

E-cigarettes: Healthy tool or gateway device?

By Jen Christensen, CNN

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
Are e-cigarettes bad for your health?

(CNN) -- If the tiny sample of smokers in a new study in the British journal Lancet are any indication, electronic cigarettes might be slightly more effective than nicotine patches in helping people quit smoking.


Great, right? Except another new study from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggests more children and teens are trying them.

The implications of both these studies means electronic cigarettes have been getting a lot of attention lately. Just what e-cigarettes are and what role they should play in helping people quit smoking depends very much on who you speak with about this topic.

Smoking is still the leading cause of avoidable death in the United States. The devices are not one of the FDA-approved methods to help people quit, but many people are using them this way. A growing number of scientists are studying them to see whether they may be a way to end an epidemic.



New cigarette trend 'smokeless'



E-cigarette sales on the rise

The topic, though,

remains as polarizing a health issue as sex education or diet sodas.

An e-what?

The e-cigarette was actually developed by a pharmacist in China.

The pharmacist, Hon Lik, was a three-pack-a-day smoker. That was nothing unusual -- more than 300 million people in China are regular smokers. But when Lik's father, who was also a heavy smoker, died of lung cancer, Lik decided he had to come up with an alternative that wouldn't kill him.

Most scientists believe nicotine itself, while highly addictive, is not what causes cancer for smokers or for the people around them who breathe their second-hand smoke. Instead, it's the toxic chemicals that are created when tobacco and filler products burn that are dangerous.

If there was a way to get nicotine addicts their fix without the burn, you just might avoid the health problems. Nicotine then becomes as harmless as any other addictive substance, such as caffeine, some experts say.

So Lik developed an e-cigarette -- a device that uses a small battery to atomize a pure liquid solution of nicotine. Nothing is burned. There is no ash. There is no smoke. There is nicotine, and then there is flavoring added for taste.

Essentially the person using these inhales a kind of vapor that looks like fog from a fog machine. A recent review of all the scientific research done on e-cigarettes by Drexel University professor Igor Burstyn concludes "current data do not indicate that exposures to vapors from contaminants in electronic cigarettes warrant a concern."

In plain language, Burstyn concludes: "It's about as harmless as you can get."

"I wouldn't worry at all if someone was smoking one of these by my kids," Burstyn said. "From a pure health perspective, these are not as bad as a cigarette."

E-cigarettes came to the U.S. market around 2009. The CDC now estimates about one in five American smokers have tried an e-cigarette -- that's about 6% of all adults.

There are e-cigarette stores, but now you can also buy them online or in convenience stores. Some look like regular cigarettes; some look like pens or thumb drives.

First you buy a starter kit, which costs between \$40 and \$130. In the kit is the e-cigarette, a charger and a few cartridges. The cartridges typically last as long as a 20-pack of cigarettes and sell for around \$10. You can also buy a bottle of e-liquid to refill the cartridge yourself.

The anti-e-cigarette camp

Critics point out e-cigarettes come in kid-friendly flavors such as gummy bear, atomic fireball candy and cookies and cream. It makes them worry that e-cigarettes will become a gateway to encourage kids to develop a lifelong nicotine addiction -- or worse, try the real thing.

Only about 20 states specifically forbid the sale of e-cigarettes to children.

Tobacco use has been on the decline with kids; it's about half what it was in the mid-1990s. But the latest CDC study shows a growing number of middle and high school students have tried e-cigarettes.

One in 10 high school students surveyed said they had tried e-cigarettes last year. That's double the number from 2011. One high school in Connecticut banned them after the principal said administrators dealt with at least one incident involving e-cigarettes every day.

CDC director Tom Frieden characterized this trend as "deeply troubling."

But as far as risky behavior goes, it's still a tiny fraction of students. The survey showed about 3% of these kids said they had used one in the last 30 days. By contrast, 39% of students said they

drank some amount of alcohol in the past 30 days, 22% binge drank and 24% rode with a driver who had been drinking.

The real problem is that 88% of adult smokers who smoke daily said they started when they were kids, according to the CDC. Kids who start down the path to using e-cigarettes may stick with them for life.

"So much is unknown about them and what the long-term complications could be with their use," said the American Lung Association's Erika Sward. "Bottom line, we don't know what the consequences of using them are, and we are very troubled that kids would find them attractive."

E-cigarettes are unregulated in the United States; no laws make manufacturers tell you what you are actually inhaling. The unknown is one of the many qualities of e-cigarettes that the American Lung Association doesn't like.

It's "a complete unregulated Wild West," Sward said. She wants the FDA to move quickly with regulatory oversight, which she says would make manufacturers disclose what the actual ingredients are in each of the 250 or so brands available.

In 2009, a FDA test on a small number of e-cigarette samples found "detectable levels of known carcinogens and toxic chemicals to which users could potentially be exposed." They found diethylene glycol in one cartridge at a 1% level; this is an ingredient used in antifreeze and can be toxic to humans in large quantities. Diethylene glycol is also found in some dental products and in some pharmaceuticals.

