in County Comparison locations from 2006 to 2011, falling 34 percent (from 2,680 incidents to 1,762 incidents) compared to the County drop of 28 percent (from 2,005 incidents to 1,449 incidents).
- During the three years of GRYD's operation, Primary GRYD locations experienced greater declines in annual gang violence than the County Comparison locations. The GRYD locations dropped 22 percent (from 2,256 to 1,762); the County locations dropped 19 percent (from 1,779 to 1,449).

- Linear gang violence trends based on monthly frequencies declined more in Primary GRYD locations than in County Comparison locations. GRYD levels dropped 29.4 percent; County levels dropped 23.0 percent.
- Actual levels of gang violence were less than predicted levels by a modestly greater amount in Primary GRYD locations than in County Comparison locations. The GRYD locations reported 8 percent fewer incidents than predicted; the County locations reported 7.7 percent fewer incidents.
- Over the three years of GRYD'S operation, Difference-in-Differences analysis showed that, relative to the County Comparison locations, gang violence levels in Primary GRYD locations declined at a slower rate in the first year of GRYD (2009), but at faster rates in the following two years.

Interpretation of Gang Violence Findings

Violent gang-related crime throughout the City of Los Angeles has been steadily declining since the summer of 2007. This trend is consistent with declines in violent crime experienced during the same period nationwide. Downward trends were observed in both the areas where GRYD program activities were targeted and in other areas of the City that were not targeted. This suggests that violent gang crime is being affected by not just the GRYD program, but also by unidentified social or environmental factors.

In contrast to previous evaluation findings about overall gang crime in Los Angeles in the Year 2 evaluation report,¹⁰ violent gang crime declined somewhat more rapidly in areas not receiving GRYD services, when compared to the Primary GRYD locations. Since GRYD logically focused its programs in the areas of the City where violent gang-related crime is most concentrated, it is likely that gang violence is more intractable in those communities than elsewhere. In addition, because of the fact that violence levels in Primary GRYD locations are much greater than in Other GRYD locations and in Non-GRYD locations, across all seven years of data that were available, direct comparisons between the three groups are not satisfactory from an evaluation point of view.

However, when comparing the trends in violent gang crime to more similar areas in Los Angeles County, the Primary GRYD locations had modestly larger declines and the year-to-year differences have increased across the three years of the GRYD program. Several different measurement approaches supported this finding. In the aggregate, to summarize, it is our view that the preponderance of the evidence from this year's evaluation supports the conclusion that the GRYD program has had positive effects on gang violence levels in the Primary GRYD locations.

¹⁰ See Footnote 7 above for references.

ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGE IN PROGRAM YOUTH IN THE PREVENTION PROGRAM

Changes between initial assessments of at-risk levels at the time of referral, and retest assessments at six month intervals thereafter, were analyzed for a sample of 1,288 youth in the prevention program. These youth were compared to 397 others who had been deemed not-eligible at referral after scoring below the eligibility threshold on the Youth Services Evaluation Tool (YSET).

We examined the seven attitudinal scales that comprise the YSET test, comparing changes from initial YSET to the most recent retest YSET for enrolled youth, and concluded that substantial and statistically significant improvements had taken place among prevention program youth on all the scales. Improvements also took place with respect to self-reported delinquent and gang-related behaviors, though at somewhat lower levels than on the attitudinal scales. Overall, by the time of the latest retest, 55 percent of the youth would no longer have qualified for entry into the program because their at-risk levels had dropped below the cut-point established by GRYD as the threshold for service eligibility.

The comparisons to the not-eligible sample, using the same measures, indicated that, on average, the not-eligible youth had some improvements on most of the attitudinal scales, but at lower proportions than the enrolled youth, and at lower levels of improvement. The not-eligible youth were found to have had little change in gang-related behaviors.

Because of the fact that enrolled youth and not-eligible youth were not equivalent groups at the time of referral, drawing unequivocal conclusions from the descriptive comparisons between the two groups is problematic. It is probable that a low risk group will have had fewer problems at the initial testing stage, and therefore were less likely to improve their already low at-risk levels. We conducted a Regression Discontinuity analysis to obtain other estimates of the comparative change between the enrolled and not-eligible groups. The results affirmed that the enrolled youth had reduced their risk levels and gang-related behavior to a greater extent than the not-eligible youth, after controlling as much as possible for the difference in at-risk levels that the initial YSET disclosed.

The conclusion we draw from this evidence is that the GRYD Prevention program has had substantial positive effects on the at-risk levels of the youth receiving services, and thereby on the likelihood that they will join gangs. Small but also positive effects were detected in their self-reported gang-related behaviors.

STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS

Stakeholder perceptions of GRYD program effectiveness were collected from a variety of groups and individuals most familiar with GRYD programs. These included members of the GRYD Office staff, service providers (most notably Community Intervention Workers and SNL Youth Squad members), leadership, detectives and line officers from LAPD, and residents of the SNL communities served by GRYD. These perceptual data were collected through surveys, interviews and focus group meetings.

The views of the stakeholders we surveyed or spoke with were largely supportive of the conclusion that the GRYD program is achieving the goals outlined under the *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, the results of the LAPD survey were less positive than those obtained from GRYD staff, intervention workers, and members of served communities. Community members that attended SNL programs during the summer of 2011 were overwhelmingly positive about program activities and staff, reported enhanced feelings of safety during SNL programming, felt comfortable calling the police, and were positive about relationships within their communities. GRYD staff and intervention workers were also quite positive about relationships with other agencies, and felt that GRYD programs were having a positive impact on crime and violence. LAPD personnel, on the other hand, tended to feel that GRYD was not having much of an effect on crime, but did indicate positive views about GRYD and SNL program effects on the community and youth in particular, by providing alternatives to street and gang life.

Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1 OVERVIEW OF THE GRYD PROGRAM

The GRYD program was established within the Los Angeles Mayor's Office in the summer of 2007 to address the problem of gang crime and gang violence in Los Angeles in a comprehensive, collaborative, and community-wide manner. GRYD was also designed to build upon previous approaches to gang control and to integrate existing public and private sector services, rather than just implement limited and targeted programs to address gang issues. The GRYD program was gradually implemented during 2009, went through adjustments and modifications during 2010, and produced a written *Comprehensive Strategy*¹ in 2011.

Early steps taken by the program produced community based assessments that identified areas in Los Angeles where gang problems were endemic.² This led to the establishment in 2008 of 12 GRYD Zones for full prevention and intervention activities, and four other zones, designated "Non-GRYD locations" at that time, that would receive lower levels of support. Subsequently five additional areas were added and the term "Secondary Areas" was adopted for all nine in the *Comprehensive Strategy*.³

Beginning in the summer of 2008, Los Angeles began operating the Summer Nights Lights (SNL) program, an annual city-sponsored event, running from July 4 through Labor Day each year. This program operates in parks and recreational centers and offers food, games, and other activities at no cost to residents. There were eight locations in 2008. Subsequent expansions increased the number of locations to 32 by 2011.

The GRYD program has established widespread geographic coverage of the locations in the city of Los Angeles where gangs are most active. A listing of the 12 GRYD Zones, the 9 Secondary Areas, and the 32 SNL Areas is as follows:

¹ Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "Comprehensive Strategy," The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD). The Strategy contains a full account of the background and formulation of the GRYD program, as well as details on all aspects of the program.

² Community Needs Assessment Reports, along with maps of the GRYD program areas, can be found at: <http://www.ci.la.ca.us/Mayor/villaraigosaplan/PublicSafety/GangReductionStrategy/index.htm>

³ The 12 Zones are each allocated \$1,000,000 annually for prevention and \$500,000 for intervention. However, in FY 2011-2012, as part of a larger effort to save money across the City, the GRYD Office cut budgets by 10 percent for some prevention service providers. The funding levels for intervention contractors remained the same during the 2011-2012 year.

The 12 GRYD Zones

77th (II), Baldwin Village/Southwest, Boyle Heights/Hollenbeck, Cypress Park/Northeast, Florence-Graham/77th, Newton, Pacoima/Foothill, Panorama City/Mission, Ramona Gardens/Hollenbeck, Rampart, Southwest (II), Watts/Southeast.

The 9 Secondary Areas

Belmont (Rampart), Canoga Park, Highland Park, San Pedro, Sun Valley (San Fernando Valley), Venice/Mar Vista, Watts, Wilmington, Wilshire.

The 32 SNL Areas

Algin Sutton Recreation Center, Costello Recreation Center, Cypress Park Recreation Center, Delano Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center, Glassell Park Recreation Center, Green Meadows Recreation Center, Highland Park Recreation Center, Hubert Humphrey Park, Imperial Courts Housing Development, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Jim Gilliam Park, Jordan Downs Housing Development, Lafayette Recreation Center, Lanark Recreation Center, Lemon Grove Park, Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center, Montecito Heights Recreation Center, Mount Carmel Park, Nickerson Gardens Housing Development, Normandale Recreation Center, Ramon South Park Recreation Center on Garcia Park, Ramona Gardens Housing Development, Ross Snyder Park, Sepulveda Park, Slauson Recreation Center, South Park Recreation Center, Sun Valley Recreation Center, Toberman Recreation Center, Valley Plaza Recreation Center, Van Ness Recreation Center, Wilmington Recreation Center.

Annual competitive solicitations begun in 2008 have resulted in awards to gang prevention and gang intervention service providers in the 12 zones and in other Secondary Areas. Staff from these providers also work in the SNL Areas during the two SNL months each year. Prevention services focus on youth considered at-risk for gang joining. Intervention services focus on youth already in gangs and on the communities in which gang activity takes place.

Evaluation services were also competitively solicited in 2008. The Urban Institute began evaluation of the GRYD program in the spring of 2009.⁴ This document reports on the third year of that evaluation. Two prior annual interim reports have been produced. The first (August 2010) was a qualitative examination of the program's implementation process. The second (August 2011) contained preliminary descriptive empirical analyses of the GRYD prevention program and of general gang crime trends in GRYD Zones and Summer Night Lights Areas.⁵ The current report extends the earlier work on the prevention component of the GRYD program, focusing on changes in the attitudes and behavior of youth who received services, and uses new evidence to assess GRYD's impact on gang violence.

GRYD is a comprehensive and evolving program that has many components. Activities of the GRYD program include the following:

⁴ The evaluation was initially limited to the 12 Zones. Subsequently, SNL Areas were added. No evaluation of the Non-GRYD Areas has been conducted.

⁵ Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., Lyons, M., and Denver, M. August 2010. "Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Y1 Report." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., and Denver, M. July 2011. "Y2 Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Evaluation reports are available through the Urban Institute website: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412409.html>.

- A prevention program that seeks referrals from individuals/families/schools/agencies in GRYD Zones that have identified youth considered at-risk for gang joining and engaging in delinquent/criminal behavior, with family and youth counseling and support services being provided to youth considered to be at high risk levels.
- An intervention program that targets youth who are already engaged in gang activity and seeks to identify challenges the youth faces and provide alternatives that will encourage youth to leave the gang life.
- A crisis response system involving Los Angeles Police Department officers (LAPD), Community Intervention Workers (CIWs), and GRYD Regional Managers (RMs), all of whom respond to street level incidents, such as homicides and shootings, that are considered to be threatening to community well-being.
- The Summer Night Lights (SNL) program, which became operational in eight recreational locations (hereafter, SNL Areas) in July-August of 2008, expanded each year since then, and operated in 32 Areas during July-August of 2011.
- The Gun Buy-Back program, which has taken place on Mother's Day in each of the last four years and has provided Los Angeles residents with the opportunity to anonymously turn in firearms to the police.
- Community Action Teams, which commenced in 2011 and were intended to create and support community-based working groups that organize programming to target the unique needs of GRYD Zone communities.
- The Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy, which began in 2010 and offers intervention training and certification to intervention service providers.
- The Community Education Campaign, which engaged GRYD staff in presentations and discussions at numerous communities and schools in Los Angeles with the hope of generating support for, and referrals to, the GRYD prevention program. and
- The coordination of post-suppression services to community members, and additional community-based activities involving law enforcement and other agencies.

I.2 GRYD'S COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

To document and formalize this increasingly complex program, the GRYD Office has developed a *Comprehensive Strategy*,⁶ which explains the key underlying assumptions behind its multi-faceted model, provides a conceptual framework to guide practice, specifies program-wide goals and objectives, and identifies the location and role of each of its activities within the program's strategy. The plan is also designed to broadly link the various components in a comprehensive manner.

The Strategy has five main elements:

- **Primary Prevention**
Community-oriented activities designed to build resistance to gang activities. The Gun

⁶ Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development Comprehensive Strategy." Los Angeles, CA: GRYD Office.

Buy-Back program and the Community Education Campaign are examples of activities within this component. Primary prevention activities are intended to engage the entire community.

- **Secondary Prevention**

Youth and family-oriented services intended to inhibit gang-joining by at-risk youth 10-15 years of age who are not currently gang members. Services are provided by GRYD-funded provider agencies in each zone.

- **Intervention**

The Intervention component has two focal points: family case management, and crisis response and proactive peace-making in the community.

- Family case management activities by intervention specialists focus on youth 14-25 years of age who are already in gangs, and emphasize individual client assistance through the provision of service referrals, such as mentoring or counseling. Intervention agencies place particular emphasis on reentry services.
- Crisis response and proactive peacemaking activities provide for an immediate response by Community Intervention Workers to gang-related violent incidents, and focus on maintaining peace both before and after such incidents occur.

- **Community Engagement**

GRYD seeks to engage communities and law enforcement in a community policing capacity; to support this goal, community engagement is an objective of all GRYD activities.

- **Suppression**

The GRYD Office does not engage directly in suppression activities conducted by police or collaborate with police in suppression, but instead seeks to sustain regular communication with law enforcement agencies and coordinate prevention and intervention activities with police actions.

Together, these five main components are intended to address the mission of the GRYD Office to reduce gang violence in GRYD Zones and SNL Areas where gang violence is endemic by:

- Reducing gang joining among youth at high risk for gang membership;
- Helping young people who have already joined a gang to desist from gang activity;
- Providing effective, proactive peace-making and responses to incidents of violence when they occur; and
- Improving communication and collaboration within and across government agencies, community-based organizations, and community residents.

As stated in the *Comprehensive Strategy*, the GRYD Office utilizes a theory of change to guide the program's objectives and implementation, incorporating elements of prior gang literature and research, and principles drawn from family systems theory.⁷ Prior gang research and literature provide the basis for understanding the conditions that lead to gang involvement, while the conceptual

⁷ The GRYD Office's theory of change utilizes family systems theory principles presented in the work of James Alexander, Ph.D., Functional Family Therapy Founder; Elaine Bobrow, M.S, MRI's Strategic Family Therapy Training Center; John Rolland, M.D.; and Froma Walsh, Ph.D., Chicago Center for Family Health. For further reading on this theory, see Bowen, M. (1993). *Family Therapy in Clinical Practice*. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc.

framework that guides the GRYD Office's response to the identified risk factors is largely shaped by family systems theory and practice.

GRYD shares the family systems theory perspective that social context is the starting point for making change. Therefore, GRYD activities seek to target both micro and macro level systems. At the micro level, program activities are focused on changing behaviors at the individual, family, and peer levels by focusing on community strengths, the family structure or living context, youths' internal decision-making processes, peer level interactions, and the absence of pro-social alternatives to gang involvement. At the macro level, program activities are intended to alter community norms that tolerate violence through the development of community-level support systems. In support of these program objectives, the *Comprehensive Strategy* establishes six guiding principles to shape practices aimed at changing both system levels:

- All families, all individuals, and all communities have the inherent capacity to transform themselves and change the narratives of their lives.
- The concept of family in the GRYD Strategy is defined through the broad lens of multi-generations, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, great grandparents, and so on.
- When biological family members are not present in a youth's life, the concept of family extends to caretakers, adults, and any other networks viewed by the youth as significant to his/her life.
- It is equally as important to identify and affirm the strengths of a youth and his/her family as it is to identify his/her deficits.
- It is equally as important to identify and affirm the strengths of a particular neighborhood as it is to identify the places that are vulnerable to counterproductive behavior.
- It is preferable to view a youth's functional and/or dysfunctional range of individual behaviors in the context of his or her living situation, which includes his/her family, peer, and community environment.

In addition, the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* draws on six family systems theory concepts to provide a framework for the program's five major strategy components: primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, community engagement, and suppression. Each is discussed briefly below in relation to relevant GRYD strategy approaches:

- **The Family Life Cycle**
The family life cycle theory suggests that critical periods exist across life cycles, and each life stage introduces age and gender-specific risks and needs for different interventions. The family health cycle model provides that family health as a whole shapes the well-being of individual family members, while the family structure is also impacted by external conditions and community-level inputs. The theory helps to identify the types of intervention that will most likely be effective at different life stages, and provides a guide for the most beneficial uses of scarce resources. In particular, connections can be made between the family life cycle model and GRYD's primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention activities.
- **Self-Differentiation**
According to the *Comprehensive Strategy*, the theory of self-differentiation predicts that individuals with low levels of self-differentiation are more likely to lose their sense of self in response to the pressures and norms of a group. The theory suggests that one-to-one multi-

generational relationships will support an individual's development of increased self-differentiation, which in turn informs the GRYD program's work in both prevention and intervention services.

- **The GRYD Vertical Strategy: Multigenerational Coaching**
The vertical strategy emphasizes long-term family resiliency, family engagement, and individual development of each GRYD client through multigenerational coaching and the cultivation of family history knowledge across generations. Multigenerational coaching is a strategic approach to heightening youth self-differentiation by which individuals or families are provided instruction to develop positive, one-on-one relationships across family generations (through activities such as letter writing and family visits). Both prevention and intervention program activities incorporate the multigenerational coaching approach. The vertical strategy also informs practice for community-level activities.
- **The GRYD Horizontal Strategy: The Problem-Solving Approach**
The horizontal level strategy emphasizes the relationship between family members/caretakers who reside together in one household, and aims to reinforce parental/caretaker authority, identify problems, and design problem-solving interventions specific to clients' social contexts. The goal of the horizontal strategy is to help individual youth and households develop problem-solving skill sets. The horizontal strategy intersects directly with the vertical strategy, and likewise defines practice for prevention, intervention, and community-level activities.
- **The Relationship-Based Community Intervention Approach**
GRYD's intervention practice adopts a multi-systemic approach that assumes behaviors associated with gang involvement are embedded and encouraged by structures at all different levels, such as beliefs and rituals, family dynamics, and neighborhood-community legacies. GRYD's intervention practice thus seeks to focus on the individual gang member, the peer group/gang, the family, and the community in which the gang or gang member claims membership. The relationship-based community approach requires that intervention workers engage and influence the many structures that shape gang involvement, and provides a guiding framework for GRYD's case management and violence interruption intervention activities.
- **Relational Triangles**
Family systems theory provides that relational triangles are the building blocks of the family emotional system, and can serve as both a source of dysfunction and a source of stability. When the interaction between the three entities within the triangle affirms the roles and boundaries of each, the relational triangle serves as a source of stability and collective competence. In the context of the GRYD program, the three entities are the community intervention workers, law enforcement personnel, and GRYD staff members. According to the *Comprehensive Strategy*, relational triangles are instrumental to GRYD's crisis response model, and all three entities are expected to work together towards the GRYD Office's broader objective to reduce gang involvement and violence. The relational triangle model directly informs the program's crisis intervention, community engagement, and suppression activities.

I.3 DATA AND METHODS IN Y3 EVALUATION

A variety of qualitative and quantitative data were collected over the course of the third year of the evaluation. These can be categorized as: individual-level participant data, GRYD stakeholder and GRYD staff perceptions; program assessments by Los Angeles Police Department officers who work in GRYD Zones and Summer Night Lights Areas; macro level crime incident data from the Los Angeles Police Department; comparable data from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; and program data for specific GRYD components. In addition, where relevant, GRYD Office internal assessment reports were used and cited in this report.

The individual-level data consists of outcomes from the initial youth assessment through the Youth Services Eligibility Tool, which is administered at the time of referral to the program, and a retest of the youth conducted not sooner than six months later. As Chapter V details, the analysis considers both youth enrolled in GRYD prevention programs and those that were deemed not-eligible for enrollment. The report documents the extent to which youth receiving services under the program changed the attitudes and behavior that place them at risk for gang joining and criminal/delinquent behavior.

Crime incident data were obtained from the Los Angeles Police Department's crime incident records management system. The city-wide incident data span January 2005 through December 2011. County-level incident data for the same period were also provided by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. These data constitute the foundation for an examination of violent gang crime in primary GRYD Locations, and Los Angeles County. Analyses of gang-related violence across the seven years of available data are made, and estimates of the effects of the GRYD program on gang violence are reported.

Views about GRYD and its effectiveness have been collected through surveys of LAPD officers, Community Intervention Workers, and GRYD Office Regional Managers. Results of the surveys are documented.

The report also presents qualitative assessments of community-level GRYD activities that are complementary to the components of the program, and that directly focus on prevention of gang joining and control of gang violence. These include the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy, the Community Education Campaign, and the Gun Buy-Back program.

I.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

In subsequent chapters, the report is organized as follows:

Chapter II Measuring Gang Violence in Los Angeles

An overview is presented of the research questions that the evaluation is considering as it assesses the gang violence situation in Los Angeles. The chapter then discusses the ways in which an assessment of the GRYD program's impact on gang violence can be conducted. The strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches are reviewed, and the decisions made by the evaluation team are documented.

Chapter III Gang Violence Before and After GRYD

This chapter focuses on gang violence in GRYD's Primary Locations (12 GRYD Zones and associated SNL Areas). Seven year trends are examined and compared to trends over the same period of time in Los Angeles County locations that are comparable to the GRYD Zones. Predictions are made of the levels of gang-related violent crime that could have been expected had trends in existence prior to the inception of GRYD simply continued. These are compared to the actual levels that occurred from program inception in 2009 to the end of 2011.

Chapter IV The Summer Night Lights Program

In this chapter, an overview of the SNL program is provided, followed by a summary of survey data collected after the summer of 2011. Three topics of interest are reviewed – assessments of the communities where the SNL recreation centers are located, community residents' experiences at SNL, and perceptions of communication and effectiveness of the SNL program staff

Chapter V Prevention

This chapter contains assessments of primary and secondary prevention. The first part of the chapter covers the Gun Buy-Back program and the Community Education Campaign. Participant perceptions of both are discussed. The second part of the chapter includes an overview of the prevention service referral process, documentation of the GRYD program's procedures for determining which at-risk youth will receive services, an assessment of the effects of the services on the attitudes and behaviors of a subset of youth enrolled in the program, and a comparison of those effects to similar measures from a sample of youth not involved in the program.

Chapter VI Intervention

This chapter describes the intervention activities of the program. Limited empirical data about the activities and their effects is available at the present time, so it is not possible to directly assess the impact of GRYD's intervention efforts on gang violence. The Crisis Response System – what is designated by GRYD as the Triangle Partnership (comprised of the Los Angeles Police Department, Community Intervention Workers, and GRYD Regional Managers) – is reviewed. The results of two surveys are reported: one summarizes the views of the Triangle partners on a selected number of crisis incidents; the other captures more general views of the GRYD program provided by a sample of LAPD officers working in GRYD Zones and SNL Areas. Findings from focus groups with

participants in the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy are presented, and GRYD's Family Case Management system is summarized.

Chapter VII Conclusions

A summary of the evaluation's findings is presented in this chapter.

Executive Summary An Executive Summary is available in a separate document.⁸

⁸ Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., Lowry, S., Kim, K., Kotonias, C., and Pacifici, L. "Executive Summary: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. It is anticipated that the Executive Summary, and this report, will be available on the Urban Institute website in April, 2013.

CHAPTER II

MEASURING GANG VIOLENCE IN LOS ANGELES

II.1 INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of the GRYD program, as defined in the *GRYD Comprehensive Strategy*,⁹ is to reduce gang violence in Los Angeles communities with the most prevalent gang problems. It is hypothesized that primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, community engagement, and law enforcement suppression¹⁰ will in combination contribute to reducing violence between gangs and produce a decline in violent crime – most particularly gang-related violent crime.

To maximize the potential for achieving this goal, the GRYD program operated in 12 GRYD Zones, 9 Secondary Areas, and 32 Summer Night Lights (SNL) Areas in 2011. In addition, the program's Crisis Incident Response system operated city-wide. The 12 Zones were identified in 2008 as containing the most serious levels of gang activities in Los Angeles. At the same time, four "Non-GRYD Zones" were also identified, but they focused on areas with less severe gang crime levels and were provided with substantially less funding than the other GRYD targeted communities. There was a subsequent expansion of these other areas to nine locations, renamed "Secondary Areas" by the GRYD Office. The 32 SNL Areas consist of locations in and around parks/recreation centers where gang activity is also considered serious. These were added to the GRYD program in annual increments beginning in 2008.

In the next two chapters, we assess whether there is empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the GRYD program has had the intended effect on violent gang-related crime.

II.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS

This chapter focuses on the data sources the evaluation uses and the methodological challenges it faces. Chapter III considers trends in the levels of gang violence from 2005 to 2011. In both chapters, we look at the specific levels of violence in the city of Los Angeles, and compare those levels to Los Angeles County. We address the following basic questions:

Chapter II Measuring Gang Violence in Los Angeles

- 1) What data sources were used to analyze potential changes in gang-related violence in Los Angeles city and Los Angeles County?
- 2) What methodological approach should be utilized to assess the potential effects of GRYD program activities on Los Angeles gang violence?

⁹ Op. cit.

¹⁰ The GRYD program does not directly engage in law enforcement or suppression, but does coordinate and work with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) through, for example, the crisis response partnership between GRYD Regional Managers, GRYD's Community Intervention Workers, and LAPD officers and SNL participation.

Chapter III Gang Violence Before and After GRYD

- 3) From 2005 to 2011, how much gang violence has there been in Los Angeles?
- 4) How much of the violence has occurred in the locations where GRYD (a) is operating, and (b) is not operating?
- 5) What are the trends in gang-related violent crime in GRYD locations and how do they compare to the trends in similar high violent gang crime locations in Los Angeles County?
- 6) Since the GRYD program commenced, how do actual levels of gang violence in GRYD locations and in Los Angeles County compare to levels predicted on the basis of trends prior to GRYD's inception?
- 7) What comparisons can be made between predicted/actual levels of gang violence in GRYD locations and similar predicted/actual levels in Los Angeles County?
- 8) What conclusions about GRYD's impact on GRYD Zone violence can be drawn?

II.3 DATA SOURCES

The violent gang crime analyses are based on city and county incident records on crime obtained from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)¹¹ and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD).¹² Both agencies provided copies of their incident specific databases for reported crimes from January 2005 through December 2011. All incidents were flagged as gang related or not by each department.¹³ Homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults (including assaults with a deadly weapon) were designated as the violent crime types that are used in this report, and these were extracted from both data sets. The crime records were geo-coded using LAPD's and LASD's reporting district classifications (RDs, hereafter).¹⁴ For Los Angeles city, this permits the allocation of incidents to specific GRYD program areas.

¹¹ We are grateful for the support and cooperation of LAPD and particularly of Nathan Ong, of the LAPD Compstat unit, who was diligent and effective at pulling the necessary data together for us.

¹² We are grateful for the cooperation of Wendy Harn, Assistant Director of the Crime Analysis Program at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, who went out of her way to provide the evaluation team with LASD data from 2005-2011, with gang flags attached.

¹³ It is important to note that gang flags are derived from independent systems of identifying gang crimes used by LAPD and LASD. These determinations rely on experience, judgment and practice by LAPD and LASD officers and staff. However, there are likely to be some incidents classified as gang-related that are not; and others not classified as gang-related that are. In addition, the extent of violent crime and violent gang-related crime in communities is not fully captured by the number of reported crime incidents. It is highly probable that a significant though unknown number of violent crimes are not reported to the police due to fear of retaliation, a lack of faith that the police response will produce positive results, and other reasons. Our view is that, as a consequence of these factors, the gang crimes identified by each department are more likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate of criminal gang activity, but we have no satisfactory way of estimating the extent of the underestimation.

¹⁴ The city and the county both use RDs to designate the geographic location of every reported incident. Each RD encompasses a relatively small area and is assigned a unique number. The size of RD areas varies somewhat in both departments, being dependent upon street boundaries and other delineating factors that the departments consider significant (e.g. population density – the more dense the population, the smaller the RD). Both departments assign an RD number to all incidents that are entered into their computerized records systems.

To illustrate the geographic distribution of gang violence in Los Angeles, Figure II.1 presents a map of the Los Angeles city boundaries, showing the locations of the 12 GRYD Zones, the 9 Secondary GRYD Areas and 32 SNL Areas. GRYD Zones have red boundaries; SNL Areas have blue boundaries; and the Secondary Areas are solid green. To enhance readability of the map, the names of each of the 53 GRYD locations have not been included¹⁵. The 2011 violent gang-related incidents are superimposed at the geographic locations where they occurred.¹⁶ Gang violence is represented as points on the map with the result that multiple violent incidents in the same or nearby locations are shown as a single point. This was needed to preserve clarity, but it conceals the density of gang violence in the GRYD Zones, as compared to the Secondary Areas. Data on the numbers of incidents in each of the three groups shown on the map are presented below in Chapter III, Table III.1.


The map clearly indicates the following: first, that gang violence is concentrated in specific areas of the city; and second, that the GRYD Zones and most of the SNL Areas are located in the neighborhoods and communities where gang violence is most serious. In 2011, 1,762 violent gang-related incidents were reported from the 12 GRYD Zones and the 32 SNL Areas and 742 were reported from the 9 Other GRYD Areas.¹⁷ Another 1,483 incidents occurred in other areas of the city. However, though these 1,483 incidents are beyond GRYD program boundaries, many of them are quite close to those boundaries, especially in the SE quadrant of the city. This creates the obvious possibility, and in fact likelihood in our view, that GRYD program efforts in designated target areas spill over into adjacent areas. This creates challenges (discussed in the next section) with respect to developing valid comparisons to GRYD program areas.

¹⁵ See above in Chapter I, section I.1 for the names of the 12 GRYD Zones, the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas, and the 32 SNL Areas.

¹⁶ Though the incidents included are from a single year (to avoid rendering the map too densely populated to be intelligible), the geographic distributions from other years were similar.


¹⁷ See Table III.1 in Chapter III for frequencies of gang violence incidents.

Figure II.1 Geographic Distribution of 2011 Gang Crime in Los Angeles



The area of Los Angeles County that was examined for selection of comparison areas to the city is mapped in Figure II.2. Within this area there are high gang crime areas that are comparable in severity to those in the city of Los Angeles, and in addition the fact that the eastern section of the city and the western section of the county have similar demographic characteristics makes this part of Los Angeles County a plausible comparison area. Details on the levels of gang violence in the area and the county RDs selected for comparison are presented in Chapter III.

Figure II.2 Comparison Area in the County of Los Angeles



II.4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

It is perhaps tempting to think that assessments of program effectiveness can be made by comparing pre-program measures with post-program measures, accompanied by the conclusion that the program was effective if the latter differ from the former in the desired direction by some arbitrarily specified amount – for example, by 5 percent, 10 percent, or some similar number. In fact, programs often use changes of this type as criteria for determining whether a program was successful in bringing about hoped-for outcomes.

While this approach has value for examining short-term differences in gang violence, problems arise if such measures are used alone. The most obvious is that long- or short-term trends may exist that are moving gang violence levels up or down regardless of program activities. When the trends are downward, there is a risk that the continuing decline may be interpreted as an indicator of program

success when, in fact, the program may not have a causal influence on the decline. When trends are upward, the opposite risk exists – that an erroneous conclusion of failure may be made.

This problem has to be addressed by comparing change in the program's target areas to change in locations where the program is not operating. The target areas and the comparison areas need to be as similar as possible with respect to the levels of gang violence. This objective is best realized through the use of a randomized control trial (RCT) evaluation design, in which equivalent program and comparison groups would be randomly selected before the program began operations. In the GRYD context, for instance, 24 communities with more or less equal levels of gang crime problems might have been identified. A random selection from among these communities could have established 12 GRYD Zones. The other 12 would have been controls. Data from before and after GRYD commenced could have been gathered from both groups and the comparison between the two data sets would have been the basis for assessment of the GRYD program's impact.

However, such a design is rarely possible for real-world programs, usually because it is ethically and politically problematic, and also because the way program focus is determined makes the establishment of suitable controls infeasible. This is the situation with respect to the GRYD program. The GRYD Zones and SNL program areas were identified on the basis of greatest need and highest severity of gang problems. This is obviously a completely sensible and appropriate approach, but it prevents a randomized design for evaluation. Thus, in the absence of an RCT design, we must rely on less rigorous descriptive and quasi-experimental approaches to evaluate the GRYD program's potential impact.

The approach we took to this problem in the second year evaluation report¹⁸ was to compare the 12 GRYD Zones and the 32 SNL Areas to the remainder of the city – those places where GRYD was not operating at all, or was operating at a lower level. Data on all gang-related crime were developed for these three groups, and differences in the magnitude and trends of those measures were presented and analyzed. The analysis showed that gang crime in Los Angeles, like all crime, had steadily risen from 2005 to the middle of 2007 and had then declined through 2011. However, in the locations where GRYD was concentrating its primary effort (the 12 Zones and the 32 SNL Areas), gang crime had declined at a modestly faster rate than elsewhere. This offered support for the view that the GRYD program was having a positive effect on gang crime, albeit small, but, as was pointed out in the report, it was not possible to be conclusive about this effect. That was primarily because the GRYD program was focusing the majority of its resources and activities on the worst gang crime areas in the city, with the result that the rest of the city was, by definition, not sufficiently comparable to the GRYD program areas with respect to the number and types of gang crimes.

To mitigate that issue in this report's focus on violent gang crime we have revised the approach to the comparison areas in two ways: we have redefined the geographic groupings of Los Angeles locations within which the frequencies of violent gang crime will be aggregated (see below for

¹⁸ Dunworth et al., 2011, op. cit.

specifications), and we have obtained data from Los Angeles County so that gang activity in a separate though similar jurisdiction can be introduced as a supplementary comparison area.

The groupings we use are identified below. They are intended to permit an assessment of the Primary locations where gang violence is highest and GRYD's maximum effort is being expended (all 12 GRYD ones plus 21 of the 32 SNL Areas), while also permitting a comparison of those locations with Secondary Locations (9 Secondary Areas the remaining 11 SNL Areas), and Non-GRYD locations. Because the Secondary and Non-GRYD locations do not constitute satisfactory controls in the experimental sense (because they are not, strictly speaking, sufficiently similar to the Primary Locations in gang crime levels), we also introduce a fourth category consisting of locations in Los Angeles County that have significant levels of gang activity.¹⁹ This group is made up of the 174 Los Angeles County Sherriff's Department reporting districts (RDs), with the highest number of violent gang crimes from 2005 to 2011, chosen from the southeastern portion of the County adjoining the city of Los Angeles. These 174 were selected to match as closely as possible the 174 RDs for the Primary GRYD locations.

The three geographic categories for the City and the Comparison locations for the County are defined as follows:

1) **Primary GRYD Locations**

These are the areas where GRYD is operating at the most intense level and has the greatest investment of effort and funding. They consist of the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 SNL Areas associated with them. We consider an SNL area to be associated with a Zone if it has a common border with a Zone or partially overlaps the area of a Zone. The GRYD Office considers that the 12 zones and these 21 associated SNL Areas are more or less integrated entities with respect to the implementation of the GRYD program.²⁰

2) **Other GRYD Locations²¹**

These are the 9 Other GRYD Areas and the 8 SNL Areas associated with them. We also include the 3 remaining SNL Areas in this category, even though they are not associated with any GRYD Zone.²²

¹⁹ These data are new to the annual GRYD program evaluation. County gang crime data were not available when the second year report was written.

²⁰ The 21 SNL Areas in the Primary Locations group are: Algin Sutton Recreation Center, Costello Recreation Center, Cypress Park Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center, Glassell Park Recreation Center, Green Meadows Recreation Center, Hubert Humphrey Park, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Jim Gilliam Park, Lafayette Recreation Center, Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center, Montecito Heights Recreation Center, Mount Carmel Park, Nickerson Gardens Housing Development, Ramon South Park Recreation Center on Garcia Park, Ramona Gardens Housing Development, Ross Snyder Park, Sepulveda Park, Slauson Recreation Center, South Park Recreation Center, Van Ness Recreation Center.

²¹ The term Secondary Location has a different meaning in this report than the term Secondary Area in the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy. The former is a term of art we utilize in this report. The latter is used by the GRYD program to identify lower priority locations that do not have funding or staffing at the same level as the 12 main GRYD Zones. The two terms do not have the same meaning.

²² The Secondary SNL Areas are: Delano Recreation Center, Highland Park Recreation Center, Imperial Courts Housing Development, Jordan Downs Housing Development, Lanark Recreation Center, Lemon Grove Park,

- 3) **Non-GRYD Locations**
These locations are not associated with the Primary or Other GRYD locations and consist of the remainder of the city.
- 4) **County Comparison Locations**
These locations are most similar to the Primary GRYD locations in terms of gang violence levels and are used as a basis of comparison to the Primary GRYD locations.

To further help compensate for the methodological constraints associated with evaluating a field-based program not amenable to experimentation, we also adopt a multi-faceted analytic approach, using tables, flow charts, segmented regressions, interrupted time series analyses, and difference-in-differences analyses.

The tabular approaches provide descriptive summaries of the annual frequencies of violent gang crimes for the four groups. Because of their basic descriptive nature, only limited outcome conclusions may be drawn from them.

The next approach, regression-based analysis of crime trends, calculates straight line estimates of the extent to which these measures increased or decreased on average before and after the implementation of GRYD programs. The trends for the Primary GRYD Locations are compared to trends for the Los Angeles County locations. In addition, a segmented approach was incorporated in order to describe 2005 to mid-2007 trends when gang crime peaked, 2007 to 2009 trends until programs began, and then post-implementation trends from 2009 through 2011. While this approach is relatively straightforward, and provides a simple comparison between the Primary GRYD Locations and the County locations, it is still largely descriptive and is not a fully satisfactory basis for making definitive conclusions about program impact.²³

An interrupted time series (ITS) analysis is a design typically used when researchers have available time series (of sufficient length) on an outcome of interest (e.g., monthly series of violent crime incidents) covering a period before and after a program's implementation. Given that we have incident data for both the Primary GRYD Locations and the County Locations from 2005 through 2011, an interrupted time series design is a viable option. The Auto Regressive Interactive Moving Average (ARIMA) model, a feature of ITS, allows for modeling how crimes were evolving prior to GRYD implementation and for projecting estimates of expected levels of violent gang crime had the pre-program trends continued. A comparison between these estimates and the actual levels for both the

Normandale Recreation Center, Sun Valley Recreation Center, Toberman Recreation Center, Valley Plaza Recreation Center, Wilmington Recreation Center.

²³ Perrin, N. October 2009. "Analysis of Interrupted Time Series with Segmented Regression." Center for Health Research.

City and the County provides evidence of the possible effects of the GRYD program. ITS is particularly useful in identifying short-term (temporary) versus longer-term (permanent) effects of the program.²⁴

The last component design — the Difference-in-Difference analysis (DID in shorthand, hereafter)²⁵— focuses on both the pre- and post-implementation periods for the Primary GRYD Locations and the County Locations. In its simplest form, the DID design is based on the assumption that if GRYD decreased crime in the Primary GRYD Locations (between the pre- and post-2009 periods), it should have done so by a magnitude larger than any decrease in crime observed in the 174 County RDs (between the pre- and post-2009 periods). In other words, the effectiveness of GRYD can be inferred to be the difference between the 174 GRYD RDs and the 174 County RDs in the period before GRYD commenced compared to the difference between the GRYD RDs and the County RDs in the same amount of time after GRYD commenced. The comparison can be extended for as much time as desired before and after program commencement. This is the source of the name — Difference-in-Differences.

Although the DID design seems to mitigate some of the drawbacks of the segmented regression and ITS designs by incorporating comparisons between an equal number of more or less equivalent locations, it has some drawbacks as well. Most important is that it focuses only on the levels of crime in limited time periods — one year before and after implementation, two years before and after, and so on. But, if the series under question are trending (decreasing or increasing over time for reasons that may have nothing to do with the GRYD program), the traditional DID analysis ignores this feature. Since, in fact, this is precisely the Los Angeles situation (as will be demonstrated in Chapter III), findings of the effectiveness of GRYD may be sensitive to this. It is therefore to be expected that different effect sizes will result from comparing a one year window around program commencement (2008 and 2009), than from comparing a two year window (2007-2008 versus 2009-2010) around the intervention period. In addition, the approach produces summary statistics that are not easily connected to the real world trends that the descriptive and predictive techniques display.

It is because of the limitations of most techniques (other than randomization) that we have decided to pursue these various approaches. The reader is cautioned that none of the designs—in and of themselves—can provide definitive answers to the question of GRYD's effectiveness. However, when considered together, they provide a more robust assessment of the effects that GRYD might have played in reducing gang violence, and help guard against drawing spurious conclusions about the program's impact.

²⁴ Hartmann, D., Gottman, J., Jones, R., Gardner, W., Kazdin, A., and Vaught, R. 1980. "Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Its Application to Behavioral Data." *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis* 13 (4): 543-559.

²⁵ For somewhat opposing views on Difference-in-Differences, see the following two articles: European Commission. September 2012. "Difference-in-Differences," available through http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/sourcebooks/method_techniques/counterfactual_impact_evaluation/difference-in-differences/difference-in-differences_en.htm;

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (1):249-275. Available through <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/119/1/249.abstract>.

CHAPTER III

GANG VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER GRYD

III.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the empirical analysis of violent gang crime trends. It begins with an examination of trends in Los Angeles from January 2005 to December 2011. Tabular analysis is used to compare the Primary GRYD locations, Other GRYD locations, and Non-GRYD locations. Comparison locations from Los Angeles County are then introduced. Violent gang crime levels and trends in these locations are compared to the Primary GRYD locations, using tabular analysis, segmented regressions, predicted versus actual levels of violent gang crime, and difference-in-differences analysis. The chapter concludes with a summary and interpretation of the findings.

III.2 ANNUAL TRENDS IN VIOLENT GANG CRIME IN LOS ANGELES

Table III.1 provides counts of violent gang crime in the city of Los Angeles from 2005 to 2011.

Table III.1 Gang Violence Incidents in Los Angeles as Percentage of City-Wide Annual Totals January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2011							
Year	City-wide N	Primary GRYD Locations		Other GRYD Locations		Non-GRYD Locations	
		N	% of City-wide Annual Total	N	% of City-wide Annual Total	N	% of City-wide Annual Total
2005	5922	2282	38.5%	1211	20.4%	2429	41.0%
2006	6720	2680	39.9%	1272	18.9%	2768	41.2%
2007	6483	2542	39.2%	1103	17.0%	2838	43.8%
2008	5862	2256	38.5%	1074	18.3%	2532	43.2%
2009	5161	2184	42.3%	892	17.3%	2085	40.4%
2010	4658	1995	42.8%	708	15.2%	1955	42.0%
2011	3987	1762	44.2%	742	18.6%	1483	37.2%
Totals	38793	15701	40.5%	7002	18.0%	16090	41.5%
Source: LAPD Computerized Crime Incident Records							
Primary GRYD locations include the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 associated SNL Areas. Other GRYD locations include the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas and 11 SNL Areas not associated with the Primary GRYD locations. Eight of these 11 are associated with Secondary Areas. Non-GRYD locations are the rest of the city.							

Annual frequencies of violent gang incidents in Primary GRYD locations, Other GRYD locations, and Non-GRYD locations are expressed as percentages of the city-wide totals for each year. For example, the 2,282 incidents that were reported in Primary GRYD locations in 2005 are 38.5 percent of

the 5,922 incidents that were reported city-wide in the same year. Incidents reported in 2005 in Other GRYD locations and Non-GRYD locations were 20.4 percent (1,211 incidents) and 41.0 percent (2,429 incidents), respectively.

The table documents a substantial reduction in the number of gang-related violent incidents from 2006 to 2011. City-wide, the total fell from 6,720 in 2006 to 3,987 in 2011. In Primary GRYD locations, the drop was from 2,680 to 1,762 during this same period of time. In Other GRYD locations, the decline was from 1,272 to 742, and in Non-GRYD locations it was from 2,768 to 1,483.

The table also shows that from 2005 to 2008, the Non-GRYD locations had greater numbers of gang violence incidents than the Primary GRYD locations, but that this relationship reversed in 2009 when the Primary GRYD locations reported 2,184 incidents and the Non-GRYD locations reported 2,085. In 2010 and 2011, this relationship persisted.

A standardized comparison of these patterns can be made from the annual percentages in the table. After holding relatively steady at around 39 percent from 2005 to 2008, the percentage of gang violence that occurred in Primary GRYD locations rose to 42.3 percent in 2009, 42.8 percent in 2010, and 44.2 percent in 2011. In the Other GRYD locations in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the three year rates were 17.3 percent, 15.2 percent, and 18.6 percent, respectively. In Non-GRYD locations during these same years, the corresponding percentages were 40.4, 42.0, and 37.2. These figures indicate that, although gang violence has been declining everywhere in the city, it has declined more slowly in the Primary GRYD locations than in other locations.

Table III.2 presents another way of looking at these patterns. The cells in the table contain the year-to-year percentage changes in gang violence incidents in Los Angeles for the four geographic groupings. The final row presents these changes by geographic grouping over the seven year (2005-2011) span of time.

Since the percentages in Table III.2 are based on the frequencies in Table III.1, they follow the patterns depicted there. Thus, year-to-year declines occurred in Primary GRYD locations in every year after the first. There were declines in the Other GRYD locations in every year except the first and last, and in Non-GRYD locations in every year except the first and second. However, the year-to-year percentage changes are not systematic across the three groupings. That is, a relatively large percentage change in one group in a given year is not necessarily accompanied by a similarly large percentage change in the other two. For example, between 2009 and 2010, gang violence incidents in Primary GRYD locations declined 8.7 percent, in Other GRYD locations declined 20.6 percent, and in the Non-GRYD locations declined 6.2 percent. But, in the following year, Primary GRYD locations experienced an 11.7 percent decline, while Other GRYD locations experienced a 4.8 percent increase and Non-GRYD locations dropped 24.1 percent.

Table III.2 Yearly Changes in Gang Violence Incidents in Los Angeles January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2011				
Years	City-wide	Primary GRYD Locations	Other GRYD Locations	Non-GRYD Locations
2005-2006	+13.5%	+17.4%	+5.0%	+14.0%
2006-2007	-3.5%	-5.1%	-13.3%	+2.5%
2007-2008	-9.6%	-11.3%	-2.6%	-10.8%
2008-2009	-12.0%	-3.2%	-16.9%	-17.7%
2009-2010	-9.7%	-8.7%	-20.6%	-6.2%
2010-2011	-14.4%	-11.7%	+4.8%	-24.1%
2005-2011	-32.7%	-22.8%	-38.7%	-38.9%
Source: LAPD Computerized Crime Incident Records				
Primary GRYD locations include the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 associated SNL Areas. Other GRYD locations include the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas and 11 SNL Areas not associated with the Primary locations. Eight of these 11 are associated with GRYD's Secondary Areas.				

These variations suggest that the factors that determine the levels of gang violence in communities vary from place to place and time to time. Because of this, it seems likely that these external factors may make gang violence levels more resistant to programmatic influence, and also may make year-to-year changes in these levels an unsatisfactory indicator for assessing program impact.

When longer-term trends are considered, a more consistent picture emerges. For example, across all seven years, gang violence in the Primary GRYD locations declined much less than in either the Other GRYD locations or the Non-GRYD locations. From 2005 to 2011, gang violence in Primary GRYD locations declined 22.8 percent, compared to 38.7 percent and 38.9 percent, respectively, for the Other GRYD locations and the Non-GRYD locations.

When changes in levels of gang violence during the three years of the GRYD program are considered (not presented in the Table III.2 – see Table III.1 for the frequencies), a similar pattern is revealed. Gang violence in Primary GRYD locations declined 21.9 percent (from 2,256 incidents in 2008 to 1,762 in 2011), but Other GRYD locations declined 31.9 percent (from 1,074 to 742), and Non-GRYD locations declined 42.4 percent (from 2,532 to 1,483). However, the Primary GRYD locations did experience increasing declines each year (3.2 percent from 2008 to 2009, 8.7 percent from 2009 to 2010, and 11.7 percent from 2010 to 2011). That kind of trend did not occur in the other two groups, and may be consistent with the view that GRYD is having an additive effect, over time. Data from future years will shed light on this matter.

What these analyses of aggregate annual data have disclosed can be briefly summarized as follows: First, gang violence has declined everywhere in the city from 2006 on. Second, when 2011 levels are compared to 2006 levels, the overall declines have been most rapid in Non-GRYD locations and least rapid in Primary GRYD locations. Third, the three year trend since GRYD commenced has seen

increasing year-to-year declines in the Primary GRYD locations, but not in the Other GRYD locations or in the Non-GRYD locations. However, using the gang violence frequency data for Los Angeles alone to assess the GRYD program's effects on gang violence is problematic for the reasons we have discussed earlier in some detail – the main concern is that the Other GRYD locations and the Non-GRYD locations are not equivalent to the Primary GRYD locations with respect to gang activity generally and gang violence in particular. This makes them less than satisfactory comparison areas. To supplement the city data, we now introduce information from Los Angeles County.

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) both record criminal incidents by geographic areas known as reporting districts (RDs). There are the 174 LAPD RDs in the Primary GRYD locations. We identified the County Comparison locations by selecting 174 LASD RDs from the area of the county shown above in Figure II.2 that had the most serious gang violence levels from 2005 to 2011. The size and shape of the RDs in the two jurisdictions are not identical (LASD RDs tend to be smaller than LAPD RDs), thus making the two measures less than completely equivalent. Nevertheless the 174 LASD RDs we have selected contain 94 percent of all the gang violence that occurred in the county area shown in Chapter II's Figure II.2, and we therefore consider them to be a useful, though not perfect, comparison group.

Table III.3 contains the gang violence frequency data for the Primary GRYD locations (also presented earlier in Table III.1) and comparable data from the County Comparison area (depicted above in Chapter II, Figure II.2).

Table III.3				
Gang Violence Incidents in Primary GRYD Locations and LA County Comparison Locations				
January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2011				
Year	Primary GRYD Locations		County Comparison Locations	
	N	% of Seven Year Total	N	% of Seven Year Total
2005	2282	14.5%	1870	15.1%
2006	2680	17.1%	2005	16.2%
2007	2542	16.2%	1951	15.8%
2008	2256	14.4%	1779	14.4%
2009	2184	13.9%	1671	13.5%
2010	1995	12.7%	1619	13.1%
2011	1762	11.2%	1449	11.7%
Seven Year Totals (2005-2011)	15701	100%	12344	100%
Source: LAPD and LASD Computerized Crime Incident Records				
Primary GRYD locations include the 174 LAPD RDs in the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 associated SNL Areas. The County Comparison area is comprised of the 174 county RDs with the highest incidence of violent gang crime from among 438 southeastern County RDs adjacent to the City from 2005 through 2011.				

Though the number of the Primary GRYD location incidents is greater than the number of County incidents (15,701 across all seven years compared to 12,344), it is clear that the trends in the two jurisdictions are similar. Both jump between 2005 and 2006, and then decline in each following year through 2011. As we have already noted, the Primary GRYD locations declined 22.8 percent from 2005 to 2011 (from 2,282 incidents to 1,762 incidents); the County locations declined 22.6 percent (from 1,876 incidents to 1,449 incidents). Further, the percentage of seven year gang violence that is reported in any given year is quite similar for both jurisdictions – for example, 14.5 percent for Primary GRYD locations in 2005, 15.1 percent for County locations; 14.4 percent in 2008 for the Primary GRYD group, 14.4 percent for the County; 11.2 percent for the Primary GRYD group in 2011, 11.7 percent for the County; and so on.

These observations tell us two things. First, the 174 County RDs we have selected are a reasonable comparison group to the 174 GRYD RDs. Second, the violent gang crime trends for the two jurisdictions from 2005 to 2011 are quite similar.

However, when the change from GRYD program inception through the end of 2011 is calculated, a somewhat different picture emerges. The Primary GRYD locations declined from 2,256 incidents in 2008 to 1,756 incidents in 2011, a drop of 22.2 percent. The County figures for the same periods declined from 1,779 to 1,449, a drop of 18.5 percent. Thus, during the years in which the GRYD program has operated, gang violence in Primary GRYD locations declined faster than in comparable County locations.

These relationships will be explored further at a subsequent point in this chapter. Before we present those analyses, however, we consider the suitability of the 174 County RDs as a comparison group from another standpoint.

We have already pointed out why comparisons of the Primary GRYD locations with other areas of the city are methodologically problematic. Below, in Table III.4, we present further evidence of why that is so. We also present evidence indicating why the County Comparison group, although also imperfect for a number of reasons²⁶ is a better comparison group than either the Other GRYD locations or the Non-GRYD locations. We base this conclusion on comparisons of the average number of violent gang crimes occurring each year in each of the RDs in the city and county groups.

The cell entries in Table III.4 are the frequencies of violent gang crimes each year divided by the number of RDs in the group (Primary GRYD locations = 174 RDs, Other GRYD locations = 916 RDs, Non-GRYD locations = 1,011 RDs, and Los Angeles County = 174 RDs). Thus, the 174 Primary GRYD location RDs experienced an average of 13.1 violent gang crimes in 2005; the 196 Other GRYD location RDs averaged 6.2; the Non-GRYD locations averaged 2.4; and the 174 County RDs averaged 10.7. Aggregated across all years, the averages for the Primary GRYD locations, Other GRYD locations, Non-GRYD locations, and the Los Angeles County RDs are 90.2, 35.7, 15.9, and 70.9, respectively.

²⁶ In particular, it is not known at present the extent to which Los Angeles County may be conducting gang prevention or intervention activities in these high gang crime areas.

Table III.4 Gang Violence Incidents per Reporting District in Primary GRYD Locations, Other GRYD Locations, Non-GRYD Locations, and Los Angeles County Locations January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2011				
Year	Primary GRYD Locations (174 RDs)	Other GRYD Locations (196 RDs)	Non-GRYD Locations (1011 RDs)	Los Angeles County (174 RDs)
2005	13.1	6.2	2.4	10.7
2006	15.4	6.5	2.7	11.5
2007	14.6	5.6	2.8	11.2
2008	13.0	5.5	2.5	10.2
2009	12.6	4.6	2.0	9.6
2010	11.5	3.6	1.9	9.3
2011	10.1	3.8	1.5	8.3
Seven Year Totals (2005-2011)	90.2	35.7	15.9	70.9

Annually, gang violence levels are two to three times greater in Primary GRYD locations than in the Other GRYD locations, and five to six times greater than in Non-GRYD locations. This reinforces our earlier observation that neither of the Los Angeles city groups work well as comparison areas. The county averages are also not perfectly appropriate. Primary GRYD locations have roughly 25 percent more gang violence per RD than the County locations.²⁷ However, for comparative purposes, the County group is clearly better than the other Los Angeles city groups.

We move now to the more detailed analysis of monthly trends, using segmented regressions, interrupted time series forecasts, and difference-in-differences analysis to compare violent gang crime in the Primary GRYD locations to the County Comparison area.


III.3 MONTHLY TRENDS IN VIOLENT GANG CRIME

In Figure III.1 we plot the monthly violent gang crime levels from January 2005 to December 2011 for the Primary GRYD locations and for the County Comparison area.

The trends for the GRYD locations are in red and their monthly frequency levels are denoted by the left vertical axis. Those for the county are in blue with monthly frequencies denoted by the right vertical axis. Both scales have been standardized so that each interval approximates a 10 percent change in violent crime, thus making it possible to directly compare the shapes of the two monthly trend lines.

²⁷ Note, though, that there is variation, both in the city and in the county, in the actual size of reporting districts, with the result that calculations per RD are not precisely comparable within each jurisdiction or across jurisdictions. This is an unavoidable constraint because RD size measurements were not available for this report.

Figure III.1
Gang-Related Violent Crimes – Pre/Post GRYD
GRYD Primary Locations and High Crime Locations in LA County
January 2005 to December 2011



The left vertical axis represents GRYD violent gang crimes and the right vertical axis represents high crime areas in the County. Both have been standardized with each interval representing approximately a 10% change in crime.

To summarize the monthly fluctuations in violent gang crimes for the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison area, linear trends²⁸ were calculated for three time periods: January 2005 - June 2007; July 2007 - December 2008, and January 2009 - December 2011. The first segment encompasses a period when gang violence was generally rising in the city of Los Angeles. The second segment begins when gang violence began to decline and runs up to the implementation of the GRYD prevention and intervention program. The last segment is for the post-implementation period through the end of the currently available crime incident data series. The percentage changes noted on the chart indicate the change in gang violence levels that are based on the beginning and ending values of each trend line (not the beginning and ending numbers of monthly incidents). For example, the GRYD change of +24.7 percent for the leftmost trend line indicates that the end point of the GRYD trend line is

²⁸ A linear trend line (sometimes referred to as the least-squares line) is a visual representation of the relationship between two variables. For this section, it represents the association between the number of violent gang crimes per month and the number of months in a time period. It is calculated to minimize the squared distances between the actual monthly levels of crime over the period and a straight line derived from the formula $Y = a + b(X)$. For more information on the assumptions and mathematical calculations for least squares regression trend analysis, see Babbie, E. (2012) *The Practice of Social Research*, Stamford, CN: Cengage Learning.

24.7 percent greater than the beginning point. The same logic applies to all the percentages. Because the two axes are standardized, the city and county percentages can be directly compared.

In general terms, the two trend lines are quite similar. The County experienced monthly fluctuations and seasonal trends that, though smaller in magnitude, are mostly comparable to those for the Primary GRYD locations in seasonal timing and direction. Further, the slopes of the segmented regression lines are upwards for both in the first time period, and downward for both in the last. Had there not been the 2007 GRYD Zone spike that was more than double the level from a couple of months earlier, the middle period slopes would have been similar as well.

From 2009 to 2011, both areas demonstrated declining trends. However, the proportional decline in the GRYD Zones was higher than in the county – a drop of 29.4 percent in the Zones, compared to a 23.0 percent drop in the County.

III.4 ACTUAL AND PROJECTED VIOLENT GANG CRIME


A common challenge in program evaluation involves accounting for temporal trends before drawing conclusions about program effects. This is particularly challenging with respect to violent gang crime in Los Angeles due to its substantial monthly fluctuations and seasonal variation. The interrupted Time-Series analysis (ITS) approach is commonly used to address this challenge. It is particularly suitable for the analysis of GRYD program effects because of the availability through LAPD records of repeated measures of the outcome variable of interest (the number of gang-related violent crimes from 2005 to 2011).

In this section, we use ITS to generate projections of the monthly levels of violent gang crime that would have occurred in Primary GRYD locations from 2009 to 2011 had the trends observed from 2005 to 2008 simply continued. These estimates are then compared to the actual levels of violent gang crime that were reported. We repeat this process for the Los Angeles County Comparison area using LASD data. We then compare the two projections.

III.4.1 Projections for the City of Los Angeles

The forecast versus actual results for the Primary GRYD locations are presented in Figure III.2. The solid red line in the figure maps the actual monthly levels of violent gang crime in the Primary GRYD locations. The dotted line represents the ARIMA projections. The question we seek to answer is: to what extent are the actual numbers of gang-related violent crimes different than what would be projected using ARIMA procedures? In other words, have the Primary GRYD locations fared better than projected?

Figure III.2
The Primary GRYD Locations
Gang-Related Violent Crimes – Forecast vs. Actual
Post-Implementation
January 2009 to December 2011




The forecast is based upon a *One-Step ARIMA* estimate of post-implementation incidents

The projections in Figure III.2 are well above the actual levels in all but 6 of the 36 months of the 2009-2011 time period. The monthly average of the actual levels (5,941 total over 36 months) was 165 violent incidents. The monthly average of the projections (totaling 6,461 across the three years) was 179. Thus the number of actual violent gang crimes per month was, on average, more than 14 less than projected. In percentage terms, there were 8 percent fewer violent gang crimes than prior experience would have predicted.

III.4.2 Projections for Los Angeles County

In Figure III.3 we present the actual and projected levels of gang violence in the 174 Los Angeles County RDs being used as a comparison area in this analysis. The ITS methodology employed is the same as used for the city projections discussed above, and the layout of the figure is set up in the same way – solid red maps the actual monthly levels of gang violence; dotted blue maps the predicted levels of gang violence.

Figure III.3
High Violent Gang Crime Areas in Los Angeles County
Gang-Related Violent Crimes – Forecast vs. Actual
Post-Implementation
January 2009 to December 2011



The forecast is based upon a *One-Step ARIMA* estimate of post-implementation incidents

It is clear that, for the County, actual and predicted levels appear closer to each other than they did for the city, but it is still the case that for 17 of the 36 months, the predicted level is higher than the actual level, and, in many of the other months actual and predicted levels are quite similar. The specific numbers of incidents provide further information. Across 2005 to 2008, 7,605 violent gang crimes were reported, a monthly average of 158. From 2009 to 2011, the total was 4,739, a monthly average of 131.²⁹ The specific monthly frequency in January 2009 was 149; by December 2011 it had dropped to almost 80. The predicted total of 5,132 incidents over that period was 393 greater than the actual level (N=4,739), a 7.7 percent decline. The average monthly drop was 10.9.

III.4.3 City-County Comparisons of Actual/Predicted Violence

The analyses of predicted and actual gang violence for the City and the County of Los Angeles disclose only small differences between the two jurisdictions. Primary GRYD location declines across the three years of GRYD’s operation were 8.0 percent; County Comparison area declines in the same period were 7.7 percent. Thus, the Primary GRYD locations have experienced a modestly greater improvement in gang violence levels than the County since GRYD began operations in 2009.

²⁹ Again, see Table III.3 and Figure III.1 above for specific frequencies.

III.5 DID ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT GANG CRIME

In this section, we use Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis to consider further the comparison between the Primary GRYD locations and the County locations.

As outlined at the start of this chapter, the DID analyses compare the 174 RDs that comprise the Primary GRYD locations with the 174 County Comparison location RDs that had the most serious levels of gang violence in 2008. The objective is to determine whether the changes from pre-intervention to post-intervention are greater for the RDs in the Primary GRYD locations than for the RDs in the County Comparison Area.

For both, there are three models:

- A One Year Model compares gang violence occurring in each jurisdiction the year before GRYD began (2008) with violence occurring during GRYD's first year (2009).
- A Two Year Model compares 2007-2008 to 2009-2010.
- A Three Year Model compares 2006-2008 to 2009-2011.

This makes it possible to consider any changes in the differences over GRYD's three year life and to also consider what progression the GRYD program has made, relative to the County, year by year, across those three years.

III.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Results

Table III.5 contains the three model DID analysis.

Table III.5 Differences-in-Differences Analysis Primary GRYD Locations and County Comparison Locations Gang-Related Violent Crimes Pre-Post GRYD Implementation				
1 Year Model	N of RD Data Points 1 Year	2008 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	2009 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	Pre-Post Difference
Primary GRYD Locations	174	13.0	12.6	-0.4
County Locations	174	10.2	9.6	-0.6
Difference		2.8	3.0	0.2 (DID)
2 Year Model	N of RD Data Points for 2 Years	2007 to 2008 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	2009 to 2010 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	Pre-Post Difference
Primary GRYD Locations	348	13.8	12.0	-1.8
County Locations	348	10.7	9.5	-1.3
Difference		3.1	2.6	-0.5 (DID)
3 Year Model	N of RD Data Points for 3 Years	2006 to 2008 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	2009 to 2011 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	Pre-Post Difference
Primary GRYD Locations	522	14.3	11.4	-2.9
County Locations	522	11.0	9.1	-1.9
Difference		3.3	2.3	-1.0 (DID)

Averages are rounded to one decimal point. Differences are between the rounded up averages. RD Data points are 174 for Year 1 (the actual N of RDs for each jurisdiction), 374 for the Year 2 model (since we have 2 years of observations), and 522 for the Year 3 model (since we have 3 years of observations).

The table contains pre- and post-means of the annual number of violent gang crimes occurring in the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison locations for each of the three models. The entries in the cells can be interpreted as follows:

Interpretation of the 1 Year Model

In the 2008 column, 13.0 is the average number of violent gang crimes per RD data point per year in the Primary GRYD locations for the pre-GRYD one year period. This average is derived from the frequencies presented above in Table III.3 (e.g., 2,256 violent gang crimes in 2008 divided by 174 RDs). Below the GRYD average, also in the 2008 column, is the equivalent average for the County RDs: 10.2 (1,779 violent gang crimes divided by 174). In the "Differences" row, again in the 2008 column, the difference between the two means is 2.8. The 2009 column contains equivalent numbers for GRYD's first year. Averages are again derived from Table III.3. The Primary GRYD locations average is 12.6, the County Comparison locations average is 9.6, and the difference between them is 3.0.

The averages do not disclose anything we did not already know from Table III.3 – the 174 GRYD RDs had greater levels of gang violence than the 174 County RDs. The key contribution of the difference-in-differences analysis is contained in the Pre-Post Differences column. This contains the change from the first year to the second for each jurisdiction. For the GRYD locations, the difference was -0.4, indicating a decline in the level of violence. For the County locations, the difference was -0.6. The difference between these is a positive number, 0.2.

This difference indicates that from 2008 to 2009, the County Comparison locations experienced a relatively greater decline in gang violence than the Primary GRYD locations. If the difference had been zero, the experience of the two jurisdictions, relatively speaking, would have been the same. If it had been positive, the GRYD locations would have had a relatively greater decline than the County.

Interpretation of the 2 Year Model

The 2 Year Model is organized in the same way as the 1 Year Model, except that there are double the number of RD data points (348 rather than 174) since RD frequencies are derived from a two year period.

Compared to the 1 Year Model, the averages for both jurisdictions increase for the two years prior to GRYD commencement because a higher violence year (2007) is added. The averages for both fall after GRYD commencement because a lower violence year (2010) is added.

Interpretation of the model's findings again lies in the DID numbers. However, in this model, the decline for the Primary GRYD locations (-1.8) is greater than the decline for the County locations (-1.3). Consequently, the DID summary number is also negative (-0.5), and indicates that when the first two years of GRYD's operation are combined, the Primary GRYD locations experienced a relatively more rapid decline in gang violence than did the County.

Interpretation of the 3 Year Model

The 3 Year Model is also organized like the other two models, but has 522 RD data points since it covers three years before GRYD and three years after. It continues the patterns just discussed for the 2 Year Model. Gang violence averages prior to GRYD's commencement are higher (another high violence year – 2006 – is added) and averages for the three years after GRYD commenced are lower (2011 has the lowest gang violence of all seven years for both jurisdictions so the averages have to go down).

The difference-in-differences between Primary GRYD locations and County locations is even greater than it was for the 2 Year model. The averages in GRYD locations declined by 2.9, but in the County they declined by 1.9, producing a DID of -1.0. This indicates that GRYD locations are, over the life of the GRYD program, experiencing an increasing rate of decline in gang violence, when compared to the County.

III.6 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have utilized four different analytic approaches to assess the level and progression of gang violence in GRYD's Primary locations:

- Tabular analysis of annual frequencies for the Primary locations compared to the Other GRYD locations and Non-GRYD locations;
- Segmented regression analyses of monthly trends in gang violence in the Primary GRYD locations compared to locations in Los Angeles County;
- ITS (ARIMA) projections of expected gang violence levels from 2009 to 2011, based on 2005 to 2008 trends, with comparisons between predictions for Primary GRYD locations and for Los Angeles County Comparison locations; and
- Difference-in-Differences analyses to compare the relative pre-post gang violence changes in Primary GRYD locations to those in County Comparison locations.

All four analyses documented the general declines in gang violence that have taken place since mid-summer 2007. The tabular analysis showed that the rate of decline in GRYD's Primary locations was slower than in either Other GRYD locations or Non-GRYD locations. However, it also showed that Primary GRYD location declines were progressively greater from 2009 to 2011 (this not being the case for the other areas in the city). It was also demonstrated that Primary location declines occurred at a somewhat faster rate than in the Los Angeles County Comparison locations.

The segmented regression comparisons between GRYD and the County showed that the rate of decline in violent gang crime in the Primary GRYD locations was greater than in the County locations (down 29.4 percent in GRYD locations, compared to 23.0 percent in County locations).

The Actual-vs.-Predicted analyses showed that gang violence in the Primary GRYD locations dropped by 520 incidents over the three years of GRYD's life (a monthly average decline of 14.4). This constituted an 8 percent decrease. The comparable County decline was 7.7 percent.

The Difference-in-Differences analysis showed that in the first year of the GRYD program, the decline in violence in the Primary GRYD locations was relatively slower than in the County Comparison locations. However, when the analysis was extended to 2 years and 3 years, GRYD program declines outpaced County declines by increasing amounts over time.

Interpretation of Violent Crime Findings

Violent gang-related crime throughout the City of Los Angeles has been steadily declining since the summer of 2007. This trend is consistent with declines in violent crime experienced during the same period nationwide. Downward trends were observed in both the areas where GRYD program activities were targeted and in other areas of the City that were not targeted. This suggests that violent gang crime is being affected by not just the GRYD program, but also by unidentified social or environmental factors.

In contrast to previous evaluation findings about overall gang crime, violent gang crime declined somewhat more rapidly in Non-GRYD locations, when compared to the Primary GRYD locations. Since GRYD logically focused its programs in the areas of the City where violent gang-related crime is most concentrated, this suggests that gang violence is more intractable in those communities than elsewhere. This seems particularly plausible given the multi-generational and geographically delimited nature of Los Angeles street gangs. Moreover, because of the large differences in violent gang-related crime incidence between the two areas, and also between Primary GRYD locations and Other GRYD locations, direct comparisons are not satisfactory from an evaluation point of view.

However, when comparing the trends in violent gang crime to more similar areas in Los Angeles County, the Primary GRYD locations had modestly larger declines. Multiple measures consistently supported this finding. In the aggregate, the preponderance of the evidence from this year's evaluation supports the hypothesis that GRYD is associated with declines in gang violence consistent with the Comprehensive Strategy's goal.

CHAPTER IV

THE SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS PROGRAM

IV.1 OVERVIEW OF THE SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS PROGRAM

The Summer Night Lights (SNL) program was established by the GRYD Office in 2008.³⁰ Starting with eight parks/recreational areas in the city of Los Angeles in 2008, it added eight additional locations in 2009, ten more in 2010, and nine more in 2011. Two locations were dropped in 2010 and one was dropped in 2011, resulting in a total of 32 participating parks and recreation centers by the summer of 2011.

SNL is designed to engage all members of the community. Anyone may attend and attendance is free. SNL seeks to integrate prevention, intervention, and community engagement strategies to reduce violence through the provision of a wide variety of activities and programs in parks and recreation centers throughout the city. SNL programming is provided to local residents in the 32 SNL Areas from 7:00 p.m. until midnight, Wednesday through Saturday, from July 4th through Labor Day weekend. There are four major program components, as defined in the *Comprehensive Strategy*:

- **Extended Programming**
Extended programming includes a variety of on-site activities such as the provision of free meals for all attendees and their families, cooking classes, athletic programming, arts programming and other skill-based programs. This aspect of SNL contributes to the primary prevention component of the overall Strategy.
- **The Youth Squad**
The Youth Squad hires youth from the community who are thought to be at-risk for gang involvement and engaging in gang violence. Youth Squad members are then given training in five areas: career building, financial literacy, violence awareness, asset mapping, and health. This aspect of SNL directly addresses the secondary prevention portion of the Strategy.
- **The Intervention Component**
Community Intervention Workers are hired from the community to engage in proactive peace-making activities as well as violence interruption strategies throughout the SNL program.³¹ This aspect of SNL directly addresses the intervention portion of the Strategy.
- **The Law Enforcement Engagement Component**
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is an active partner in the programming of SNL. Law enforcement presence at SNL sites takes the form of participation and interaction with community members in sports, cooking, and arts activities.

³⁰ The SNL program was modeled on the "Summer of Success Baldwin Village Program," which was implemented in 2003 at Jim Gilliam Park under the direction of Guillermo Cespedes, the current Deputy Mayor and Director of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Office.

³¹ Most Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) also provide intervention services in the GRYD Zones during the entire year, although temporary CIWs are also hired for just the SNL period.

During the 2011 Summer Night Lights program, the GRYD Office conducted on-site surveys of its program staff and of residents who attended SNL programming. The complete results of these surveys are detailed in a separate Urban Institute report.³² In the first part of this chapter, we summarize the main findings of that report, concentrating on the following topics: 1) how staff and attendees view the health and well-being of their communities; 2) staff and attendees' perceptions of LAPD; 3) staff and attendees' assessments of community safety levels; and 4) staff and attendees' opinions about the Summer Night Lights program.³³

IV.2 SNL SURVEY RESULTS

The 2011 surveys were conducted with four SNL groups: Youth Squad members (N=320), Lead Community Intervention Workers (N=35) who coordinated CIW activities at each park, other Community Intervention Workers (N=141), and community residents (herein, Community Members) attending SNL (N=3,850).³⁴ The surveys of the first three groups can be considered representative of the groups since most members were surveyed. However, the community resident surveys, which were voluntary and anonymous, were obtained by GRYD staff on an ad hoc basis on the SNL area grounds. In that sense, they are a convenience sample and should not be considered statistically representative of all SNL attendees (informally estimated to have been in the hundreds of thousands over the two months of the program). There may have been inadvertent bias introduced by the fact that surveyors had to obtain agreement from respondents (the likelihood of agreement perhaps being greater among those who had strong feelings, one way or the other, about SNL). For these reasons, the analytic approach used in this report is descriptive only; the perceptions and viewpoints of the surveys completed at the end of SNL by the four groups are summarized. Despite this caveat, we consider the surveys useful to the GRYD Office as it seeks to assess SNL's value to communities and residents.

³² Hayeslip, D., Dunworth, T., and Denver, M. July 2012. "Summer Night Lights Supplemental Y3 Report." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Also available from the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development.

³³ For details on gang crime trends in SNL Areas separate from GRYD Zones, see Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., and Denver, M. July 2011. "Y2 Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Evaluation reports are available through the Urban Institute website: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412409.html>,

³⁴ GRYD also conducted surveys at the beginning of SNL with the hope of being able to measure pre- and post-change in attitudes and opinions. This proved infeasible and so we instead concentrate here on what can be considered the 'exit' surveys. See the report cited in Footnote 4 for further details.

A summary of the information sources is provided in Table IV.1.

The data collection instruments were group specific, with some items asked of only a particular group and some items asked of each of the four groups. As a result, not all items could be compared across all groups because of the different purposes of each survey.

Table IV.1 – Information Sources for SNL Perspectives	
Sources of Information	Who participated
Youth Squad Members	A survey of Youth Squad members hired to facilitate SNL activities in each of 32 parks during the summer of 2011
Community Intervention Workers	A survey of Community Intervention Workers hired to engage gang-involved youth and to assist in peace-keeping activities as part of the SNL program in each of the 32 parks during the summer of 2011
Lead Intervention Workers	Interviews of the Lead Intervention Workers in each of the SNL locations during the summer of 2011
Community Members	A convenience sample in each SNL Area of approximately 120 residents attending SNL activities during the summer of 2011

The 32 2011 SNL parks were organized by eight regions for administrative purposes by the GRYD Office.³⁵ The numbers of survey respondents in each SNL region are listed in Table IV.2.

SNL Region	Youth Squad	Other CIWs	Lead CIWs	Community Members
East	40	5	4	480
Northeast	37	10	4	481
Central	29	7	3	362
Watts	31	15	4	361
South	71	18	8	842
Harbor	22	3	2	240
Valley	56	10	6	722
West	29	4	3	362
Worked in Two Regions	0	1	1	N/A
Totals	315	74	35	3850

³⁵ Parks/Recreational Centers in the SNL regions are: *East* (Ramon Garcia Park, Ramona Gardens Housing Development, Costello Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center); *Northeast* (Cypress Park Recreation Center, Glassell Park Recreation Center, Highland Park Recreation Center, Montecito Heights Recreation Center); *Central* (Ross Snyder Park, South Park Recreation Center, Slauson Recreation Center); *Watts* (Nickerson Gardens Housing Development, Jordan Downs Housing Development, Imperial Courts Housing Development); *South* (Algin Sutton Recreation Center, Green Meadows Recreation Center, Jim Gilliam Park, Mount Carmel Park, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center, Van Ness Recreation Center); *Harbor* (Normandale Recreation Center, Wilmington Recreation Center); *Valley* (Hubert Humphrey Park, Sepulveda Park, Valley Plaza Recreation Center, Delano Recreation Center, Sun Valley Recreation Center, Lanark Recreation Center); and *West* (Lemon Grove Park, Lafayette Recreation Center, Toberman Recreation Center).

IV.2.1 Survey Sample Demographics

Table IV.3 presents self-reported demographic characteristics of each of the three respondent groups. CIWs were predominantly male, about 40 years old, and split more or less evenly between African American and Latino ethnicity. A slight majority of Youth Squad members were male, the average age was 18, and more than 70 percent were Latino. Community Members were split evenly by gender, averaged 24.6 years of age, and were also predominantly Latino (64.6 percent). Almost 90 percent of all three groups reported living in the community where the SNL they were attending was held.

Table IV.3 – Survey Respondent Characteristics			
	Youth Squad	Other CIWs	Community Members
Male	148 (53.2%)	61 (84.7%)	1906 (49.5%)
Female	130 (46.8%)	11 (15.3%)	1944 (50.5%)
Average Age (Years)	18.3	39.5	24.6
African American	75 (27.0%)	35 (47.9%)	1091 (28.3%)
Latino	198 (71.2%)	36 (49.3%)	2489 (64.6%)
Other Ethnicity/Race	5 (1.9%)	2 (2.7%)	244 (6.3%)
Live in SNL Community	248 (89.2%)	64 (87.7%)	3420 (88.9%)
Totals	278	72	3850

With respect to levels of educational attainment, about a third (30.6 percent) of Youth Squad respondents reported that they were not currently attending school, as did slightly less than half (45.1 percent) of Community Members. Currently attending college was the highest proportional response for the Youth Squad (40.6 percent). On the other hand, attending high school was the highest for Community Members (27.4 percent). The most common reported level of educational attainment for both the Youth Squad and Community Members not currently in school was high school/GED (61.6 percent and 39.4 percent, respectively). Less than ten percent of the Youth Squad group reported having completed some college, while about 28 percent of Community Members indicated that they had completed some college or had earned college degrees.

IV.2.2 Community Assessment

Community assessment was explored in the survey through questions regarding community relationships, relationships with the police, and perceptions of community safety.

Community Relationships

A primary area of interest for the GRYD Office was to better understand respondents' perceptions about certain characteristics of their neighborhoods and the SNL parks and recreation centers.

Because surveys were slightly different for each of the four groups, not all groups responded to questions associated with each topic. In particular, Lead CIWs were not asked about community relationships or park safety, and CIWs were not asked about relationships with LAPD. Youth Squad and community attendees were asked about all three topics.

The survey staff asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statements about the neighborhood they lived in: people care about the neighborhood; people get along well; people can be trusted; neighbors care for one another; people share the same values; and racial/ethnic tensions are low.³⁶

The majorities of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that people in their neighborhood cared about the neighborhood. However, these levels of agreement varied across the three groups for this item: 53.2 percent of Youth Squad respondents, 61.9 percent of Community Members, and 85.5 percent of CIWs.

While majorities of all three groups somewhat or strongly agreed that people in their neighborhoods generally get along with each other, only the CIW group responded with a majority indicating they somewhat or strongly agreed that people in their neighborhood could be trusted (69.6 percent) and that people in their neighborhood shared the same values (66.1 percent). None of the three respondent groups showed a majority either agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that there is a strong level of trust and credibility between the police and residents. Modest majorities for the CIW and Community Member groups responded that they somewhat or strongly agreed with the statement that tensions were low between different racial and ethnic groups in their neighborhoods (50.7 percent and 56.6 percent, respectively), although only 37.1 percent of the Youth Squad were in agreement.

Relationships with the Police


Three questions on the surveys focused on relationships with LAPD: how comfortable respondents were 1) reporting a crime, 2) calling for help in an emergency, and 3) just asking for assistance.

³⁶ These questions ask respondents to draw on experiences in their own neighborhoods, which could be different than the SNL Areas.

The Community Members' responses from each area are presented in Figure IV.1

Community Members across six different SNL regions felt most comfortable calling LAPD in the case of an emergency (more than 60 percent in 6 regions). However, their levels of agreement with how comfortable they were reporting a crime were lower: in only two of the regions (Valley and West) did a majority indicate they were comfortable doing so, and several other regions were below 40 percent. In the Central region, only a third of respondents were comfortable calling in a crime. Proportions indicating being comfortable or very comfortable were slightly higher across all eight regions for calling for assistance than calling to report a crime. Once again, respondents in the Central region appeared least comfortable, while those in the Valley region were most comfortable with calling for assistance.

Figure IV.1 – Proportion of Community Members Reporting They Are Comfortable (Or Very Comfortable) Calling LAPD



About two-thirds of the Lead CIWs indicated that they felt uncomfortable or very uncomfortable calling LAPD to report a crime (63.6 percent), compared to about one-third of the Youth Squad having the same opinion.

However, about one-half of the Youth Squad and 62.7 percent of Community Members indicated that they felt comfortable calling LAPD for help in an emergency. In addition, over two-thirds of Lead CIWs shared this level of comfort in emergencies. Only about one in five across all the groups reported that they felt uncomfortable or very uncomfortable calling LAPD for help.

When these responses are considered, it becomes clear that substantial numbers of citizens are not comfortable engaging with law enforcement in various ways. Two caveats are needed with respect to this finding. First, the community respondents cannot be assumed to be representative of the entire community (due to the convenience nature of the sample); and second there is no information at present on whether or not attitudes towards the police are changing. Future surveys will be able to repeat these questions and thus facilitate an assessment of any trends in the issue.

Perceptions of Community Safety

The community assessment component also sought to understand perceptions of public safety issues in and around the SNL parks (both during the day and at night), as well as perceptions of how safe the SNL parks would be after SNL ended.

Perceptions of Daytime Safety. When the Youth Squad and Community Member groups were asked how they felt about safety *before* SNL started in the park where they were working, most (60.1 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively) said they felt safe or very safe. On the other hand, only 46.6 percent of the CIWs indicated that they felt safe in the parks during the daytime *before* SNL. Less than 15 percent of all three groups reported feeling unsafe or very unsafe during the day *before* SNL.

When asked about *current* perceptions of SNL daytime safety, the proportion of respondents feeling safe or very safe rose for Youth Squad members (to 83.4 percent), CIWs (to 82.2 percent) and Community Members (to 89.2 percent). Only 2.0 to 3.3 percent of each group reported feeling currently unsafe or very unsafe.

The perceptions of how safe the parks would be during the day *after* SNL ended were lower across all three groups, although the majorities of the three groups still thought it would be safe or very safe in the future.

Perceptions of Nighttime Safety. Less than half of two respondent groups reported that they felt safe or very safe at the park at night *before* SNL started (41.7 percent of the Youth Squad group, and 42.6 percent of the CIW group), while 50.6 percent of Community Members reported feeling safe. About 30 percent of the Youth Squad and slightly less than 30 percent of the other two groups indicated that they felt unsafe or very unsafe at the park at night *before* SNL started.

Perceptions about park safety at night also jumped markedly for all three groups when asked about their views while at SNL (which runs from 7 p.m. until midnight). The proportion of Youth Squad members indicating they felt safe or very safe jumped to 70.9 percent. The percentage of CIWs who felt safe or very safe rose to 72.0 percent, and among Community Members, this rose to 83.6 percent. While all three groups did report feeling less safe at night than during the day, at the end of SNL these opinions were expressed by only 7.6 percent of the Youth Squad, 5.8 percent of the CIWs, and 4.7 percent of Community Members.