After that study, the FDA banned the sale of e-cigarettes. They warned e-cigarette smokers that they were inhaling "toxic" and "harmful" chemicals. However, in 2010, a court ruled that "the FDA had cited no evidence to show that electronic cigarettes harmed anyone," and stores could go on selling them.

The early e-adopters

On the other side of the debate are the passionate supporters of e-cigarettes. Many who use them say it is the first thing that has helped them stop using cigarettes -- something more than 90% of smokers fail to do with any of the existing FDA-approved methods. There are blogs and message boards dedicated to them. And there are countless impassioned testimonials from the people who use them.

Florida resident Craig Lashley says they've changed his life.

"I got tired of being like that little kid in 'Peanuts' who had the cloud of smoke following him all the time," Lashley said. "I didn't like the way I smelled when I smoked, and I didn't like what smoking said about me, especially to kids."

He discovered the e-cigarette about a year ago and hasn't smoked a regular cigarette since.

He says he smells better, feels better and spends a lot less -- about \$10 a week on e-cigarettes. He used to spend about \$45 a week on regular cigarettes.

"I like the feel of blowing smoke," Lashley said. "It seems to me like (e-cigarettes are) a healthier alternative."

A growing number of respected physicians and scientists agree, and they say these products could end a major health problem.

"Electronic cigarettes and other nicotine-containing devices offer massive potential to improve public health, by providing smokers with a much safer alternative to tobacco," the Royal College of Physicians says. "They need to be widely available and affordable to smokers."

The latest study, published in the British journal the Lancet, examined whether people who used them as an alternative to smoking would abstain from using regular cigarettes.

The New Zealand authors studied the behavior of 657 people who were trying to quit. One group got nicotine patches, another got nicotine e-cigarettes and others got placebo e-cigarettes without the nicotine.

Over a period of six months, only a tiny fraction of the people in the study actually quit smoking.

People using the nicotine e-cigarettes quit at a slightly better rate compared with those using the patch, though. Some 7.3% using the e-cigarettes abstained from smoking traditional cigarettes compared with the 5.8% who stopped with the patch. About 4.1% stopped with just the placebo e-cigarettes.

It was such a small number of people who quit that the authors concluded "more research is urgently needed to clearly establish their overall benefits and harms at both individual and population levels."

Dr. Michael Siegel, a physician who has spent the past couple decades working on tobacco control initiatives, has been surprised by the negative reaction to e-cigarettes from so many people in the public health sector. Siegel says the studies he's done have shown e-cigarettes are a help.

"True we don't know the long-term health effect of e-cigarettes, but there's a very good likelihood that smokers are going to get lung cancer if they don't quit smoking," he said. "If they can switch to these and quit smoking traditional cigarettes, why condemn them?"

Siegel theorizes the e-cigarettes might look too much like smoking.

"It's ironic the very thing that makes them so effective ... drives the anti-smoking groups crazy. But what makes them so effective is it mimics the physical behaviors smokers have, which is something the patch can't do."

Siegel does believe there is an urgent need for more regulations.

Ray Story, founder of the Tobacco Vapor Electronic Cigarette Association, agrees. He says his association has also pushed for age verification legislation.

"When you have these companies trying to promote these as something they are not, and you have stores that sell them in the candy aisle, you are going to have a problem," Story said. "If they are officially categorized as a tobacco product, you get an automatic age verification put in place.

"Nicotine is addictive, and we want the federal government to create guidelines and a structure that will confine these to being sold as adult products."

Lashley says no matter what the debate, he will continue to spread the e-cigarette gospel to his fellow adults.

So far, his co-workers have been receptive to the idea. He used to be the only one with an e-cigarette on smoke breaks. Now he says he's got more than a dozen colleagues doing the same.

One colleague, though, complained about it.

"He said 'I'm sick of all these people smoking electronic cigarettes,'" Lashley said. "When I asked him why he said, 'Simple, now I can't bum any off of them.' "

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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

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History of the Surgeon General's Reports on Smoking and Health

On January 11, 1964, Luther L. Terry, M.D., Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, released the first report of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health.

On the basis of more than 7,000 articles relating to smoking and disease already available at that time in the biomedical literature, the Advisory Committee concluded that cigarette smoking is

A cause of lung cancer and laryngeal cancer in men

A probable cause of lung cancer in women

The most important cause of chronic bronchitis

The release of the report was the first in a series of steps, still being taken more than 40 years later, to diminish the impact of tobacco use on the health of the American people.

For several days, the report furnished newspaper headlines across the country and lead stories on television newscasts. Later it was ranked among the top news stories of 1964.

During the more than 40 years that have elapsed since that report, individual citizens, private organizations, public agencies, and elected officials have pursued the Advisory Committee's call for "appropriate remedial action."