Just over half of each of the three respondent groups indicated that that they felt the park would be safe or very safe at night *after* SNL ended. Approximately 52 percent of members of the Youth Squad suggested that it would be safe or very safe in the future (down about 20 percent from feelings during SNL but about 10 percent higher than *before* SNL). Fifty-five percent of CIWs felt the park would be safe or very safe in the future (down 17 percent from *current* but about 13 percent higher than *before* SNL). Nearly 54 percent of Community Members said the park would be safe or very safe in the future (down almost 30 percent from *current* and about 3 percent higher than views of safety *before* SNL).

Perceptions of Safety Across SNL Regions. As shown in Figure IV.2, similar patterns of perceptions of park safety were seen across the eight SNL regions. More participants indicated they felt safe or very safe *during* SNL than *before* SNL, but perceptions of safety declined for the *future*. The lowest proportions of pre-SNL nighttime feelings of safety were expressed in the Harbor and West Regions, while the highest daytime feelings of safety before SNL were in Northeast and Watts. The highest current safety levels were registered in the Valley Region (daytime), East (daytime) and Northeast (daytime). Future safety predictions were lowest in the Harbor Region (nighttime) and Valley Region (nighttime).

Figure IV.2 – Proportion of Community Members Reporting Feeling Safe (or Very Safe) in Their Park Before SNL, During SNL and in the Future by SNL Region





Figure IV.2 (cont.) – Proportion of Community Members Reporting Feeling Safe (or Very Safe) in Their Park Before SNL, During SNL and in the Future by SNL Region



Perceptions of Biggest Park Safety Issues. Youth Squad, CIWs and Community Members were all also asked to indicate which items in a list of safety issues were the most pressing at the time they were surveyed near the end of SNL programming. Respondents could select any number of issues. Views of the three groups regarding the most serious safety issues varied, as can be seen in Table IV.4. Drinking/Alcohol, Drug Use, Fights and Shootings were prioritized in that order by the majority of Youth Squad members. On the other hand, only Drinking/Alcohol was cited as the biggest safety issue by a majority (68.1 percent) of CIWs. None of the seven issues received a majority of responses from Community Members, although Fights and Drug Use received the most responses (39.3 percent and 38.3 percent, respectively). It should also be noted that Gang Intimidation was not highly rated by any of the groups as being the biggest safety issue in and around the park at the time of the surveys.

Table IV.4 What Do You Think Are Some of the Biggest Safety Issues In and Around Your Park?			
	Youth Squad	Other CIWs	Community Members
Shootings	126 (54.7%)	30 (43.5%)	1260 (32.7%)
Drug use	186 (66.9%)	32 (13.0%)	1476 (38.3%)
Drug sales	136 (48.9%)	17 (24.6%)	1021 (26.5%)
Fights	173 (62.2%)	30 (43.5%)	1513 (39.3%)
Assaults	85 (30.6%)	9 (12.3%)	707 (18.4%)
Drinking/alcohol	187 (67.3%)	47 (68.1%)	1229 (31.9%)
Gang intimidation	125 (45.0%)	20 (29.0%)	1136 (29.5%)

In summary:

- 1) Most Youth Squad, CIWs, and Community Members felt at the time they were surveyed that people cared for their neighborhoods, got along with one another, and that racial and ethnic tensions were low. There was some disagreement about whether other residents in the respondents' neighborhood shared the same values, could be trusted, or trusted law enforcement.
- 2) Most respondents felt comfortable calling the police in emergencies but less so to report a crime.
- 3) Most respondents reported that they considered the local parks to be relatively safe before SNL. Perceptions of safety rose markedly when asked about the safety during SNL, and then declined somewhat when looking ahead, though not to pre-SNL perception levels.

IV.2.3 The SNL Experience

The second main topic the SNL survey explored with attendees was their participation in SNL activities and how satisfied they were with these activities. While most questions were put to Community Members, Youth Squad members were asked about frequency of park use before SNL as well. CIWs and Community Members were all asked about the amount of time they spent with people in different age groups. This item is important since it seeks to measure the extent to which different groups were responding to the overall objective of GRYD programs to foster relationships across the entire family life cycle.

Participation in SNL Park Activities

There were five questions on the Community Member surveys that addressed participation in park and SNL programs, one of which was also included on the Youth Squad surveys. These questions asked about how frequently attendees came to the parks before SNL was implemented, how Community Members learned about and got involved in SNL, how frequently attendees came to the parks during SNL, in which specific programs attendees participated, and how much time the different groups spent with others across different age groups.

Youth Squad and Community Members both reported that they frequented their local SNL parks relatively often before SNL was implemented. About one-third of the Youth Squads and over 40 percent of Community Members reported that they came to the parks either daily or four to five times per week before SNL. Majorities of both groups indicated that they frequented the parks at least twice a week, while only 16.8 percent of the Youth Squads and 14.3 percent of Community Members reported that they had never come to the park before SNL.

Community Members responded that they heard about or got involved in SNL through a variety of ways, as shown in Table IV.5. The largest proportion (24.9 percent) said that they heard about SNL through a friend. Between 10 and 17 percent of respondents indicated that they learned about or got involved in SNL because of a program flyer, from recreation/park staff, through a family member or because the respondent participated last year. Very few reported learning about SNL from the police, through faith-based organizations, or through other community organizations.

Table IV.5 – How Did You Get Involved or Hear About the SNL Program?	
	Community Members
Recreation/park staff	455 (11.8%)
Police	16 (.4%)
Family member	512 (13.3%)
Participated last year	438 (11.4%)
Faith-based organization	30 (.8%)
Neighbor	148 (3.8%)
Friend	958 (24.9%)
Community organization	66 (1.7%)
Youth squad member	162 (4.2%)
Flyer	421 (10.9%)
Other	643 (16.7%)
Total	3849

About 45 percent of Community Members reported that they attended SNL daily during the two months, compared to 30 percent who came to the park daily before SNL. A similar proportion said they participated in SNL at least twice a week, which was an increase of almost 20 percent over such attendance prior to SNL.

Community Members were also asked about their participation in 11 specific SNL activities. The largest majority (83.5 percent) indicated that they had consumed free meals. Sports activities were the next most common: 68.6 percent indicating that they engaged in sports league activities and 58.5 percent said they were involved in non-league sports. A slight majority stated that they participated in music (57.5 percent) and arts (55.8 percent) activities. Dance, crafts and theatre were engaged in by slightly less than half of attendees, while educational, writing and history/cultural programs were attended by substantially fewer SNL participants.

As can be seen in Figure IV.3, there was substantial variation in activity participation across the eight SNL regions. While large majorities took advantage of the free meals in all the regions, a lower proportion did so in Watts. League sports participation was highest in Watts and lowest in the Valley region, as was non-league sports participation. Music participation was highest in Central and Watts, but lowest in Northeast. Arts and crafts participation was similar across most regions with the exception of lower participation in Northeast, Valley and West. Writing was most popular in Watts and least popular in Valley and West, as were history and theatre activities.

Figure IV.3 - Percentage of Residents Reporting They Participated in Activities by Region





Figure IV.3 (cont.) - Percentage of Residents Reporting They Participated in Activities by Region



One of the GRYD program’s family life-cycle objectives is to increase inter-generational engagement and the survey explored this issue. Self-reports of the amount of time that different groups spent with friends, family, neighbors, and others across age categories varied, and correlated with respondent ages; people seemed more likely to spend the most time with others of similar age. Youth Squad members indicated that they spent most of their time with others from 13 to 18 years of age. Youth Squad members also reported spending time with the 19 to 29 year-old group, and only 18 percent reported spending a lot of time with those over 50 years of age. On the other hand, large proportions of CIWs indicated that they often spent time (or spent all of the time) with all age groups. Fifty-six to 66 percent of Community Members indicated that they spent a lot of time with each of the age groups under 30 years of age, and 41 percent said they often spent time (or spent all of the time) with 30 to 49 year olds. Only 26.8 percent responded similarly for the over 50 years old age group.

Program Satisfaction

Large majorities of both Youth Squad and Community Members responded that they felt comfortable (or very comfortable) coming to their SNL park (75.9 percent and 80.2 percent, respectively) and participating in park activities (78 percent and 79 percent, respectively).

Among Community Members who said they participated in SNL activities, the sports league program had the largest proportion who somewhat liked or liked any activity a lot (93.0 percent). The

next highest rated activities were music (86.9 percent) and non-league sports (86.1 percent). With the exception of writing and history/cultural activities, all of the remaining SNL activities garnered positive responses from at least 80 percent of respondents. However, even writing and history, while the lowest, still had 74.2 percent and 77 percent of Community Members indicating that they somewhat liked or liked these activities a lot. Regarding levels of satisfaction with the SNL activities overall, 93 percent responded that they were somewhat or very satisfied, and almost 94 percent of the Community Members surveyed responded that they were either somewhat or very satisfied with the SNL staff. Satisfaction with the overall SNL experience received the highest positive reaction, with 94.1 percent of Community Members responding they were somewhat or very satisfied.

In summary:

- 1) Most respondents reported that they came to their local park/recreation center relatively often before SNL. Respondents' use of the parks/centers increased substantially while SNL was in operation.
- 2) Community Members learned about SNL through a variety of means; the most commonly cited method was hearing about SNL from a friend.
- 3) The most popular SNL activity was the free meals, followed by sports.
- 4) CIWs reported spending time at SNL events with friends, family and others across different age groups more so than other respondent groups did.
- 5) Most Youth Squad and Community Members were comfortable coming to the parks during SNL and participating in SNL activities.
- 6) Those who said they participated in a variety of SNL activities were overwhelmingly positive about such activities. About three-quarters of Community Members reported being very satisfied with SNL, SNL staff, and SNL activities.

IV.2.4 Communication and 2011 SNL Effectiveness

The final survey topic explored CIW views on working relationships and program effectiveness. This included the nature and effectiveness of relationships between CIWs and other stakeholders, including LAPD, GRYD staff, Youth Squad Supervisors, Community Outreach Supervisors, the Leads of the Youth Squads, and staff members from the Department of Recreation and Parks.

Effectiveness of Communication

About two-thirds (68.1 percent) of the CIWs responded that they felt that communication with the LAPD was effective or somewhat effective, and only 8.7 percent indicated that it was somewhat or very ineffective. Lead CIWs were just as positive about the effectiveness of LAPD communication, with 68.6 percent responding that this communication was very or somewhat effective, and only a single Lead CIW indicating that it was somewhat ineffective.

CIWs and Lead CIWs were even more affirmative about communication with the GRYD Office staff. All of the Lead CIWs rated GRYD staff communications as effective. Nearly all CIWs (92.8 percent) agreed.

Communication with Youth Squad Supervisors was also highly rated by both CIWs (95.6 percent) and Lead CIWs (97.2 percent). In addition, large majorities of both the CIWs (88.2 percent) and Lead

CIWs (97.2 percent) also felt that communications with Community Outreach Supervisors were effective.

A large majority of Lead CIWs (86.8 percent) said that communication was somewhat or very effective with the staff at the Department of Recreation and Parks.

Perceptions of SNL Effectiveness

CIWs and Lead CIWs were asked about the ease of implementing SNL and their views on the overall effectiveness of the program. Nearly the same proportions of respondents from both the CIW and Lead CIW groups (84.1 percent and 85.7 percent, respectively) indicated that they felt the intervention component of SNL was easy to implement in their parks during the summer of 2011. Although some obstacles were mentioned (ranging from concerns about other stakeholders' practices to lighting and equipment problems), all were reported as having been overcome.

The vast majority of Lead CIWs (94.3 percent) also reported that they felt that the SNL program successfully engaged gang-involved youth and adults. In addition, they all reported that they saw the SNL experience as providing opportunities for multigenerational family time together. Lead CIWs noted that they observed many families coming to the park together and participating in sports and other activities. They also noted that some families reported that they would not normally come to the park but felt safe doing so during SNL.

A large majority (88.6 percent) of the Lead CIWs indicated that they thought that community intervention work during SNL in 2011 was responsible for reductions in violence. Common reasons cited by the Lead CIWs were that the park activities gave people a safe haven during the summer and that youth were engaged in activities in the evenings instead of just congregating and getting into trouble. Several also pointed to SNL's success in building relationships and understanding other members of the community.

Furthermore, all of the Lead CIWs reported that the intervention component was effective during the summer of 2011. Most CIWs (92.7 percent) shared this positive view. Getting to know people, building relationships, and being able to effectively communicate with both gangs and members of the community were commonly cited as illustrations of intervention effectiveness.

In summary:

- 1) CIWs and Lead CIWs expressed overwhelmingly positive views about effective communication with most other SNL stakeholder organizations, such as the Youth Squads and Community Outreach Supervisors. However, less than half of the CIW respondents reported effective communication with LAPD.
- 2) CIWs reported that implementation of intervention programs during SNL was relatively easy and that they were able to overcome initial obstacles.
- 3) Overall, SNL intervention activities were viewed as effective by CIWs.

IV.3 CONCLUSIONS

The evidence from the analysis of the surveys of Youth Squad members, CIWs, and Community Members suggests that community relationships were positive, the community was satisfied with their SNL experiences, program stakeholder communications were generally effective, and intervention programs in particular were viewed as having positive effects.

CHAPTER V PREVENTION

V.1 INTRODUCTION

Two central components of the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* are primary and secondary prevention. Primary prevention is oriented toward communities, and in particular, this component seeks to provide activities and services that are designed to build community-level resistance to gang joining and gang violence. Whereas primary prevention activities are intended to target the entire community, and efforts are made to include residents of all ages, the secondary prevention component focuses more on individual youth and families, with an emphasis on services and programming for youth 10-15 years of age who are at-risk for joining gangs and not yet gang members.

The GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* includes four programs as part of the primary prevention component:³⁷ Gun Buy-Back; the GRYD Cabinet; Community Action Teams; and the Community Education Campaign. This chapter provides an overview of the objectives and recent activities of the Gun Buy-Back program and the Community Education Campaign. Findings are drawn from two main sources: surveys of participants from the 2012 Gun Buy-Back program and surveys from those who attended Community Education Campaign presentations. Though some preparatory activities and limited programming were undertaken by the GRYD Cabinet and the Community Action Teams, neither had developed to the point where evaluation of the activities would be meaningful. Therefore, these components were excluded from this Year 3 report.

The remaining sections of the chapter describe and analyze the activities associated with the secondary prevention component. First, the numbers of different types of community referrals of at-risk youth to the GRYD program are considered. Next, the University of Southern California's Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), used by GRYD to identify youth whose attitudes and behavior are considered to make them at-risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal or delinquent behavior, is reviewed. The results of that process are then presented. Finally, an analysis is made of the effects of the GRYD program on the Eligible youth who received services. Comparisons are made: (1) between the initial YSET scores and retest YSET scores for youth enrolled in programming (referred to throughout this chapter as Enrolled youth); and (2) between the attitudinal and behavioral changes observed for Enrolled youth and those observed for a sample of youth found to be ineligible for services based on the initial YSET assessment (referred to throughout this chapter as Not-Eligible youth). In the last part of the chapter, conclusions are presented about the potential impacts of the GRYD program's prevention component.

³⁷ Op. cit.

V.2 PRIMARY PREVENTION

V.2.1 The Gun Buy-Back Program

The Gun Buy-Back (GBB) program began in 2009 and has continued in all subsequent years since then. On Mother's Day each year, the program provides Los Angeles residents with the opportunity to anonymously turn in firearms to the police. In return, participants receive up to \$100 gift cards for handguns, shotguns, and rifles, and up to \$200 gift cards for assault weapons. GRYD Office staff partner with LAPD to operate six drop-off locations throughout the city. GRYD prevention and intervention agencies also partner with the GRYD Office and LAPD to staff the locations. Police check the guns that are turned in to determine whether they are operational or not, and the value of gift cards is reduced if they are not.

The local media outlet KCBS/KCAL 9 is a program sponsor and, prior to the start of each year's GBB program, the station features nightly media segments that examine the effects of gang and gun violence in Los Angeles. These annual events mark the beginning of the GRYD summer violence reduction effort and serve as a precursor event to the Summer Night Lights (SNL) program.³⁸

On May 14, 2012, the Los Angeles Mayor's GBB press release reported that 1,673 firearms – 791 handguns, 527 rifles, 302 shotguns and 53 assault weapons – were turned in across six GBB locations at the 2012 event, with a total of 7,942 firearms collected through the initiative during the four years of its operation.³⁹ A reasonable presumption is that most, if not all, of the firearms turned in were illegally owned (that is, not the possessions of owners with licenses to carry and/or own them).

At the 2012 GBB locations, GRYD staff gave drive-up participants a survey focusing on their experience with the GBB program. The survey could be completed anonymously, either while in line or later. There were 732 respondents. Seventy percent were male and the majority was 50 years of age or older (62 percent). Thirty-two percent were 30-49 years old, 5 percent were 19-29 years old, and 1 percent was 13-18 years old.

The GRYD Office reports that most respondents expressed positive views of the program – which was to be expected given that respondents had voluntarily brought guns to turn in, and that the survey, like the program itself, was anonymous and optional. Most participants (84 percent) said they learned about the program from the local media and felt that the community would be safer because of the event (91 percent). In addition, 95 percent felt “very comfortable” or “somewhat comfortable” participating in the event and 94 percent felt that it was “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to participate.

GBB programs generally have two objectives: to reduce gun violence by taking guns off the street, and to increase public awareness of gun violence, with the hope that increased awareness will

³⁸ The Summer Night Lights program is discussed above in Chapter IV.

³⁹ http://mayor.lacity.org/PressRoom/LACITYP_020391

influence gun use. We have no data other than the survey that permits evaluation of the effectiveness of the GBB.⁴⁰

V.2.2 Community Education Campaign

Under the secondary prevention component (discussed in more detail below), the GRYD program offers gang prevention services, provided by GRYD-funded agencies in each zone, to youth, and their families, that are determined to be at-risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal/delinquent activity. This component is dependent upon referrals from schools, other agencies, and the community at large. To increase community awareness of the GRYD program and to encourage referrals to secondary prevention services, the GRYD Office has operated a Community Education Campaign (CEC).

The CEC targets community members (typically parents) and school professionals and staff at elementary, middle and high schools in and around the GRYD Zones. Through school-based forums, GRYD staff present information to the community and schools to increase knowledge and awareness of gang risk factors and gang-joining. School staff and community members are urged to refer youth they believe to be at-risk for gang-joining to their local gang prevention provider, and referral forms to do so are distributed during these community education forums. The referral process is voluntary and not under the direct control of the GRYD program.

The GRYD Office launched the Community Education Campaign at the beginning of the 2010-2011 fiscal year, and made 44 presentations about the GRYD program at schools in and around GRYD Zones. In the 2011-2012 school year, 56 additional schools were identified for CEC presentations to community members and staff. Fifteen presentations were made to community members, and eight presentations were made to school staff. Campaign materials were distributed at 49 of the 56 schools. However, the GRYD Office reported that the remaining planned presentations at these schools have not taken place because the schools were unresponsive, declined an invitation from the GRYD program to participate in CEC presentations, or cancelled presentations after they were scheduled.

Following the Community Education Campaign presentations given in January through April 2012, GRYD staff conducted surveys with participants in both the teacher and community member forums to gather information regarding their experiences with the CEC presentation they attended and participants' knowledge and utilization of GRYD services within their communities. Ninety-seven presentation attendees responded to the survey – 14 teachers, 72 parents, 2 school personnel, 2 students, and 1 grandparent. Six respondents did not specify their identity.⁴¹

Results from the survey indicated that a large majority of attendees understood the role of the GRYD program in their communities following the Community Education Campaign presentations. Ninety-four percent of presentation participants “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they understood the

⁴⁰ For assessments of GBB programs generally, see BJA JRSA Evaluation News, April/May 2010, accessible at <http://www.bja.gov/evaluation/e-news/apr-may10.pdf>.

⁴¹ 13 of the surveyed teachers and 1 respondent who did not specify identity attended a staff presentation; 1 teacher, 72 parents, 2 school personnel, 2 students, 1 grandparent, and 5 survey respondents who did not specify identity attended community member presentations.

role GRYD plays in reducing gang violence in their communities *after* attending the presentation. Ninety-five percent expressed that they “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they understood the types of services that GRYD funds to *prevent* youth at-risk from joining gangs in their communities. And, ninety-four percent of participants indicated that they “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they understood the types of services GRYD funds to help young people in gangs *reduce their involvement* in gang violence. Ninety-five percent of program participants also indicated that they understood how GRYD is helping community leaders and residents reduce gang violence.

Following the presentation, the majority of attendees responded positively about their own ability to assess youth risk and their knowledge of GRYD’s referral system. Eighty-seven percent of survey respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they felt confident that they could identify risk factors for gang membership among youth between the ages of 10 to 15. In addition, 89 percent of the participants reported that they now knew how to make a referral to an agency providing GRYD prevention services.

CEC attendees were also asked to consider the frequency with which they made referrals to GRYD services prior to attending the presentation, and how often they anticipated making referrals following their attendance at the CEC presentation. Forty-six percent of survey respondents indicated that they had “never” or “rarely” referred a youth to GRYD services, while only 24 percent responded that they referred youth to GRYD services “often” or “all the time.” When then asked how often participants thought they would refer youth to GRYD services following the presentation, more than half of the participants (63 percent) indicated that they would refer youth to GRYD services “often” or “all the time,” and only a small number of respondents (7 percent) indicated that they anticipated referring youth to GRYD services “never” or “rarely” following their attendance at the presentation.⁴² Most striking are the number of “never” responses before and after the presentations. While 43 percent of respondents indicated that they never made referrals to GRYD services prior to attending the CEC presentation, only 2 percent of survey respondents reported that they believed they would never refer youth to GRYD services following the presentation.

⁴² “Sometimes” responses and missing data account for the remaining percentage of participant responses to both the pre-CEC presentation and post-CEC presentation referral questions.

V.3 SECONDARY PREVENTION

V.3.1 Introduction

As mentioned above, the secondary prevention component of the GRYD program provides services to youth who are considered at-risk of joining gangs and engaging in criminal/delinquent behavior. During the third year of the program, GRYD adopted a new family services orientation to prevention. In order to guide the implementation of GRYD services, the GRYD Office defined a “GRYD Gang Prevention Model of Practice” in its *Comprehensive Strategy*. The Model utilizes both a vertical strategy of multi-generational coaching and a horizontal strategy of problem-solving techniques to guide activities at each of seven stages of a six-month programming cycle. The vertical strategy emphasizes individual development, family engagement, and family resiliency; whereas, the horizontal strategy is intended to cultivate problem-solving interventions that are specific to the youth’s household situation and broader social context.

Beginning on September 1, 2011, all youth enrolled in the GRYD program, including those that were previously enrolled and new youth enrolled moving forward, were assigned to one of two groups: the GRYD Model Group, guided by the principles stated in GRYD’s Model of Practice; or the Traditional Programming Group, for which standard counseling approaches are continued. To accomplish this, providers were given the discretion to select up to 100 youth enrolled prior to September 1, 2011 for the Model Group, based on the provider’s assessment of youth need. Subsequently, to facilitate future evaluation, all *new* clients enrolled on or after September 1 were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. For additional information on the random assignment process, see Appendix B.

All youth, regardless of Model Group or Traditional Group program assignment, are provided services in six-month cycles. Cycles are broken into monthly service phases. Each phase is considered complete once a youth has finished all required activities for the specific phase. While both the Model Group and Traditional Programming Group contain an assessment and reassessment period, the specific activities required for each programming group differ in both the number and type of services.

Training for GRYD staff and providers regarding the Model Group and Traditional Group programming commenced during the third year of the program. While the Model Group and Traditional Group programming framework has been implemented, data on services provided and youth outcomes based on program type have not yet been developed, and thus analysis of change in attitudes and behaviors between the two programming groups is not yet possible.

The following sections of this chapter provide a review and analysis of GRYD’s secondary prevention program. We first offer a description of the referral process and the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), which is used to determine whether referred youth are eligible for program services. We then consider the results of the referral process, and provide summary information on the types and numbers of referrals received by the GRYD program since its inception in 2009 through mid-June 2012. We then describe the retest process, through which enrolled youth take another YSET interview to assess their progress in the program. Using data collected through the retesting process, the difference

in risk-level and behavioral change between samples of Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth are described. Then, a regression discontinuity analysis is used to assess the impacts of the GRYD program on the observed changes.

V.3.2 The Referral Process

Since the inception of the GRYD program in 2009, youth between the ages of 10-15 who are perceived to be at-risk for gang involvement were referred to the GRYD program's prevention service providers in each GRYD Zone by schools, law enforcement agencies, social service agencies, and parents.⁴³ Potential referral sources have been made aware of the GRYD program through publicity, the Community Education Campaign, and new or pre-GRYD relationships established by GRYD's service providers. There are also a few instances of youth self-referring by contacting service providers directly.

Deciding Eligibility for Services: The Youth Services Eligibility Tool

Referred youth are all believed to be in need of help by those making the referrals. However, GRYD program resources are finite and a program decision was made at the outset that services could only be offered to those youth who are at highest risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal or delinquent behavior. To make this determination, GRYD gang prevention agencies in each of the 12 zones interview referred youth and administer the YSET

During the introductory interview with each youth, the GRYD service provider administers the YSET by asking a series of questions about their attitudes and self-reported delinquent behavior.⁴⁴ Specifically, the YSET utilizes nine measurement scales: seven are attitudinal and two are behavioral. The scales, the number of items in each scale, and the range of possible responses to the items in a scale are presented in Table V.1.

⁴³ Referrals are made to four non-GRYD Zones as well as to the 12 GRYD Zones. Since the evaluation focuses on the GRYD Zones only, the Non-GRYD Zone referrals (about 1,300 over the life of the GRYD program) are not included in the analyses presented in this report.

⁴⁴ There have been some adjustments to the factors and the items in the YSET since the program commenced, but the general principles and structure of the risk measurement approach have been consistent.

Table V.1 Structure of the YSET Risk Scales					
Risk Scales		Scale Structure			
		Number of Scored Items on Each Scale	Range of Responses	Maximum Possible Risk Score	Risk Threshold Score if 12 Yrs Old or Younger
A	Anti-Social/Pro-Social Tendencies	6	1 - 5	30	16
B	Parental Supervision	3	1 - 5	15	7
C	Critical Life Events	7	0 - 1	7	4
DE	Impulsive Risk Taking	4	1 - 5	20	14
F	Neutralization	6	1 - 5	30	19
G	Negative/Positive Peer Influence	3	1 - 5	15	10
H	Peer Delinquency	6	1 - 5	30	12
IJ	Self-Reported Delinquency or Substance Abuse	17	0 - 1	17	4
T	Family Gang Influence	2	0 - 2 ⁴⁵	2	2

Most scales consist of questions with five response options for each question, rank ordered from low to high risk. A value of 1 is assigned to the lowest risk response and a value of 5 is assigned to the highest risk response. To obtain a score for a respondent on any scale, the responses to the items on that scale are summed. The result is then compared to the risk threshold USC has established for the scale to determine if the youth is at-risk with respect to that scale. On Scale A for instance, which has a maximum possible risk score of 30 (6 items, with 5 being the highest risk response on each item), a youth between the ages of 10-12 is considered at-risk with a score of 16 or more. The same approach is used on each scale that has items with a risk range of 1-5 (Scales B, DE, F, G, and H). Thus, the score for each youth on each item is calculated by assigning 1 to the lowest risk response for a single item within a risk scale (e.g., “Strongly Agree” on such items as “I do as I am told”) and 5 to the highest risk response (e.g., “Strongly Agree” on such items as “I take things that are not mine from home, school, or elsewhere”).

For scales that have questions with Yes/No responses, the range is 0 (no) to 1 (yes). This produces a lower maximum risk score but the logic behind making the decision on the level of risk is the same. On Scale C, Critical Life Events, for instance, a score of 4 puts a 12-year-old above the at-risk threshold. There are modest upward adjustments in the risk threshold for older youth (13 - 15 years of age) on some of the scales. However, the same decision rules are applied. A youth is deemed Eligible or

⁴⁵ The two items in this scale are open-ended quantitative questions; however, the scoring structure assigns zero, one, or two points for this scale overall, based on responses to the two items.

Not-Eligible for GRYD services based on the number of scales for which the youth has scores above the at-risk threshold. A youth who is at-risk on four or more scales is deemed Eligible to enroll in the program and receive GRYD services.

To arrive at this decision for each youth who completes the YSET interview, the provider agency sends the responses given by the youth to a USC team for scoring. The USC team calculates the scores, makes the eligibility determination, and returns the information to the originating provider agency using a feedback report that identifies for each scale whether the youth is above or below the at-risk threshold.⁴⁶ The provider may challenge the USC decision and submit evidence supporting the challenge to the GRYD Prevention Review Committee. The Committee has the authority to change the eligibility classification made by USC. This has resulted in some youth being offered services even though their YSET results were below the risk threshold. The provider then seeks to enroll Eligible youth in the GRYD prevention program, develops a case plan for those who do enroll, and begins service delivery.⁴⁷ Based on GRYD Office policy, a youth may be enrolled in the program for up to two retest cycles (one year), and possibly longer if the periodic youth reassessment that the provider conducts provides evidence of a necessary extension. The reassessment form includes changes among the youth's YSETs, other indicators of improvement, such as provider staff assessments of progress, and family assets and strengths. Several indicators in each category are summed, and this raw number is used to determine whether the client is ready to graduate, should continue services, or if the case needs to be further reviewed by the GRYD Office.

⁴⁶ Youth who are already gang members are considered Not-Eligible for prevention services and are referred to GRYD's intervention program. However, in certain situations, youth in gangs are approved for prevention services due to unique circumstances that make them more suitable for prevention versus intervention programs.

⁴⁷ The YSET component of the retest process is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Results of the Referral Process: 2009-2012

The Eligible and Not-Eligible decisions for the youth referred to the GRYD program between its commencement in 2009 and mid-June 2012 are presented in Table V.2.⁴⁸

Time Periods	Eligible		Not-Eligible		All cases
	Total (N)	%	Total (N)	%	Overall Total (N)
Start of program through June 2009	615	45.3%	744	54.7%	1,359
July 2009 through June 2010	1,700	61.6%	1,059	38.4%	2,759
July 2010 through June 2011	921	67.5%	443	32.5%	1,364
July 2011 through mid-June 2012	604	66.5%	304	33.5%	908
Totals	3,840	60.1%	2,550	39.9%	6,390

Referrals to the prevention program were modest in the first few months of 2009 but had picked up very rapidly by the end of June 2009, resulting in more than 1,300 new cases for YSET screening by that time. Approximately 45 percent of those cases were found eligible. Referrals more than doubled over the next year (N=2,759), with 62 percent determined to be eligible, bringing the cumulative total of youth referrals to more than 4,000 since the program's inception. In July 2010 through June 2011, there were far fewer referrals (N=1,364), with a slightly higher group of eligible youth (68 percent), but a referral rate similar to what was experienced in the first few months of the program. In the most recent year, there were 908 referrals, with 67 percent of these cases being eligible.⁴⁹

Thus, the Table V.2 data indicate that the volume of referrals to the program has been declining as the program has matured (from 2,759 in the 12 months from July 2009 to June 2010 to 908 in the 11 ½ months from July 2011 to mid-June 2012). The proportion of referrals judged eligible appears to have stabilized at about two thirds.

The reasons for this decline in referrals are not clear. It is possible that participating referral sources have declining numbers of youth, not already referred, that they consider at-risk. It is also

⁴⁸ Some youth referred to the GRYD prevention program are already in gangs, or for other reasons are considered unsuitable for the prevention approach. Such youth are generally transferred to the intervention services component (discussed below in Chapter VI).

⁴⁹ Full referral data for the month of June 2012 were not available for the Year 3 evaluation report. However, it seems highly probable that the full 12 month total, when available, will be less than the prior year.

possible that as service providers have become more familiar with the YSET eligibility instrument, they have become better at identifying the type of youth who will score above the at-risk cut-point, and so do not accept or test referrals they think will fall below it. It has not been possible, to this point, to obtain the kinds of data that would support assessment of these possibilities.

After an eligibility determination is made, providers must then complete the enrollment process for the youth before services can be given. This involves obtaining an informed consent for the youth to participate from both the youth and the parents or guardians and making arrangements for youth to attend prevention programming at the provider's facilities. The youth or the youth's family may decline at that point, for any reason, and this results in drop-outs by some eligible youth. Consequently, the number of Enrolled youth will generally be less than the number of Eligible youth. At present, information systems documenting enrollment have not reached the stage where reliable measures of enrollment levels can be calculated. It is expected that this condition will be fixed during the next year of the GRYD program.

From the beginning of the GRYD prevention program in 2009 through mid-June 2012, over 6,300 youth were referred to the program. The sources of referrals in each of the 12 GRYD Zones are presented in Table V.3. Consistent with previous years, the table illustrates that most referrals were made by family, friends, and peers (42%), followed by school staff (39%), and smaller percentages of referrals from law enforcement or other sources.

Referral levels range from a high of 841 (Newton) to a low of 214 (Florence-Graham). At the outset of the program, GRYD established 200 individuals per zone as the target number of youth to receive services (later modified to 150-200 for the Model program and 50 for the Traditional program). The exact number of youth who have received services was not available. However, since the average number of referrals deemed eligible for services is 60.1 percent (see Table V.2 above), and using that as a surrogate for the number of youth actually receiving services, it seems likely that most of the zones met their targets.

Table V.3 GRYD Prevention Program Referral Sources From Program Commencement Through Mid-June 2012						
GRYD Zone	Referral Source					Total
	School	Family, Self, Or Peers	Law Enforcement Or Probation	Other	Source Missing	
77 th Division II	398	180	17	24	3	622
Baldwin Village	128	264	89	74	9	564
Boyle Heights	302	163	22	53	9	549
Cypress Park	226	181	26	73	9	515
Florence-Graham	136	68	1	8	1	214
Newton	125	605	2	107	2	841
Pacoima/Foothill	224	210	45	82	22	583
Panorama City	150	193	90	53	5	491
North Hollenbeck	136	162	30	45	33	406
Rampart	347	133	12	150	9	651
Southwest II	181	123	5	40	12	361
Watts/Southeast	159	380	10	38	6	593
Totals N (%)	2,512 (39%)	2,662 (42%)	349 (5%)	747 (12%)	120 (2%)	6,390

Note: the "Other" category includes referrals from churches or religious groups, SNL or GRYD outreach, other city or community programs, events, the Department of Children and Family Services, and intervention workers.

V.4 THE RETESTING PROCESS

V.4.1 Overview

In order to measure change, if any, in risk propensity for each Eligible youth during the period that services are being provided, the Urban Institute developed a retesting process using the same YSET scales contained in the initial eligibility interview. Prevention agencies began retesting youth under this system in late 2010. To distinguish between these two tests, the initial YSET is termed YSET-I, and the retest YSET is termed YSET-R. At this point, many youth have had two or even three retests. To ensure that the most up-to-date information is used to assess each youth's progress in the program, we

concentrate on the most recent retest in this chapter. For example, if a particular youth has taken three retests, we have included in our analyses the initial YSET compared to the third retest rather than those that fall between these two surveys or time points.

Since the YSET-R was developed, the GRYD Office has adopted it as a reassessment procedure. Providers have been instructed to administer the YSET-R to all youth at approximately six month intervals after they enroll in the GRYD program. Providers have not yet reached that goal in part due to retesting backlogs, but they are currently working through retests of the backlog of youth who have been in the program longer than six months. The YSET-R forms are sent to the evaluation team for analysis and scoring. This scoring procedure is conducted in exactly the same manner as the USC initial scoring. Results are then returned to the originating provider. This information is expected to aid providers in determining how to adjust service provision on a case-by-case basis on evidence-based grounds and has the potential to help determine which types of services are, or are not, effective.⁵⁰ In addition, by providing new scores for each retest, with the goal of retests being conducted at six-month increments, the providers have the means to measure change in risk by comparing the various feedback reports, which can help to decide when a youth can “graduate” from the GRYD program.⁵¹

Table V.4 presents zone-by-zone counts of youth referred to the program since its inception in 2009, and the number deemed eligible or not-eligible on the basis of their YSET scores. The total number of referrals is 6,390. Of these, 3,840 were deemed at a high enough risk to be eligible, and 2,550 were not.

Not all youth who are deemed eligible actually enroll in the program and receive services, and some do drop out at a later time. At present, the exact number of youth actively engaged in the program is not known and therefore enrollment status is based upon YSET information. However, the GRYD Office has implemented information gathering systems during the past year that are expected to generate complete counts of active youth.

For the purposes of this report, we have identified subsets of enrolled and not-eligible youth for whom we have both initial YSET-I results and YSET-R results. Their zone-by-zone counts are also listed in Table V.4. There are 1,288 Enrolled youth and 397 Not-Eligible youth in these subsets. It is important to note that the retest numbers are a subset of youth in the program, not counts of all youth in the program.

⁵⁰ Assessment of the differential effects of different services requires information on the specific kinds of services each youth receives and how much service is provided. The GRYD program is developing an information system to gather such data, but it has not yet reached sufficient maturity to be a dependable basis for evaluating which services and how much of each service has the best effect.

⁵¹ Beginning September 1, 2011, the GRYD program started implementing a structured process to assess whether youth receiving services manifest a sufficiently reduced risk level to move out of the program. The process is still underway and is expected to be operational sometime during the fourth program year (July 2012 to June 2013).

Zone	# of Youth Tested for Eligibility through mid-June 2012	# Deemed Eligible for Services	# Deemed Not-Eligible for Services	# of Enrolled Youth for Whom Re-test Information Was Available through mid-June 2012	# of Not-Eligible Youth for Whom Re-test Information Was Available through mid-June 2012
77 th Division II	622	489	133	145	48
Baldwin Village	564	354	210	140	74
Boyle Heights	549	270	279	109	34
Cypress Park	515	312	203	160	24
Florence-Graham	214	116	98	11	6
Newton	841	450	391	134	50
North Hollenbeck	406	237	169	60	6
Pacoima/Foothill	583	283	300	186	60
Panorama City	491	263	228	53	21
Rampart	651	413	238	111	74
Southwest II	361	270	91	65	0
Watts/Southeast	593	383	210	114	0
Totals	6,390	3,840	2,550	1,288	397


Note: The 1,288 youth whose retests are used in this report are a subset of active cases, not a statement of all active cases receiving services. The 397 Not-Eligible youth are a sample of all not-eligible youth whose retests were conducted by providers at the request of the evaluation team. Not-eligible youth are not routinely retested.

V.4.2 Comparison of Enrolled Youth to Not-Eligible Youth

This section measures change in the nine risk scales for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth who had completed at least one YSET-R by mid-June 2012.⁵² The attitudinal scales and the behavioral scales are discussed separately. To avoid the possibility of misinterpretation and/or distortion that might occur due to the low numbers of completed YSET-Rs in some GRYD Zones, results have been aggregated and are presented as a composite for the GRYD program as a whole.

The changes in the average YSET-I to YSET-R scores on the seven Attitudinal Risk Scales are depicted in Figure V.1 for samples of 1,288 GRYD Enrolled youth and 397 Not-Eligible youth.

Figure V.1
Percent Improvement/Deterioration in Average Risk Factor
Scores: YSET-I to Most Recent YSET-R
GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)

* Statistically significant $p < .05$

These numbers represent youth for which both a YSET-I and YSET-R have been conducted and were available. They are therefore a subset of all referrals (about 34 percent of eligible youth, and 16 percent of Not-Eligible youth). The upper bar indicates the percent improvement/deterioration in the average scores for Enrolled youth and the lower bar displays the same change for those who were considered not-eligible at initial screening. A positive percentage change reflects a decrease in risk, and

⁵² Some youth declined to respond to some YSET questions, resulting in counts below 1,288 and 397 in some of the charts.

therefore an improvement. On the Antisocial scale for instance, the Enrolled youth, on average, had scores at retest that were 24.7 percent better than their scores at initial YSET. Alternatively, a negative percentage change shows an increase in risk on that scale. On the Peer Influence scale for instance, Not-Eligible youth had scores that on average were 2.5 percent worse than their scores at initial YSET. An asterisk beside each percentage change indicates that the difference between the two time points is statistically significant at the .05 level.⁵³


The differences in change for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible groups are striking. Enrolled youth improved across all seven risk factor scales. These improvements ranged from 14 percent for the Peer Delinquency Scale to 34 percent for Critical Life Events, and all of the changes were statistically significant. Not-Eligible youth improved, but only very slightly on five of the scales (Antisocial, Parental Supervision, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, and Neutralization) and worsened on the other two (Peer Influence and Peer Delinquency). The largest improvement for the Not-Eligible group was 12 percent on the Critical Life Events scale, but this was only slightly more than one-third of the improvement demonstrated by Enrolled youth.

Caution is needed, however, when considering how to interpret these comparisons. Not-Eligible youth have lower scores than Eligible youth on these scales at the time of referral (otherwise they would not be deemed Not-Eligible). They therefore have less room for improvement, and a simple comparison of magnitude of change may be misleading.

To examine the differences from another perspective, Figures V.2 (Enrolled Youth) and V.3 (Not-Eligible Youth) report the percentages of each group that improved or deteriorated between the initial test and the most recent retest.

⁵³ Measurement of change was calculated using repeated measures t-tests, with significance indicated at $p < .05$.


Figure V.2
Percentage and Number
of Enrolled Youth that Improved or Not
Self-Reported Risk Factor Scores
YSET-I to Most Recent Retest



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)

The percentages and numbers of youth that improved on each risk scale are on the right of the charts, while percentages and numbers of youth that deteriorated are on the left. For example, on the Antisocial scale, 1,046 youth – a little more than 80% of the total – improved, and 239 – a little less than 20% – deteriorated. Each scale can be interpreted this way.

Figure V.3
Percentage and Number
of Not-Eligible Youth that Improved or Not
Self-Reported Risk Factor Scores
YSET-I to Most Recent Retest



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)

It is clear that the large majority of youth that were enrolled in GRYD prevention programs improved on their risk for joining gangs from the time of initial screening to the most recent retest. The largest improvement was for Antisocial Attitudes, where over 80 percent of Enrolled youth showed improvement. The lowest improvement was on the Peer Delinquency scale, which has just over 60 percent of Enrolled youth showing improvement. Improvements on the other scales were all near 70 percent.

In contrast, as shown in Figure V.3, slight majorities of Not-Eligible youth deteriorated between the initial YSET and the retest YSET. The largest changes in this direction were for the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency risk scales, each of which were over 60 percent deterioration. The most positive change for this group was for Antisocial risk, where just over 50 percent showed improvement.

It is clear from both the perspective of average scale scores and an examination of the proportions of youth demonstrating improvement or deterioration that those enrolled in GRYD prevention programs changed positively over the course of receiving GRYD services. Not-Eligible youth showed little change on average scores and, as a group, a greater likelihood of worsening or experiencing no change on the risk factors.

Changes in Reported Behavior – Enrolled and Not-Eligible Youth

In addition to the seven scales discussed above, both the YSET-I and the YSET-R contained twenty items that asked youth to report previous involvement in delinquency and use of illicit or prohibited substances, as well as activities associated with gangs. Each of the items was asked in three ways: whether the youth had ever engaged in a given behavior; whether the youth had engaged in the given behavior in the past six months; and if the youth was a gang member, whether the youth had engaged in the behavior with other gang members. These questions were repeated at retest to determine if the youth consistently engaged in delinquency or reduced the level of such behaviors after receiving services.


For this analysis, we report on the behaviors over the six months prior to the test, and group the behavioral response items into the following four categories: gang-related activities (four questions), violent criminal behavior (four questions); substance use or abuse (four questions); and non-violent criminal behavior (nine questions). Given the explicit GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* mission of reducing gang violence in Los Angeles, the following YSET change analysis focuses only on gang-related activities and violent criminal behavior. The figures below again compare these categories between the YSET-I and the most recent YSET-R. Within each chart the specific YSET items for the given category are presented. The bars depict the proportion and changes in the percentages of youth that responded that they had engaged in the activities within six months prior to the YSET surveys. The difference between the YSET-I and YSET-R percentages is also noted in the chart, as are the total numbers that responded affirmatively to each item.

Comparisons between Enrolled youth and Not-Eligible youth are somewhat problematic for the Behavior Scales because of the low numbers of Not-Eligible youth who reported engaging in some kinds of behaviors. The fact that some numbers are low is of course to be expected – low levels of criminal/delinquent behavior are one of the reasons why the youth were deemed Not-Eligible in the first place.

Changes in Gang-Related Behavior

Figure V.4 presents the number and percentages of youth who reported engaging in gang-related behaviors at initial YSET and retest YSET, and the percent change between the two. For example, 209 youth, 16.2 percent of the 1,288 Enrolled youth, reported having engaged in gang fights during the six months preceding referral. At retest, the number had dropped to 118, 9.2 percent of the total. Thus, the decline between tests in the percentage of youth reporting this behavior was 7.0 percent. More than 50 percent (N=674) of the Enrolled group said that they had “hung out with gang members” prior to starting GRYD, compared to 32.4 percent (N=417) at retest – a 19.9% improvement. Far fewer reported “participating in gang activities” before GRYD, but this number also dropped slightly by retest. All of these changes were statistically significant. In contrast, reports of being a “member of a gang” increased between the initial YSET and most recent retest, but this change was very small in comparison to the total number of youth enrolled (8 youth out of over 1,200) and was not statistically significant.


Figure V.4
Change in Percentages of Self-Reported Gang-Related Behaviors
GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)
 Differences are statistically significant $p < .05$ (n.s. – difference is not significant)

The number of Not-Eligible youth responding affirmatively to the YSET behavior items was quite low during both testing periods (YSET-I and YSET-R), and this is evident in the gang-related behavior items presented in Figure V.5. Fewer than 15 out of the 397 Not-Eligible youth said that they had been in “gang fights,” “participated in gang activities” or had joined a gang in the six months prior. There were 61 youth that said they had, in the six months prior, “hung out with gang members” before taking the YSET-I and this increased to 71 youth by the most recent retest. None of the differences in self-reports were statistically significant.

Figure V.5
Change in Percentage of Self-Reported Gang-Related Behavior
Not-Eligible Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest




Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)
 Differences are statistically significant $p < 0.05$ (n.s. = difference not significant)

Changes in Violent Criminal Behavior

The four items that tested violent criminal behaviors are presented in Figure V.6 for Enrolled youth. There were declines in the number of youth reporting that they had engaged in violent activities in the past six months from the initial screen to the most recent retest across all four behaviors, and, with the exception of “attacking someone with a weapon,” the decreases were statistically significant. The largest change was for “hitting someone to hurt them.” Over half of the Enrolled youth reported “yes” to this question at YSET-I while just over a quarter did so on the retest. Very few acknowledged that they had “attacked someone with a weapon” or “used force to steal,” and the decreases were modest. Two hundred and forty-six Enrolled youth reported that they “carried a hidden weapon” in the six months prior to completing the YSET-I, but this dropped to 174 for the six months prior to YSET-R, a difference of about six percent.


Figure V.6
Change in Percentage of Self-Reported Violent Criminal Behavior
GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)
 Differences are statistically significant $p < .05$ (n.s. – not statistically significant)

Figure V.7 shows that very few Not-Eligible youth acknowledged engaging in any of the violent criminal activities. Less than five admitted to “attacking someone or using force to steal.” Eighty-four did state that they had “hit someone to hurt them” in the six months prior to the initial survey, but this declined to 65 at the most recent retest, although the change was not statistically significant. The number of Not-Eligible youth that acknowledged “carrying a hidden weapon” increased, but again, in comparison to the total number in this group, the increase in number of youth was quite small (24 out of 397).

Figure V.7
Change in Percentage of Self-Reported Violent Criminal Behavior
Not-Eligible Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)
Differences are statistically significant $p < .05$ (n.s. – difference not significant)

In summary, then, the conclusion to be drawn from the information presented in Tables V.1 to V.7 is that Enrolled youth exhibited improvements on all attitudinal scales and behavioral measures that were significantly greater than those shown by Not-Eligible youth.

Changes in Eligibility

The objective of the prevention program is to take youth who are at-risk with respect to joining gangs and participating in gang-related activities and, through the provision of services, help them to change. A key question therefore is whether youth considered eligible on the initial YSET-I would also be considered eligible based on their scores on the YSET-R. In addition, it is important to know whether youth not receiving services because of low scores on the YSET-I have continued to score below the at-risk threshold or whether the retest indicates that they are above the threshold.

To assess these questions, each of the retests we conducted was scored using the USC at-risk standards (see above for details), and a determination of Eligibility/Non-Eligibility was made. For the Enrolled youth who were retested, the findings are presented in Table V.5. Results for Not-Eligible youth are presented in Table V.6.

Table V.5 Changes in Eligibility from YSET-I to YSET-R for Enrolled Youth			
	Total Eligible on YSET-I and Enrolled	Still Eligible at YSET-R	Changed to Not-Eligible at YSET-R
77th II	145	59	85
Baldwin Village	140	41	99
Boyle Heights	109	45	63
Cypress Park	160	68	92
Florence-Graham	11	4	7
Newton	134	50	84
Pacoima/Foothill	186	101	85
Panorama City	53	32	21
North Hollenbeck	60	28	32
Rampart	111	55	56
Southwest II	65	36	29
Watts/Southeast	114	53	61
Totals (%)	1288 (100%)	572 (44.5%)	714 (55.5%)

Note: One youth is excluded from the above table due to missing age; another was removed due to missing data that prevented the risk score calculation.

Table V.5 shows that 55.5 percent of Enrolled youth scored below the eligibility level on their most recent retest. Thus, had the retest scores for this group been the ones recorded at the time of referral, they would not have been offered entry into the program. This demonstrates a substantial improvement in attitudes and behavior during their time in the program. The median time in program for the 714 youth in this group was approximately 16 months, 26 days longer on average than the 572 youth whose retest scores were still above the eligibility level (475 days compared to 449 days).

There is some variability across zones with respect to this measure. Nine of the zones had more youth retesting below eligibility risk levels than continuing at risk; three did not. To date, zone specific assessments of changes in youth attitudes and behavior have not been feasible; consequently, there is currently no explanation for this difference.

	Total Not-Eligible on YSET-I	Still Not-Eligible at Retest	Changed to Eligible at Retest
77th II	48	46	2
Baldwin Village	74	64	10
Boyle Heights	34	30	4
Cypress Park	24	23	1
Florence-Graham	6	4	2
Newton	50	43	7
Pacoima/Foothill	60	46	14
Panorama City	21	21	0
North Hollenbeck	6	6	0
Rampart	74	61	13
Southwest II	0	0	0
Watts/Southeast	0	0	0
Totals (%)	397 (100%)	344 (86.6%)	53 (13.4%)

Table V.6 shows that for youth found not eligible on the YSET-I at referral, only 13.4 percent were found to be above eligibility risk levels at the time of the retest. The vast majority maintained a not-eligible status. All zones that conducted retests had similar outcomes.

V.5 ASSESSING GRYD IMPACTS ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

V.5.1 Introduction

This section describes findings from applying a Regression Discontinuity design to more rigorously evaluate the effects of GRYD's prevention program on the attitudes and self-reported delinquency of youth who enrolled in the program and who were subsequently retested. Enrolled youth are compared to a sample of youth who were referred to the program but who were not deemed sufficiently at-risk to be eligible for GRYD services (i.e., the Not-Eligible youth).

A major challenge for the evaluation has been to identify a group of youth who are similar in demographic characteristics and behavior to the youth receiving prevention services, but who are not themselves receiving services. If such a group could be identified, and if information about the youth in the group could be developed, comparisons between the two groups could help determine whether changes in the youth enrolled in GRYD prevention programming are a consequence of services received. The optimal approach – a randomized design in which youth referred to the GRYD program would be randomly assigned to an experimental group (receiving services) or to a control group (not receiving services) – was declared infeasible by GRYD for ethical reasons at the beginning of the GRYD program. Further, because of insurmountable practical and privacy/security difficulties, finding such a group from the general population of Los Angeles youth was also ruled out.

We have therefore focused on the possibility of comparing Enrolled youth to Not-Eligible youth, within the context of the GRYD prevention program. Youth are separated into these two groups at the time of referral because they have varying risk levels, which mean they are not as equivalent as we would like for evaluation purposes. Thus, the simple comparison of changes in attitude and behavior between them that we have performed, though informative and accurate, is not completely satisfactory because there is a possibility that the differences we have noted may be partly due to the non-equivalency of the groups. To partially compensate for these methodological realities, we complement the descriptive analysis with the Regression Discontinuity design because it is suitable for analyzing a program such as GRYD, where eligibility for GRYD prevention services is based on reaching a specific cut-point on a scale of risk factors measured by the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET).⁵⁴

V.5.2 A Hypothetical Illustration of Regression Discontinuity

To illustrate how the Regression Discontinuity design works, we present a hypothetical illustration in Figure V.8. Assume that eligibility for a program such as GRYD is based on a scoring

⁵⁴ Schochet, P., Cook, T., Deke, J., Imbens, G., Lockwood, J.R., Porter, J., and Smith, J. 2010. "Standards for Regression Discontinuity Design." Retrieved from What Works Clearinghouse website: http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/pdf/wwc_rd.pdf.


scheme that ranges from 0 to 50, and that youth scoring above 25 are to be considered eligible for a program. Now consider that the outcome of interest is some measure of gang-joining over time (e.g. six months or a year after the scores are obtained). The vertical axis in Figure V.8 represents the gang-joining rate (from 0-100 percent), and the horizontal axis represents the at-risk score. The vertical line in the center of the figure is the cut-point (a score of 25). The dark S-shaped curve plots the at-risk scores of our hypothetical group. The line to the left of the cut-point plots not-eligible scores below the cut-point; the line to the right plots eligible scores above the cut-point. The dotted continuations of each solid line simply illustrate how the actual scores would have continued to 0 or 100 percent.

As in the real world of the GRYD program, we assume that there can be multiple individuals scoring at any given level. The plots show how gang-joining rates rise as the at-risk levels of the youth (eligible versus not-eligible) also rise. Because the eligible group is higher risk, we can expect them to join gangs at a higher rate. Thus, the dark line to the right of the cut-point is (on average) much higher than the dark line to the left. Indeed, it would appear that, in this hypothetical presentation, the average gang-joining rate for the eligible group is about 75 percent, whereas the average gang-joining rate for the not-eligible group is about 35 percent.

This would indicate that in the time period after the scores were obtained, the eligible group performed much worse with respect to gang joining. However, this difference should not be used to suggest that the program was the cause of the difference. It would be more meaningful to compare the hypothetical sample members around a score of 25 because at that point – the point of discontinuity or cut-point – they have similar at-risk levels. The plot shows that, at the point of discontinuity, there is a sharp decline in the gang-joining rate. Some eligible youth joined gangs at a lower rate than not-eligible youth. Hence, even though the average gang-joining rate for the eligible group may be higher than that of the not-eligible group, when the sample members who are similar are compared, the conclusion would be that the program reduced gang-joining. A technical appendix to this chapter, Appendix D, documents how the Regression Discontinuity design supports an estimation of that drop in the outcome at the point of discontinuity.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Appendix D also provides further details on the regression discontinuity approach.

Figure V.8 Graphical Depiction of the Regression Discontinuity Design



There are several advantages to using a Regression Discontinuity design in this context. First, it would be difficult to apply other quasi-experimental designs to evaluate the effectiveness of the GRYD program because most of them rely on attempting to account for the differences between the not-eligible and enrolled youth. There is very little overlap between the two groups in terms of riskiness or how likely it would be that youth in each group would join a gang, given that the Not-Eligible youth are by design considered to be at a lower risk level, and standard quasi-experimental designs would not accomplish the balance between the two groups. This could bias the results and lead to erroneous conclusions about the effects of the program.

Second, sometimes there is fuzziness in terms of the selection mechanism for which youth enter the program and which do not, and the Regression Discontinuity design can accommodate that. For example, fuzziness might be introduced by the possibility of over-rides or changes in the cut-point itself. In such cases, some sample members below the cut-point might be deemed eligible and some above the

cut-point might be deemed not-eligible. This is, in fact, the situation in the GRYD program. For example, we previously mentioned challenge cases where Not-Eligible youth may be admitted to the program if a strong case is presented for doing so.

Third, as was noted above, the Regression Discontinuity design is an analytical strategy that produces estimates of the difference around the point of discontinuity by using data on the entire sample, including cases that score 0 and those that score 50. Despite these benefits, there are some drawbacks and assumptions that must be satisfied for the design to produce credible estimates. First, there must actually be a discontinuity around the cut-point (and therefore program participation). For example, if the hypothetical cut-point of 25 is frequently compromised there might not be an observable discontinuity in the selection process. Further, the Regression Discontinuity design could still be compromised if there are other relevant factors that also exhibit discontinuity at the cut-point of 25. For example, if the age of the youth also exhibits a jump at a score of 25 (meaning older youth have higher scores and younger youth have lower scores), then it would be unclear if the hypothetical drop in gang-joining is because of the program or the change in age at the point of discontinuity.

Fourth, the design relies on the modeled links between the eligibility score and the outcome of interest. This poses two concerns. There should clearly be sufficient range in the score to allow us to estimate the relationship. At a minimum, there should be four distinct points to the left and four to the right of the cut-point (see methodological Appendix D). But more importantly, the Regression Discontinuity results can be sensitive to the functional form of the relationship between the score and the outcome. For example, should the relationship between the variables of interest be linear, quadratic, or some flexible form? In practice, a flexible functional form is usually preferred as it provides the most conservative estimates. Given these potential drawbacks, it is always advisable to conduct robustness checks to ensure that these assumptions are not violated. We do this at the end of this section.

A final limitation of the Regression Discontinuity design is its generalizability. The Regression Discontinuity design is what is termed a localized design. There are two aspects of this limitation that should be highlighted. First, it provides estimates of the program's effect on the outcome only under the current program admission standards. For example, an analysis of the plot in Figure V.8 would lead researchers to conclude that the hypothetical program reduces gang joining. However, if, in a future year, the hypothetical program were to revise its eligibility cut-point to 35, the Regression Discontinuity results from using 25 as the cut-point would not be a credible basis for concluding the same or similar effectiveness. However, for an assessment of the program as it is currently implemented, the Regression Discontinuity design is aptly suited. The second aspect of this limitation relates to the variations in the effectiveness of the program at different points. If the Regression Discontinuity design shows no effect of the program at the current cut-point, this in no way suggests that the program is ineffective for all members being treated. For example, even if the Regression Discontinuity has an insignificant effect around the cut-point of 25, it is still possible that the program could be working effectively among sample members who have very high at-risk levels (for example, those who score 40 or above in our hypothetical example).

V.5.3 Comparison of Eligible and Not-Eligible Youth

Moving to the actual data derived from the GRYD prevention program, we begin with an assessment of 1,685 youth referred to the program. Table V.7 presents the risk factor scores for this sample, and the Eligible/Not-Eligible determination that was made on the basis of their YSET scores. Youth in the Eligible sample were all actually enrolled in the program and received services.⁵⁶

Number of High Risk Factors	Number of Youth in Category	Number Enrolled in GRYD	% Enrolled in GRYD	Number Not-Eligible	% Not-Eligible
0	112	0	0%	112	100%
1	94	1	1%	93	99%
2	115	8	7%	107	93%
3	116	46	40%	70	60%
4	189	180	95%	9	5%
5	241	239	99%	2	1%
6	285	283	99%	2	1%
7	268	267	100%	1	0%
8	178	177	99%	1	1%
9	87	87	100%	0	0%
Totals	1,685	1,288	76%	397	24%

Irrespective of the source from which youth are referred to the GRYD prevention program, they are first assessed for their risk of gang-joining and criminal or delinquent behavior. This assessment is done via the initial administration of the YSET (designated YSET-I). Based on algorithmic rules, youth are either deemed eligible or not-eligible for prevention services. The rules are summarized as follows:

- Youth who report being active in a gang are referred to the GRYD intervention program and are not eligible.
- Before November 9, 2009, youth who were not in a gang and had three or fewer risk factors were deemed not-eligible. Youth who had four risk factors were considered for further screening. Youth with five or more risk factors and not in a gang were considered eligible.
- After November 9, 2009, the threshold for eligibility was lowered to four risk factors and modest changes were made in some of the items for some of the risk factor scales.

⁵⁶ Two hundred and fifty-four prevention program youth for whom enrollment could not be determined have been excluded from the regression discontinuity analysis.

There have been a few exceptions to these rules. As Table V.7 shows, some youth with risk factor scores less than four are reported as being enrolled and some youth scoring at or above five are recorded as being not-eligible. However, these crossovers are not sufficient in number to compromise the findings.

Given that the YSET-R has become a systematic part of the periodic reassessment process to which every enrolled youth is subject, with youth being retested every six months, some Enrolled Youth have had multiple retests. As was the case in previous analyses, we have used their most recent retest. A sample of 1,200 Not-Eligible youth (100 from each GRYD Zone) was randomly selected by the evaluation team, and GRYD's service providers were asked to locate these youth and retest them as part of the evaluation process. This was a difficult task due to the fact that some Not-Eligible youth have moved and others declined to participate. In the aggregate, providers were able to locate and retest 397 Not-Eligible youth.

Since, for all intents and purposes, the youth in our dataset who scored "at-risk" on three or fewer risk factors were considered Not-Eligible while those who scored "at-risk" on four or more were considered Eligible, we define the point of discontinuity as the break between three and four factors.

As noted in the introductory section, the Regression Discontinuity design is capable of handling over-rides or small changes in eligibility criteria that result in overlap between the two groups. This design is termed the Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design (as opposed to the Sharp Regression Discontinuity design). In our analysis, we have relied on this variant of the standard regression discontinuity design to assess the effectiveness of GRYD at improving attitudes and behavior for Enrolled youth compared to Not-Eligible youth.

V.5.4 Findings

The effects of GRYD on a total of seven attitudinal scales and twenty behavioral items, which were grouped into four delinquency measures, were analyzed:

Attitudinal scales: Antisocial, Parental Supervision, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, Neutralization, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency.

Behavioral Measures: Self-reported delinquency measures were computed separately for Substance Abuse/Use, Gang-Related Behavior, Violent Criminal Behavior, and Non-Violent Criminal Behavior.

The outcome measures of interest were changes in these scales and measures between the YSET-I and YSET-R. If GRYD prevention services have had a positive effect, we should find that scores on the scales reduce between the initial YSET and the retest YSET. To assess whether any changes are more likely to be a result of GRYD than any other factors (e.g., aging of the youth), the reduction, if any, should be larger for youth who received services – the Enrolled group – than for the youth who did not – the Not-Eligible youth. In other words, if the difference between the YSET-I and YSET-R for the Enrolled youth were found to be no greater than for the Not-Eligible youth, the GRYD program could not be assumed to have an effect.

Because the assignment of youth to the Enrolled and Not-Eligible groups is based, in part, on these risk measures (i.e., the attitudinal and behavioral scales), and because there is a substantial variation in the degree of risk observed across youth (some are just above or just below the cut-point representing low to moderate levels of risk while others manifest a much greater distance from the cut-point or a high level of risk), a simple comparison of their scale scores (i.e., what the youth's score was on the Antisocial Scale) could be misleading. However, as noted in the introductory section, the Regression Discontinuity design permits us to use the full sample to estimate the change in outcome at the point of discontinuity, thereby allowing us to derive credible inferences about the effectiveness of GRYD services—at least in improving the outcomes of the marginal youth (on or about the cut-point).

For each of the outcomes considered, two different versions of change between the initial YSET (denoted with 'I' in formulas hereafter as YSET-I) and the retest (denoted with 'R' in formulas hereafter as YSET-R) were constructed—calculating a difference and a ratio. Because the scales are an additive sum of underlying responses, in other words a combination of several questions on the survey with the higher the score meaning higher risk, there is a natural range for each scale. The lowest possible value for any scale is 0. This means that individuals who score low on the initial assessment cannot score much lower on the reassessment because they started out with a low score that bottoms out at 0 and cannot become negative. As a result, simply computing the difference between the I and R scores tends to bias the analysis towards finding larger differences among those who are at higher risk (as reflected by higher scores on their initial assessment), than those at lower risk. As a robustness check, therefore, we also created ratio measures of the percent change in the reassessment risk scale (relative to the initial assessment). Ratio measures of change are less susceptible to the bias introduced by the variation in the initial risk scores of the two groups. Specifically, the difference measures are computed as $\text{Difference} = R - I$, whereas ratio measures are computed as $\text{Ratio} = R/I$. Because the scales can have a value of 0 and the denominator of the ratio ('I') cannot be equal to 0, the ratio versions were operationalized as $\text{Ratio} = (1+R)/(1+I)$ to avoid getting missing values as a result of dividing by 0. These computations were performed for the Enrolled youth and the Not-Eligible youth, and the difference between the two groups was calculated

Table V.8 presents the results from the analysis of the difference and ratio measures. The table contains two types of analysis: Average Change and Modeled Change. The Average Change analysis compares the attitudinal and behavioral changes for Enrolled youth with the same level of change among Not-Eligible youth. The Modeled Change compares the same outcomes for youth scoring below and above the cut-point of four. There are three sets of modeled changes. The Unconditional estimate provides a simple comparison of the outcome in these two groups, the difference between youth above and below the cut-point (while accounting for the fact that some youth with scores of four or above were Not-Eligible and some with scores below four were Enrolled). The two 'RegDisc' estimates following that are from the Regression Discontinuity design analysis. As a robustness check, the table presents the estimates using a linear functional form (referred to as linear in the table) as well as a flexible functional form (referred to as flexible in the table).

Table V.8 provides estimates of what is called a Fuzzy RDD analysis⁵⁷ for changes in seven attitudinal scales. YSET-I and YSET-R data were available for a total of 1,684 youth⁵⁸ - 1,288 Enrolled and 397 Not-Eligible. The point of discontinuity is set at the break between 3 and 4 (e.g., all scores equal to or above four are considered in the same eligible category). A cut-point of four is appropriate because, as Table V.8 shows, the probability of enrollment was almost 100 percent at a total risk score of four or more.

Of the 1,684 youth in the sample, 76 percent were Enrolled in GRYD and 24 percent were Not-Eligible. As noted, the sample includes a few youth who scored above the cut-point but were not enrolled and a few who scored below the cut-point and were enrolled.

⁵⁷ The term 'Fuzzy' RDD analysis is used to reflect the fact that some youth who scored below the cut-point are nevertheless enrolled in GRYD, while some other youth who scored above the cut-point are not. See Appendix D on the Regression Discontinuity Methodology for a more complete explanation of the analytic adjustments being made to accommodate such cross-overs.

⁵⁸ Two youth were missing comparable information on the Antisocial and Peer Delinquency scales and were dropped from the analysis.

Table V.8 Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Attitudinal Scales							
	Attitudinal Scales						
	Antisocial	Parental Supervision	Critical Life Events	Impulsive Risk Taking	Neutralization	Peer Influence	Peer Delinquency
Sample Size Used	1,682	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,682
Percent Enrolled	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%
Percent Not-eligible	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%
Average Difference Between Enrolled and Not-Eligible Groups							
Difference (R-I)	-3.76 **	-2.31 **	-1.27 **	-2.99 **	-4.21 **	-2.45 **	-2.05 **
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	-0.20 **	-0.23 **	-0.28 **	-0.23 **	-0.23 **	-0.28 **	-0.17 **
Modeled Difference Between Youth Below and Above the Point of Discontinuity							
Difference (R-I)							
Unconditional	-4.65 **	-2.92 **	-1.47 **	-3.55 **	-4.77 **	-2.88 **	-2.42 **
RegDisc (Linear)	-2.02 **	0.78 **	-0.59 **	-2.10 **	-1.89 **	0.77 *	1.96 **
RegDisc (Flexible)	-1.52 **	1.04 **	-0.28	-1.02 **	-0.68	1.21 **	1.47 **
Difference as Ratio (R/I)							
Unconditional	-0.25 **	-0.30 **	-0.32 **	-0.27 **	-0.26 **	-0.34 **	-0.20 **
RegDisc (Linear)	-0.14 **	0.09 *	-0.14 **	-0.19 **	-0.14 **	0.00	0.09 **
RegDisc (Flexible)	-0.10 **	0.14 **	-0.01	-0.08 **	-0.04 *	0.08	0.08 **

NOTE: ** indicates a statistical significance level of $p < .05$ and * indicates a level of $p < .10$

The entries in the table can be interpreted as follows. The number -3.76 in the Antisocial column indicates that, for this scale, the decrease in risk from I-R for the Enrolled youth was greater than the decrease in the same scale for Not-Eligible youth by an average 3.76 units. This number is calculated from data not included in the table as follows: the mean of the Antisocial scale for the Not-Eligible youth dropped 0.73 (from 12.93 at YSET-I to 12.20 at YSET-R) but the mean of the Antisocial scale for the youth Enrolled in GRYD dropped 4.49 (from 18.15 at YSET-I to 13.66 at YSET-R). Subtracting 0.73 from 4.49 results in a difference of 3.76. This indicates that Enrolled youth improved much more than Not-Eligible youth during the time services were provided.

The ratio version of the outcome is compared in a similar manner. The average ratio change for youth enrolled in GRYD was 0.79 and for the Not-Eligible youth was 0.99 (these background numbers are not included in Table V.8). This yields a difference of 0.20, as indicated in the Table V.8. Note that the ratio version computes the change between YSET-I and YSET-R as a percent change. Therefore, on average, the YSET-R scores for GRYD Enrolled youth were 79 percent of the YSET-I scores. For the Not-Eligible youth, the YSET-R scores were about 99 percent of the YSET-I scores (reflecting almost no change; scores were very similar between the two waves of the survey). The two versions are thus mutually supportive in that both provide evidence of GRYD's positive effects on youth receiving services.

The modeled estimates use the discontinuity point for making comparisons (as opposed to the actual enrollment status of the youth). The unconditional estimates are similar to the average difference calculations explained above with two caveats. First, rather than use the enrollment status (Enrolled versus Not-Eligible), these numbers are computed by comparing youth below and above the point of discontinuity. Second, they account for the fact that there is a discrepancy between the eligibility criteria or cut-point of four, and actual enrollment status. As a result, because it is based on a parameter estimate from a regression model, there is no simple way to interpret the calculations of an estimate like -4.65 under the Antisocial scale (which is possible for the average calculation above). However, this number is still an estimate of the difference between youth below or above the point of discontinuity. The two estimates labeled 'RegDisc' provide the same calculation but *at the point of discontinuity*.

Figure V.8 provided a graphical depiction of the regression discontinuity design. As was explained earlier, the effect of the program (GRYD services in this case) is computed as the drop in the outcome at the point of discontinuity. In the hypothetical example in Figure V.8, this drop is shown at the score of 25 (from almost 68 percent to about 45 percent). This would constitute a drop of 23 percent points. The number -1.52 under the Antisocial scale is the estimate of the actual drop in the outcome (change between YSET-I and YSET-R) at the point of discontinuity, when utilizing a flexible functional form. In other words, the reduction in the Antisocial scale between YSET-I and YSET-R was 1.52 units more for GRYD Enrolled youth than among the Not-Eligible youth. The number -2.02 is the same estimate using a linear functional form. The row presented in bold face (the flexible model) provides the most conservative estimates and is what we use to derive inferences about the performance of GRYD. This helps to guard against overstating GRYD effects. The main findings are summarized below:

- First, on the Antisocial and Impulsive Risk Taking scales, enrollment in the GRYD program significantly reduced the attitudinal scales between YSET-I and YSET-R by a larger magnitude than the change for similar youth who did not receive GRYD services. For Critical Life Events and Neutralization scales, the reductions for GRYD Enrolled youth are larger than the Not-Eligible youth, but the differences are not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.
- Second, for the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence and Peer-Delinquency attitudinal scales, the effects are statistically significant but in the wrong direction (the reductions are smaller among the GRYD Enrolled youth than the Not-Eligible youth, at the margin).
- Third, the difference and ratio versions of the change between the YSET-R and YSET-I scales generally depict similar results. Typically, when one is statistically and substantively significant, the other is as well (the sole exception is the Peer Influence scale).
- Fourth, though the flexible functional form versions of the models provide more conservative estimates of the effects of GRYD program than the linear versions, the effects reported through both are always in the same direction (positive or negative).

In order to assess the substantive significance of the estimates reported in Table V.8, Table V.9 provides the estimated standard deviations (variation from the average) of the changes in the various attitudinal scales for the entire sample. For example, on average, deviation of the change in the

Antisocial scale (between YSET-I and YSET-R) is 4.77. This puts the estimated reduction (provided in Table V.8 as -1.52) in correct perspective. It suggests that the effect of GRYD is about 30 percent of the average deviation in the sample as a whole ($1.52/4.77 = 0.31$). There is no hard rule to interpreting this as substantively significant or otherwise. However, as is evident, the most conservative estimates from the flexible functional forms range between 10 and 30 percent of the standard deviation in the sample. This suggests that some of the effects are more substantial than others. For example, it would appear that the effect of GRYD on the Antisocial scale is fairly substantive (as it reflects a reduction that is over 30 percent of the standard deviation in the sample). On the other hand, although statistically significant, the effect of GRYD on Neutralization scales is considerably smaller (reflecting a reduction that is only 13 percent of the standard deviation in the sample).

	Attitudinal Scales						
	Antisocial	Parental Supervision	Critical Life Events	Impulsive Risk Taking	Neutralization	Peer Influence	Peer Delinquency
Difference (R-I)	4.77	3.90	2.08	4.15	5.21	4.41	4.37
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	0.27	0.47	0.53	0.31	0.28	0.54	0.37

It is difficult to interpret the effects of GRYD on the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency scales. Findings from Table V.8 suggest that GRYD participants showed less improvement in these domains, compared to non-participants. Though parents/guardians and peers may experience little personal attitudinal change simply because GRYD is providing services to the youth it is unclear why participant scores on these scales should deteriorate.

Table V.10 presents the same results for the self-report delinquency and substance abuse scales and Table V.11 presents the standard deviations of the outcome measures. The notations in these tables are the same as in Tables V.8 and V.9. The regression discontinuity analysis suggests that the GRYD Enrolled youth do not, in general, manifest larger and statistically significant changes in their self-reported delinquent behavior than similar Not-Eligible youth. The one exception is a reduction in non-violent criminal behavior using the ratio measure with the flexible functional form specification. However, even this reduction is only statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence level.

Table V.10 Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Self-Report Delinquency Scales				
	Self-report Delinquency Scales			
	Substance Abuse/Use	Gang-related Behavior	Violent Criminal Behavior	Non-violent Criminal Behavior
Sample Size Used	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,684
Percent Enrolled	76%	76%	76%	76%
Percent Not-eligible	24%	24%	24%	24%
Average Difference Between Enrolled and Not-Eligible Groups				
Difference (R-I)	-0.25 **	-0.35 **	-0.33 **	-1.21 **
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	-0.03	-0.17 **	-0.15 **	-0.37 **
Modeled Difference Between Youth Below and Above the Point of Discontinuity				
Difference (R-I)				
Unconditional	-0.28 **	-0.38 **	-0.38 **	-1.45 **
RegDisc (Linear)	0.22 **	0.01	0.06	0.21
RegDisc (Flexible)	0.13	0.00	0.07	0.00
Difference as Ratio (R/I)				
Unconditional	-0.04	-0.17 **	-0.17 **	-0.47 **
RegDisc (Linear)	0.21 **	0.01	0.00	-0.17 *
RegDisc (Flexible)	0.13 *	0.01	0.00	-0.18 *

NOTE: ** indicates a statistical significance level of $p < .05$ and * indicates a level of $p < .10$

Table V.11 Standard Deviations of the Self-Report Delinquency Scale Changes (from YSET-I to YSET-R) for the Full Sample				
	Self-report Delinquency Scales			
	Substance Abuse/Use	Gang-related Behavior	Violent Criminal Behavior	Non-violent Criminal Behavior
Difference (R-I)	0.99	1.00	0.92	2.24
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	0.65	0.60	0.55	0.93

V.5.5 Robustness Checks

As noted earlier in this section, the robustness of the Regression Discontinuity design method rests on assumptions that need to be checked. In Figure V.9, we present robustness checks in two critical areas. First, we consider whether the probability of enrollment does in fact display a discontinuity at or about the YSET cut-point. Second, we examine five other characteristics of the youth to see if they also possess a discontinuity at that point. Violation of either of these conditions would render the reported findings suspect.

Figure V.9: Variation in the Percent GRYD Enrolled and Demographic Factors Across the Range of Values of the Number of Risk Factors




Figure V.9⁵⁹ plots the average of several series over the range of possible values for the number of risk factors. The percent-GRYD Enrolled series (using data from Table V.7) is the only one that displays a marked discontinuity or shift in the pattern that the line follows. The discontinuity is at the YSET cut point (between 3 and 4 risk factors). The other five series—percent male, percent Black, percent Latino,

⁵⁹ The percentage series (GRYD Enrolled, Male, Black, and Latino) are measured on the left axis. Average Age and Average Grade are measured on the right axis.

average age, and average grade of the youth—all vary little across the range of risk levels and none exhibit a discontinuity at the YSET cut point.⁶⁰ This indicates that the results presented in Tables V.8 and V.9 are not the result of changes in the five factors from one risk level to another.

V.6 CONCLUSIONS

Attitudinal and Behavioral Change in Prevention Program Youth

Changes between initial assessments of at-risk levels at the time of referral, and retest assessments at six month intervals thereafter were analyzed for a sample of 1,288 youth in the prevention program. These youth were compared to 397 others who had been deemed not-eligible at referral due to low scores on the Youth Services Evaluation Tool.

We examined the seven attitudinal scales that comprise the YSET test, comparing changes from initial YSET to the most recent retest YSET for enrolled youth, and concluded that substantial and statistically significant improvements had taken place on all the scales. Improvements also took place with respect to self-reported delinquent and gang-related behaviors, though at somewhat lower levels. Overall, by the time of the last retest, 55 percent of the youth would no longer have qualified for entry into the program because their at-risk levels had dropped below the cut-point established by GRYD as the threshold for service eligibility.

The comparisons to the not-eligible sample, using the same measures, indicated that, on average, the not-eligible youth had some improvements on most of the attitudinal scales but at lower proportions than the enrolled youth, and at lower levels of improvement. The not-eligible youth had little change in gang-related behaviors.

Because of the fact that enrolled youth and not-eligible youth were not equivalent groups at the time of referral, drawing firm conclusions from the descriptive comparisons between the two groups is problematic. It is probable that a low risk group will have had fewer problems and had less chance to improve their at-risk levels since they were already low to begin with. We conducted a Regression Discontinuity analysis to obtain other estimates of the comparative change between the enrolled and not-eligible groups. The results affirmed that the enrolled youth had reduced their risk levels and gang-related behavior to a greater extent than the not-eligible youth, after controlling as much as possible for the difference in at-risk levels that the initial YSET disclosed. Our view is that these reductions have been brought about by the GRYD program.

⁶⁰ Percent male, percent Black, percent Latino, and the enrollment rate are measured on the left y-axis while the average age and average grade variables are measured on the right y-axis of Figure V.9.

CHAPTER VI

INTERVENTION

This chapter addresses the GRYD program's intervention strategy, which seeks to encourage youth desistance from gang activity and facilitate proactive peace-making responses to incidents of gang violence. The GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* outlines a two-pronged approach to guide intervention programming: crisis response and proactive peace-making in the community; and family-based case management activities for gang-involved youth.⁶¹ Crisis response is a coordinated reaction to violent incidents in the community and is intended to directly interrupt gang violence. In order to encourage and facilitate joint responsibility in the handling of violent incidents, a tripartite system involving law enforcement, GRYD staff, and Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) comprise the Triangle team that responds to violent incidents when they occur. Family-based case management provides a variety of services to gang members in order to encourage them to desist from engaging in violent acts and facilitate their departure from gang membership.

The first section of this chapter includes a description of the case management component. However, because only a limited amount of data on GRYD case management activities is currently available, that topic is not examined in detail in this Y3 evaluation report. The second section of this chapter examines crisis response from several perspectives to assess the impact that GRYD intervention strategies are having on violent gang crime. To do so, the section reports on results of surveys and focus group discussions conducted with participants of the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), a GRYD Office-sponsored training program for CIWs. The chapter then examines a subset of violent incidents from 2012 to which members of a Triangle team responded. Next, survey responses capturing the experiences of individuals in the three Triangle response groups during a sample of violent incidents are reported and reviewed.

The chapter then provides a summary of views from a random sample of LAPD personnel who work in LAPD areas that contain GRYD Zones and/or Summer Night Lights recreation areas. Some questions from this survey touch upon intervention activities; others focus on topics such as the GRYD program overall, its key components, and LAPD personnel's views on changes in gang crime and violence since the program's inception. Finally, the chapter offers summary conclusions on GRYD intervention programming.

VI.1 FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT

The family-based case management component of the GRYD program is intended to serve 14-25 year olds who are gang-involved. In order to be eligible for services, youth must meet two or more criteria that indicate gang involvement, such as personal identification as a gang member, identification as a gang member by a Los Angeles Police Department Gang Unit officer, the presence of gang tattoos, and gang-activity related arrests, among other criteria. The program also intentionally targets gang-

⁶¹ *Comprehensive Strategy*, op. cit.

involved individuals reentering the community from a correctional institution, and the GRYD Office states that at least 10 percent of clients are considered reentry status.

According to the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy*, case management links clients to resources within the client's community to meet his or her service needs. Each client is assigned a family-based case management team, which includes both a case manager and a CIW. Programming spans six phases from referral and assessment (Phase 1) through to reassessment (Phase 6). Services are provided to clients on a six-month cycle following the assessment period, during which case management connects youth with a wide range of services, varying based on the individual client's specific needs. Examples of services span from vocational training and job placement to tattoo removal and assistance with record expungement. At reassessment during the sixth month of programming, the client's family-based case management team determines whether the youth has made sufficient progress to exit the program, or if the youth should remain in the program for an additional six-month cycle of case management services.

The GRYD Office began a systematic data collection procedure for family case management during the spring of 2012. Information on referrals and clients' characteristics, as well as the meetings, referrals, and activities clients received as part of family case management services, is now collected by intervention providers on a regular basis. The GRYD Office anticipates these data will be ready for analysis in the Year 4 evaluation.

VI.2 LOS ANGELES VIOLENCE INTERVENTION TRAINING ACADEMY

The Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA) is a component of the Advancement Project's Urban Peace Academy.⁶² LAVITA provides training designed to professionalize CIWs and to provide them with the necessary skills to communicate effectively with other responders, gang members, victims, victims' families, and the community. In addition, LAVITA seeks to encourage the ongoing education of CIWs through the provision of continuing education courses.

VI.2.1 Background and Course Certification

The LAVITA Basic 101 Certification course is a 140-hour lecture-based program. Standards of Practice and Conduct, developed by the Professional Standards Committee (PSC) of the Urban Peace Academy, are used for assessing and certifying Academy participants on the basis of pre/post interviews, pre/post written exams, and a classroom-based conduct and participation point system. Intervention workers who do not have contracts with the GRYD program may also attend this training through self-referral, former graduates' nomination, or referrals from PSC members. LAVITA course material is structured around five core competencies: direct practice, personal development, applied theory, concrete tasks, and broader policy initiatives. In addition to the Basic 101 course, an accelerated training is also offered. While the accelerated course addresses similar topics to the Basic 101 course, its instructional methodology utilizes a seminar format rather than a lecture-based approach.

⁶² For information on the Advancement Project (AP), go to www.advancementprojectca.org. The Urban Peace Academy is one of AP's centers.

The entry and accelerated curriculums share the same broad training objectives:

- To appreciate the contribution to effective intervention at the street level of LAVITA training components at all levels (Entry level, Continuing Education, SNL, and Accelerated);
- To understand the use of a license to operate,⁶³ mediation, and conflict resolution in creating a safe community;
- To understand ethnic dynamics in relation to the field of gang intervention;
- To understand the public health approach to violence reduction;
- To understand the role of gang intervention within the public health model; and
- To understand the importance of succession planning for sustaining violence reduction efforts.

The Advancement Project launched its first training program in March of 2010. Since the program's inception, 126 participants have received certification through the LAVITA course. Seventy-eight of the participating CIWs have worked in GRYD Zones. Five CIWs participating in Summer Night Lights programming were certified, and forty-three others also received certification.