Early on, the U.S. Congress adopted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. These laws—

- Required a health warning on cigarette packages

- Banned cigarette advertising in the broadcasting media

- Called for an annual report on the health consequences of smoking

In September 1965, the Public Health Service established a small unit called the National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health.

Through the years, the Clearinghouse and its successor organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Office on Smoking and Health, have been responsible for 29 reports on the health consequences of smoking.

In close cooperation with voluntary health organizations, the Public Health Service has—

- Supported successful state and community programs to reduce tobacco use

- Disseminated research findings related to tobacco use

- Ensured the continued public visibility of antismoking messages

Within this evolving social milieu, the population has given up smoking in increasing numbers. Nearly half of all living adults who ever smoked have quit.

The antismoking campaign is a major public health success with few parallels in the history of public health. It is being accomplished despite the addictive nature of tobacco and the powerful economic forces promoting its use.

However, more than 45 million American adults still smoke, more than 8 million are living with a serious illness caused by smoking, and about 438,000 Americans die prematurely each year as a result of tobacco use.

Efforts to implement proven interventions must be continued and expanded.

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Failed promises of the cigarette industry and its effect on consumer misperceptions about the health risks of smoking

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Background: In January 1954, US tobacco manufacturers jointly sponsored an advocacy advertisement entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" which appeared in 448 newspapers in 258 cities reaching an estimated 43 245 000 Americans. The advertisement questioned research findings implicating smoking as a cause of cancer, promised consumers that their cigarettes were safe, and pledged to support impartial research to investigate allegations that smoking was harmful to human health.

Objective: To examine (1) the extent to which cigarette companies fulfilled the promises made to consumers in the 1954 "Frank Statement", and (2) the effect of these promises on consumer knowledge, beliefs, and smoking practices.

Methods: This study reviews statements made since 1954 by the tobacco companies individually and collectively through the Tobacco Institute and Tobacco Industry Research Committee/Council for Tobacco Research on the subject of smoking as a cause disease, and the industry's pledge to support and disclose the results of impartial research on smoking and health. Many of the industry documents evaluated in this study were obtained from a collection consisting of 116 documents entitled the "Statement of Defendants' Misrepresentations" prepared by attorneys representing the state of Connecticut in the Medicaid litigation against the tobacco industry in 1998. In addition, we searched for corroborating material from tobacco industry documents collected from the tobacco industry's document websites. In order to contrast industry statements on smoking and health with what smokers' actually believed about smoking we reviewed reports of public polling data on smokers' knowledge and beliefs about smoking and disease gathered from tobacco industry sources and from surveys conducted by public health researchers.

Results: Analysis of public statements issued by the tobacco industry sources over the past five decades shows that the companies maintained the stance that smoking had not been proven to be injurious to health through 1999. The public statements of the tobacco industry are in sharp contrast to the private views expressed by many of their own scientists. The tobacco documents reveal that many scientists within the tobacco industry acknowledged as early as the 1950s that cigarette smoking was unsafe. The sincerity of the industry's promise to support research to find out if smoking was harmful to health and to disclose information about the health effects of smoking can also be questioned based upon the industry's own documents which reveal: (1) scepticism about the scientific value of the smoking and health research program established by the industry; and (2) evidence that research findings implicating smoking as a health problem were often not published or disclosed outside the industry. Industry documents also show that the companies knew that their own customers were misinformed about smoking and health issues.

Conclusion: It is clear that the cigarette companies failed to fulfill the promises made to consumers in the 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement. The failure of cigarette manufacturers to honour these promises has resulted in a public that even today remains misinformed about the health risks of smoking.

See end of article for authors' affiliations

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Cigarette manufacturers have only recently acknowledged the medical and scientific consensus that smoking causes serious diseases such as lung cancer, respiratory disease and heart disease.¹⁻⁴ For most of the past 100 years, cigarette manufacturers have told smokers that their products were not injurious to health.⁵⁻²⁷ In fact, cigarette companies frequently promised consumers that their brands were better for them than their competitor's brands because the smoke was less irritating, smoother, and milder.²⁷ In 1935, RJ Reynolds told consumers that Camel cigarettes were so mild that "they don't get your wind" and that you could "smoke all you want". In 1943, Philip Morris told smokers "you're safer smoking Philip Morris . . . this cigarette has been scientifically proved less irritating to the nose and throat. . . eminent doctors report that every case of irritation of the nose and throat due to smoking cleared completely or definitely improved." In 1943, Lorillard promoted its Old Gold brand by claiming it was "lowest in nicotine, lowest in

throat—irritating tars and resins." In 1946, Brown and Williamson used baseball legend Babe Ruth to pitch Raleigh cigarettes, with the claim that "Medical science offers proof positive . . . No other leading cigarette is safer to smoke!" Ironically, Babe Ruth later died of throat cancer.

As publicity about the health risks of smoking increased in the 1950s the industry recognised that the design of products that were perceived by consumers to be safer could be profitable. For example, in 1953 one unnamed tobacco company research director was quoted as saying: "Boy, wouldn't it be wonderful if our company was the first to produce a cancer-free cigarette? What we could do to competition."²⁸ In

Abbreviations: CTR, Council for Tobacco Research; FDA, Food and Drug Administration; RFP, request for production; SAB, scientific advisory board; TIRC, Tobacco Industry Research Committee

the 1950s and 1960s, in response to information linking cigarette smoking with cancer, the tobacco industry propagated massive amounts of advertising that helped position filters and lower tar cigarettes as technological fixes.^{29, 30}

Product claims of less throat irritation, milder tasting smoke, and low tar and low nicotine were good selling points for cigarette brands as demonstrated by the increasing market share of filtered cigarettes in the 1950s and 1960s and later by the growth of low tar/low nicotine brands in the 1960s.³¹ Ironically, medical science has shown that making cigarette smoke milder, less irritating, and lower in nicotine increased smokers' ability to inhale the smoke into their lungs thereby negating any health benefit that might have been gained by altering the product.³²⁻³⁴ The question of when cigarette manufacturers should have known about the serious health consequences of smoking their products and what they told consumers about these risks is the crux of current litigation.

Evidence now indicates that senior scientists and executives within the cigarette industry knew about the cancer risks of smoking as early as the 1940s³⁵ and were aware that smoking could cause lung cancer by the mid 1950s.³⁶ By 1961, cigarette companies had access to dozens of published scientific studies warning that cigarette smoking and chemical agents found in tobacco smoke might cause cancer.³⁷ Despite growing knowledge of the serious health risks associated with cigarette smoking, cigarette companies continued to reassure smokers that their products were safe. In January 1954, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and American Tobacco jointly placed an advertisement entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" which appeared in 448 newspapers in 258 cities, reaching an estimated 43 245 000 people.^{7, 38} The "Frank Statement" advertisement questioned research findings implicating smoking as a cause of cancer, promised consumers that their cigarettes were safe, and pledged to support impartial research to investigate allegations that smoking was harmful to human health. This paper examines the extent to which cigarette companies fulfilled the promises made to consumers in the 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement and the effect of these promises on consumer knowledge, beliefs, and smoking practices.

METHODS

This study reviews statements made since 1954 by the tobacco companies individually and collectively through the Tobacco Institute and Tobacco Industry Research Committee/Council for Tobacco Research on the subject of smoking as a cause disease and the industry's pledge to support and disclose the results of impartial research on smoking and health. Many of the industry documents evaluated in this study were obtained from a collection consisting of 116 documents entitled the "Statement of Defendants' Misrepresentations" prepared by attorneys representing the state of Connecticut in the Medicaid litigation against the tobacco industry in 1998.³⁹ In addition, we searched for corroborating material from tobacco industry documents collected from the tobacco industry's document websites. The websites were searched using "request for production" (RFP) codes, specified keyword searches, and serendipitous terms identified in document citations found with RFP and keyword searches.

In order to contrast industry statements on smoking and health with what smokers' actually believed about smoking we reviewed reports of public polling data on smokers' knowledge and beliefs about smoking and disease gathered from tobacco industry sources and by surveys conducted by public health researchers.⁴⁰⁻⁴¹

RESULTS

Promise 1: "We believe the products we make are not injurious to health"

In October 1999, Philip Morris Tobacco Company announced to the public on its web site that "[t]here is an overwhelming

medical and scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other serious disease in smokers."⁴² While some people may have interpreted this message to mean that Philip Morris had changed its long held position that smoking was not a cause of disease, in fact the message only acknowledged that there was medical and scientific consensus that smoking caused disease, not that Philip Morris accepted this consensus. A response from the Philip Morris board of directors to a shareholders' resolution on this subject revealed that the company had not changed its position about smoking and health.⁴³ The shareholders' resolution asked the company to produce a report on how it intended to correct the defects that resulted in its products causing disease. A letter sent to the Securities and Exchange Commission, dated 10 February 2000, on behalf of Philip Morris responding to the proposed shareholders resolution noted that: "Mr Neuhauser's letter mischaracterizes the Company's web site as constituting a public admission that cigarettes causes illness. It does not."⁴⁴

The reality is that cigarette manufacturers have only recently—and in a very general way—acknowledged that smoking is a cause of lung cancer and other serious diseases. For example, in a recent interview, world scientific manager for Philip Morris, Bruce Davies, stated: "[Philip Morris] is not proud of the fact that our products cause disease."⁴⁵ Other cigarette manufacturers have followed Philip Morris' lead in providing information to consumers about the risks of smoking and acknowledging that there is "no such thing as a safe cigarette."^{46, 47} However, for the most of the past century, cigarette manufacturers have assured the public that the use of their products was safe.