VI.2.2 Stakeholder Perceptions

In order to gather stakeholder perceptions of the LAVITA course, surveys and focus groups were conducted with LAVITA students and instructors who participated in the LAVITA program during the fall of 2011. Nine instructors and eight students submitted survey responses. One additional instructor provided focus group input but declined to submit survey responses to the evaluation team. Both the survey and focus groups addressed the overview component of the training – which offers participants exposure to the basics of the program such as its expectations and requirements – and each of its five core components. Respondents were asked to rate the quality of each of the five core training topics as well as each subtopic that the LAVITA curriculum was intended to cover within the five themes. The focus group discussion closely followed the content of the survey, and was intended to elicit more detailed information on stakeholder perceptions. The results are summarized by topic below.

Training Overview

LAVITA training begins with an initial overview component to introduce course participants to program expectations, requirements, standards of conduct, and group agreements. Group activities are also conducted to introduce students, instructors, and administrators.

Both instructors and participants responded positively about the overview component of the training. In particular, survey responses indicated that the discussion of training expectations was effective. In the focus groups, entry level participants suggested that the overview component provided helpful ground rules, basic logistical information, and guidance to support a respectful course environment among participants. Participants in both the entry level and accelerated courses noted that the ground rules introduced by the overview component encouraged honesty and professionalism throughout LAVITA course participation.

⁶³ Defined as the gaining and sustaining of street credibility with gangs in the community.

Direct Practice

The direct practice component of LAVITA emphasizes the development of basic skills and knowledge for entry level gang intervention and introduces intervention workers to the basic “dos and don’ts” of gang intervention work. Topics covered in the theme include females in gangs, victims’ services, license to operate, mediation/conflict resolution, community crisis intervention, intervention organizing, creating ceasefires, school-based intervention, hospital intervention, reentry to the community from jail or prison, fire department dynamics, and law enforcement.

Within the direct practice component, the quality of the license to operate training received the most positive survey feedback; most instructors and participants indicated that the training was very helpful. Other topics receiving positive responses (measured by helpful or very helpful responses) from the majority of both instructor and participant survey respondents included victims’ services, community crisis intervention, creating ceasefires, school-based intervention, hospital intervention, and reentry/prison nexus. The quality of the law enforcement dynamics training received the most negative responses, with a third of participants reporting that the training was not helpful.

Three direct practice topics were highlighted during the focus groups: females in gangs, mediation/conflict resolution, and license to operate. Participants felt that the curriculum on females in gangs was insufficient, in both the entry and advanced course. Program participants also noted that the mediation/conflict resolution topic was particularly important to them. But, the difficulty of teaching mediation was also emphasized – a skill that participants believed must be learned through practical experience. In addition, some participants suggested that the mediation role-playing exercise was not helpful because mediation could not be clearly communicated by an individual prior to having experience mediating an actual conflict. Participants disagreed on the effectiveness of the license to operate training. While some participants suggested that the training deserved greater curricular attention, others felt that it was not a teachable skill, but rather one that is closely related to individual intervention worker capabilities and community connections. Instructors also highlighted that training should provide clarification on the role of intervention activities and workers’ and victims’ services as well as the need for additional time dedicated to the topic of females in gangs.

Personal Development

The personal development component of LAVITA aims to cultivate a code of conduct and understanding of professionalism among entry level gang intervention workers. Course instruction seeks to encourage personal insight, self-reflection, and individual growth. Topics covered in this theme include recent cases, CIWs’ roles and responsibilities, ethics, professionalism, leadership, handling individuals with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and healing/reflection.

The ethics, CIWs’ roles and responsibilities training, professionalism, and leadership training were reported as the most helpful by both instructors and participants. The majority of instructors thought all of the topics were either helpful or very helpful. More than half the participants also reported that the CIWs’ roles and responsibilities training was either helpful or very helpful, and nearly half of the participants indicated that the ethics training was very helpful. The majority of participants found both the professionalism and leadership training very helpful as well. Most participants and

instructors expressed either neutral or negative views of the helpfulness of the spirituality, healing and reflection components.

In the focus groups, some students also emphasized the value of the ethics training within the personal development core. It was also suggested that the healing and reflection training stirred bad memories and deep emotions, and that the healing and reflection training was unnecessary or irrelevant to their work as CIWs. Instructors were somewhat more critical in the focus groups than were the surveyed students. In particular, they emphasized the difficulty of leading an effective course on spirituality under the tight five-hour time limit provided in the curriculum. Instructors also agreed that spirituality should not be a priority in the training.

Applied Theory

The applied theory portion of the LAVITA training is intended to promote understanding among CIWs of the ideas supporting proactive peace building and the collaboration-oriented practice of gang intervention. The theme seeks to relate theory to the challenges created by larger community dynamics that crisis intervention work encounters. Topics covered include a basic overview of the public health model of violence reduction, history of gangs and gang intervention, immigration, ethnic dynamics, and application of gang intervention standards.

Survey respondents reported that the public health model overview, ethnic dynamics, and application of gang intervention standards trainings were the most helpful of the applied theory component topics. Most participants and instructors found both topics either helpful or very helpful. Focus group participants felt that the history of gangs and gang intervention topic was helpful, but noted concerns regarding the credibility and veracity of the information presented in the Latino gangs training. They suggested that more personal life experience was necessary to inform teaching about gangs. Several participants agreed that the immigration topic was not fully covered, and also suggested that the training should better address how to obtain tangible resources, such as information on qualified pro bono lawyers and organizations that can assist with green cards, employment, and citizenship.

Some instructors echoed the participants' sentiment that life experience is useful for teaching coursework on gangs. Instructors also suggested that a panel approach would be useful in teaching about gangs and would provide a better opportunity to compare different histories and introduce new perspectives.

Concrete Tasks

The concrete tasks component of the LAVITA training is intended to increase CIWs' concrete skills required to satisfactorily complete the administrative tasks that are associated with gang intervention work. To that end, topics included in the curriculum are basic organization administration concepts, budget and finance tools, program evaluation, proper documentation, and communication protocols.

Most instructors indicated through survey responses that nearly all component trainings for concrete tasks were either helpful or very helpful. Program participants reported less positive perceptions of the concrete task topics. Some student respondents found the budget and finance tools topic not at all helpful and less than a third of respondents found the topic helpful or very helpful. The organizational management concepts, proper documentation and program evaluation topics received the most positive feedback from participants; most participants reported that the three topics were either helpful or very helpful.

Concerns voiced during the focus group regarding the concrete tasks instruction included opinions that it was poorly led, or simply not taught at all in the case of the accelerated course. However, instructors noted that the time limits imposed by the curriculum constricted their ability to effectively teach concrete tasks, though they also did highlight management as being a useful topic.

Broader Policy Initiatives

The broader policy initiatives component is meant to enhance CIWs' understanding of both the local and state policy-making and legal context of gang intervention. Accordingly, topics covered in the training component include legal liability and violence prevention policy at the local and state level.

The broader policy initiatives component received mixed survey responses about all three of its topic areas. Some respondents noted that these topics were simply not covered during their training. However, the majority of students indicated that the legal liability training was helpful or very helpful, while just under half of instructors indicated the same. The focus groups again noted that curriculum time constraints weakened the broader policy initiatives component. While participants noted that the topics provided useful information, they suffered under tight time allotments. Instructors shared this sentiment; while they felt that the legal liability training was helpful, they suggested that handouts and more time for detailed discussion would strengthen the training.

Overall Training Perspectives

Participants at both the entry and accelerated level emphasized the need for increased discussion of immigration as a topical focus. Participants additionally suggested that the curriculum address single parents and family dynamics, poverty dynamics and effects, and community resources. Instructors recommended that additional information on sexuality, school intervention, and reentry all be provided to participants.

Instructors felt that much of the material taught in LAVITA was being utilized by participants in some form or another, particularly mediation and conflict guidance, license to operate, professionalism, and general rubrics and procedures that were discussed throughout the course. Instructors also noted that LAVITA provides an opportunity to build relationships across organizations, equips staff with a standard, helps increase participant self-esteem, and offers a particularly essential training to work with multi-service agencies conducting gang work. Participants agreed on the value of the relationships developed through LAVITA, and said that they shared information regarding license to operate, law enforcement, and how systems work with their colleagues. However, some participants explained that

they were less likely to share information learned in LAVITA with colleagues with extensive field experience because they already had a depth of knowledge regarding intervention work.

Finally, participants recommended that instructors needed to prepare more for their course presentations and emphasized the importance of prior experience working in gang intervention as a prerequisite to serve as an effective instructor. Instructor suggestions reiterated the need for additional materials and handouts to strengthen the training overall.

VI.3 CRISIS RESPONSE

The crisis response Triangle, made up of individuals from law enforcement (LAPD), GRYD Office Regional Managers (RMs), and Community Intervention Workers (CIWs), was established by the GRYD Office to minimize the effects on communities of serious violent crimes. An incident that is considered to need a crisis response does not have to occur in a GRYD Zone or SNL recreation Area, and it does not have to be gang-related. If it is considered sufficiently serious to disrupt the community, Triangle members will respond. Notification that a critical incident has occurred in a community comes to Triangle members in a number of ways. LAPD may receive a call for service for such an incident and will then notify other Triangle members. Alternatively, CIWs or RMs may get critical incident reports from community members or from other sources. They will then alert LAPD. Once notified, CIWs and RMs determine whether the incident is sufficiently critical for them to go on scene. At the scene, the three Triangle entities seek to coordinate their activities.

The Crisis Response System has a multifaceted approach. Family systems theory, which informs the *Comprehensive Strategy*, suggests that a relational Triangle serves as a source of stability and collective competence when the interaction between the three entities within the Triangle affirms the roles and boundaries of each. This notion is instrumental to the design of the crisis intervention model, and law enforcement, GRYD RMs, and CIWs are expected to systematically engage one another in each of their gang-related incident responses.

The objectives of the Triangle response system include: reducing the likelihood of gang retaliation after gang-involved incidents; providing services and assistance to crime victims and their families; helping to calm community residents through rumor control at the scene; and meeting with community members and personal contacts after the event. In addition, all three parties are to meet on a bi-weekly basis to assess the needs of both victims and their families, and to monitor hot spots with potential for future violence.

The GRYD Office provided the evaluation team with data describing a list of 90 crisis response incidents that occurred from May 1 to June 30, 2012. Prior to this period, GRYD data on incidents were not considered sufficiently dependable or complete to comprise a valid basis for review.⁶⁴

Included in the data were RM and CIW activity log summaries describing these incidents, including location, time of day, number of participants, and actions taken.⁶⁵ A brief narrative describing

⁶⁴ Not all report items are included but the complete Quarterly Report is available from the GRYD Office.

the incident is included in the logs. Using this data, three separate topics are examined: 1) how RMs and CIWs were notified about a crisis incident for response, 2) characteristics of those incidents, and 3) actions taken by RMs and CIWs both during and following the incident. A summary of specific activities concerning the incidents that were logged by CIWs is also provided below.⁶⁶

VI.3.1 Crisis Incident Notification

The crisis intervention response begins when the police are notified of a homicide, shooting, stabbing, or other violent crime considered sufficiently serious to disrupt the community (herein, these are referred to as violent crisis incidents). Through a number of different methods, the other members of the Triangle team are then notified for response. The most common method, as is presented in Table VI.1 below, is through LAPD's Real Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) system, whereby alerts are transmitted to on-call RMs and CIWs electronically through Blackberry® devices; 60 percent of the RMs and 28.9 percent of the CIWs reported being notified through this method. Among RMs, the next most common method of receiving this information was through personal contact with LAPD officers (23.3 percent), while 7.8 percent also report finding out directly from CIWs. CIWs, in turn, are often notified by RMs or other GRYD staff (26.7 percent) or other CIWs (13.3 percent). They also hear from the community (11.1 percent) and from the police directly (7.8 percent).

	RMs	CIWs
GRYD Staff	2 (2.2%)	24 (26.7%)
RACR	54 (60.0%)	26 (28.9%)
Community contact	0 (0.0%)	10 (11.1%)
LAPD contact	21 (23.3%)	7 (7.8%)
CIWs	7 (7.8%)	12 (13.3%)
State of City Report	4 (4.4%)	2 (2.2%)
On Site	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.1%)
Other	1 (1.1%)	4 (4.4%)
Totals	90	90
Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012		

⁶⁵ LAPD reports summarizing the same incidents were not collected by the GRYD Office.

⁶⁶ Too few specific RM activities were recorded for analysis. Not all individual report items are included, but the complete Quarterly Report is available from the GRYD Office.

VI.3.2 Characteristics of Crisis Incidents

Crisis response is not constricted by GRYD or SNL Area boundaries. As is seen in Table VI.2, RMs reported that 58.9 percent of the incidents were located outside the GRYD Zones and about 95 percent were outside of the SNL parks.

	Yes	No	Total
Inside GRYD	37 (41.1%)	53 (58.9%)	90
In or Around an SNL Park	4 (4.4%)	86 (95.5%)	90
On School Grounds	2 (2.2%)	88 (97.8%)	90
In Public Housing	0 (0.0%)	90 (100%)	90

Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012

As can be seen in Table VI.3, while most incidents were outside of GRYD program areas, the vast majority were nevertheless reported to be gang-related (91.1 percent according to RMs, and 95.6 percent according to CIWs).⁶⁷ The large majority of violent incident victims were reported to have been shot, and both the RMs and CIWs indicated that nearly 17 percent were homicide victims. Compared to the number of homicides reported in Los Angeles during the period covered by the reports we reviewed, it seems evident that crisis responses were made in the majority of cases. Similarly, assuming that the all reported incidents match actual incidents, the reported data indicate that a large majority of shooting incidents received a Triangle response. An average of 70⁶⁸ shootings were reported per month in the first six months of 2012.

Both the GRYD RMs and CIWs also report that the majority of victims were in the age range of 16 to 25 (53.1 percent and 58.6 percent, respectively). The next largest age group of crisis incident victims was over 25 years of age. Only one victim was reported to be less than nine years of age, and none were reported to be in the 10 to 15 year old category.

⁶⁷ The difference between CIW and RM classifications may be because the two reports are completed at different times and reflect the (possibly incomplete) information available to the respondent at the time the report is made.

⁶⁸ Los Angeles Police Department, 2012 Mid-Year Crime Snapshot, www.lapd.org.

Table VI.3 Crisis Incident Characteristics		
	RMs - Number of Incidents Reported	CIWs - Number of Incidents Reported
Gang-Related	82 (91.1%)	86 (95.6%)
	RMs - Number of Victims	RMs - Number of Victims
Homicide	19 (16.5%)	21 (17.2%)
Shooting	91 (79.1%)	90 (73.8%)
Stabbing, other	5 (4.3%)	11 (9.0%)
Totals	115	122
	RMs - Age of Victims	CIWs - Age of Victims
0-9	1 (.9%)	1 (.9%)
10-15	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
16-25	60 (53.1%)	65 (58.6%)
25+	52 (46.0%)	45 (40.5%)
Totals	113	111

Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012

VI.3.3 Actions Taken

The kinds of potential actions taken during crisis response incidents by RMs and CIWs vary, depending on their different roles during a crisis. Table VI.4 highlights the types of responses for each group. Note that the number of actions exceeds the number of incidents, as a responder could initiate multiple actions. However, the percentages are calculated on the basis of the 90 incidents in order to describe the likelihood that RMs or CIWs would engage in certain actions for incidents.

According to their reports, actually arriving at the scene of a crisis location is not always required. This is particularly the case for RMs, who only go to the crime scene 21.1 percent of the time and to hospitals to visit victims (if relevant) only 4.4 percent of the time. Instead, RMs' most common immediate action is the collection and dissemination of information with others about the incident by telephone or e-mail.

In contrast, CIWs are more likely to proceed to the location of an incident. They reported responding to the crime scene 68.9 percent of the time, to the community where the incident took place 52.2 percent of the time, and to the hospital 35.6 percent of the time. Like RMs, CIWs often engaged in communication activities; they reportedly canvassed the neighborhood around the crisis incident (77.7 percent) and just over half of the time helped with rumor control in the community. Less frequently (24.4 percent), CIWs reported connecting the victim or victims' families to support services, such as counseling and medical assistance. Among CIWs, crowd control and peacekeeping negotiations were much less frequently performed.


Table VI.4 Number of Incidents in Which Actions Were Taken		
	RMs – Number of Actions Reported	CIWs – Number of Actions Reported
Nothing, not gang-related	0 (0.0%)	7 (7.8%)
Responded to crime scene	19 (21.1%)	62 (68.9%)
Responded to hospital	4 (4.4%)	32 (35.6%)
Responded to place in community	2 (2.2%)	47 (52.2%)
Made phone calls/e-mails to collect information	80 (88.9%)	66 (73.3%)
Canvassed the community/outreach	N/A	70 (77.8%)
Controlled rumor diffusion	N/A	46 (51.1%)
Connected victim or victim's family to services	N/A	22 (24.4%)
Crowd control	N/A	5 (5.6%)
Ceasefire/renegotiate agreements	N/A	0 (0.0%)
Ceasefire/negotiate new agreement	N/A	3 (3.3%)
Other	7 (7.8%)	4 (4.4%)
Totals (more than one action could be taken per incident)	90 incidents 112 reported actions	90 incidents 364 reported actions
Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012 Note: N/A indicates an activity that is not a RM responsibility		

As discussed earlier, the role of the crisis response Triangle team is not meant to terminate when they leave the scene. Triangle members are also responsible for a variety of follow-up activities in the days following a violent situation. RMs report that the most common follow-up action in which they engaged was contacting LAPD, including the detective investigating the incident. They also reported contacting victims' families, although this was rare, as only 4.4 percent of the incidents involved family follow-up. On the other hand, CIWs appeared to be active in post-incident outreach activities: in 27.8 percent of the incidents, they made contact with the victim's family; in 18.9 percent of the incidents, they followed up with groups affiliated with the victims; and in 22.2 percent of the situations, they had further contact with LAPD detectives.

Table VI.5 Follow-Up Contacts After Crisis Response		
	RMs Number of Actions Reported	CIWs Number of Actions Reported
Contact victim's family	4 (4.4%)	25 (27.8%)
Contact Council office	1 (1.1%)	6 (6.7%)
Contact LAUSD	1 (1.1%)	13 (14.4%)
Contact LAPD/Detective	75 (83.3%)	20 (22.2%)
Contact with victim or perpetrator's affiliated groups	N/A	17 (18.9%)
Other	9 (10.0%)	20 (22.2%)
N/A	5 (5.6%)	0 (0.0%)
Totals	90 incidents 95 reported actions	90 incidents 101 reported actions
Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012		

As noted earlier, CIWs are also required to maintain individual activity logs. The activities reported in these logs are aggregated across all incidents, and the most prevalent activities reported are illustrated in Figure VI.1. The most common intervention activity reported by CIWs was street outreach (18 percent of reported activities), followed by school outreach (16 percent), monitoring potential street hotspots (9 percent), and providing safe passages to local residents (9 percent). Participating in local activities and contact with victims support groups were less common. The large “other” category combines a wide variety of additional reported activities, none of which accounted for more than 4 percent of the total reported.

Figure VI.1
Summary of CIW Crisis Incident Activities
(Source: CIW Activity Logs)



VI.4 TRIANGLE GROUP MEMBER SURVEYS

To assess the effectiveness of the Triangle response, web-based surveys were conducted of the lead crisis response Triangle members for thirty-four randomly selected violent incidents that took place from January to May 2012.⁶⁹ The surveys were anonymous. A brief summary of the incident was provided to each respondent based upon GRYD Office incident documentation, and each respondent was asked to provide their perceptions about Triangle roles and collaboration, short term response outcomes, and longer term outcomes for that particular incident alone. Thus, the responses are aggregations of incident-specific perceptions, not general views of the Triangle Crisis Response System.

Across the thirty-four incidents, there were twenty-nine responses from RMs, twenty-eight responses from CIWs, and thirteen responses from LAPD officers or commanders. In other words, there were some incidents for which not all three groups responded. In fact, responses from each of the three Triangle members were gathered with respect to only seven of the incidents, although only one incident did not receive a response from any member of the Triangle team. The survey results across all of the incidents are presented in the following tables.

VI.4.1 On Scene Roles and Collaboration

Table VI.6 presents Triangle member responses concerning their perceptions of the clarity of other team members' roles during the violent incidents to which the team responded. All of the GRYD RMs reported that the role of LAPD was clear to them during the crisis response in question, and they thought the GRYD RMs' role was also clear to other team members. Slightly less (96.4 percent) were clear about the role of the CIWs. CIWs also reported that they understood the GRYD staff members' role (100 percent). Ninety-three percent of CIWs felt that they were clear about the role of LAPD and that other team members were clear about the CIWs' role in the incident. LAPD respondents were not as positive about roles, however, although a majority (75 percent) felt that the roles of the GRYD Office and CIWs were clear. Seventy-five percent of LAPD also felt that other team members understood the role of the police in the incident.

⁶⁹ A copy of the surveys can be found in **Appendices E and F**.

Respondents Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing to the Following Statements	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. It was clear to me what the role of the GRYD staff was during this incident.	N/A	28 (100%)	9 (75.0%)
2. It was clear to me what the role of the LAPD was during this incident.	28 (100%)	26 (93.0%)	N/A
3. It was clear to me what the role of CIWs was during this incident.	27 (96.4%)	N/A	9 (75.0%)
4. It appeared to be clear to the GRYD staff and the LAPD what the role of the CIWs was during this incident.	N/A	26 (93.0%)	N/A
5. It appeared to be clear to the CIWs and the LAPD what the role of the GRYD Office was during this incident.	28 (100%)	N/A	N/A
6. It appeared to be clear to the GRYD staff and CIWs what the role of the LAPD was during this incident.	N/A	N/A	9 (75.0%)
7. The three Triangle partners were able to do their jobs without stepping on each other's toes.	28 (100%)	27 (96.4%)	9 (75.0%)

When asked about being able to do their jobs without stepping on other Triangle team members' toes, all of the RMs agreed, as did 96.4 percent of the CIWs. The majority of LAPD respondents also agreed with this statement, although the percentage (75 percent) was substantially lower than the other two groups.

Table VI.7 presents the perceptions of crisis response teams regarding the extent of communication between the team members and first responders. Once again, GRYD RMs were positive in their opinions of team communications. All surveyed RMs felt that information was shared by LAPD with them, and 96.4 percent were similarly positive about CIW information sharing. CIWs were somewhat less positive, with 82.1 percent indicating there was some or extensive communication from LAPD and the GRYD Office with them. LAPD officers were the least positive, with 75 percent reporting communication by RMs and CIWs with them.

There was substantial variation when asked about communications by other first responders, such as the County Sheriff's department, or the Fire Department. Only 10 percent of GRYD RMs, and 35.7 percent of CIWs, reported having communication with other crisis responders. Eighty-three percent of LAPD officers reported some or extensive communication with other first responders, which is likely consistent with their primary public safety role on scene.

Table VI.7 Triangle Members Perceptions of Communication by Other Members			
Respondents Saying Extensive or Some to the Following Questions	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. The extent to which information was shared with me by GRYD staff	N/A	23 (82.1%)	9 (75.0%)
2. The extent to which information was shared with me by LAPD	28 (100%)	23 (82.1%)	N/A
3. The extent to which information was shared with me by CIWs	27 (96.4%)	N/A	9 (75.0%)
4. The extent to which information was shared with me by other responders (such as fire and rescue)	3 (10.7%)	10 (35.7%)	10 (83.3%)

Triangle members' perceptions of their own communication with members of the team and with other first responders are presented in Table VI.8. The perception of GRYD RMs regarding their own communication with others was the same as communications by others with them; all of the RMs indicated that they communicated extensively or somewhat with LAPD and 96.4 percent said the same about communication with CIWs. Only 10.7 percent said they communicated with other first responders. Eighty-two percent of the CIWs reported communicating with GRYD staff, but only 64.3 percent said the same about communicating with LAPD. Equal majorities (75 percent) of LAPD officers reported communicating with GRYD RMs and CIWs. The large majority (83.3 percent) of officers also said they communicated with other first responders, while about a third of CIWs reported communication with this group and just 10.7 percent of GRYD RMs responded similarly.

Table VI.8 Triangle Members Perceptions of Their Own Communication			
Respondents Saying Extensive or Some to the Following Questions	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. The extent to which information was shared by me with GRYD staff	N/A	23 (82.1%)	9 (75.0%)
2. The extent to which information was shared by me with LAPD	28 (100%)	18 (64.3%)	N/A
3. The extent to which information was shared by me with CIWs	27 (96.4%)	N/A	9 (75.0%)
4. The extent to which information was shared by me with other responders (such as fire and rescue)	3 (10.7%)	9 (32.1%)	10 (83.3%)

As can be seen in Table VI.9, a minority of the Triangle response teams (25.0 percent of LAPD officers, 21.4 percent of CIWs, and 17.9 percent of RMs) felt that on-scene coordination and communication could have been improved for the particular incident in question. The most common observation was that more specific details on the incident, and receiving accurate information in a timelier manner, would have been helpful.

	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
Yes	5 (17.9%)	6 (21.4%)	3 (25.0%)
No	23 (82.1%)	22 (78.6%)	9 (75.0%)

VI.4.2 Short Term Incident Outcomes

Table VI.10 summarizes the perceptions of Triangle members about the short term (same day or night) outcomes resulting from their crisis responses to incidents. Majorities of all three groups agreed that the incident in question was quickly controlled, that timely information was provided to the community, and that rumors and fears in the community were effectively suppressed. There was less agreement about short term conflict resolution, however; while 75 percent of CIWs felt that tensions among incident participants were reduced in the short term, only 58.3 percent of LAPD respondents and 42.9 percent of GRYD RMs agreed. Similarly, 44.4 percent of CIWs said that conflicts were mediated on scene, but only about a quarter of LAPD officers and GRYD RMs agreed. Majorities of all three groups responded that they agreed that short term retaliation was prevented, and that timely medical and social services were provided.

**Table VI.10
Triangle Members Perceptions of Short Term Incident Outcomes**

Respondents Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing to the Following Statements	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. This incident was quickly controlled.	20 (71.4%)	24 (88.9%)	11 (91.7%)
2. Tensions among incident participants were reduced.	12 (42.9%)	21 (75.0%)	7 (58.3%)
3. Conflicts were mediated on scene.	8 (28.6%)	12 (44.4%)	3 (25.0%)
4. Others at the incident were calmed down (bystanders, relatives, passerby, etc.).	12 (42.9%)	17 (60.7%)	7 (58.3%)
5. Short term retaliation was prevented.	17 (60.7%)	23 (82.1%)	8 (66.7%)
6. Timely emergency medical services were provided.	20 (74.1%)	19 (67.9%)	11 (91.7%)
7. Other timely social services for victims and their families were provided (counseling, etc.).	18 (64.3%)	16 (57.1%)	7 (58.3%)
8. Timely and effective information about the incident was provided to the community.	27 (96.4%)	25 (89.3%)	9 (75.0%)
9. Rumors and fears in the community about this incident were effectively controlled.	27 (96.4%)	26 (96.3%)	9 (75.0%)

VI.4.3 Longer Term Incident Outcomes

The extent to which the different Triangle member groups engaged in longer term (during the days following the incident) follow-up activities varied. As shown in Table VI.11, majorities of both the GYRD RMs and LAPD officers reported that they were involved in follow-up criminal investigations. A majority (64.3 percent) of the CIWs noted that they held follow-up meetings with victims' families, and majorities of both LAPD respondents and CIWs said they continued to monitor potential hot spots afterwards. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the RMs cited debriefings with other Triangle members as something they engaged in after the incident was over. Most of the other activities associated with the crisis incident model were not reportedly undertaken by majorities of any of the three groups.

Respondents Saying They Engaged in Activities Following an Incident	GYRD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. Follow-up criminal investigation	14 (50.0%)	8 (28.6%)	8 (66.7%)
2. Community meetings	--	11 (39.3%)	3 (25.0%)
3. Follow-up meetings with victim(s)	4 (14.3%)	10 (35.7%)	3 (25.0%)
4. Follow-up meetings with victims family	4 (14.3%)	18 (64.3%)	8 (66.7%)
5. Outreach to victims gang/fellow gang members	4 (14.3%)	17 (60.7%)	--
6. Outreach to rival gangs/gang members	2 (7.1%)	9 (32.1%)	1 (8.3%)
7. Debriefing meetings with other Triangle member	19 (67.9%)	11 (39.3%)	2 (16.7%)
8. Interviews/communication with media	--	1 (3.6%)	--
9. Monitored potential hot spots	8 (28.6%)	27 (96.4%)	8 (66.7%)

As demonstrated below in Table VI.12, respondents generally believed that there were no directly related violent incidents in the days following the incident in question, with roughly two-thirds of each group responding “no” to the survey question. LAPD personnel were most likely to state that a related violent incident did occur, but only 16.7 percent answered affirmatively. Nearly 30 percent of the CIWs said that they did not know if there were any related violent incidents afterwards, as did a quarter of the RMs and 16.7 percent of the LAPD officers.

Table VI.12 Triangle Members Perceptions of Whether There Were Any Violent Incidents Related to This One in the Days Following			
	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. Yes	2 (7.1%)	1 (3.7%)	2 (16.7%)
2. No	19 (67.9%)	18 (66.7%)	8 (66.7%)
3. Don't Know	7 (25.0%)	8 (29.6%)	2 (16.7%)

Respondents were also asked to consider violence levels in the vicinity of each crisis response incident in the days following its occurrence. Table VI.13 shows that CIWs were overwhelmingly (70.4 percent) of the opinion that violence levels did not change in the days following the incident, while only one quarter of the responding RMs and LAPD officers agreed that violence levels were left unchanged. Half of the LAPD officers responded that they felt violent crimes in the vicinity of the incident decreased in the days following the incident, as did 39.3 percent of the RMs. Few respondents suggested that crime increased in the area after the incident and crisis response occurred, though 35.7 percent of RMs and 8.3 percent of LAPD indicated that they did not know whether violence had changed or not in the following days.

	GRYD RMs	CIWs	LAPD
1. No, it was the same as before	7 (25.0%)	19 (70.4%)	3 (25.0%)
2. Yes, violent crimes such as this one declined	11 (39.3%)	6 (22.2%)	6 (50.0%)
3. Yes, violent crimes such as this one increased	--	2 (7.4%)	2 (16.7%)
4. Don't Know	10 (35.7%)	--	1 (8.3%)

VI.4.4 Summary

The Triangle survey responses and additional respondent comments revealed a general consensus among the members of the three respondent groups that their individual roles were clear and understood by other members responding to violent crisis incidents. Majorities of all three groups also reportedly shared information with other team members and felt that information was shared with them. Most also indicated that they did not think coordination and communication could have been improved. There was less agreement about the short term incident outcomes, although most felt that the incident in question was effectively controlled, that timely services were provided, that information was effectively shared with the community, and that rumors and fears were controlled. Longer term follow-up activities by members of the Triangle appeared mixed in the days after the violent incident response, and participation in these activities varied across the groups. There was general consensus that related violent incidents did not take place following the team's crisis response, but views of the effects of the incident on nearby violence in the days following were again more mixed.

VI.5 LAPD PERSONNEL VIEWS OF GRYD

In order to gather views on gang activity in Los Angeles and the operation and effectiveness of the GRYD program in GRYD Zones and SNL Areas, web-based surveys were submitted to a representative stratified random sample of 449 LAPD personnel who worked in LAPD areas that contained a GRYD Zone and/or SNL recreation center.⁷⁰ The sample included patrol officers, detectives, supervisors and senior management. The survey was anonymous. Respondent identifiers were not included in survey responses, and neither LAPD nor the Los Angeles Mayor's Office was given access to sample identifiers.

The survey response rate was disappointingly low. Only 68 of the 449 personnel sample returned a survey --too few to be considered representative of the LAPD staff working in the LAPD areas from which the sampling frame was drawn. The results reported below should therefore be considered to have come from a convenience sample rather than a randomized sample.

The survey sought information on the respondents' background characteristics, employment, familiarity with GRYD and SNL programs and activities, interactions and perspectives about GRYD Zones and SNL Areas, including perceptions of community changes in the past year. The survey questions were structured to gather information regarding LAPD personnel's experience over the past year, in order to focus on the year 3 evaluation period. Survey responses are thus based on LAPD experience from the summer of 2011 until the summer of 2012 (when surveys were conducted).

VI.5.1 Characteristics of Respondents

The majority of respondents were patrol officers (63.2 percent). A sizable percentage was comprised of first line supervisors (16.2 percent), followed by mid-level commanders (10.3 percent), detectives (7.4 percent), and senior-level managers (2.9 percent). Tenure with LAPD ranged from less than 1 year to 31 years, with a mean of 13.13 years. The most common duty locations were Seventy-Seventh Street II, Southwest, Mission, and Foothill. Areas in which the lowest numbers of respondents reported working included Topanga, Harbor, Hollywood, West Valley, Pacific, North Hollywood, and Olympic.

VI.5.2 Familiarity with GRYD and SNL

The first topic explored in this survey was LAPD personnel's familiarity with GRYD and SNL components, including Community Action Teams, Community Education Campaigns, the Crisis Response System, the Gun Buy-Back program, Gang Joining Prevention Services, Intervention Case Management with Gang Members, and the Watts Region Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) Task Force.⁷¹ As presented in Table V.14, a majority of respondents reported some level of familiarity with

⁷⁰ We appreciate the support and co-operation of LAPD Deputy Chief Robert Green and the Police Protective League. The survey would not have been possible without their assistance in approving the survey protocol and developing the sampling frame of more than 2500 officers from which the Urban Institute evaluation team independently and confidentially drew the sample.

⁷¹ Initiated in late 2011, the Watts Region HACLA Task Force is a special public housing oriented effort in Watts targeting gang violence in collaboration with the GRYD program.

the Community Action Teams (56.7 percent), the Crisis Response System (62.9 percent), the Gun Buy-Back program (91.9 percent), Gang Joining Prevention Services (60.3 percent), Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (58.3 percent), and the Summer Night Lights program (88.9 percent). The Watts Regional HACLA Task Force and the Community Education Campaign were not familiar at all to a majority of the respondents (51.7 percent and 55 percent, respectively).

GRYD Program Components	Very familiar	Somewhat familiar	Not familiar at all
Community Action Teams (N=60)	13 (21.7%)	21 (35.0%)	26 (43.3%)
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD Schools (N=60)	7 (11.7%)	20 (33.3%)	33 (55%)
Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs (N=62)	20 (32.3%)	19 (30.6%)	23 (37.1%)
Gun Buy-Back Program (N=62)	26 (41.9%)	31 (50%)	5 (8.1%)
Gang Joining Prevention Services (N=58)	14 (24.1%)	21 (36.2%)	23 (39.7%)
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (N=60)	18 (30%)	17 (28.3%)	25 (41.7%)
Summer Night Lights (N=63)	34 (54%)	22 (34.9%)	7 (11.1%)
Watts Region HACLA Task Force (N=60)	9 (15%)	20 (33.3%)	31 (51.7%)

LAPD staff members were also asked about the extent to which they have actually spent time working with different GRYD programs. Table VI.15 shows that, with the exception of the Summer Night Lights component – on which 59.7 percent reportedly spent some or a lot of time working – the majority of respondents reported spending no time with each of the GRYD program components listed. The components with which LAPD staff reported spending no time were the Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools (80 percent) and Watts Region HACLA Task Force (83.3 percent) components.

GRYD Program Components	A lot of my time was spent with this component	Some of my time was spent with this component	None of my time was spent with this component
Community Action Teams (N=60)	3 (5%)	14 (23.3%)	43 (71.7%)
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD Schools (N=60)	--	12 (20%)	48 (80%)
Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs (N=61)	4 (6.6%)	22 (36.1%)	35 (57.4%)
Gun Buy-Back Program (N=61)	4 (6.6%)	20 (32.8%)	37 (60.7%)
Gang Joining Prevention Services (N=60)	2 (3.3%)	17 (28.3%)	41 (68.3%)
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (N=62)	1 (1.6%)	15 (24.2%)	46 (74.2%)
Summer Night Lights (N=62)	10 (16.1%)	27 (43.5%)	25 (40.3%)
Watts Region HACLA Task Force (N=60)	1 (1.7%)	9 (15%)	50 (83.3%)

VI.5.3 Interaction with GRYD Zones

Contribution of GRYD Components to LAPD Personnel's Work

Surveying LAPD personnel allowed for some understanding of the respondents' work in GRYD Zones and their perceptions of the degree to which the GRYD components were helpful to their work. As is presented in Table VI.16, most GRYD programs were viewed as neither helpful nor unhelpful by the respondents. The components deemed to be the most helpful were the Gun Buy-Back program (which 42.3 percent felt was helpful) and SNL (which 45 percent felt was helpful). The most negative responses surrounded the intervention case management component, with nearly 14 percent reporting that GRYD intervention case management with gang members was very unhelpful.

GRYD Program Components	Very helpful	Somewhat helpful	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	Somewhat unhelpful	Very unhelpful
Community Action Teams (N=57)	3 (5.3%)	12 (21.1%)	36 (63.2%)	--	6 (10.5%)
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD Schools (N=56)	3 (5.4%)	9 (16.1%)	38 (67.9%)	--	6 (10.7%)
Crisis Response System with GRYD staff and Community Intervention Workers (N=59)	4 (6.8%)	15 (25.4%)	30 (50.8%)	3 (5.1%)	7 (11.9%)
Gun Buy-Back Program (N=59)	14 (23.7%)	11 (18.6%)	25 (42.4%)	2 (3.4%)	7 (11.9%)
Gang Joining Prevention Services (N=56)	5 (8.9%)	11 (19.6%)	30 (53.6%)	3 (5.4%)	7 (12.5%)
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (N=58)	5 (8.6%)	10 (17.2%)	32 (55.2%)	3 (5.2%)	8 (13.8%)
Summer Night Lights (N=60)	10 (16.7%)	17 (28.3%)	21 (35%)	4 (6.7%)	8 (13.3%)
Watts Region HACLA Task Force (N=56)	5 (8.9%)	12 (21.4%)	32 (57.1%)	1 (1.8%)	6 (10.7%)

Work in the GRYD Zones and Perception of Community Changes in Past Year

All respondents worked in LAPD areas where GRYD Zones or SNL parks are located. However, only two-thirds of the LAPD respondents said that they had actually worked in a GRYD Zone over the past year. These zones included Watts-Southeast (16.7 percent), 77th II (14.3 percent), Panorama City (11.9 percent), and Southwest II (11.9 percent). They also mentioned working in Boyle Heights, Florence Graham, and Ramona Gardens (each with 1 respondent, or 2.4 percent of the sample), although to a much lesser extent.

Those who actually worked in one or more of the 12 GRYD Zones in the previous year were asked to compare gang violence, gang visibility, community senses of safety, and community sense of trust in police at the time of the survey to the previous year. As is seen in Table VI.17 below, most respondents felt that the visibility of gangs did not change in the past year, although just over a third suggested that the visibility was somewhat lower. Further, respondents' views were very mixed on the level of gang violence in the past year. Some respondents believed levels were somewhat higher (17.1 percent), while a sizable group (34.1 percent) felt that there was no change, and a larger group (36.6 percent) believed that levels of gang violence were somewhat lower. In addition, more of the respondents felt that either the community's sense of safety was somewhat higher than about a year ago (36.6 percent) or that there was no change in the community's sense of safety as compared to a year ago (39 percent). And finally, a majority of respondents felt that community trust of the police was somewhat higher than a year ago (53.7 percent), while 36.6 percent felt that there was no change in community trust of the police.

	Much higher	Somewhat higher	No change	Somewhat lower	Much lower	Don't know/no opinion
Visibility of gangs (N=41)	--	5 (12.2%)	21 (51.2%)	11 (26.8%)	4 (9.8%)	--
The level of gang violence (N=41)	1 (2.4%)	7 (17.1%)	14 (34.1%)	15 (36.6%)	4 (9.8%)	--
The community's sense of safety (N=41)	1 (2.4%)	15 (36.6%)	16 (39%)	5 (12.2%)	3 (7.3%)	1 (2.4%)
Community trust of the police (N=41)	2 (4.9%)	22 (53.7%)	15 (36.6%)	1 (2.4%)	--	1 (2.4%)

Opinions on GRYD's Crisis Response System

As was discussed in the earlier section, LAPD personnel play a central role in the GRYD Crisis Response System, alongside CIWs and GRYD Office RMs. However, only a small proportion of LAPD respondents to the general survey (22.5 percent) were personally involved in a Triangle response to a

crisis incident during 2011. Their responses are presented below. None of them were included in the Triangle survey discussed above.

As Table VI.18 reveals, responses varied greatly for each of the five measures of effectiveness. Notably, a consistent 22 to 26.8 percent of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that each of the components was effective. However, on balance, more respondents agreed that the teams were effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident (49.3 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion regarding this matter; more respondents agreed that the teams helped to dispel/manage rumors following a gang-related incident (41.5 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion regarding this matter; more respondents did not agree that/didn't know/had no opinion regarding whether the teams reduced the likelihood of retaliation among gang members (41.4 percent) than those who did agree; more respondents agreed that LAPD is able to effectively communicate/work with intervention workers in response to crisis incidents (41.5 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion regarding this matter; and more respondents agreed that LAPD is able to effectively communicate/work with GRYD staff in response to crisis incidents (51.3 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/no opinion
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has been effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident. (N=41)	5 (12.2%)	13 (37.1%)	9 (22%)	6 (14.6%)	4 (9.8%)	4 (9.8%)
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has helped to dispel or manage rumors following a gang-related violent incident. (N=41)	7 (17.1%)	10 (24.4%)	10 (24.4%)	5 (12.2%)	5 (12.2%)	4 (9.8%)
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and intervention workers has reduced the likelihood of retaliation among gang members. (N=41)	6 (14.6%)	9 (22%)	9 (22%)	6 (14.6%)	5 (12.2%)	6 (14.6%)
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to crisis incidents. (N=41)	5 (12.2%)	12 (9.3%)	11 (26.8%)	6 (14.6%)	4 (9.8%)	3 (7.3%)
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with GRYD staff in response to crisis incidents. (N=41)	4 (9.8%)	17 (41.5%)	11 (26.8%)	4 (9.8%)	2 (4.9%)	3 (7.3%)

VI.5.4 Interaction with Summer Night Lights

Twenty-three LAPD survey respondents reported working in eleven Summer Night Lights parks during the summer of 2011.⁷² Respondents were asked to describe the impacts of SNL in the community *during* the summer of 2011 and then *following* the 2011 SNL program. The survey asked respondents to rate the impacts of the program in the following areas: improved public safety, reduced gang conflicts, presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs, reduced inter-gang violence, improved relations between the police and the community, improved quality of life in the community, and increased access to positive alternative activities for youth. The respondents' perceptions are presented in Table VI.19.

Perceptions of Impacts of SNL

While the majority of respondents (56.5 percent) reported a high level of impact of SNL on safety during the 2011 SNL, views on the impacts following its completion were less positive. The majority of respondents (63.6 percent) reported that the SNL program would have no effect on community safety after the 2011 SNL ended. Responses were mixed about the effects of SNL on gang violence; while 52 percent of respondents reported that the SNL program had some impact on reducing gang violence (ranging from very low to very high), 47.8 percent reported the SNL program had no effect at all on reducing gang violence during the 2011 program. Positive responses declined when asked about when SNL 2011 ends; the majority of respondents (63.6 percent) reported that the SNL program would have no impact on gang conflict reduction once SNL 2011 ended.

LAPD personnel also provided mixed responses about opportunities for peaceful engagement resulting from the SNL program season. While 39.1 percent of respondents believed that the program impact was high during the 2011 SNL, 34.8 percent of respondents saw no effect at all during the same time period. The remaining respondents reported a low program impact. Perceptions captured by the survey suggest that the impact of the 2011 SNL on peaceful opportunities would decline after programming ceased. Exactly half of respondents saw no effect at all on opportunities for peaceful engagement following the end of the 2011 SNL.

During the 2011 SNL season, 39.1 percent of LAPD staff saw no program effect on inter-gang violence. Fewer respondents saw a likely positive impact following the 2011 SNL program's end, with 63.6 percent reporting that the SNL program would have no effect on inter-gang violence after summer programming ended. LAPD respondents also reported high program impact on improving relations (47.8 percent) while the 2011 SNL season was active. Just over 30 percent of respondents saw no effect during the same time period. Fewer officers reported positive feedback for after SNL 2011 ended.

Perceptions of LAPD staff regarding the SNL 2011 impact on quality of life in the community revealed that the majority of respondents (61.9 percent) reported a high impact on the quality of life in

⁷² SNL parks where LAPD survey respondents reported working included: Cypress Park Recreation Center, Jordan Downs, Jim Gilliam Park, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Van Ness Recreation Center, Sepulveda Park, Lafayette Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center, South Park Recreation Center, Imperial Courts, and Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center.

the community during SNL. As with other questions, perceptions of the impact of the program after the 2011 SNL season declined. While 36.4 percent of respondents still reported a high or very high impact, 45.5 percent of respondents perceived no impact at all after SNL ended.

LAPD staff also shared their perceptions on whether the SNL program increased youth access to positive alternative activities to gang membership, and the majority of respondents provided positive feedback regarding the periods both during and after the 2011 SNL. A high majority of respondents (82.6 percent) reported that the 2011 SNL program had, to different degrees, a high impact on increasing youth access to alternatives while programming was active, while a majority (54.6 percent) reported that the impact would be sustained at high levels after the 2011 SNL ended.

Table VI.19 – Perceived Impacts of SNL					
	Very low	Low	No effect	High	Very high
Community Safety					
Improved community safety during 2011 SNL (N=23)	2 (8.7%)	1 (4.3%)	7 (30.4%)	9 (39.1%)	4 (17.4%)
Improved community safety after 2011 SNL (N=22)	2 (9.1%)	1 (4.5%)	14 (63.6%)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)
Reduced Gang Conflicts					
Reduced gang conflicts during 2011 SNL (N=23)	3 (13.0%)	3 (13.0%)	11 (47.8%)	5 (21.7%)	1 (4.3%)
Reduced gang conflicts after 2011 SNL (N=22)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)	14 (63.6%)	3 (13.6%)	—
Opportunities for Peaceful Engagement					
Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs during 2011 SNL (N=23)	6 (26.1%)	—	8 (34.8%)	5 (21.7%)	4 (17.4%)
Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs after 2011 SNL (N=22)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)	11 (50.0%)	5 (22.7%)	1 (4.5%)
Reduced Gang Violence					
Reduced inter-gang violence during 2011 SNL (N=23)	3 (13.0%)	4 (17.4%)	9 (39.1%)	4 (17.4%)	3 (13.0%)
Reduced inter-gang violence after 2011 SNL (N=22)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)	14 (63.6%)	2 (9.1%)	1 (4.5%)

Table VI.19 – Perceived Impacts of SNL (cont.)					
	Very low	Low	No effect	High	Very high
Relationships with the Police					
Improved relations between the police and the community during 2011 SNL (N=23)	1 (4.3%)	4 (17.4%)	7 (30.4%)	7 (30.4%)	4 (17.4%)
Improved relations between the police and the community after 2011 SNL (N=22)	2 (9.1%)	4 (18.2%)	7 (31.8%)	7 (31.8%)	2 (9.1%)
Quality of Life					
Improved quality of life in the community during 2011 SNL (N=21)	--	3 (14.3%)	5 (23.8%)	10 (47.6%)	3 (14.3%)
Improved quality of life in the community after 2011 SNL (N=22)	1 (4.5%)	3 (13.6%)	10 (45.5%)	6 (27.3%)	2 (9.1%)
Access to Positive Alternatives for Youth					
Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth during 2011 SNL (N=23)	1 (4.3%)	2 (8.7%)	1 (4.3%)	13 (56.5%)	6 (26.1%)
Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth after 2011 SNL (N=22)	1 (4.5%)	3 (13.6%)	6 (27.3%)	10 (45.5%)	2 (9.1%)

VI.6 CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this chapter is generally supportive of the conclusion that activities supported by the GRYD Office are being implemented and are having desired outcomes consistent with the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, it should be noted that the sample sizes from which the findings have been derived are limited, and caution should be exercised when making generalizations.

Nonetheless, in the area of gang violence intervention training, participants and instructors are positive about the content and delivery of training for new and experienced CIWs. Some suggestions have been offered for training improvement, including eliminating topics about spirituality and strengthening the instruction on immigration issues. Allotting more time to topics, and improving handouts and other materials were also suggested.

The findings from the snapshot of crisis incident responses showed that a large proportion of these incidents took place outside GRYD Zones and SNL Areas, and that some were gang-related and some were not. Though the mission of the GRYD program is to ameliorate gang-related violent crime in the GRYD Zones, the Triangle teams respond to an

incident without necessarily knowing, at the time notification is received, whether the incident is inside a GRYD Zone or is gang-related. Subsequently, more exact categorization can be made. But, at the time the notification comes in, the important objective, especially for CIWs, is to get on the scene as quickly as possible. The result, during the period we evaluated, is that most shootings and homicides in Los Angeles became Triangle incidents. From a public safety point of view, this kind of coverage is obviously a good thing.

Survey results of Triangle members also point to success in achieving stated goals for the Crisis Response System. GRYD's Triangle members reported substantial communication amongst themselves, including informal notifications to each other of crisis incidents that had not yet been broadcast through the RACR system. Immediate responses are more common by CIWs than RMs, and the LAPD component of the Triangle is always present. This is consistent with their relative roles in the Crisis Response System, and with their responsibilities as defined by the GRYD Office; a variety of on-scene and post-incident activities are undertaken, in line with the separate roles of CIWs and RMs in the response system. The follow-up actions by CIWs tended to emphasize community outreach.

All of these observations are consistent with the expectations stated in the *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, there was less agreement among the three groups about short term, immediate outcomes as well as about longer term effects of crisis response, although most views were again positive.

In general, LAPD staff views on the Crisis Response System and other GRYD programs and activities were somewhat positive, but to a lesser degree than those expressed by RMs and CIWs. For instance, most LAPD respondents tended to indicate no perceived community changes in public safety and gang-related incidents due to the System, while others expressed no opinion. However, LAPD respondents tended to report that SNL programs had positive effects on the community, and were valuable in providing alternative programming for youth.

Thus, on balance, the responses we have obtained from the self-reported surveys convey positive views about GRYD-sponsored activities. However, at this point in the evaluation, we are not able to confirm these views from independent sources. We do not know, for instance, whether the Crisis Response System does reduce retaliation when the incident is gang-related. We also do not know how community residents and victims view the System. These are unanswered questions that, in our view, the GRYD Office should explore as soon as feasible.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

VII.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter briefly summarizes the conclusions reached from the results of the third year of the evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). It includes program implementation highlights, key findings relating to GRYD outcomes and effects, and stakeholder perceptions about the GRYD and Summer Night Lights (SNL) programs.

VII.2 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Past evaluation reports by the Urban Institute/Harder+Company have highlighted the challenges that the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development has faced in implementing its highly ambitious and complex set of programs. Year three of the program has seen significant progress in addressing those challenges.

The most notable program implementation improvement by the GRYD Office this year was its development and dissemination of a *Comprehensive Strategy*⁷³ in December 2011. This plan was the result of an on-going dialogue with those most affected by and knowledgeable about gang violence in the City of Los Angeles. The GRYD Office obtained input from a variety of groups and individuals: prominent gang researchers; service providers working with at-risk youth; gang intervention specialists; and many people within the GRYD program itself. The result is a well-thought-out and far-reaching strategy for achieving reductions in gang and gun violence, and gang joining by Los Angeles youth. It not only provides theoretical justifications for program structures and objectives, but also establishes the management and organizational principles and procedures that are essential for a complex program such as GRYD. Program benefits are already observable, and we expect these to continue and expand during the coming year.

One benefit has been GRYD's ability to increase the accountability of service providers and prepare the way for performance measurement. These steps have included renewed efforts toward documentation of program progress and of individual prevention and intervention provider activities. Capturing these important pieces of information, and subsequently compiling them in searchable databases is noteworthy, given the problems that impeded earlier efforts to do so. A key component of this is that systematic information is being developed on GRYD's Crisis Response System and the incidents to which responses are made. This is not yet at the point where it can be considered fully operational at a level that will support evaluation, but all indications are that these shortcomings will be rectified during the coming year.

⁷³ Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD): Comprehensive Strategy."

In addition, the Summer Night Lights program has been expanded from 24 to 32 parks and recreation centers across the city. There were many thousands of attendees during the two months SNL operated in 2011 and, as is noted below, community residents' reactions to SNL have been very positive.

VII.3 KEY OUTCOME FINDINGS

Program outcome changes were examined at both the community and individual levels. Analysis of violent gang-related crime was undertaken at the community level; youth in GRYD's prevention programs were the focus of the individual-level outcome assessment.

Gang Violence

At the community level, this year's evaluation focused on gang-related violent crimes. Gang-related homicide, robbery and aggravated assault incidents were used to map violence trends across the areas in the city where GRYD devoted the largest amount of resources to support its program activities from January 2005 to December 2011. Year-to-year changes were also examined for other locations in the city where GRYD has operated, although to a substantially lower degree, and in areas of the city where GRYD was not implemented.

Since violent gang crimes were far more concentrated in the Primary GRYD locations than in other areas of the city, a more representative comparison area was selected from Los Angeles County. This area had high numbers of violent gang-related crimes that more closely approximated those in the Primary GRYD target locations in the city. Comparisons were made using three different but complementary methodologies: segmented regression, which was used to describe the trends; interrupted time series analysis, which was used to make projections based on the trends from 2005-2008 in order to see whether actual incident levels were higher or lower than predicted; and difference-in-differences analysis, which assists in compensating for differences between the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison locations.

Gang violence has substantially declined throughout the city of Los Angeles since 2007. Declines were observed in areas where the GRYD program is operating and in areas where it is not. This suggests that there are factors beyond the GRYD program affecting violent gang crime. Somewhat smaller year-to-year declines were observed in Primary GRYD locations compared to where programs are not present. However, these differences appear largely due to the high concentration of violent gang crime in the targeted areas and a much lower incidence of gang violence elsewhere in the city. Moreover, following implementation of GRYD programs in 2009, year-to-year declines occurred in the Primary Locations at increasing rates

Comparisons of gang violence levels in the Primary GRYD locations and those in similar areas in Los Angeles County showed that both areas had similar declining trends since 2007. However, the declines in violent gang crimes were modestly larger in the GRYD areas than in the County Comparison locations following GRYD implementation in 2009. This finding was confirmed through linear regression trend estimates and comparisons of actual monthly frequencies of gang crimes to forecast models based upon past crime. A differences-in-differences comparison showed a somewhat slower decline in the city during the first year of GRYD, but faster rates of decline thereafter in comparison to the county.

Attitudinal and Behavioral Change in Prevention Program Youth

At the individual level, this year's evaluation focused on attitudinal and behavioral risk levels among youth in the GRYD program. Changes between initial assessments of at-risk levels at the time of referral, and retest assessments at six month intervals thereafter, were analyzed for a sample of 1,288 youth in the prevention program. These youth were compared to 397 others who had been deemed not-eligible at referral after scoring below the eligibility threshold on the Youth Services Evaluation Tool (YSET).

We examined the seven attitudinal scales that comprise the YSET test, comparing changes from initial YSET to the most recent retest YSET for enrolled youth, and concluded that substantial and statistically significant improvements had taken place among prevention program youth on all the scales. Improvements also took place with respect to self-reported delinquent and gang-related behaviors though at somewhat lower levels. Overall, by the time of the latest retest, 55 percent of the youth would no longer have qualified for entry into the program because their at-risk levels had dropped below the cut-point established by GRYD as the threshold for service eligibility.

The comparisons to the not-eligible sample, using the same measures, indicated that, on average, the not-eligible youth had some improvements on most of the attitudinal scales but at lower proportions than the enrolled youth, and at lower levels of improvement. The not-eligible youth were found to have had little change in gang-related behaviors.

Because of the fact that enrolled youth and not-eligible youth were not equivalent groups at the time of referral, drawing firm conclusions from the descriptive comparisons between the two groups is problematic. It is probable that a low risk group will have had fewer problems at the initial testing stage, and therefore were less likely to improve their already low at-risk levels. We conducted a Regression Discontinuity analysis to obtain other estimates of the comparative change between the enrolled and not-eligible groups. The results affirmed that the enrolled youth had improved to a greater extent than the not-eligible youth, after controlling as much as possible for the difference in at-risk levels that the initial YSET disclosed.

VII.4 STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS

In addition to empirical evidence concerning program outcomes, the Year 3 evaluation captured stakeholder perceptions of GRYD program effectiveness. Data were collected from a wide variety of groups and individuals most familiar with GRYD programs. These included members of the GRYD Office staff, service providers (most notably Community Intervention Workers and SNL Youth Squad members), leadership, detectives and line officers from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and residents of the SNL communities served by GRYD. These perceptual data were collected through surveys, interviews and focus group meetings.

The views of the stakeholders surveyed or spoken with were largely supportive of the conclusion that the GRYD program is achieving the goals outlined under the *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, the results of the LAPD survey were less positive than those obtained from GRYD staff, intervention workers, and members of served communities. Community members that attended SNL programs during the summer of 2011 were overwhelmingly positive about program activities and staff

reported enhanced feelings of safety during SNL programming, felt comfortable calling the police, and were positive about relationships within their communities. GRYD staff and intervention workers were also quite positive about relationships with other agencies, and felt that GRYD programs were having a positive impact on crime and violence. LAPD personnel, on the other hand, tended to feel that GRYD was not having much of an effect on crime, but did indicate positive views about GRYD and SNL program effects on the community, and on youth in particular, by providing alternatives to street and gang life.

VII.5 SUMMARY

The Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program operates within targeted communities in the city with high levels of gang violence and prevalence. As a community-based program, it cannot be evaluated with the rigor of a true experimental evaluation design, in which gang violence levels in selected communities randomly assigned to receive GRYD program services would be compared to levels in communities not receiving such services. As a result, absolute assertions of cause and effect relationships of the GRYD program on observed outcomes cannot be made. However, in the aggregate, the preponderance of the outcome evidence documented in this year's evaluation provides support to the hypothesis that the GRYD program is having effects consistent with the *Comprehensive Strategy's* goals. Violent gang-related crimes have declined modestly more since implementation than in comparable areas in the county, and individuals participating in GRYD prevention programs have shown substantial improvements in attitudinal and behavioral risk factors associated with potential and future gang involvement. In addition, program partners and participants have very positive perceptions about GRYD program implementation and its effects. Finally, large majorities of community residents report satisfaction with GRYD programs in their neighborhoods and report feeling safer because of GRYD.

Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY FOR INTERRUPTED
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

Appendix A

A Note on the Methodology for Interrupted Time Series Analysis

Time-Series Analysis

One of the impact evaluation methods used in this report is interrupted time-series analysis. This is based on the Box-Jenkins methodology, which refers to the set of procedures for identifying, fitting, and checking auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models with time-series data. These models can be written as follows:

$$Y_t = N_t + I_t$$

where N_t denotes an ARIMA “noise” component and I_t denotes an “intervention” component. The N_t component serves as the null case for the time series quasi experiment (McDowall et al. 1980). The basis of a general ARIMA (p,d,q) model can be understood as a sequence of random shocks or a white noise process. The time series is called “white noise” when the t^{th} observation, a_t , is randomly and independently drawn from a normal distribution with zero-mean and constant variance.

Following conventional ARIMA model-building strategies, we first modeled the noise component of the two outcome variables, the number of gang-related violent crimes and the number of calls for service involving shots fired. This process involves (1) identification, (2) estimation, and (3) diagnosis. After iterations of model fitting and diagnostic tests, the most parsimonious and appropriate ARIMA model for the number of gang-related violent crimes was identified as ARIMA (2,0,0)(1,0,0)₁₂. For the time-series of shots-fired calls, ARIMA (1,0,0) yielded white-noise residuals.

For the estimation of those models, we used Stata 12.0, which redefines conventional ARIMA models as structural models with ARMA disturbances (Hamilton, 1994). Both approaches are essentially equivalent in terms of modeling the autoregressive process of a time-series, but the latter offers greater flexibility. For example, below are how AR(1) is denoted in each of the approaches.

Approach 1:	$Y_t = \alpha + \beta Y_{t-1} + \mu_t$	(Standard AR1)
Approach 2:	$Y_t = \alpha + \mu_t$	(AR1: Structural Equation)
	$\mu_t = \rho \mu_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$	(AR1: Disturbance)

In the application of the ARIMA procedure to monthly data, the intervention term was lagged by various time lengths ranging from 0 to 4 months. This allows for a possible delayed onset of impact, following the implementation of the program being examined. We also examined three patterns of intervention that vary by the duration and pace of program impact. Table A-1 presents the technical definition and estimators of those models reported in our evaluation.

Table A-1. Typology of Program Impact

Typology	Description	Equation
Abrupt, Persistent	Intervention where $I_t = 0$ if $t < T$ and $I_t = 1$ if $t \geq T$	$Y_t = \omega I_t$
Abrupt, Temporary	Intervention where $P_t = 0$ if $t \neq T$ and $P_t = 1$ if $t = T$	$Y_t = \omega P_t$
Gradual, Persistent	Intervention where $I_t = 0$ if $t < T$ and $I_t = 1$ if $t \geq T$	$Y_t = \delta Y_{t-1} + I_t$

Note. A pulse function (P) is denoted for temporary impact (rather than a step function); T is the point of time for intervention; ω is the estimate of program impact and δ is the bounds of system stability.

There is one technical detail worth mentioning in Table A-1. The gradual pattern incorporates the lagged Y value (Y_{t-1}). Because the two time-series models presented in this report include an autoregressive process (Y_{t-n}) already, the use of the lagged Y may seem redundant. However, the ARIMA process is defined in terms of disturbance in our models, and the inclusion of the lagged outcome in the AR models does not pose a problem in model estimation.

APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY FOR RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
TO MODEL/TRADITIONAL FAMILY
COUNSELING PROGRAMS

METHODOLOGY FOR RANDOM ASSIGNMENT TO MODEL/TRADITIONAL FAMILY COUNSELING PROGRAMS

On September 1, 2011, the GRYD Office implemented a new family counseling program. UI's initial proposal for this program was to make random assignments to the program from existing clients and to also randomly assign new clients. The GRYD office decided that full random assignment was not possible and would not be accepted by service providers. The GRYD office therefore permitted providers to select families for each of the two groups on a subjective basis. Providers were authorized to assign current families to the MODEL group on the basis of the provider's perception of "need" (no standards or criteria) up to a total of 100 (the GRYD program's upper limit). A comparison group of 50 other families were also to be identified, and would be in the TRADITIONAL program group. The MODEL group receives special services, while the TRADITIONAL PROGRAM group receives services as usual¹.

Providers made some number of assignments to the MODEL program from clients enrolled prior to 9/1/2011. All new cases with an enrollment date on or after 9/1/2011 have been randomly assigned to one of the two groups by UI by the following process. Immediately after YSET-I determination of eligibility, USC submits eligible youth to UI, and UI make a random assignment to MODEL or TRADITIONAL. This is communicated to USC. USC then sends the YSET-I feedback report to the provider along with the assignment. Once a case is assigned in this fashion, no subsequent switch can be made by the provider.

Thus, the MODEL group can be considered the TREATMENT group and the TRADITIONAL group can be considered the CONTROL group. The evaluation objective is to determine whether there are outcome differences between the two groups in terms of youth attitudes and behavior. The evaluation team also hopes to assess the response of families to the two approaches in ways that will be defined at a later time (surveys, interviews, etc.). However, no evaluation has yet taken place due to the fact that the program has not reached maturity and documentation of activities and participation has not been definitively specified.

Siblings are treated as single cases for random assignment, to ensure that siblings are assigned to the same group. In cases in which a sibling of an existing client is referred and found eligible, the new sibling will be assigned to the same program group as the existing sibling, without going through the random assignment process. Sometimes this results in a random assignment being reversed when it is determined (later) that the assigned youth actually has a sibling. Providers have been asked to identify siblings when the YSET-I is sent to UI but this does not always happen.

The random assignment process uses Excel's RAND() function. This generates a random number between 0 and 1, up to 8 decimal places. The function is dynamic, which means that the random

¹ In fact, TRADITIONAL families would receive the same services that providers had previously delivered. Since not all zones had 100 families that could be put into the MODEL group, the actual numbers would vary from zone to zone. To date there has been no clear identification which families went into the MODEL group and which didn't.

number generated is recalculated by Excel whenever data are entered anywhere in the work sheet. The rand() function is implemented in one column. Any entry in any other column changes the random number. Since this would change assignments previously made, a list of 1500 random numbers was generated and then copied as "values only" to the Probability column in the Assignment spreadsheet. This preserves randomness but avoids dynamic change.

Since the objective is to have a 2:1 ratio between MODEL and TRADITIONAL (e.g. 100 MODEL families and 50 TRADITIONAL families), a criterion of .6666667 is established. When the random number in the PROBABILITY column is below that criterion, the assignment is to TREATMENT. When it is above the criterion, the assignment is to CONTROL. This results, over time, in a 2/3 to 1/3 distribution - thus achieving approximately a 2:1 ratio of MODEL to TRADITIONAL assignments.

APPENDIX C
YOUTH SERVICES ELIGIBILITY TOOL (YSET)
YSET-R INSTRUMENT

ID _____

Version: 2011 MAY



Youth Eligibility for Services Interview Reassessment (YSET-R) The Urban Institute/Harder+Company

**PLEASE USE BLACK INK
ALL QUESTIONS MUST BE ANSWERED / DO NOT SUBMIT WITH MISSING RESPONSES**

ID NUMBER* _____ DATE OF INTERVIEW: _____

*Please make sure this is the same ID Number that was submitted with the youth's initial YSET.

I certify that I conducted this private interview in accordance with the GRYD Program Training.

Interviewer Name: _____ Interviewer Signature: _____

Interviewer's Position: _____

Did you interview this youth for their initial YSET (to determine program eligibility)?

Yes

No

Don't remember

If this youth is participating in your program, how often do you provide services directly to them?

More than once a week

About once a week

More than once a month

About once a month

A few times a year

Never

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW: _____ (no address e.g., "youth's home")

Current or last completed grade in school is: (circle one)

4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th

Sex: boy girl Name of School: _____

Age: 10 11 12 13 14 15

Circle YES for all that apply and allow the youth to give more detail where indicated.

- Are you African American / Black? 0 No 1 Yes
- Are you Latino / Hispanic? 0 No 1 Yes
- Are you Asian / Pacific Islander 0 No 1 Yes
- Are you White / Anglo 0 No 1 Yes
- Other 0 No 1 Yes, specify _____

Where were you born? (e.g., LA/ LA county/ elsewhere in CA/ elsewhere in USA/ another country)

Today's date is: _____

*Six months ago was : _____

***Interviewer:** Please help the youth think back to the date six months ago since this will be important in later questions. For example, you might prompt such examples as, "around the time school was out," "around the 4th of July," and so on. This is very important for the reliability of answers that ask them to think back over the last six months.

Read to respondents: The GRYD program is designed to help young people develop successfully and keep them out of gangs. We are interviewing some youth who are NOT participating in the program as well as those that are, and we would like to ask you some questions. This is not a test and there are no right or wrong answers. All you have to do is answer honestly. All of your answers will be kept private and you personally will not be identified to anyone outside the GRYD program. OK?

Here are six statements that may or may not describe you. Let us know if the statement describes you or not. For example, if the statement says: I get along better with adults than with people my own age, you can answer by using these choices: always, often, half the time, rarely or never.

- | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|-----------------|----------|---------|--|
| 1. I try to be nice to other people because I care about their feelings. | SHOW CARD 1 | | | | |
| 1 always | 2 often | 3 half the time | 4 rarely | 5 never | |
| 2. I get very angry and -lose my temper . (very angry = yell or get mad or -pissed off) | | | | | |
| 5 always | 4 often | 3 half the time | 2 rarely | 1 never | |
| 3. I do as I am told. | | | | | |
| 1 always | 2 often | 3 half the time | 4 rarely | 5 never | |
| 4. I try to scare people to get what I want. (scare = threaten, bully, punk) | | | | | |
| 5 always | 4 often | 3 half the time | 2 rarely | 1 never | |
| 5. I am accused of not telling the truth or cheating. (accused = blamed / not telling the truth or lying) | | | | | |
| 5 always | 4 often | 3 half the time | 2 rarely | 1 never | |
| 6. I take things that are not mine from home, school, or elsewhere. | | | | | |
| 5 always | 4 often | 3 half the time | 2 rarely | 1 never | |

A. ANTISOCIAL / PROSOCIAL TENDENCIES	TOTAL	A. _____
INTERVIEWER: Leave all totals blank. To be scored by YSET staff.		

Next I'd like you to tell me how frequently you have done the following things over the last six months. For example, if I read the statement: -I talk to my friends on the phone after school.|| You answer how frequently you have done this over the last six months. Choose: **always, often, half the time, rarely or never.**

- | | | | | | |
|---|---------|-----------------|----------|---------|--|
| 7. When I go out, I tell my parents or guardians where I am going or leave them a note (or text or phone them.) | | | | | |
| 1 always | 2 often | 3 half the time | 4 rarely | 5 never | |
| 8. My parents or guardians know where I am when I am not at home or at school. | | | | | |
| 1 always | 2 often | 3 half the time | 4 rarely | 5 never | |
| 9. My parents or guardians know who I am with, when I am not at home or at school. | | | | | |
| 1 always | 2 often | 3 half the time | 4 rarely | 5 never | |

CLARIFY: If R does not tell parents or lies about where he is or who with, then parents do not know ...

B. WEAK PARENTAL SUPERVISION TOTAL B. _____

For the next questions, I want you to think about a whole year instead of the last six months. Sometimes things happen in young persons' lives that are important and serious. Tell me if any of these things happened to you in the last year.

SHOW CARD 2

- | | | |
|--|----|-----|
| | 0 | 1 |
| 10. Did you fail to go on to the next grade in school or fail a class in school? (flunk) | No | Yes |
| 11. Did you get suspended, expelled or transferred to another school for disciplinary reasons?(kicked out, OT) | No | Yes |
| 12. Did you go out on -a date with a boyfriend or girlfriend for the very first time?
<small>(CLARIFY: Do you have a boyfriend or a girlfriend for the very first time)</small> | No | Yes |
| 13. Did you break up with a boyfriend or girlfriend or did he or she break up with you? (dumped) | No | Yes |
| 14. Did you have a big fight or problem with a friend? | No | Yes |
| 15. Did you start hanging out with a new group of friends? (hanging out = kicking it) | No | Yes |
| 16. Did anyone you were close to die or get seriously injured? (injured = hurt) | No | Yes |

C. CRITICAL LIFE EVENTS TOTAL C. _____

I'm going to read several statements. Please tell me how well the statement describes you. For example, if the statement is: -I am very good at playing sports,|| tell me how *strongly you agree or disagree* that this statement is true for you.

SHOW CARD 3

Choose: **strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.**

17. Sometimes I like to do something dangerous just for the fun of it. (dangerous = risky, not safe)
- | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
| 5 strongly agree | 4 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 2 disagree | 1 strongly disagree |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
18. I sometimes find it exciting to do things that might get me in trouble.
- | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
| 5 strongly agree | 4 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 2 disagree | 1 strongly disagree |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
19. I often do things without stopping to think if I will get in trouble for it. (CLARIFY: without thinking if I will get in trouble or not)
- | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
| 5 strongly agree | 4 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 2 disagree | 1 strongly disagree |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
20. I like to have fun when I can, even if I will get into trouble for it later.
- | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
| 5 strongly agree | 4 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 2 disagree | 1 strongly disagree |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|

DE. IMPULSIVE RISK TAKING TOTAL DE. _____

21. It is okay for me to lie (or not tell the truth) if it will keep my friends from getting in trouble with parents, teachers or police.
- | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
| 5 strongly agree | 4 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 2 disagree | 1 strongly disagree |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
22. It is okay for me to lie (or not tell the truth) to someone if it will keep me from getting into trouble with him or her.
- | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|
| 5 strongly agree | 4 agree | 3 neither agree nor disagree | 2 disagree | 1 strongly disagree |
|------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|

23. It is okay to steal something from someone who is rich and can easily replace it.

5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

24. It is okay to take little things from a store without paying for them because stores make so much money that it won't hurt them.

5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

25. It is okay to beat people up if they hit me first.

5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

26. It is okay to beat people up if I do it to stand up for myself.

5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

F. NEUTRALIZATION

TOTAL F. _____

Please be honest about how likely you are to go along with your friends in the following situations? Think about your friends over the last six months.

Choose: **Yes** (definitely), **probably**, **not sure**, **probably not**, or **No** (definitely not).

Do you understand the choices?

SHOW CARD 4

27. If your friends told you not to do something because it was wrong, would you listen to them?

1 Yes 2 probably 3 not sure 4 probably not 5 No

28. If your friends told you not to do something because it was against the law, would you listen to them?

1 Yes 2 probably 3 not sure 4 probably not 5 No

29. If your friends were getting you into trouble at home, would you still hang out with them?

5 Yes 4 probably 3 not sure 2 probably not 1 No

30. If your friends were getting you into trouble at school, would you still hang out with them?

5 Yes 4 probably 3 not sure 2 probably not 1 No

31. If your friends were getting you into trouble with the police, would you still hang out with them?

5 Yes 4 probably 3 not sure 2 probably not 1 No

G. NEGATIVE / POSITIVE PEER INFLUENCE

TOTAL G. _____

Think about the friends you have now. How many of your friends have done each of these things during the last six months. Your choices are: **none**, **a few**, **half**, **most**, or **all** of your friends.

During the last six months, how many of your friends have . . . (CLARIFY: As far as you know)

SHOW CARD 5

32. How many of your friends have skipped school without an excuse?

(skipped school = ditched / excuse = permission)

5 All 4 Most 3 Half 2 A few 1 None

33. How many of your friends have stolen something?

(stolen = jacked)

5 All 4 Most 3 Half 2 A few 1 None

34. How many of your friends have attacked someone with a weapon (like a knife or a gun)?

5 All 4 Most 3 Half 2 A few 1 None

35. How many of your friends have sold marijuana or other illegal drugs? (sell drugs = slanging)

5 All 4 Most 3 Half 2 A few 1 None

36. How many of your friends have used any of these: cigarettes, tobacco, alcohol, marijuana or other illegal drugs?

5 All 4 Most 3 Half 2 A few 1 None

37. How many of your friends have belonged to a gang? (belonged to = been in)

5 All 4 Most 3 Half 2 A few 1 None

check if suspect not honest (state why)	H. PEER DELINQUENCY	TOTAL H. _____
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38. Including everyone you think of as being in your family, how many people in your family think that you probably will join a gang someday?

39. How many people in your family are gang members?

(CLARIFY: Not counting if they were in a gang before but not now.)

check if suspect not honest (state why)	T. FAMILY GANG INFLUENCE	TOTAL T. _____
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People sometimes break rules or laws. In this last section, I'd like you to be honest with me about the rules or laws you have broken in your entire life or have broken during the last six months. Remember, your answers will stay private. I will read a list of things that some people do. For each thing, I'll ask if you have ever done it and then if you have done it in the last 6 mos.

SHOW CARD 6

Have you ever . . .	(Ever)	In the last 6 mos?	See Q60c
40. Used alcohol or cigarettes?	No Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes
41. Used marijuana or other illegal drugs? (illegal: =against the law)	No Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes
42. Used paint or glue or other things you inhale to get high? (inhale = sniffing)	No Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes
43. Skipped classes without an excuse? (ditched without permission)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
44. Lied about your age to get into some place or to buy something?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
45. Avoided paying for things such as movies, bus, or subway rides? (sneak into)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
46. Purposely damaged or destroyed property not belonging to you?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
47. Carried a hidden weapon for protection?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
48. Illegally spray painted a wall or a building - -doing graffiti ? (graffiti = tagging)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
49. Stolen or tried to steal something worth \$50 or <u>less</u> ? (stolen= jacked)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
50. Stolen or tried to steal something worth <u>more</u> than \$50?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
51. Gone into or tried to go into a building to steal something?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
52. Hit someone with the idea of hurting him/her? (CLARIFY: not just playing)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
53. Attacked someone with a weapon? (attacked= jumped with gun, knife or other weapon)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
54. Used a weapon or force to get money or things from people?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
55. Been involved in gang fights? (gang fight = rumble)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes
56. Sold marijuana or other illegal drugs? (sell drugs=deal, slang/ illegal=against the law)	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No Yes	No Yes

57. Hung out with gang members in your neighborhood? (hang out = kick it) No Yes No Yes No Yes
58. Participated in gang activities or actions (beyond just hanging out) (been a part of) No Yes No Yes No Yes
59. Been a member of a gang? No Yes No Yes

INTERVIEWER: If the answer to either Q59 "ever" or "6 months" is yes, then ask Q60 a, b & c

Q60a. Did you have to do anything to join the gang? No Yes

Q60b. (If yes:) Please tell me more about this. [INTERVIEWER: write down youth's exact words.]

Q60c. Which of the things in the list I just read have you done with another member of your gang in the last 6 months? (60c)

INTERVIEWER: Go back and circle answers to Q40 thru Q56 that youth has done in last 6 mos with someone from his gang.

check if suspect not honest (state why) **SELF REPORT DELINQUENCY & SUBSTANCE USE** IJ. _____

check if suspect not honest (state why) **Current Gang Involvement** GM. _____

INTERVIEWER: SCREEN 2 BEGINS HERE:

USE SHOW CARD 7

Here are some statements about your experiences at school over the last 6 months.

Tell me if you: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each sentence.

61. I try hard in school.
 1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 strongly disagree
62. I feel like I am an important person in my classes. CLARIFY: I feel like I am important to my teachers at school.
 1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 strongly disagree
63. Teachers think good things about me.
 1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 strongly disagree
64. I usually finish my homework.
 1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 strongly disagree
65. Grades are very important to me.
 1 strongly agree 2 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 disagree 5 strongly disagree
66. If I had to choose between studying to get a good grade on a test or going out with my friends, I would ...
 5 go with friends 4 probably go with friends 3 not sure 2 probably study 1 study

K. COMMITMENT TO SCHOOL SCORE K. _____

Are there -unspoken rules|| in your neighborhood about how you should to be acting? For example, if the statement says: -People who own guns are often looked up to and respected,|| choose how *strongly you agree or disagree* that this is true in your neighborhood.

67. If someone uses violence against you, it is important that you use violence against them to get even. (violence = shove, hit, stab or shoot)
 5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree
68. When someone disrespects you, it is important that you use physical force or aggression to teach them not to disrespect you. (disrespect=dissed / physical force or aggression=push, hit, stab)
 5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree
69. People will take advantage of you if you don't let them know how tough you are. (tough = hard)
 5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

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70. People do not respect a person who is afraid to physically fight for his/her rights. (fight physically = fight with your body, hands or feet)
5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

71. Sometimes you need to threaten people in order to get them to treat you fairly. (threaten=scare, bully, punk)
5 strongly agree 4 agree 3 neither agree nor disagree 2 disagree 1 strongly disagree

M. CODE OF THE STREET SCORE M. _____

What's going on in the neighborhood where you live? Answer NO or YES. SHOW CARD 8

72. Is there a lot of talk about gangs around your neighborhood? No Yes

73. Are there enemy gangs close by? (enemy = rival) No Yes

74. Is there pressure on neighborhood kids to join gangs? No Yes

75. Are any of the people living on your street members of a gang? (CLARIFY: as far as you know) No Yes

L. GANG AWARENESS SCORE L. _____

SECTION ASKING ABOUT GROUP OF FRIENDS

76. Some people have a group of friends that they spend time with, doing things together, just hanging out or kicking it. Do you have a group of friends like that? 0 No 1 Yes

In the next questions we call these friends, -your group of friends|| or -your group||.

77. How old are the people in your group of friends? INTERVIEWER: Write in age of most, youngest and oldest.
_____ most _____ youngest _____ oldest 9 no group

78. Does your group of friends spend a lot of time together in public places like the park, the street, shopping areas, or out in the neighborhood?
0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

79. How long has this group existed? (CLARIFY: How long has this group been around, even if the people in the group have changed?)
1 less than 3 months 4 five to 10 years
2 three months to less than one year 5 eleven to 20 years
3 one to 4 years 6 more than 20 yrs 9 no group

80. Is doing illegal things accepted or okay for your group? (illegal = against the law) 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

81. Do people in your group actually do illegal things together? 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

83. What kind of illegal things do people in your group do together? Do they . . . (illegal = against the law)
a. take things that don't belong to them 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group
b. get into gang fights 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group
c. use a weapon against someone 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group
d. sell drugs 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

84. Is your group known by other groups of young people or others who live in your neighborhood for being willing to be violent—even if this does not happen often? (-be violent|| = physically hurt someone or threaten to hurt them)
0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

85X. Is your group of friends:
a) a gang? 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group
b) a crew, clique, crowd, or posse that is not a gang? 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

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c) [ASK IF BOTH 85a AND 85b ARE NO] What kind of group is it? _____

86X. Right now, are you:

a) a gang member? 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

b) a member of a crew, clique, crowd or posse that is not a gang? 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

c) [ASK IF BOTH 86a AND 86b ARE NO] What kind of group are you in? _____

87a. Does your group have a name? 0 No 1 Yes 9 no group

(IF YES) what is the name of your group? _____ 9 no group

INTERVIEWER: (write-in the name or write "R did not want to say")

87b. Tell me three things that you and others in your group do together. [do not leave blank]

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

SECTION ASKING ABOUT ACTIVITY GROUPS

88. Not counting the group of friends that you hang out with or kick it with, have you been involved any activities or teams during the last six months – something at school, a park, a library, a rec or tech center, a community agency, a religious center, or somewhere else. Tell me all of your activity groups.

INTERVIEWER: Write in each activity group mentioned. If youth is not part of any activity groups, write NONE on line a.

a. _____ b. _____

c. _____ d. _____

e. _____ f. _____

89a. Of all the activity groups you just said which one do you like the most? (Just activity groups, not including group of friends.)

Activity Group youth likes the best?: _____ [fill in or write NONE, do not leave blank]

89b. Tell me three things that you do together with others in the activity group that you like the most.

a. _____ [fill in or write NONE, do not leave blank]

b. _____

c. _____

90. How many people in this activity group are also in your group of friends that you told me about? (CLARIFY: See Q76)

5 none or almost none 4 a few 3 about half 2 many 1 all or almost all 9 no group

COMMENTS ON SCREEN 1 (pages 2-6) PLEASE INDICATE THE RELEVANT SECTION OR QUESTION NUMBER

COMMENTS ON SCREEN 2 (pages 6 – 8): PLEASE INDICATE THE RELEVANT SECTION OR QUESTION NUMBER

GENERAL COMMENTS

APPENDIX D
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON REGRESSION
DISCONTINUITY

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY

Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is a popular quasi-experimental design. The What Works Clearinghouse (http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/pdf/wwc_rd.pdf) provides a succinct document that details the standards when a regression discontinuity design is applicable. The document lists three related criteria as a minimum requirement. These are:

1. Treatment assignments are based on a forcing variable; units with scores at or above (or below) a cutoff value are assigned to the treatment group while units with scores on the other side of the cutoff are assigned to the comparison group (although non-compliance with treatment assignment is permitted).
2. The forcing variable must be ordinal with a sufficient number of unique values. This condition is required to model the relationship between the outcomes and forcing variable. The forcing variable should never be based on cardinal (non-ordinal) categories (like gender or race). The analyzed data must also include at least four unique values of the forcing variable below the cutoff and four unique values above the cutoff.
3. There must be no factor confounded with the forcing variable.

The first two criteria are satisfied by the GRYD eligibility rules. The last criterion was demonstrated in the section (Robustness Check).