The 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement assured consumers that research into tobacco use and human health did not substantiate generalised charges against smoking as a cause of cancer.^{7, 38} To help support the claim that their cigarette products were not injurious to health the Frank Statement advertisement informed the public that "distinguished authorities point out that there is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the causes."^{7, 38} However, this statement is misleading since some of the medical authorities identified as questioning the evidence that smoking was a cause of cancer did acknowledge that there might be some merit to the hypothesis, only that more research was needed.^{39, 41}

According to Edwin Jacobs, a lawyer who represented the tobacco industry, many industry officials in 1953 felt that claims about smoking and lung cancer were unsubstantiated and would eventually be proven false.³⁸ Such beliefs may account for some of the bold promises and statements made by cigarette manufacturers around the time of the Frank Statement advertisement. For example, in a 1953 interview, Paul Hahn, president of the American Tobacco Company, stated: "[t]here is no proof of lung cancer in any person traceable to tobacco or any form of tobacco product."⁴⁸ In two 1954 speeches made by Philip Morris vice president George Weissman, he promised: "[I]f we had any thought or knowledge that in any way we were selling a product harmful to consumers, we would stop business tomorrow."⁴⁹ The 1953 annual report from Lorillard Tobacco Company told stockholders: "[w]e believe Lorillard products are not injurious to anyone's health, but that we accept as an inherent responsibility of our corporate citizenship the obligation to make the public's health our business."⁵⁰

Whether or not the top cigarette executives believed their own statements that smoking was safe, at least some of their scientists clearly thought otherwise. In 1953, a young chemist at RJ Reynolds', Dr Claude Teague, conducted a comprehensive literature survey on smoking and cancer in which he referenced 78 scientific papers on the topic of smoking and cancer.³⁶ Based on this comprehensive literature review, Teague concluded: "studies of clinical data tend to confirm the relationship between heavy and prolonged tobacco smoking and incidence of cancer of the lung. Extensive though inconclusive testing of tobacco substances on animals indicates the

probable presence of carcinogenic agents in those substances.⁵⁶ Teague was employed at RJ for Reynolds' for 35 years (1952-1987) and held various executive level positions at the company including that of director of research and development.

In 1956, a chemist who later also became the director of research at RJ Reynolds, Dr Alan Rodgman, commented on the implications of his research studies that had set out to isolate and/or identify several polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons present in the cigarette smoke of Camel cigarettes.⁵⁶ Rodgman stated in 1956 that: "[s]ince it is now well established that cigarette smoke does contain several polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and considering the potential and actual carcinogenic activity of a number of these compounds, a method of either complete removal or almost complete removal of these compounds from cigarette smoke is required."⁵⁶ In a 1959 memo Rodgman noted that: "there is a distinct possibility that these substances [polycyclic hydrocarbons] would have a carcinogenic effect on the human respiratory system."⁵⁷ Scientists at RJ Reynolds were not the only ones acknowledging the probable association between smoking and cancer. A 1958 report authored by a British American Tobacco scientist who visited with leading industry and non-industry scientists in the USA and Canada, noted that: "with one exception the individuals whom we met believe that smoking causes lung cancer."⁵⁸ A 1961 Liggett and Myers memorandum stated that there are "biologically active materials present in cigarette tobacco. These are: a) cancer causing; b) cancer promoting; and c) poisonous."⁵⁹ By 1978, a scientist at Lorillard acknowledged that: "[t]he [smoking] habit can never be safe."⁶⁰

However, while internally acknowledging the mounting evidence showing a link between smoking and disease, cigarette manufacturers continued to deny the validity of the health charges against smoking externally. In 1957 speech to members of the Burley Auction Association, Philip Morris executive, George Weissman declared: "there is not one shred of conclusive evidence to support the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer."⁶¹ In the 1959 annual report from Lorillard Tobacco, company chairman Lewis Gruber commented on new evidence pertaining to health in relation to tobacco by assuring stockholders that: "I believe in the innocence of our products as well as their future."⁶² A 1963 letter to an elementary school teacher from RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company assured the teacher that: "medical science has been unable to establish that smoking has a direct causal link with any human disease."⁶²

Even after the Surgeon General issued his report on smoking and health in 1964, cigarette companies continued to cast doubt on the link between smoking and cancer. A 1968 Tobacco Institute publication entitled "The Cigarette Controversy" stated "no scientific proof, then, has been found to convict smoking as a hazard to health."⁶³ A 1969 advertisement published in the New York Times by the American Tobacco Company proclaimed: "[w]e believe the anticigarette theory is a bum rap."⁶⁴

In 1971, the chairman of Philip Morris, Joseph Cullman, appeared on the TV news show, Face the Nation, and declared: "we do not believe that cigarettes are hazardous; we don't accept that."⁶⁵ In 1972 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Philip Morris vice president James Bowling repeated the company's promise to consumers two decades earlier that "if our product is harmful, we'll stop making it."⁶⁶ Bowling repeated the company's position on smoking and health in a 1976 interview when he noted: "from our standpoint, if anyone ever identified any ingredient in tobacco smoke as being hazardous to human health or being something that shouldn't be there, we could eliminate it. But no one ever has."⁶⁷ In a 1976 letter sent to an individual who had written a letter to the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company after his father had been diagnosed with lung cancer, the company responded that: "this Company does not regard itself as being in any way responsible. We firmly believe that cigarettes have been unfairly blamed as a

cause of human disease."⁶⁸ In a 1978 magazine interview William Dwyer, vice president of the Tobacco Institute, stated: "we take the view that the best science can say is that cigarette smoking may be hazardous. And then it may not be."⁶⁹ A 1978 Philip Morris publication entitled "Facts About the Smoking Controversy" stated: "scientists have not determined what causes cancer . . . cigarettes have never been proven unsafe."⁷⁰