Imbens and Lemieux (2008)² provide a detailed technical discussion of the methodology and its practical application. RDD differs from a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) in one fundamental way—whereas in the RCT design the assignment mechanism (into treatment and control groups) is completely random and unknown, under the RDD design the assignment mechanism is completely deterministic and known in advance. The YSET scoring of youth on a number of risk factors and designating youth eligible based on a cut-point is an example of an assignment mechanism that is deterministic. In effect, the RDD permits assessment of the treatment effect by comparing youth who score similarly (are very close) but are on either side of the cut-point. The cut-point—or the point of discontinuity—determines the assignment into treatment and control groups and, as such, the RDD is also considered a localized experiment. At the point of discontinuity, the subjects are considered randomized into the treatment and control groups.

As with crossovers in an RCT—where some subjects randomly assigned to the treatment group do not get treatment and some randomly assigned to the control group do get treatment—crossovers in the RDD arise when the assignment mechanism is violated. For example, a small number of youth scoring above the YSET cut-point are not enrolled in GRYD and a small number who score below are enrolled. In such circumstances, what is called a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design is applicable. As the name suggests, the Fuzzy RDD permits crossovers in the assignment mechanism so long as (a) there is sufficient discontinuity in the probability of enrollment at the cut-point and (b) there is not any discontinuity in other relevant variables (e.g., demographic or other factors). Requirement (b) is a robustness check to ensure that any discontinuity in the outcomes of interest—changes in the attitudes and behaviors of the enrolled youth versus the not-eligible youth—is not caused by other factors.

What is known as the Sharp RDD is implemented by estimating the regression:

²Imbens, G.W. and Lemieux, T. (2008). "Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice" *Journal of Econometrics* 142(2): 615-635.

$$y_i = a + b * t_i + g(s_i - c) + e_i$$

Where y_i is the outcome of interest (e.g., changes in youth attitudes or behavior), t_i is an indicator of youth enrollment, $g(\cdot)$ is a flexible functional form linking y_i to $s_i - c$ with c being the cut-point (or point of discontinuity) and s_i being the risk score used for assignment. The functional form of $g(\cdot)$ can be linear but in general leaving it flexible yields more conservative estimates if the true underlying form is non-linear. Note that the elements of $g(\cdot)$ are in deviation form so that, by default, the coefficient b yields the effect of t_i on y_i at the cut-point (because $s_i - c = 0$ at the cut-point).

When the RDD is Fuzzy (and not Sharp) a correction needs to be made to account for crossovers because the estimated treatment effect is potentially diluted. As with the correction for crossovers in the RCT design, the RDD can be modified by first estimating the regression:

$$t_i = a + b * f_i + g(s_i - c) + e_i$$

Where t_i is the actual enrollment (or treatment assignment) and f_i is the intended treatment or assignment (under a Sharp design). Once estimated, this analysis is used to create a “probability” of assignment (rather than actual assignment) and that probability is used in place of t_i . In other words, we first estimate \hat{t}_i as the predicted probability of enrollment and then estimate the regression:

$$y_i = a + b * \hat{t}_i + g(s_i - c) + e_i$$

Now the coefficient b yields the treatment effect while accounting for the crossovers—the Fuzzy RD estimate. In the analysis presented in the report, this two-step procedure is used to estimate the effect of enrolling in the GRYD program.

APPENDIX E
TRIANGLE SURVEY METHODOLOGY
AND INSTRUMENT

TRIANGLE SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Participants

Thirty-four incidents that took place between January 1, 2012 and April 15, 2012 were randomly selected from the GRYD Client and Services Information Database. All three members of the triangle partnership—Los Angeles Police Department officers (LAPD), GRYD Regional Managers (RMs), and the Crisis Intervention Workers (CIWs) who responded to these 34 incidents were invited to participate in the triangle survey. Participants were asked to complete a survey for each incident to which they responded, thus some participants were asked to complete more than one survey.

The evaluation team sent a total of 97 online surveys (34 for LAPD, 31 for the GRYD office, and 32 to the lead intervention agencies). At the close of the survey, the evaluation team received 70 total responses, 66 of which were unduplicated. The survey response rate was 68%.

Instrument

The online triangle survey included primarily close-ended questions. Survey respondents were asked about: (1) the extent to which the three triangle agencies collaborated after they arrived on scene of an incident, (2) how clear was the role of each agency during the incident, (3) the level of communication with other “triangle members” during the incident, and (4) whether short and long term objectives were met during the particular incident. A copy of the triangle surveys can be found in this appendix, below.

Procedures

Responses to the GRYD triangle survey was collected using SurveyMonkey, an online survey services company. To protect the confidentiality of all members, a single link was created for each of the three individual surveys (i.e., LAPD, the CIWs, and GRYD Office RM staff). No names or individual e-mail addresses were stored in SurveyMonkey. The link for each survey was sent via personal e-mail, and the responses were tracked using an incident ID generated by the evaluation team.

The online survey was launched May 10, 2012. Survey recipients received three reminders online until the survey closed on June 22, 2012. Survey responses were exported into a statistical analysis program and summarized using univariate analyses.



**Crisis Response "Triangle" Survey – Los Angeles Police Department
5-7-12**

SURVEY # S _____

Purpose

The Urban Institute/Harder+Company Community Research is conducting the Evaluation of the Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD) for the Los Angeles Mayor's GRYD Office. As part of this evaluation we are asking you to complete this online survey. This survey is designed to collect information from the primary Gang Violence Crisis Incident Responders; LAPD, Community Intervention Workers and GRYD Office staff (the "Crisis Response Triangle"). The purpose is to document the views of the triangle members about communications, collaboration and outcomes of a particular crisis incident that occurred earlier this year. You have been specifically selected to complete this survey as a triangle member who is reported to have responded to this particular incident. A brief description of the incident is presented on the first page of the survey

The findings will help the GRYD Office better understand the different perceptions of the police, intervention workers and GRYD staff about how this important component of the GRYD program is working and how they might improve response planning and implementation in the future.

Confidentiality

All of the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. Your responses will be combined with the responses of other triangle members for other incidents and your name will not be recorded anywhere. Participation is completely voluntary and there are no consequences for you if you choose not to answer any questions. Individual responses will not be provided to the GRYD Office, nor will they be shared with LAPD or intervention service providers.

Contact Us

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact [INSERT NAME, EMAIL, and PHONE - Harder], or Terry Dunworth, GRYD evaluation director at tdunworth@urban.org, cell 978-270-0685

Thank you for completing this important survey!

NOTE: IN ORDER TO PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY AND KEEP YOUR RESPONSES CONFIDENTIAL, THIS SURVEY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A RANDOMLY GENERATED SURVEY ID #, RANGING FROM S01 TO S34.

THIS IS SURVEY # S _____

THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS THE GRYD INCIDENT # FOR THIS INCIDENT. A SEPARATE EMAIL HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU LINKING THE SURVEY NUMBER AND THE GRYD INCIDENT NUMBER AND PROVIDING THE INCIDENT DESCRIPTION.

IF YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTIES IDENTIFYING THE INCIDENT TO WHICH THIS SURVEY APPLIES, PLEASE CONTACT LINDA TRAN AT _____, OR ALPHONSO MARTIN AT _____

For the following questions you should answer for the specific incident identified above. Please **do not** respond with your overall views based upon all of the incidents you have responded to – just respond for this one incident. Other incidents will be covered separately.

Section A – On Scene Roles and Collaboration

A1. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning *this particular incident* after you arrived on scene.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. It was clear to me what the role of the GRYD staff was during this incident.						
2. It was clear to me what the role of the Community Intervention Workers was during this incident						
3. It appeared to be clear to the Community Intervention Workers and GRYD staff what the role of the LAPD was during this incident						
4. The three triangle partners were able to do their jobs without “stepping on each other’s toes”						

A2. Please indicate the extent to which information was shared among “triangle members” on scene during this incident.

	Extensive Information Sharing	Some Information Sharing	Little Information Sharing	Almost No Information Sharing	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. The extent to which information was shared with me by GRYD staff					
2. The extent to which information was shared with me by Community Intervention					

Workers					
3. The extent to which information was shared with me by other responders (such as fire and rescue)					

A3. Please indicate the extent to which you communicated with other triangle members” on scene during this incident.

	Extensive Information Sharing	Some Information Sharing	Little Information Sharing	Almost No Information Sharing	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. The extent to which information was shared by me with GRYD staff					
2. The extent to which information was shared by me with Community Intervention Workers					
3. The extent to which information was shared by me with other responders (such as fire and rescue)					

A4. Do you think that on-scene coordination and communication between the triangle partners could have been improved for *this particular incident*?

No
 Yes. If yes, please describe below how collaboration and communication could have been improved: _____

Section B – Short Term Incident Outcomes (same day or same night)

B1. Please indicate your views on how well the following short term objectives were met for *this particular incident*.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. This incident was quickly controlled						
2. Tensions among incident participants were reduced						
3. Conflicts were mediated on scene						
4. Others at the incident were						

calmed down (bystanders, relatives, passerby etc.)						
5. Short term retaliation was prevented						
6. Timely emergency medical services were provided						
7. Other timely social services for victims and their families were provided (counseling etc.)						
8. Timely and effective information about the incident was provided to the community						
9. Rumors and fears in the community about this incident were effectively controlled						

Section C – Longer Term Incident Outcomes (in the days following the incident)

C1. Please indicate whether you or other members of the GRYD Office engaged in any of the following activities related to the incident after it was over.

- Follow up criminal investigation
- Community meetings
- Follow up meetings with victim(s)
- Follow up meetings with victims' family
- Outreach to victims' gang/fellow gang members (list gangs)
 - _____
 - _____
 - _____
- Outreach to rival gangs/gang members (list gangs)
 - _____
 - _____
 - _____
- Debriefing meetings with other "triangle member."
- Interviews/communication with media
- Monitored potential "hot spots"

C2. As far as you know, were there any violent incidents that were related to this one in the days following the incident?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

If you answered Yes above, please briefly describe the incident(s) and provide the GRYD Crisis Response identification # and LAPD DR# if you know them:

C3. As far as you know, did the level of violence in the vicinity of the incident change in the days following this incident?

- No, it was the same as it was before
- Yes, violent crimes such as this one declined
- Yes, violent crimes such as this one increased
- Don't know

D. Additional Comments

Please write any additional comments you might have about your views of crisis incident response and the "triangle" approach for *this particular incident*. **Please do not include any individual names in your comments, including your own:**

Thank you again for completing this survey!



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Crisis Response “Triangle” Survey – GRYD Office Regional Managers
5-7-12
SURVEY ID # S_____

Purpose

The Urban Institute/Harder+Company Community Research is conducting the Evaluation of the Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD) for the Los Angeles Mayor’s GRYD Office. As part of this evaluation we are asking you to complete this online survey. This survey is designed to collect information from the primary Gang Violence Crisis Incident Responders; LAPD, Community Intervention Workers and GRYD Office staff (the “Crisis Response Triangle”). The purpose is to document the views of the triangle members about communications, collaboration and outcomes of a particular crisis incident that occurred earlier this year. You have been specifically selected to complete this survey as a triangle member who is reported to have responded to this particular incident. A brief description of the incident is presented on the first page of the survey

The findings will help the GRYD Office better understand the different perceptions of the police, intervention workers and GRYD staff about how this important component of the GRYD program is working and how they might improve response planning and implementation in the future.

Confidentiality

All of the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. Your responses will be combined with the responses of other triangle members for other incidents and your name will not be recorded anywhere. Participation is completely voluntary and there are no consequences for you if you choose not to answer any questions. Individual responses will not be provided to the GRYD Office, nor will they be shared with LAPD or intervention service providers.

Contact Us

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact [INSERT NAME, EMAIL, and PHONE - Harder], or Terry Dunworth, GRYD evaluation director at tdunworth@urban.org, cell 978-270-0685

Thank you for completing this important survey!

NOTE: IN ORDER TO PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY AND KEEP YOUR RESPONSES CONFIDENTIAL, THIS SURVEY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A RANDOMLY GENERATED SURVEY ID #, RANGING FROM S01 TO S34.

THIS IS SURVEY # S_____

THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS THE GRYD INCIDENT # FOR THIS INCIDENT. A SEPARATE EMAIL HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU LINKING THE SURVEY NUMBER AND THE GRYD INCIDENT NUMBER AND PROVIDING THE INCIDENT DESCRIPTION.

IF YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTIES IDENTIFYING THE INCIDENT TO WHICH THIS SURVEY APPLIES, PLEASE CONTACT LINDA TRAN AT _____, OR ALPHONSO MARTIN AT _____

For the following questions you should answer for the specific incident identified above. Please **do not** respond with your overall views based upon all of the incidents you have responded to – just respond for this one incident. Other incidents will be covered separately.

Section A – On Scene Roles and Collaboration

A1. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning *this particular incident* after you arrived on scene.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. It was clear to me what the role of the LAPD was during this incident.						
2. It was clear to me what the role of the Community Intervention Workers was during this incident						
3. It appeared to be clear to the Community Intervention Workers and LAPD what the role of the GRYD Office was during this incident						
4. The three triangle partners were able to do their jobs without “stepping on each other’s toes”						

A2. Please indicate the extent to which information was shared among triangle members on scene during this incident.

	Extensive Information Sharing	Some Information Sharing	Little Information Sharing	Almost No Information Sharing	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. The extent to which information was shared with me by LAPD					
2. The extent to which information was shared with me by Community Intervention Workers					

3. The extent to which information was shared with me by other responders (such as fire and rescue)					
---	--	--	--	--	--

A3. Please indicate the extent to which you communicated with other triangle members on scene during this incident.

	Extensive Information Sharing	Some Information Sharing	Little Information Sharing	Almost No Information Sharing	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. The extent to which information was shared by me with LAPD					
2. The extent to which information was shared by me with Community Intervention Workers					
3. The extent to which information was shared by me with other responders (such as fire and rescue)					

A4. Do you think that on-scene coordination and communication between the triangle partners could have been improved for *this particular incident*?

No

Yes. If yes, please describe below how collaboration and communication could have been improved: _____

Section B – Short Term Incident Outcomes (same day or same night)

B1. Please indicate your views on how well the following short term objectives were met for *this particular incident*.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. This incident was quickly controlled						
2. Tensions among incident participants were reduced						
3. Conflicts were mediated on scene						
4. Others at the incident were calmed down (bystanders, relatives, passerby etc.)						

5. Short term retaliation was prevented						
6. Timely emergency medical services were provided						
7. Other timely social services for victims and their families were provided (counseling etc.)						
8. Timely and effective information about the incident was provided to the community						
9. Rumors and fears in the community about this incident were effectively controlled						

Section C – Longer Term Incident Outcomes (days to weeks afterwards)

C1. Please indicate whether you or other members of the GRYD Office engaged in any of the following activities related to the incident after it was over.

- Follow up criminal investigation
- Community meetings
- Follow up meetings with victim(s)
- Follow up meetings with victims' family
- Outreach to victims' gang/fellow gang members(list gangs)
 - _____
 - _____
- Outreach to rival gangs/gang members (list gangs)
 - _____
 - _____
- Debriefing meetings with other "triangle member."
- Interviews/communication with media
- Monitored potential "hot spots"

C2. As far as you know, were there any violent incidents that were related to this one in the days following the incident?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

If you answered Yes above, please briefly describe the incident(s) and provide the GRYD Crisis Response identification # and LAPD DR# if you know them:

C3. As far as you know, did the level of violence in the vicinity of the incident change in the days following this incident?

- No, it was the same as it was before
- Yes, violent crimes such as this one declined
- Yes, violent crimes such as this one increased
- Don't know

D. Additional Comments

Please write any additional comments you might have about your views of crisis incident response and the "triangle" approach for *this particular incident*. **Please do not include any individual names in your comments, including your own.**

Thank you again for completing this survey!



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**Crisis Response "Triangle" Survey – Community Intervention Workers
5-7-12**

SURVEY # S _____

Purpose

The Urban Institute/Harder+Company Community Research is conducting the Evaluation of the Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD) for the Los Angeles Mayor's GRYD Office. As part of this evaluation we are asking you to complete this online survey. This survey is designed to collect information from the primary Gang Violence Crisis Incident Responders; LAPD, Community Intervention Workers and GRYD Office staff (the "Crisis Response Triangle"). The purpose is to document the views of the triangle members about communications, collaboration and outcomes of a particular crisis incident that occurred earlier this year. You have been specifically selected to complete this survey as a triangle member who is reported to have responded to this particular incident. A brief description of the incident is presented on the first page of the survey

The findings will help the GRYD Office better understand the different perceptions of the police, intervention workers and GRYD staff about how this important component of the GRYD program is working and how they might improve response planning and implementation in the future.

Confidentiality

All of the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. Your responses will be combined with the responses of other triangle members for other incidents and your name will not be recorded anywhere. Participation is completely voluntary and there are no consequences for you if you choose not to answer any questions. Individual responses will not be provided to the GRYD Office, nor will they be shared with LAPD or intervention service providers.

Contact Us

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact [INSERT NAME, EMAIL, and PHONE - Harder], or Terry Dunworth, GRYD evaluation director at tdunworth@urban.org, cell 978-270-0685

Thank you for completing this important survey!

NOTE: IN ORDER TO PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY AND KEEP YOUR RESPONSES CONFIDENTIAL, THIS SURVEY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A RANDOMLY GENERATED SURVEY ID #, RANGING FROM S01 TO S34.

THIS IS SURVEY # S _____

THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS THE GRYD INCIDENT # FOR THIS INCIDENT. A SEPARATE EMAIL HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU LINKING THE SURVEY NUMBER AND THE GRYD INCIDENT NUMBER AND PROVIDING THE INCIDENT DESCRIPTION.

IF YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTIES IDENTIFYING THE INCIDENT TO WHICH THIS SURVEY APPLIES, PLEASE CONTACT LINDA TRAN AT _____, OR ALPHONSO MARTIN AT _____

For the following questions you should answer for the specific incident identified above. Please **do not** respond with your overall views based upon all of the incidents you have responded to – just respond for this one incident. Other incidents will be covered separately.

Section A – On Scene Roles and Collaboration

A1. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning *this particular incident* after you arrived on scene.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. It was clear to me what the role of the GRYD staff was during this incident.						
2. It was clear to me what the role of the LAPD was during this incident						
3. It appeared to be clear to the GRYD staff and the LAPD what the role of the CIWs was during this incident						
4. The three triangle partners were able to do their jobs without “stepping on each other’s toes”						

A2. Please indicate the extent to which information was shared among “triangle members” on scene during this incident.

	Extensive Information Sharing	Some Information Sharing	Little Information Sharing	Almost No Information Sharing	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. The extent to which information was shared with me by GRYD staff					
2. The extent to which information was shared with me by LAPD					
3. The extent to which information was shared with me					

by other responders (such as fire and rescue)					
---	--	--	--	--	--

A3. Please indicate the extent to which you communicated with other triangle members” on scene during this incident.

	Extensive Information Sharing	Some Information Sharing	Little Information Sharing	Almost No Information Sharing	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. The extent to which information was shared by me with GRYD staff					
2. The extent to which information was shared by me with LAPD					
3. The extent to which information was shared by me with other responders (such as fire and rescue)					

A4. Do you think that on-scene coordination and communication between the triangle partners could have been improved for *this particular incident*?

- No
- Yes. If yes, please describe below how collaboration and communication could have been improved: _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

Section B – Short Term Incident Outcomes (same day or same night)

B1. Please indicate your views on how well the following short term objectives were met for *this particular incident*.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
1. This incident was quickly controlled						
2. Tensions among incident participants were reduced						
3. Conflicts were mediated on scene						
4. Others at the incident were calmed down (bystanders, relatives, passerby etc.)						
5. Short term retaliation was prevented						
6. Timely emergency medical						

services were provided						
7. Other timely social services for victims and their families were provided (counseling etc.)						
8. Timely and effective information about the incident was provided to the community						
9. Rumors and fears in the community about this incident were effectively controlled						

Section C – Longer Term Incident Outcomes (during the days following the incident)

C1. Please indicate whether you or other CIWs engaged in any of the following activities related to the incident after it was over.

- Follow up criminal investigation
- Community meetings
- Follow up meetings with victim(s)
- Follow up meetings with victims’ family
- Outreach to victims’ gang/fellow gang members(list gangs)
 - _____
 - _____
- Outreach to rival gangs/gang members (list gangs)
 - _____
 - _____
- Debriefing meetings with other “triangle member.”
- Interviews/communication with media
- Monitored potential “hot spots”

C2. As far as you know, were there any violent incidents that were related to this one in the days following the incident?

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know

If you answered Yes above, please briefly describe the incident(s) and provide the GRYD Crisis Response identification # and LAPD DR# if you know them:

C3. As far as you know, did the level of violence in the vicinity of the incident change in the days following this incident?

- No, it was the same as it was before
- Yes, violent crimes such as this one declined
- Yes, violent crimes such as this one increased
- Don't know

D. Additional Comments

Please write any additional comments you might have about your views of crisis incident response and the "triangle" approach for *this particular incident*. **Please do not include any individual names in your comments:**

Thank you again for completing this survey!

APPENDIX F
LAPD SURVEY METHODOLOGY,
INSTRUMENT AND RESULTS

LAPD SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Participants

A survey of LAPD personnel was conducted to gather their views on gang activity in Los Angeles, and the operation and effectiveness of the GRYD program in GRYD zones and SNL areas. The sampling frame for the survey consisted of 4,465 LAPD personnel – including lieutenants, sergeants, officers, managers, detectives and supervisors – who at the time were working in LAPD areas in which GRYD operates was created with the assistance of LAPD leadership.³

A randomized selection of 449 potential respondents was drawn by the evaluation team from the sampling frame. The survey was anonymously conducted and was voluntary. No disclosure of the sample IDs was made to the LAPD or to the Los Angeles Mayor's office. Starting on June 1, 2012, sample members received a link to an online survey. They then received multiple reminders online via email until the survey was closed on August 23, 2012.

A total of 68 recipients completed the survey, for a survey response rate of 15 percent.

Instrument

The online LAPD survey was composed primarily of close-ended questions, and participants provided their survey responses between the period of June 1, 2012 to August 23, 2012. The survey gathered information on the respondents' characteristics, including position, length of time with LAPD, and locations worked; familiarity with GRYD and SNL components; interactions with GRYD zones, including the role of GRYD in their daily work and perceptions of community changes in the past year; and interactions with and perceptions of the SNL program. Respondents were also invited to provide additional comments on the GRYD program.

Procedures

The LAPD survey was conducted using SurveyMonkey, an online survey services company. Survey recipients received a link to the online survey. To protect LAPD personnel confidentiality, a single link was sent to each survey respondent's personal e-mail address. No identifying information, such as names or individual e-mail addresses, was stored in the online survey tool. Additionally, all responses were combined and used for analysis, and are presented in the aggregate form in this chapter. A copy of the survey protocol can be found below.

The online survey was launched on June 1, 2012. Survey recipients received multiple reminders online via email until the survey was closed on August 23, 2012. Survey responses were exported into a statistical analysis program and summarized using univariate analyses.

³ The evaluation team is grateful for the assistance of LAPD South Bureau Deputy Chief Robert Green and the LAPD Police Protective League for their assistance in helping to create a sample pool of potential survey respondents.



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Survey of Los Angeles Police Department Officers

5-10-2012

Purpose

The Urban Institute/Harder+Company Community Research is conducting the Evaluation of the Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD) for the Los Angeles Mayor's GRYD Office. As part of this evaluation we are asking you to complete this online survey. The purpose of this survey is to collect information about LAPD officers' views of changes in crime and gang-related incidents over the past year, and your opinions about the effectiveness of prevention and intervention programs in the twelve GRYD Zones, 32 Summer Night Lights parks and recreation centers, and the Watts Region. You and other officers across different ranks have been selected randomly from among those serving in divisions encompassing these GRYD locations.

The findings will help the GRYD Office better understand the perceptions of the police about how the GRYD program is working and how they might improve the gang reduction and youth development programs in the future.

Confidentiality

All of the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. Your responses will be combined with the responses of other officers and your name will not be recorded anywhere. Participation is completely voluntary and there are no consequences for you if you choose not to answer any questions. Individual responses will not be provided to the GRYD Office, nor will they be shared with LAPD.

Contact Us

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact [INSERT Harder Staff Name Here], or Terry Dunworth, GRYD Evaluation Director, at tdunworth@urban.org, cell phone 978-270-0685.

Thank you for completing this important survey!

Section A – Background Information

A1. What is your current position with LAPD?

- Patrol officer
- First line supervisor (Sergeant, etc.)
- Detective
- Mid-level command (Lieutenant, shift/unit commander)
- Senior-level management (Captain, precinct and above)

A2. How many years have you been a police officer?

- Less than a year with LAPD
- Number of years with LAPD
- Number of years with other police departments

A3. Over the past year, please indicate the number of months you worked in each of the following LAPD Areas.

- | | | | | | |
|----------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| 1 Central | <input type="checkbox"/> | 11 Northeast | <input type="checkbox"/> | 21 Topanga | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 Rampart | <input type="checkbox"/> | 12 77 th Street | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 3 Southwest | <input type="checkbox"/> | 13 Newton | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 4 Hollenbeck | <input type="checkbox"/> | 14 Pacific | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 5 Harbor | <input type="checkbox"/> | 15 N Hollywood | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 6 Hollywood | <input type="checkbox"/> | 16 Foothill | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 7 Wilshire | <input type="checkbox"/> | 17 Devonshire | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 8 West LA | <input type="checkbox"/> | 18 Southeast | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 9 Van Nuys | <input type="checkbox"/> | 19 Mission | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 10 West Valley | <input type="checkbox"/> | 20 Olympic | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |

Section B – Experience Working the LA GRYD Zones During 2011

B1. Please indicate your familiarity with the following components of the GRYD program.

GRYD Program Components	Very Familiar	Somewhat Familiar	Not Familiar At All
Community Action Teams			
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools			
Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs			
Gun Buyback Program			
Gang Joining Prevention Services			
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members			
Summer Night Lights			
Watts Region HACLA Task Force			

B2. For each component of the GRYD program listed below, please indicate how much you worked with that component.

GRYD Program Components	A lot of my time was spent with this component	Some of my time was spent with this component	None of my time was spent with this component
Community Action Teams			
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools			
Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs			
Gun Buyback Program			
Gang Joining Prevention Services			
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members			
Summer Night Lights			
Watts Region HACLA Task Force			

B3. How helpful or unhelpful were the following components of the GRYD program to you in the execution of your duties?

GRYD Program Components	Very helpful	Somewhat helpful	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	Somewhat unhelpful	Very unhelpful
Community Action Teams					
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools					
Crisis Response System with GRYD staff and Community Intervention Workers					
Gun Buyback Program					
Gang Joining Prevention Services					
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members					
Summer Night Lights					
Watts Region HACLA Task Force					

B4. Over the past year did you work in any of the 12 GRYD zones?

- No (if no, skip to section C)
 Yes (if yes, check the location you worked in most)

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 77 th II | <input type="checkbox"/> Newton | <input type="checkbox"/> Rampart |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Baldwin Village | <input type="checkbox"/> Florence Graham | <input type="checkbox"/> Ramona Gardens |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Boyle Heights | <input type="checkbox"/> Pacoima/Foothill | <input type="checkbox"/> Southwest II |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cypress Park | <input type="checkbox"/> Panorama City | <input type="checkbox"/> Watts-Southeast |

B5. Thinking about the location you identified, how would you compare the way things are now to the way they were about a year ago?

	Much Higher	Somewhat Higher	No Change	Somewhat Lower	Much Lower	Don't Know/No Opinion
Visibility of gangs						
The level of gang violence						
The community's sense of safety						
Community trust of the police						

B6. Addressing gang violence through the GRYD Crisis Response system is an important component of the GRYD intervention program. Did you personally respond to any incidents in 2011 as part of the GRYD crisis response team?

- No
 Yes

B7. GRYD has established Crisis Response teams consisting of LAPD officers, GRYD Regional Managers, and Community Intervention Workers. Whether you personally responded to an incident as part of the GRYD

Crisis Response team or not, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements as they apply.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree or Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know/No Opinion
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has been effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident.						
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has helped to dispel or manage rumors following a gang-related violent incident.						
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and intervention workers has reduced the likelihood of retaliation among gang members.						
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to crisis incidents.						
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with GRYD staff in response to crisis incidents.						

Section C – Experience Working During Summer Night Lights During 2011

C1. Did you work in any of the Summer Night Lights (SNL) parks or recreation centers during SNL last summer (2011)?

- No (if no, skip to Section D)
- Yes (if yes, check the site you worked in most)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ramon Garcia Park <input type="checkbox"/> Costello Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Cypress Park Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Highland Park Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Ross Snyder Park <input type="checkbox"/> Slauson Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Jordan Downs <input type="checkbox"/> Algin Sutton Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Jim Gilliam Park <input type="checkbox"/> Jackie Tatum Harvard Park <input type="checkbox"/> Van Ness Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Wilmington Recreation Center | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ramona Gardens <input type="checkbox"/> El Sereno Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Glassell Park Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Montecito Heights Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> South Park Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Nickerson Gardens <input type="checkbox"/> Imperial Courts <input type="checkbox"/> Green Meadows Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Mount Carmel Park <input type="checkbox"/> Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Normandale Recreation Center <input type="checkbox"/> Hubert Humphrey Park |
|--|---|

- ___ Sepulveda Park
- ___ Delano Recreation Center
- ___ Lanark Recreation Center
- ___ Lafayette Recreation Center

- ___ Valley Plaza Recreation Center
- ___ Sun Valley Recreation Center
- ___ Lemon Grove Park
- ___ Toberman Recreation Center

C2. Thinking about this SNL area, how would you describe the impacts of SNL in the community during the summer of 2011?

	Very High	High	No Effect	Low	Very Low
Improved community safety					
Reduced gang conflicts					
Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs					
Reduced inter-gang violence					
Improved relations between the police and the community					
Improved quality of life in the community					
Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth					

C3. Thinking about this SNL area, how would you describe any impacts in the community since SNL 2011 ended?

	Very High	High	No Effect	Low	Very Low
Improved community safety					
Reduced gang conflicts					
Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs					
Reduced inter-gang violence					
Improved relations between the police and the community					
Improved quality of life in the community					
Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth					

D. Additional Comments

Please provide any additional comments you might have about your views of gangs, crime and the effectiveness of the Los Angeles GRYD Program in the spaces below. If you consider that improvements could be made in the City's operation of the program, please indicate what they are. **Please do not include any names in your comments, including your own.**

D1. Comments about the GRYD program excluding Summer Night Lights.

D2. Comments about Summer Night Lights only.

Thank you again for completing this survey!

SURVEY RESULTS

Section A – Background Information

A1. What is your current position with LAPD?

- Patrol officer
- First line supervisor (Sergeant, etc.)
- Detective
- Mid-level command (Lieutenant, shift/unit commander)
- Senior-level management (Captain, precinct and above)

A1. What is your current position with LAPD?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Patrol officer	43	61.4	63.2	63.2
	First line supervisor (Sergeant, etc.)	11	15.7	16.2	79.4
	Detective	5	7.1	7.4	86.8
	Mid-level command (Lieutenant, shift/unit commander)	7	10.0	10.3	97.1
	Senior-level management (Captain, precinct and above)	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	68	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	2.9		
Total		70	100.0		

A2. How many years have you been a police officer?

- ___ Less than a year with LAPD
- ___ Number of years with LAPD
- ___ Number of years with other police departments

A2. How many years have you been a police officer?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than a year with LAPD	3	4.3	4.4	4.4
	More than one year with LAPD	65	92.9	95.6	100.0
	Total	68	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	2.9		
Total		70	100.0		

Number of years with LAPD

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1	1.4	1.5	1.5
	1.00	2	2.9	2.9	4.4
	3.00	4	5.7	5.9	10.3
	4.00	3	4.3	4.4	14.7
	5.00	2	2.9	2.9	17.6
	6.00	6	8.6	8.8	26.5
	7.00	4	5.7	5.9	32.4
	8.00	1	1.4	1.5	33.8
	9.00	3	4.3	4.4	38.2
	10.00	4	5.7	5.9	44.1
	11.00	1	1.4	1.5	45.6
	12.00	2	2.9	2.9	48.5
	13.00	3	4.3	4.4	52.9
	14.00	3	4.3	4.4	57.4
	15.00	4	5.7	5.9	63.2
	16.00	4	5.7	5.9	69.1
	17.00	5	7.1	7.4	76.5
	18.00	1	1.4	1.5	77.9
	20.00	1	1.4	1.5	79.4
	22.00	2	2.9	2.9	82.4
	23.00	4	5.7	5.9	88.2

	24.00	2	2.9	2.9	91.2
	25.00	1	1.4	1.5	92.6
	26.00	1	1.4	1.5	94.1
	28.00	1	1.4	1.5	95.6
	30.00	1	1.4	1.5	97.1
	31.00	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	68	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	2.9		
Total		70	100.0		

Number of years with other police departments

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	31	44.3	77.5	77.5
	2.00	4	5.7	10.0	87.5
	3.00	1	1.4	2.5	90.0
	6.00	2	2.9	5.0	95.0
	8.00	1	1.4	2.5	97.5
	10.00	1	1.4	2.5	100.0
	Total	40	57.1	100.0	
Missing	System	30	42.9		
Total		70	100.0		

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Number of years with other police departments	40	.00	10.00	1.0250	2.36955
Number of years with LAPD	68	.00	31.00	13.1324	7.98114
Valid N (listwise)	40				

A3. Over the past year, please indicate the number of months you worked in each of the following LAPD Areas.

1 Central

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	57.1	57.1
	1.00	1	1.4	14.3	71.4
	3.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	48.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	10.0	100.0	
Missing	System	63	90.0		
Total		70	100.0		

2 Rampart

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	38.5	38.5
	1.00	1	1.4	7.7	46.2
	4.00	1	1.4	7.7	53.8
	12.00	4	5.7	30.8	84.6
	24.00	1	1.4	7.7	92.3
	30.00	1	1.4	7.7	100.0
	Total	13	18.6	100.0	
Missing	System	57	81.4		
Total		70	100.0		

3 Southwest

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	29.4	29.4
	1.00	1	1.4	5.9	35.3
	2.00	1	1.4	5.9	41.2
	9.00	2	2.9	11.8	52.9
	10.00	2	2.9	11.8	64.7
	12.00	5	7.1	29.4	94.1
	28.00	1	1.4	5.9	100.0
	Total	17	24.3	100.0	
Missing	System	53	75.7		
Total		70	100.0		

4 Hollenbeck

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	55.6	55.6
	1.00	1	1.4	11.1	66.7
	6.00	1	1.4	11.1	77.8
	12.00	1	1.4	11.1	88.9
	36.00	1	1.4	11.1	100.0
	Total	9	12.9	100.0	
Missing	System	61	87.1		
Total		70	100.0		

5 Harbor

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	83.3	83.3
	38.00	1	1.4	16.7	100.0
	Total	6	8.6	100.0	
Missing	System	64	91.4		
Total		70	100.0		

6 Hollywood

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	80.0	80.0
	22.00	1	1.4	20.0	100.0
	Total	5	7.1	100.0	
Missing	System	65	92.9		
Total		70	100.0		

7 Wilshire

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	57.1	57.1
	18.00	1	1.4	14.3	71.4
	24.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	48.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	10.0	100.0	
Missing	System	63	90.0		

7 Wilshire

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	57.1	57.1
	18.00	1	1.4	14.3	71.4
	24.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	48.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	10.0	100.0	
Missing	System	63	90.0		
Total		70	100.0		

8 West LA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	71.4	71.4
	9.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	12.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	10.0	100.0	
Missing	System	63	90.0		
Total		70	100.0		

9 Van Nuys

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	55.6	55.6
	8.00	1	1.4	11.1	66.7
	10.00	1	1.4	11.1	77.8
	11.00	1	1.4	11.1	88.9
	72.00	1	1.4	11.1	100.0
	Total	9	12.9	100.0	
Missing	System	61	87.1		
Total		70	100.0		

10 West Valley

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	71.4	71.4
	2.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	39.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0

Total	7	10.0	100.0
Missing System	63	90.0	
Total	70	100.0	

11 Northeast

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	3	4.3	27.3	27.3
	1.00	1	1.4	9.1	36.4
	12.00	6	8.6	54.5	90.9
	24.00	1	1.4	9.1	100.0
	Total	11	15.7	100.0	
Missing	System	59	84.3		
Total		70	100.0		

12 77th Street

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	18.2	18.2
	1.00	1	1.4	4.5	22.7
	2.00	1	1.4	4.5	27.3
	4.00	1	1.4	4.5	31.8
	6.00	1	1.4	4.5	36.4
	10.00	1	1.4	4.5	40.9
	12.00	7	10.0	31.8	72.7
	13.00	1	1.4	4.5	77.3
	30.00	1	1.4	4.5	81.8
	51.00	1	1.4	4.5	86.4
	55.00	1	1.4	4.5	90.9
	156.00	1	1.4	4.5	95.5
	336.00	1	1.4	4.5	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

13 Newton

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	36.4	36.4
	2.00	2	2.9	18.2	54.5
	3.00	1	1.4	9.1	63.6
	12.00	3	4.3	27.3	90.9
	84.00	1	1.4	9.1	100.0
	Total	11	15.7	100.0	
Missing	System	59	84.3		
Total		70	100.0		

14 Pacific

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	66.7	66.7
	3.00	1	1.4	16.7	83.3
	4.00	1	1.4	16.7	100.0
	Total	6	8.6	100.0	
Missing	System	64	91.4		
Total		70	100.0		

15 N Hollywood

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	66.7	66.7
	2.00	1	1.4	16.7	83.3
	12.00	1	1.4	16.7	100.0
	Total	6	8.6	100.0	
Missing	System	64	91.4		
Total		70	100.0		

16 Foothill

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	33.3	33.3
	2.00	2	2.9	13.3	46.7
	3.00	1	1.4	6.7	53.3
	6.00	1	1.4	6.7	60.0
	8.00	2	2.9	13.3	73.3
	10.00	1	1.4	6.7	80.0
	12.00	1	1.4	6.7	86.7
	75.00	1	1.4	6.7	93.3
	120.00	1	1.4	6.7	100.0
	Total	15	21.4	100.0	
Missing	System	55	78.6		
Total		70	100.0		

17 Devonshire

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	57.1	57.1
	1.00	1	1.4	14.3	71.4
	16.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	24.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	10.0	100.0	
Missing	System	63	90.0		
Total		70	100.0		

18 Southeast

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	35.7	35.7
	3.00	1	1.4	7.1	42.9
	12.00	4	5.7	28.6	71.4
	14.00	1	1.4	7.1	78.6
	16.00	1	1.4	7.1	85.7
	28.00	1	1.4	7.1	92.9
	36.00	1	1.4	7.1	100.0
	Total	14	20.0	100.0	
Missing	System	56	80.0		
Total		70	100.0		

19 Mission

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	4	5.7	28.6	28.6
	1.00	2	2.9	14.3	42.9
	8.00	1	1.4	7.1	50.0
	11.00	1	1.4	7.1	57.1
	12.00	5	7.1	35.7	92.9
	36.00	1	1.4	7.1	100.0
	Total	14	20.0	100.0	
Missing	System	56	80.0		
Total		70	100.0		

20 Olympic

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	71.4	71.4
	6.00	1	1.4	14.3	85.7
	13.00	1	1.4	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	10.0	100.0	
Missing	System	63	90.0		
Total		70	100.0		

21 Topanga

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	5	7.1	100.0	100.0
Missing	System	65	92.9		
Total		70	100.0		

Section B – Experience Working the LA GRD Zones During 2011

B1. Please indicate your familiarity with the following components of the GRD program.

Community Action Teams

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	13	18.6	21.7	21.7
	Somewhat Familiar	21	30.0	35.0	56.7
	Not Familiar At All	26	37.1	43.3	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	7	10.0	11.7	11.7
	Somewhat Familiar	20	28.6	33.3	45.0
	Not Familiar At All	33	47.1	55.0	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	20	28.6	32.3	32.3
	Somewhat Familiar	19	27.1	30.6	62.9
	Not Familiar At All	23	32.9	37.1	100.0
	Total	62	88.6	100.0	
Missing	System	8	11.4		
Total		70	100.0		

Gun Buy-Back Program

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	26	37.1	41.9	41.9
	Somewhat Familiar	31	44.3	50.0	91.9
	Not Familiar At All	5	7.1	8.1	100.0
	Total	62	88.6	100.0	
Missing	System	8	11.4		
Total		70	100.0		

Gang Joining Prevention Services

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	14	20.0	24.1	24.1
	Somewhat Familiar	21	30.0	36.2	60.3
	Not Familiar At All	23	32.9	39.7	100.0
	Total	58	82.9	100.0	
Missing	System	12	17.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Intervention Case Management with Gang Members

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	18	25.7	30.0	30.0
	Somewhat Familiar	17	24.3	28.3	58.3
	Not Familiar At All	25	35.7	41.7	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Summer Night Lights

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	34	48.6	54.0	54.0
	Somewhat Familiar	22	31.4	34.9	88.9
	Not Familiar At All	7	10.0	11.1	100.0
	Total	63	90.0	100.0	
Missing	System	7	10.0		
Total		70	100.0		

Watts Region HACLA Task Force

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Familiar	9	12.9	15.0	15.0
	Somewhat Familiar	20	28.6	33.3	48.3
	Not Familiar At All	31	44.3	51.7	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

B2. For each component of the GRYD program listed below, please indicate how much you worked with that component.

Community Action Teams

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	3	4.3	5.0	5.0
	Some of my time was spent with this component	14	20.0	23.3	28.3
	None of my time was spent with this component	43	61.4	71.7	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Some of my time was spent with this component	12	17.1	20.0	20.0
	None of my time was spent with this component	48	68.6	80.0	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	4	5.7	6.6	6.6
	Some of my time was spent with this component	22	31.4	36.1	42.6
	None of my time was spent with this component	35	50.0	57.4	100.0
	Total	61	87.1	100.0	
Missing	System	9	12.9		
Total		70	100.0		

Gun Buy-Back Program

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	4	5.7	6.6	6.6
	Some of my time was spent with this component	20	28.6	32.8	39.3
	None of my time was spent with this component	37	52.9	60.7	100.0
	Total	61	87.1	100.0	
Missing	System	9	12.9		
Total		70	100.0		

Gang Joining Prevention Services

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	2	2.9	3.3	3.3
	Some of my time was spent with this component	17	24.3	28.3	31.7
	None of my time was spent with this component	41	58.6	68.3	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Intervention Case Management with Gang Members

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	1	1.4	1.6	1.6
	Some of my time was spent with this component	15	21.4	24.2	25.8
	None of my time was spent with this component	46	65.7	74.2	100.0
	Total	62	88.6	100.0	
Missing	System	8	11.4		
Total		70	100.0		

Summer Night Lights

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	10	14.3	16.1	16.1
	Some of my time was spent with this component	27	38.6	43.5	59.7
	None of my time was spent with this component	25	35.7	40.3	100.0
	Total	62	88.6	100.0	
Missing	System	8	11.4		
Total		70	100.0		

Watts Region HACLA Task Force

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A lot of my time was spent with this component	1	1.4	1.7	1.7
	Some of my time was spent with this component	9	12.9	15.0	16.7
	None of my time was spent with this component	50	71.4	83.3	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

B3. How helpful or unhelpful were the following components of the GRYD program to you in the execution of your duties?

Community Action Teams

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	3	4.3	5.3	5.3
	Somewhat helpful	12	17.1	21.1	26.3
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	36	51.4	63.2	89.5
	Very unhelpful	6	8.6	10.5	100.0
	Total	57	81.4	100.0	
Missing	System	13	18.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	3	4.3	5.4	5.4
	Somewhat helpful	9	12.9	16.1	21.4
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	38	54.3	67.9	89.3
	Very unhelpful	6	8.6	10.7	100.0
	Total	56	80.0	100.0	
Missing	System	14	20.0		
Total		70	100.0		

Crisis Response System with GRYD staff and Community Intervention Workers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	4	5.7	6.8	6.8
	Somewhat helpful	15	21.4	25.4	32.2
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	30	42.9	50.8	83.1
	Somewhat unhelpful	3	4.3	5.1	88.1
	Very unhelpful	7	10.0	11.9	100.0
	Total	59	84.3	100.0	
Missing	System	11	15.7		
Total		70	100.0		

Gun Buy-Back Program

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	14	20.0	23.7	23.7
	Somewhat helpful	11	15.7	18.6	42.4
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	25	35.7	42.4	84.7
	Somewhat unhelpful	2	2.9	3.4	88.1
	Very unhelpful	7	10.0	11.9	100.0
	Total	59	84.3	100.0	
Missing	System	11	15.7		
Total		70	100.0		

Gang Joining Prevention Services

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	5	7.1	8.9	8.9
	Somewhat helpful	11	15.7	19.6	28.6
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	30	42.9	53.6	82.1
	Somewhat unhelpful	3	4.3	5.4	87.5
	Very unhelpful	7	10.0	12.5	100.0
	Total	56	80.0	100.0	
Missing	System	14	20.0		
Total		70	100.0		

Intervention Case Management with Gang Members

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	5	7.1	8.6	8.6
	Somewhat helpful	10	14.3	17.2	25.9
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	32	45.7	55.2	81.0
	Somewhat unhelpful	3	4.3	5.2	86.2
	Very unhelpful	8	11.4	13.8	100.0
	Total	58	82.9	100.0	
Missing	System	12	17.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Summer Night Lights

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	10	14.3	16.7	16.7
	Somewhat helpful	17	24.3	28.3	45.0
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	21	30.0	35.0	80.0
	Somewhat unhelpful	4	5.7	6.7	86.7
	Very unhelpful	8	11.4	13.3	100.0
	Total	60	85.7	100.0	
Missing	System	10	14.3		
Total		70	100.0		

Watts Region HACLA Task Force

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very helpful	5	7.1	8.9	8.9
	Somewhat helpful	12	17.1	21.4	30.4
	Neither helpful nor unhelpful	32	45.7	57.1	87.5
	Somewhat unhelpful	1	1.4	1.8	89.3
	Very unhelpful	6	8.6	10.7	100.0
	Total	56	80.0	100.0	
Missing	System	14	20.0		
Total		70	100.0		

B4. Over the past year did you work in any of the 12 GRYD zones?

___ No (if no, skip to section C)

___ Yes (if yes, check the location you worked in most)

B4. Over the past year did you work in any of the 12 GRYD zones?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	42	60.0	66.7	66.7
	No	21	30.0	33.3	100.0
	Total	63	90.0	100.0	
Missing	System	7	10.0		

B4. Over the past year did you work in any of the 12 GRYD zones?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	42	60.0	66.7	66.7
	No	21	30.0	33.3	100.0
	Total	63	90.0	100.0	
Missing	System	7	10.0		
Total		70	100.0		

B4a. Please check the location you worked in most

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	77th II	6	8.6	14.3	14.3
	Baldwin Village	2	2.9	4.8	19.0
	Boyle Heights	1	1.4	2.4	21.4
	Cypress Park	4	5.7	9.5	31.0
	Newton	4	5.7	9.5	40.5
	Florence Graham	1	1.4	2.4	42.9
	Pacoima/Foothill	4	5.7	9.5	52.4
	Panorama City	5	7.1	11.9	64.3
	Rampart	2	2.9	4.8	69.0
	Ramona Gardens	1	1.4	2.4	71.4
	Southwest II	5	7.1	11.9	83.3
	Watts-Southeast	7	10.0	16.7	100.0
	Total	42	60.0	100.0	
	Missing	System	28	40.0	
Total		70	100.0		

B5. Thinking about the location you identified, how would you compare the way things are now to the way they were about a year ago?

Visibility of gangs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Higher	5	7.1	12.2	12.2
	No Change	21	30.0	51.2	63.4
	Somewhat Lower	11	15.7	26.8	90.2
	Much Lower	4	5.7	9.8	100.0

Total	41	58.6	100.0
Missing System	29	41.4	
Total	70	100.0	

The level of gang violence

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much Higher	1	1.4	2.4	2.4
	Somewhat Higher	7	10.0	17.1	19.5
	No Change	14	20.0	34.1	53.7
	Somewhat Lower	15	21.4	36.6	90.2
	Much Lower	4	5.7	9.8	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

The community's sense of safety

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much Higher	1	1.4	2.4	2.4
	Somewhat Higher	15	21.4	36.6	39.0
	No Change	16	22.9	39.0	78.0
	Somewhat Lower	5	7.1	12.2	90.2
	Much Lower	3	4.3	7.3	97.6
	Don't Know/No Opinion	1	1.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

Community trust of the police

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much Higher	2	2.9	4.9	4.9
	Somewhat Higher	22	31.4	53.7	58.5
	No Change	15	21.4	36.6	95.1
	Somewhat Lower	1	1.4	2.4	97.6
	Don't Know/No Opinion	1	1.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

B6. Addressing gang violence through the GRYD Crisis Response system is an important component of the GRYD intervention program. Did you personally respond to any incidents in 2011 as part of the GRYD crisis response team?

- No
- Yes

B6. Addressing gang violence through the GRYD Crisis Response system is an important component of the GRYD intervention program. Did you personally respond to any incidents in 2011 as part of the GRYD crisis response team?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	9	12.9	22.5	22.5
	No	31	44.3	77.5	100.0
	Total	40	57.1	100.0	
Missing	System	30	42.9		
Total		70	100.0		

B7. GRYD has established Crisis Response teams consisting of LAPD officers, GRYD Regional Managers, and Community Intervention Workers. Whether you personally responded to an incident as part of the GRYD Crisis Response team or not, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements as they apply.

The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has been effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	5	7.1	12.2	12.2
	Agree	13	18.6	31.7	43.9
	Neither Agree or Disagree	9	12.9	22.0	65.9
	Disagree	6	8.6	14.6	80.5
	Strongly Disagree	4	5.7	9.8	90.2
	Don't Know/No Opinion	4	5.7	9.8	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has helped to dispel or manage rumors following a gang-related violent incident.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	7	10.0	17.1	17.1
	Agree	10	14.3	24.4	41.5
	Neither Agree or Disagree	10	14.3	24.4	65.9
	Disagree	5	7.1	12.2	78.0
	Strongly Disagree	5	7.1	12.2	90.2
	Don't Know/No Opinion	4	5.7	9.8	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and intervention workers has reduced the likelihood of retaliation among gang members.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	6	8.6	14.6	14.6
	Agree	9	12.9	22.0	36.6
	Neither Agree or Disagree	9	12.9	22.0	58.5
	Disagree	6	8.6	14.6	73.2
	Strongly Disagree	5	7.1	12.2	85.4
	Don't Know/No Opinion	6	8.6	14.6	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to crisis incidents.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	5	7.1	12.2	12.2
	Agree	12	17.1	29.3	41.5
	Neither Agree or Disagree	11	15.7	26.8	68.3
	Disagree	6	8.6	14.6	82.9
	Strongly Disagree	4	5.7	9.8	92.7
	Don't Know/No Opinion	3	4.3	7.3	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with GRYD staff in response to crisis incidents.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	4	5.7	9.8	9.8
	Agree	17	24.3	41.5	51.2
	Neither Agree or Disagree	11	15.7	26.8	78.0
	Disagree	4	5.7	9.8	87.8
	Strongly Disagree	2	2.9	4.9	92.7
	Don't Know/No Opinion	3	4.3	7.3	100.0
	Total	41	58.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	41.4		
Total		70	100.0		

Section C – Experience Working During Summer Night Lights During 2011

C1. Did you work in any of the Summer Night Lights (SNL) parks or recreation centers during SNL last summer (2011)?

- No (if no, skip to Section D)
 Yes (if yes, check the site you worked in most)

C1. Did you work in any of the Summer Night Lights (SNL) parks or recreation centers during SNL last summer (2011)?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	23	32.9	37.1	37.1
	No	39	55.7	62.9	100.0
	Total	62	88.6	100.0	
Missing	System	8	11.4		
Total		70	100.0		

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ramon Garcia Park | <input type="checkbox"/> Ramona Gardens |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Costello Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> El Sereno Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cypress Park Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Glassell Park Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Highland Park Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Montecito Heights Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ross Snyder Park | <input type="checkbox"/> South Park Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Slauson Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Nickerson Gardens |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jordan Downs | <input type="checkbox"/> Imperial Courts |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Algin Sutton Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Green Meadows Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jim Gilliam Park | <input type="checkbox"/> Mount Carmel Park |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jackie Tatum Harvard Park | <input type="checkbox"/> Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Van Ness Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Normandale Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Wilmington Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Hubert Humphrey Park |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sepulveda Park | <input type="checkbox"/> Valley Plaza Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Delano Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Sun Valley Recreation Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lanark Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Lemon Grove Park |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lafayette Recreation Center | <input type="checkbox"/> Toberman Recreation Center |

C1a. Please check the site you worked in most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Cypress Park Recreation Center	1	1.4	4.3	4.3
	Jordan Downs	3	4.3	13.0	17.4
	Jim Gilliam Park	2	2.9	8.7	26.1
	Jackie Tatum Harvard Park	4	5.7	17.4	43.5
	Van Ness Recreation Center	1	1.4	4.3	47.8
	Sepulveda Park	3	4.3	13.0	60.9
	Lafayette Recreation Center	1	1.4	4.3	65.2
	El Sereno Recreation Center	1	1.4	4.3	69.6
	South Park Recreation Center	2	2.9	8.7	78.3
	Imperial Courts	2	2.9	8.7	87.0
	Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center	3	4.3	13.0	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

C2. Thinking about this SNL area, how would you describe the impacts of SNL in the community during the summer of 2011?

Improved community safety

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	4	5.7	17.4	17.4
	High	9	12.9	39.1	56.5
	No Effect	7	10.0	30.4	87.0
	Low	1	1.4	4.3	91.3
	Very Low	2	2.9	8.7	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Reduced gang conflicts

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	1	1.4	4.3	4.3
	High	5	7.1	21.7	26.1
	No Effect	11	15.7	47.8	73.9
	Low	3	4.3	13.0	87.0
	Very Low	3	4.3	13.0	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	4	5.7	17.4	17.4
	High	5	7.1	21.7	39.1
	No Effect	8	11.4	34.8	73.9
	Very Low	6	8.6	26.1	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Reduced inter-gang violence

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	3	4.3	13.0	13.0
	High	4	5.7	17.4	30.4
	No Effect	9	12.9	39.1	69.6
	Low	4	5.7	17.4	87.0
	Very Low	3	4.3	13.0	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Improved relations between the police and the community

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	4	5.7	17.4	17.4
	High	7	10.0	30.4	47.8
	No Effect	7	10.0	30.4	78.3
	Low	4	5.7	17.4	95.7
	Very Low	1	1.4	4.3	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

Improved quality of life in the community

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	3	4.3	14.3	14.3
	High	10	14.3	47.6	61.9
	No Effect	5	7.1	23.8	85.7
	Low	3	4.3	14.3	100.0
	Total	21	30.0	100.0	
Missing	System	49	70.0		
Total		70	100.0		

Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	6	8.6	26.1	26.1
	High	13	18.6	56.5	82.6
	No Effect	1	1.4	4.3	87.0
	Low	2	2.9	8.7	95.7
	Very Low	1	1.4	4.3	100.0
	Total	23	32.9	100.0	
Missing	System	47	67.1		
Total		70	100.0		

C3. Thinking about this SNL area, how would you describe any impacts in the community since SNL 2011 ended?

Improved community safety

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	2	2.9	9.1	9.1
	High	3	4.3	13.6	22.7
	No Effect	14	20.0	63.6	86.4
	Low	1	1.4	4.5	90.9
	Very Low	2	2.9	9.1	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Reduced gang conflicts

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	3	4.3	13.6	13.6
	No Effect	14	20.0	63.6	77.3
	Low	2	2.9	9.1	86.4
	Very Low	3	4.3	13.6	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	1	1.4	4.5	4.5
	High	5	7.1	22.7	27.3
	No Effect	11	15.7	50.0	77.3
	Low	2	2.9	9.1	86.4
	Very Low	3	4.3	13.6	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Reduced inter-gang violence

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	1	1.4	4.5	4.5
	High	2	2.9	9.1	13.6
	No Effect	14	20.0	63.6	77.3
	Low	2	2.9	9.1	86.4
	Very Low	3	4.3	13.6	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Improved relations between the police and the community

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	2	2.9	9.1	9.1
	High	7	10.0	31.8	40.9
	No Effect	7	10.0	31.8	72.7
	Low	4	5.7	18.2	90.9
	Very Low	2	2.9	9.1	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Improved quality of life in the community

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	2	2.9	9.1	9.1
	High	6	8.6	27.3	36.4
	No Effect	10	14.3	45.5	81.8
	Low	3	4.3	13.6	95.5
	Very Low	1	1.4	4.5	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	2	2.9	9.1	9.1
	High	10	14.3	45.5	54.5
	No Effect	6	8.6	27.3	81.8
	Low	3	4.3	13.6	95.5
	Very Low	1	1.4	4.5	100.0
	Total	22	31.4	100.0	
Missing	System	48	68.6		
Total		70	100.0		

D. Additional Comments

Please provide any additional comments you might have about your views of gangs, crime and the effectiveness of the Los Angeles GRYD Program in the spaces below. If you consider that improvements could be made in the City's operation of the program, please indicate what they are. **Please do not include any names in your comments, including your own.**

D1. Comments about the GRYD program excluding Summer Night Lights.

**Specific comments are not reported herein to maintain anonymity and confidentiality of survey responses.

ATTACHMENT D

Evaluation RFP: Notification Letters to Applicants and Appeals Procedure



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA

December 20, 2012

Marcus L. Stevenson, Director
Office of Grants, Contracts and Pricing
The Urban Institute
2100 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Stevenson:

On September 12, 2012 the Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the Evaluation of its GRYD Comprehensive Strategy. The Urban Institute submitted a proposal to provide evaluation services in support of our efforts to reduce gang violence within the communities of Los Angeles.


A total of two proposals to provide evaluation services were received. An independent review committee carefully reviewed and rated your proposal. A total of 100 possible points was given. Below is your final score for your submitted proposal.

Final Score:	Final Rank:
92.3	1 st

All applicants, including top-scoring applicants, are given the opportunity to appeal based upon the Mayor's GRYD appeals procedure. If you wish to submit an appeal, please follow instructions in the attached document. Upon completion of our appeals procedure, recommendations for funding will be presented to members of City Council and Mayor for approval. Funding will be contingent upon the availability of funds.

If you have any questions related to this process, please contact Mildred M. Lopez directly at (213) 473-7798 or mildred.m.lopez@lacity.org

Sincerely,


Guillermo Cespedes, MSW
Deputy Mayor
Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development

Attachment: GRYD Procedure for Appeals





Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development
Evaluation Request for Proposals
Proposal Evaluation Summary

Applicant Agency	Urban Institute
Evaluation Factors	Reviewer Comments: <i>These comments are intended to identify some areas of strengths and weaknesses, which were identified by the reviewers; each comment does not correlate with an exact deduction of possible points. Each proposal was read and scored by four individuals, a consensus meeting was held and final scores after the consensus meeting were averaged to reach a final score per agency.</i>
Related Experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposer addresses past and present experience with gang and gang-related projects (i.e. PI has experience in this area); Proposer has more specific experience with gang program evaluation.• Other than its own evaluation of the first 3 years of the GRYD, proposer cited only one other study (Spergel Model) to describe its knowledge of street gang literature of the past 20 years. Proposer did not demonstrate a familiarity with the definitional issues about gangs, gang membership, and gang-related crime. However, their extensive prior experience in evaluating community-level social programming, demonstrates extensive experience with past evaluations to implement and evaluate coordinated street gang prevention and intervention programs, including: the evaluation of the first 3 years of the GRYD. During this evaluation Proposer developed positive relationships with a wide range of stakeholders from law enforcement, community groups, gang intervention specialists and GRYD program management personnel that is effectively demonstrated in this proposal.• No mention of building positive relationships to support and facilitate data collection; No discussion of the gang definitional issues.• Agency is qualified generally; Proposer has more specific experience with gang program evaluation.



Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development
Evaluation Request for Proposals
Proposal Evaluation Summary

General Evaluation Approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The overall design is well specified. There is clear linkage between the research questions, the data collection methods, and the analysis. There is thoughtful discussion throughout of the potential challenges and strategies for dealing with them. The proposer was responsive to what was stated in the RFP on multiple levels - from the overall approach, to the emphasis on individual items such as strengthening the comparison groups, use of scorecards, use of strategies from Skogan et al.'s evaluation, and the key research questions to be addressed. Proposer has clear knowledge of the data; for example, in her discussion of incident vs. arrest vs. calls for service data, her explanation that incident data had a gang flag and the other data did not and possible strategies of how to address this show a high level of expertise specifically related to the topic area of this evaluation. Use of the existing data collection tools was also clearly enumerated. The potential ability to do within-zone as well as all-zone analyses was also discussed. In short, it is clear the proposer read the RFP and specifically addressed each requested item thoughtfully and when possible, creatively and with innovation.• Needs some degree of focus: reviewer had to search through 22 pages of the proposal to cull out specifics to this section. Proposer acknowledged difficulty in collecting some data sets, particularly among gang involved participants, but still raised questions regarding alternative solutions to this problem in addition to identifying respondents through monetary reward or increasing sample size. Proposer offered clear and excellent model for assessing process evaluation vs. outcome evaluation and conveyed a clear understanding of GRYD strategy and program challenges along with a strong understanding of sources for relevant data, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each data source. Proposer admits that pre-year 4 analysis will be difficult because of a lack of data collection during the first 3 years of the GRYD evaluation. Proposer will use data to create a profile of each GRYD zone summarizing key demographic and crime information and the level and type of GRYD activity in each zone but fails to develop a plan for collecting and analyzing ethnographic and related qualitative data -- this is a clear shortcoming in this proposal.
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Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development
Evaluation Request for Proposals
Proposal Evaluation Summary

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposal was not as well organized, but substantively, they had a better understanding of the GRYD work to date. The comparison groups suggested by UI were more creative, appropriate and thought-provoking--although I do have some questions about feasibility. UI's suggested design for the gang violence/crime analysis was more thorough and incorporated the impact of incident response--something the RFP clearly expected proposers to do. UI specifically discussed how they would build maps to display GRYD activity and relate those maps to the development scorecards--another feature required by the RFP. UI proposes exit surveys (requested by RFP). It offers key informant surveys for prevention but again, this is something that was done in the past with little usefulness to the overall evaluation. UI suggests estimating the at-risk population and using that population for comparison--this is a creative idea that is worthy of consideration. Tracking gang members outside of GRYD Zones as comparison youth for FCM is an intriguing idea worthy of discussion--not entirely sure it will be feasible in the end. It demonstrates, however, more innovative thinking in this particular area. UI proposes to do a gang network analysis, which is desirable and aligns the work currently underway in Chicago. It would also have multiple benefits in assessing the impact of the crisis/incident response part of GRYD. For crisis response, proposer indicates that interviews and focus groups would be completed with the triangle partners and proposes to direct data collection to the actual responders. The details related to measures were fairly minimal --it did not appear from the narrative that the authors took time to align their narrative with the supplemental materials given to them that lay out the measures currently collected by providers.
Work Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposer has included a detailed evaluation task timeline outlining the schedule for the project. The schedule appears to be realistic, although in several instances the Proposer will begin data analyses two months before data collection has finished which raises some small concern. Proposer is committed to providing continuous feedback to GRYD staff. The Urban Institute (UI), which is the principle contractor in the proposal, is headquartered in Washington, DC. but their local presence is optimally covered with




Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development
Evaluation Request for Proposals
Proposal Evaluation Summary

	<p>the involvement of a secondary contractor, Harder + Company, a Los Angeles-based company. The UI will send representatives to Los Angeles on a monthly basis to participate in data collection, observe GRYD activity, troubleshoot problems, and to confer with GRYD staff. Throughout the evaluation Harder will maintain a continuous local presence which more than fulfills "geographic" concerns.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Staff roles were only generally addressed. Harder is listed as having an LA presence, but what Harder staff do was not specifically addressed.
Budget	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Budget and budget narrative clearly describe the tasks that will be carried out, and the staff that will be needed to carry out the tasks. Costs are reasonable for the tasks proposed. Sub-contractor responsibilities are clear. Sufficient detail is presented in the narrative for each line item.• Budget is complete and comprehensive. Proposer has included an itemized budget spreadsheet accompanied by a detailed narrative explaining all costs/charges. Excellent, thorough and clear.• Proposal adheres to the budget requirements.
Management and Staffing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A clear management plan is described, with specific tasks outlined and linked to specific staff, and their concomitant expertise is also explained. A staff organization chart is presented that clearly outlines roles and responsibilities specifically as they relate to project tasks. A clear plan for how Urban Institute staff not located in Los Angeles will manage the project is laid out, with a clear role for LA-based Harder Inc.



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	<p>staff. Letters of commitment are included for all subcontracting staff.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposer has identified all principle personnel who will participate in this evaluation -- although some lower level personnel such as research assistants have not been identified specifically but positions are noted. For those who are identified, Proposer has provided detailed resumes. The proposed staffing appears to be sufficient to accomplish all requirements of the RFP. Proposer has provided a detailed staffing organization chart that contains all of the required information. Proposer has explained how it will maintain a local presence. Proposer has provided letters of commitment from subcontractors as required. Excellent and thorough work throughout.• The management and staffing plan appears to be stronger in this proposal because it more closely aligns with the work proposed in the narrative. The personnel include a wide variety of staff at different levels for the different types of data collection and analyses proposed. Their organization plan/chart aligns well with the work and reasonable assumptions about staffing the work proposed. However, the UI proposal in this area does not clearly lay out how the comparison groups will be accomplished--there is some detail for FCM but none for prevention. I'm not entirely convinced they have budgeted enough time for FCM.
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OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA

December 20, 2012

Dennis Flieder, Director
Office of Contract and Grant Services
RAND Corporation
1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90401

Dear Mr. Flieder:

On September 12, 2012 the Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the Evaluation of its GRYD Comprehensive Strategy. RAND Corporation submitted a proposal to provide evaluation services in support of our efforts to reduce gang violence within the communities of Los Angeles.

A total of two proposals to provide evaluation services were received. An independent review committee carefully reviewed and rated your proposal. A total of 100 possible points was given. Below is your final score for your submitted proposal.

Final Score:	Final Rank:
67.3	2 nd

All applicants, including top-scoring applicants, are given the opportunity to appeal based upon the Mayor's GRYD appeals procedure. If you wish to submit an appeal, please follow instructions in the attached document. Upon completion of our appeals procedure, recommendations for funding will be presented to members of City Council and Mayor for approval. Funding will be contingent upon the availability of funds.

If you have any questions related to this process, please contact Mildred M. Lopez directly at (213) 473-7798 or mildred.m.lopez@lacity.org

Sincerely,

Guillermo Cespedes, MSW
Deputy Mayor
Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development

Attachment: GRYD Procedure for Appeals

200 NORTH SPRING STREET • LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

PHONE: (213) 978-0600 • FAX: (213) 978-0750

EMAIL: MAYOR@LACITY.ORG





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Applicant Agency	RAND Corporation
Evaluation Factors	Reviewer Comments: <i>These comments are intended to identify some areas of strengths and weaknesses, which were identified by the reviewers; each comment does not correlate with an exact deduction of possible points. Each proposal was read and scored by four individuals, a consensus meeting was held and final scores after the consensus meeting were averaged to reach a final score per agency.</i>
Related Experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Agency is qualified generally; proposer cited 8 publications that describe knowledge of street gang literature of the past 20 years; proposer demonstrated prior experience in evaluating community-level social programming.• Proposer demonstrated familiarity with past evaluations, citing the Urban Institute's evaluation of the GRYD (3 years) and provided a detailed analysis of strengths and weaknesses, however it was too extensive and not constructive in a proposal of this nature.• No discussion of definitional issues about gangs, gang membership, or gang related crime; no mention of proposer's ability to build positive relationships to facilitate data collection.• Lacked a thoughtful analysis of the current issues based on the more current research.• None of the primary project team (the 4 Co-Principal Investigators) were authors on the gang studies conducted by RAND, listed in past experience. In addition, a criticism of the current evaluator's comparison group approach was provided, and then subsequently proposed as the comparison strategy of ineligible clients.



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General Evaluation Approach

- Proposal was well-written and organized.
- Proposer has developed easy-to-understand logic models for each GRYD strategy to be evaluated that can work to guide the evaluation and inform decision makers and key stakeholders.
- The suggestion of using the Census, ACS, and NCED was a strong addition to identifying better comparison groups.
- Proposer has not developed a well-organized conceptual model to evaluate each GRYD activity; process evaluation and qualitative measures are underdeveloped.
- While proposer has a plan for identifying comparison communities, there is no real development of how GRYD zones will be assessed; Group of adolescents in substance abuse as the comparison group does not seem like an appropriate comparison group and they do not clearly show how the YSET and GAIN tools are comparable in any way.
- Proposer has identified data sets that can be used to easily assess effectiveness between intervention and non-intervention communities and individuals, however the discussion of this is far too general and not specific to GRYD.
- To further insure the accuracy of data analysis, the Proposer has developed sophisticated statistical tools that will account for variables between communities. However, while there is a heavy argument for use of statistical tools, qualitative methodology and approaches are lacking. Qualitative follow-up with key community stakeholders and/or ethnographic



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observation is completely missing from evaluation plan.

- Proposer mentions community characteristics profiles, but does not discuss the use of a scorecard or “user-friendly” way of portraying the results of the evaluation; proposer does offer a good suggestion in doing observations of a few client sessions to augment the evaluation.
- The details related to measures were fairly minimal; it did not appear from the narrative that the authors took the time to align their narrative with the supplemental materials given to them that lay out the measures currently collected by providers.
- There is poor linkage between individual evaluation questions and specific data collection strategies in all 4 sections of the evaluation. For example, on page 8, in Figure 2, there are 3 evaluation questions listed, and 5 sources of data, but no clearly stated linkage between the two. Nor did the narrative make this linkage; in fact, the evaluation questions are not discussed in the narrative at all. It is therefore unclear how "reach of activities in GRYD zones" will be measured (with which data), or analyzed.
- Process evaluation measures and analysis strategies are weak in their design and overall approach in all 4 parts of the evaluation. For example, key informant interviews are listed as the main data collection method to gather "detailed descriptions of programs and perceived efficacy", but only from the perspective of GRYD staff. First, which GRYD staff? Administrators may give very different responses to activities and efficacy vs. line staff. Second, will GRYD staff be forthcoming with the negatives of their program? How will we know how balanced and accurate the information is that is shared by key informants? How will key informants be identified and selected to account for this potential bias? How many key informants will be interviewed? Other perspectives such as those of GRYD community members or GRYD youth were not mentioned but could conceivably improve the approach considerably by presenting



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	<p>additional perspectives that could validate (or not) the perspectives of GRYD staff on program activities and efficacy. It also seems appropriate to consider gathering more objective sources of data to track process measures, such as administrative data or program documentation, or systematic observation of scheduled events.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The analysis approach for the process data is also poorly specified. What is "classic qualitative analysis" or "classic content analysis"? A grounded theory approach is mentioned without being further described. We have quantitative formulas inserted throughout the text ad nauseam, but the specifics of the qualitative data collection, analysis, and interpretation are very poorly described. This presents serious concerns about the quality of the process evaluations in each of the 4 sections of the evaluation.• There are also issues with the proposed use of the GAIN. First, this is a GREAT idea, if appropriately executed. Big areas of concern are: (1) the youngest age for which the GAIN has been validated is age 12, yet the sample proposed goes down to age 10 (top of pg. 15); this will very likely lead to a GAIN comparison sample that is 12 or older; (2) among youth, GAIN has been used among probation populations, but not exclusively so; it has been used extensively on AAFT projects, which are not specifically delinquency prevention services, though some projects have served probation populations. This may limit the GAIN comparison sample as well because many of the youth received substance abuse treatment services but were not gang involved; (3) there is only one question on the GAIN that specifically asks about gang involvement, and this may not adequately identify youth who are gang involved.
Work Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposer has included a detailed evaluation task timeline outlining the schedule for the project. The schedule appears to be realistic and includes all deliverables; i.e. monthly reports, tri-annual reports, and annual report. Proposer maintains that its staff will maintain



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	<p>a continuous local presence from corporate headquarters in Santa Monica.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The workplan is very non-specific as to tasks and who will be carrying out the tasks. For example, how will IRB application be written, submitted, and approved in Month 1 of the project? This seems unrealistic given the scope of the project, even with an internal IRB. Who will be making the decisions that must go into an IRB protocol? Or will an incremental approach be taken? The IRB approach was mentioned very generally but actual steps for carrying it out were not discussed. This was the pattern across all tasks - no specifics were provided as to how tasks will be accomplished. Nor were personnel specifically identified that would be doing each task. There was no mention of how tasks would be coordinated across the two RAND offices that are 3,000 miles apart. There was no mention of which tasks would be managed from the Santa Monica office and which would be managed in Philadelphia, and how this would be handled so that the work would be managed efficiently and at a high quality of performance.• RAND's proposal is very top-heavy in personnel--i.e., there are a lot of high-level folks but very few individuals who would appear to collect data for the project.
Budget	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Budget is complete and comprehensive. Proposer has included an itemized budget spreadsheet accompanied by a detailed narrative explaining all costs/charges.• Proposal adheres to the budget requirements. The budget is supportive all the activities proposed, although I do question the costs associated with the research advisory group. It is not clear what exactly the benefit of this group is the evaluation.



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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Budget justification lacked detailed itemization in several sections specific to this project. For example, several staff are listed, with their FTE's included, but specific tasks that they will be doing are not listed. Only general mention is made in other parts of the proposal as to their responsibilities. For some tasks, it is completely unstated who will carry them out; for example, what staff will be conducting the follow-up surveys of youth in the comparison group? Certain line items in the budget are questionable. For example, \$50,000 is listed almost as a "miscellaneous" category, with no clear itemization and only brief mention of how it will be used. No mention is made of incentives for participants who complete surveys; how much will the incentives be and how much has been allocated in the budget? There is an item of approximately \$20,000 for graphic design for the final report. This seems high given the other needs of this large scale evaluation. Specific hours have not been allocated by all 4 prongs of the GRYD evaluation (crime trends, gang prevention, intervention family case management, intervention violence interruption, analysis of data). The project also lacks a project manager with a sufficient FTE that can coordinate day-to-day communications with GRYD staff; there is no mention of how this will be handled. FTE's overall seem low and spread across too many staff to achieve these tasks; in addition, there is no clearly stated plan for how each task will be accomplished and by whom from a budgetary standpoint (meaning, hours per task, per person).
Management and Staffing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No linkage was presented between actual tasks and who will be responsible for and complete each task. Only general mention was made of the task groups without specific attention to hands-on responsibilities. There was a very general treatment of the management plan overall that did not describe how the project would be managed on a day-to-day basis and from a larger perspective of achieving the necessary tasks. The management infrastructure chart is also very general. There is no allocation of hours or linkage to the 4 parts of the evaluation or evaluation tasks beyond general mention of "core" group (statistics,



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	<p>criminology, data). It is unclear how data collection will be managed from 3,000 miles away; for example, will a secured FTP site be used? There is no mention of a subcontractor. The one RAND person located in Santa Monica, as opposed to back east, Jessica Saunders, is assigned to the criminology core. There is no mention of how the LA presence will be addressed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposer has identified all principle personnel who will participate in this evaluation. Proposer has provided detailed resumes -- however, these all appear to be "high level" individuals -- raising some concerns re: "boots on the ground." Proposer has provided a staffing organization chart, but it lacks the detail needed regarding who will be carrying out the "face-to-face" community work.• RAND provides a minimal chart that does not clarify how the top-heavy staffing plan will accomplish all the data collection proposed. Additionally, it does not contain letters of commitment from the scientific review/expert panel.
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Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa
Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD)

PROCEDURE FOR APPEALS OF FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS

BASIS FOR APPEALS:

All proposers, including those that have received a top score, shall have the opportunity to appeal funding recommendations made by the Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD). Appeal hearings are reserved for proposers filing under one of the following two (2) categories:

1. Procedural errors in the review process and/or the review of the proposer's application that resulted in unequal treatment or actual bias.
2. Total points scored. Unsatisfied proposers must provide references to the specific indicators on the proposal evaluation summary provided by the GRYD Office that they believe were scored incorrectly or arbitrarily. The letter of appeal must demonstrate that particular errors were made in the evaluation and/or that pertinent information was provided in the proposal which was not considered. The Appeal's Board will not consider general statements of objections as a valid basis for appeal.

GRYD staff will review letters of appeal and prepare a written response citing necessary facts that either support or deny the recommendation and score of the Review Committee for presentation to the Appeals Board and Appellant prior to the time of the appeals hearing.

APPEALS BOARD AUTHORITY:

The Appeals Board shall take one (1) of the following actions:

- A. Deny the appeal and find that the GRYD Office and/or the Review Committee's decision was supported by substantial evidence; or
- B. Accept the appeal and remand the matter back to the GRYD Office to reevaluate the proposal with particular instructions.

GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR ALL APPEALS:

All proposers submitting an appeal must follow the instructions provided in these procedures. Questions relating to the appeals process may be directed to Mildred M. Lopez, mildred.m.lopez@lacity.org or 213.473.7798.

Appeals Filing Procedure

Proposers who wish to file a written appeal must submit a letter (see requirements below) to the Mayor's GRYD Office **no later than Thursday, January 3, 2013 at 12:00PM, PST** to the email address below:

mildred.m.lopez@lacity.org

The letter will be deemed received upon proof of successful email notification. Applicant appeals that are mailed in or courier-delivered will **NOT** be accepted. Upon receipt of your letter of appeal, the GRYD Office will provide you with a confirmation receipt (via email). Your appeal is **not** registered until you receive this confirmation. The City reserves the right to determine the timeliness of all letters of appeal.

Letter of Appeal Requirements

Only one appeal per application will be permitted. The letter of appeal shall request the Appeals Board to grant a hearing and shall set forth, in detail, the basis for the appeal. The letter of appeal shall not exceed two typewritten pages using Times New Roman 12-point font, 1-inch margins.

The letter of appeal shall be specific in nature and identify the facts and circumstances that demonstrate (1) the GRYD Office and/or Review Committee failed to fairly and equitably apply the RFP policy criteria to the application or (2) the proposer's application was scored incorrectly or arbitrarily.

The letter of appeal may not include any new or additional information that was not originally submitted with the application in question. Appeals that contain matters beyond the scope of the proposer's application, such as generalized policy issues, will **not** be considered by the Appeals Board.

The City reserves the right to reject any letter of appeal that fails to comply with the Appeals Procedures in general and the letter of appeal requirements specifically.

The letter of appeal shall also include the following:

- The appeal letter must be submitted on agency letterhead
- The applicant agency's legal name and authorized signatory must be submitted
- The category in which the appeal is being filed (see above)
- The name, title, phone number, email address, and fax number of the person who will speak on behalf of the applicant agency. The name(s) and title(s) of two (2) additional individuals to speak on behalf of the agency and application. This is optional. No more than three (3) individuals from the applicant organization will be admitted into the hearing.

Structure of the Appeal Hearings:

1. Applicants will receive a date, time, and location to appear for the hearing and are requested to arrive at the hearing at least fifteen (15) minutes prior to the scheduled hearing time. A conference call may also be scheduled if the applicant is unable to attend in person.
2. The appeals guidelines will be reviewed prior to the interview to ensure guidance and adherence to the process.
3. One person designated by the applicant agency to speak on its behalf shall provide a summary. The appellant shall be given no more than five (5) minutes to summarize their written appeal.
4. The Appeals Board will then proceed with the question and answer period which shall not exceed fifteen (15) minutes at the discretion of the Board. All representatives of the applicant organization will be able to participate in the question and answer period.
5. No new information or handouts are to be given to the board members before, during, or after the hearing.
6. Neither the appellant nor Appeals Board members may introduce issues beyond those identified in the written appeal.
7. The Appeals Board will confer regarding the appeal and within seven (7) business days of the appeal hearing a letter will be issued to the appellant stating its decision whether to accept or deny the appeal.

Code of Conduct During Appeals Hearing:

- A. Avoid attempting to speak privately with any member of the Appeals Board.
- B. After the Appeal Hearing process is completed, you may state your appeal to the full City Council.

ATTACHMENT E

Evaluation Contract: Scope of Work (DRAFT)

EVALUATION SERVICES SCOPE OF WORK

Task 1—Design Development and Modifications

The UI Evaluation Team (UI, hereafter) will work with the GRYD Research Director (GRYD hereafter) to finalize the methodological plan for Year 4 by April 30, 2013, which in turn, will be appended to the FY 2012-13 contract. The methodological plan will be comprehensive covering all tasks in this Scope of Work statement, and any others that GRYD and UI agree should be incorporated, and will contain task and sub-task specifications with as much detail as is feasible by that time. Upon completion of the methodological plan, UI will generate a revised Budget Expenditure Plan (BEP) that is based upon the April 30, 2013 methodology and the Scope of Work it defines.

Throughout the fiscal year, UI and GRYD will discuss progress and when necessary, make changes to the methodological plan with corresponding adjustments to the BEP. Such changes will be documented in the monthly reports (see Task 7 below).

As the plan is being developed, evaluation work will continue on those elements of tasks that do not depend on the plan for their definition and execution. These include: response to GRYD comments on the evaluation report; continued operation of retesting through the YSET-R program; preliminary assessments of the number of at-risk youth in the GRYD zones; work with LAPD to define gang territories; meetings and discussions with prevention and intervention providers and with GRYD office staff; and any other activities that the GRYD office and UI agree should be undertaken in the April – March 2014 time frame.

Task 2—YSET Data Collection

UI will continue to provide instructional documents and technical assistance to providers in order to ensure the continuation of YSET testing in accordance with the methodological plan. As part of this work, UI will, provide a Master List of youth to providers for on-going completion of retesting. The composition of the final master list must be approved by GRYD.

Task 3—Program Implementation Data

GRYD will provide UI with copies of all program implementation forms. UI will review these forms and provide GRYD feedback on them. When the forms are finalized, GRYD will arrange for providers (prevention and intervention) to complete them and transmit them to the GRYD office on a monthly basis. GRYD will forward the providers' monthly transmittals to UI for analysis purposes.

Task 4—Crime Data Analysis

UI will continue to work with the LAPD/COMPSTAT to receive crime data and gang boundary information on a periodic basis for all GRYD zones. More specification of this task will be included in the Y4 methodological plan that will be developed and submitted by March 31, 2014.

Task 5—Summary of GRYD Activities

UI will receive an inventory of all GRYD activities (overall and by GRYD zone) from the GRYD Office. UI will produce a summary of those activities by GRYD zone and will consider those results when summarizing and evaluating the GRYD's overall ability to implement a comprehensive model directed at gang membership and violence. The content and timing of the inventory and the summary will be specified in the Y4 methodological plan to be completed by March 31, 2014.

Task 6—Project Management

UI will engage, at a minimum, in monthly communications (following the submission of a monthly report—see Task 7) with the GRYD Office and Research Director to monitor and overcome obstacles that may arise during the course of completing the evaluation. UI will also engage, when necessary, in additional communications related to Task 1 (i.e., evaluation planning and coordination activities) and issues that arise during data collection. UI will also cooperate with oversight agencies, such as the City Council and Controller's Office when necessary and requested by the GRYD Office, to the extent permitted by the Task 1 methodological plan and the Contract budget.

Task 7—Reporting

UI will provide monthly reports using a template created by the GRYD Office to document their activities related to each of the tasks listed by the 15th of each

month for the previous month. A GRYD-UI conference call will be held each month when needed to review the monthly reports. In the final methodological plan, a timeline will be generated for reporting preliminary results on each part of the evaluation. Detailed summaries of the results for different aspects of the project will be submitted according to this timeline as part of the monthly report and will be discussed during the monthly call. Monthly reports will be used by the GRYD Office and UI to assess progress on each of the Tasks listed in the final methodological plan and if necessary, determine if revision of the tasks is required. UI will submit a progress report to the GRYD Office by October 31, 2014 summarizing progress in each area of the methodological plan. The intention of this report is not to detail evaluation results but rather to identify (according to the methodological plan) the status of each of the evaluation activities. UI will submit a Final Evaluation Report in draft form to the GRYD Office by March 1, 2014. This report will summarize all the results from Y4 evaluation activities. The GRYD Office will provide comments to UI by March 15, 2014 and a final copy of the report will be submitted by March 31, 2014.

DRAFT