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the cigarette industry held fast to the view that scientists had not proven conclusively that smoke or any of the thousands of its constituents as found in cigarette smoke causes human disease. A 1990 letter sent by RJ Reynolds to the principal of an elementary school in upstate New York declared: "[d]espite all the research going on, the simple and unfortunate fact is that scientists do not know the cause or causes of the chronic diseases reported to be associated with smoking."⁷¹ The letter encouraged the school principal to share this information with his fifth grade students. In the 1994 Congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, industry executives again expressed their belief that smoking had not been proven to be a cause of cancer.⁷² As recently as 1998, a senior research scientist at RJ Reynolds testified that: "[i]t's not scientifically established that smoking by itself causes disease."⁷³ In 1998, Philip Morris chairman Geoffrey Bible responded to the question "has anyone died from smoking cigarettes?" in the following manner: "I don't know if anyone dies from smoking tobacco, I just don't know."⁷⁴

Promise 2: "We are pledging aid and assistance to the research effort into all phases of tobacco use and health"

The 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement promised the public that the tobacco industry would support research into all phases of tobacco use and health.⁷⁵ Towards this end, the tobacco industry announced the establishment of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC), which later became known as the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). The stated goal of the TIRC was "to investigate and make known to the public facts about tobacco use in relation to human well-being."⁷⁶ According to a 1957 TIRC press release: "[o]ur sole purpose is to encourage and support qualified research scientists in their efforts to learn more about these complex problems [cancer and heart disease]."⁷⁶ However, many TIRC and CTR funded research projects were only remotely related to smoking and health, as acknowledged in a 1960 court case (the Lartique trial) by the first scientific advisory board (SAB) chairman of TIRC, Dr Clarence Cook Little.⁷⁷ Little "testified that TIRC had conducted no studies of tobacco smoke because it had never been proven to be carcinogenic. He viewed such a study a waste of time. Similarly, Little refused to conduct animal experimentation because he believed that it was only relevant to animals, not human beings. Finally, TIRC did not sponsor epidemiological studies."⁷⁸ Evidence that CTR funded research projects had little to do with smoking and health was further confirmed in a 1989 survey of CTR funded scientists, which asked grantees if their research had anything to do with understanding the relationship between smoking and health. Only one of six scientists responded affirmatively to this question.⁷⁹

While the tobacco industry touted the SAB "independence" to determine what research was deemed worthy of supporting, the SAB was selected by the tobacco companies. It is noteworthy that no person known to favour the cigarette/disease hypothesis was selected to serve on the original SAB.⁸⁰ The independence of the TIRC/CTR can also be questioned by the amount of money disbursed either directly to the chair of the SAB and to SAB members themselves or to the institutions with which they were affiliated.⁸¹ Two board members, Dr Richard Bing and Dr Hans Meier, received grants from the TIRC/CTR each of the years they served on the SAB.⁸² The independence of the TIRC/CTR was even questioned by the president of American Tobacco Company (RK

Heiman) who in 1977 wrote: "Another side result of our new direction is that we seem to be combining in one person, a Scientific Director and a quasi-grantee, a combination which is hardly compatible with the administration of an objective and independent grant program."⁶⁴

Internal industry documents also reveal that industry scientists questioned the scientific value of research produced by the TIRC/CTR. For example, the director of research for Philip Morris said in 1970 that: "[I]t has been stated that CTR is a program to find out the truth about smoking and health. What is truth to one is false to another. CTR and the Industry have publicly and frequently denied what others find as truth. Let's face it. We are interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegation that cigarette smoking causes disease."⁶⁵ Notes from a 1978 meeting of the officials of the major tobacco companies to discuss the future role of the CTR reveals that CTR was considered valuable primarily for public relations purposes.⁶⁷

Despite the fact that much of the research supported by the tobacco industry had little to do with understanding the health effects of smoking, cigarette companies publicised their support of scientific research as a way to reassure the public that an answer to the question of whether smoking caused disease would be forthcoming. For example, a 1958 press release from the Tobacco Institute declared that: "[t]he industry itself is contributing millions through unbiased scientific research facilities to find the truth."⁶⁶ In a 1957 magazine article authored by Clarence Little, director of the TIRC, he wrote that: "[t]he industry intends to support research until these charges can be proved or disproved by direct experimental evidence."⁶⁹ A 1962 press release from the Tobacco Institute reassured the public that: "[w]e in the tobacco industry recognize a special responsibility to help science determine the facts."⁷⁰ In a 1966 speech by Philip Morris president Joseph Cullman to members of the South Carolina Tobacco Warehouse Association, he stated: "We feel a deep sense of responsibility to our cigarette smokers . . . We intend to leave no research question unanswered in our quest for the truth."⁷¹ In a 1976 letter from RJ Reynolds to the family member of a lung cancer patient, Reynolds noted: "[y]ou may be interested in knowing that we and others in our industry have for many years supported scientific research to learn the true facts about smoking and health."⁶⁸ In 1985, RJ Reynolds took out advertisements in major newspapers and magazines which stated: "We believe in science. That is why we continue to provide funding for independent research into smoking and health . . . Science is science. Proof is proof. That is why the controversy over smoking and health remains an open one."⁷² A 1990 letter from the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company to an elementary school principal stated that: "the tobacco industry in a sincere attempt to determine what harmful effects, if any, smoking might have on human health, established the Council for Tobacco Research - USA."⁷³

During its four decade history the TIRC/CTR never acknowledged that smoking had been proven to be a cause of cancer or other serious diseases in smokers, even though the vast majority of CTR funded scientists themselves believed that cigarette smoking was responsible for a wide range of serious, and often, fatal diseases.⁶⁵ It appears that the cigarette companies were unwilling to accept the opinions of the scientists it had deemed worthy to support. More striking is the fact that during the same period when cigarette companies expended billions of dollars to design and market cigarette brands that ostensibly lowered a smoker's exposure to the harmful constituents in tobacco smoke, research on the health benefits of these redesigned products was virtually nonexistent.^{29 74}

Promise 3: "We always have and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health"

The 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement told the public that the tobacco industry "will cooperate closely with those

whose task it is to safeguard the public health."^{75 76} However, rather than cooperate, there is abundant evidence that the tobacco industry went to great lengths to undermine tobacco control efforts of the public health community. The former director of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Dr David Kessler, has recently described the efforts of the industry to avoid regulation by the FDA.⁷⁷ Other recent publications have also documented how Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and Brown & Williamson attempted to thwart public health efforts to curb tobacco use.⁷⁵⁻⁷⁷ Additionally, it is clear that the tobacco industry has endeavoured to influence or undermine specific tobacco control efforts and credibility of public health officials.^{78 79} A 1972 Tobacco Institute memorandum from vice president Fred Panzer to Tobacco Institute president Horace Kornegay describes the industry's strategy "for nearly twenty years" consisted of "creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it"; "advocating the public's right to smoke, without actually urging them to take up the practice"; and "encouraging objective scientific research as the only way to resolve the question of the health hazard."⁸⁰ The document describes that although this strategy had been effective in litigation and "on the political front" it was rapidly becoming a public relations failure. Panzer stressed: "the public . . . must perceive, understand, and believe in evidence to sustain their opinions that smoking may not be the causal factor in lung cancer. As things stand, we supply them with too little in the way of ready made credible alternatives."⁸⁰ He then points out "two such credible alternatives exist": the "constitutional hypothesis" that smokers differ in substantive ways from non-smokers; and the "multifactorial hypothesis" that "as science advances, more and more factors come under suspicion as contributing to the illnesses for which smoking is blamed . . ."⁸⁰ Panzer goes on to outline a plan to disseminate such information in a believable manner to the public. Other documents indicate that such research was supported by the tobacco industry.⁸¹

The 1954 "Frank Statement" advertisement also told the public that the tobacco industry had "an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business."^{75 76} The goal of supporting research on smoking and health was, the companies claimed, to find out if their products posed a health hazard and then to share this information with consumers. In 1955, the director of the TIRC, Dr Clarence Cook, did a TV interview with Edward R Murrow in which he was asked the following question: "Suppose the tremendous amount of research going on were to reveal that there is a cancer-causing agent in cigarettes, what then?" Little replied: "[I]t would be made public immediately and just as broadly as we could make it, and then efforts would be taken to attempt to remove that substance or substances."⁸² A 1968 press release from Philip Morris declared: "[w]e would like the public to be fully informed."⁸³ A 1970 advertisement from the Tobacco Institute said: "[t]he Tobacco Institute believes the American public is entitled to complete, authenticated information about cigarette smoking and health."⁸⁴

Despite the promise made to disclose information about smoking and health issues to the public, internal industry documents reveal that cigarette companies failed to keep this promise. A 1953 document from the files of the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton which helped create the TIRC, suggests that the purpose of the "Frank Statement" advertisement was to assure smokers that it was safe to smoke rather than to share what was known about the health dangers of smoking: "There is only one problem—confidence, and how to establish it; public assurance, and how to create it . . . And, most important, how to free millions of Americans from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths—regardless of any pooh-poohing logic—every time they light a cigarette."⁸⁵ A 1962 internal report on the "smoking and health problem", written by RJ Reynolds scientist Dr

Date of survey	Reference	Survey method and sample	Knowledge/belief question	Response to question
1994	48	Nationwide telephone survey of 335 current and recent ex-smokers	"Do you know the tar level of the cigarette you smoke?"	79% said no
1995	47	Nationwide telephone survey of 737 current smokers	"Do you think your risk of a myocardial infarction (or cancer) is higher, the same, or lower than other (men/women) your age?"	Only 29% and 40% of smokers believed they have a higher average risk of myocardial infarction or cancer, respectively
1996	46	Telephone survey of 142 Light and Ultra Light cigarette smokers in Massachusetts	"Does your current brand have any rings of holes on the filter?"	Less than 20% of respondents answered yes, even though most Light and Ultra Light brands have ventilated filter tips
1997	50	In-person intercept survey of a convenience sample of 52 current and 24 former smokers	"Do you think a filter makes a cigarette safer than the same cigarette without a filter?"	58% answered "yes"
2001	51	Nationwide telephone survey of 1046 current smokers	"Has the addition of filters made cigarette smoking less dangerous?" "Has the reduction of tar in made cigarette smoking less dangerous?"	65% answered "yes" or "don't know" to the filter question. 64% answered "yes" or "don't know" to the tar reduction question

Alan Rodgman, reveals that: "Members of this [Reynolds] Research Department have studied in detail cigarette smoke composition. Some of the findings have been published. However, much data remain unpublished because they are concerned with carcinogenic or co-carcinogenic compounds or patentable material."³³

Given the cigarette industry's promise to investigate the smoking and health question, one would expect to find numerous references to scientific papers authored by industry scientists in the medical and public literature. However, this turns out not to be the case. We performed an author query using the Center for Disease Control's Smoking and Health database using the names of 29 tobacco company executives, senior industry scientists, and scientific leaders affiliated with the TIRC/CTR mentioned in the documents reviewed for this study (see footnote for the names of individuals included in this analysis). The Smoking and Health database contains over 63 120 citations to scientific papers published on the smoking and health question.³³ This analysis yielded fewer than 100 citations to papers authored by these individuals. Many of the citations for papers authored by these individuals appeared in non-peer reviewed journals or are from conference proceedings. Few of the citation from papers authored by industry executives/scientists relate to active smoking and health concerns and most of the papers that do are based upon studies with animals not humans.

It seems clear that if cigarette company scientists were seriously working on finding answers to the questions of smoking and health, they were not sharing their results with the broader scientific community. The promise to disclose evidence about the health risks of smoking is also not reflected in cigarette advertising and promotions used to sell cigarettes. While federal legislation began requiring cigarette companies to place a mandated warning on cigarette packs in 1965, cigarette companies themselves never used their advertisements

to inform consumers about what they knew about the serious health risks related to smoking, the presence of cancer causing agents in cigarette smoke, and the problem of compensatory smoking. On the contrary, cigarette brand marketing during the past half century was designed primarily to reassure smokers that they could get good taste by smoking a low tar, filtered cigarette.

Consumer beliefs about the health risks of smoking

In litigation, cigarette companies have argued that they are not responsible for any health problems that might arise from smoking because smokers have always been aware of the health risks involved with smoking cigarettes.³⁴ Even if smokers have known of the health risks of smoking, which it is not the case, the fact remains that many smokers optimistically assume that their personal risk of illness is no greater than average.³⁵ This belief is due in part to the misperception that many smokers have that they will be able to stop smoking before health problems occur.³⁶ This optimistic perception of one's ability to stop smoking ignores evidence showing that the majority of smokers are dependent on nicotine, which inhibits their ability to stop smoking easily.³⁷⁻³⁹

While population surveys do show that smokers today generally recognise some health risks from smoking, this has not always been the case. Beliefs about smoking as a cause of lung cancer have changed over time. According to the Gallup Organization, in January 1954, 41% of people answered, "yes" to the question "Do you think cigarette smoking is one of the causes of lung cancer, or not?"⁴⁰ In September 1999, 92% of people answered "yes" to this same question.⁴⁰ Polling data collected by cigarette companies reveal that the companies themselves recognised that smokers were misinformed about the health risks of smoking. For example, a 1959 Elmo Roper and Associates poll conducted for Philip Morris found that while many smokers perceived cigarettes as "bad for you", there was "surprising little concern about the health aspects of cigarettes."⁴² According to the poll, concern about health "seems directed at the avoidance of throat irritation and the consequent search for mildness which seems to be a major asset of filters."⁴² A 1970 study sponsored by RJ Reynolds to determine consumer attitudes toward the idea of a "substitute" product for cigarettes reported that 68% of smokers answered either "true" or "don't know" to the statement: "Cigarette smoking in moderation is safe."⁴³

In 1977, Dr Martin Fishbein reported to the Federal Trade Commission that "almost 50% of all current smokers had not

Author queries were performed on the following tobacco industry scientists and spokespeople: Phillip Morris: TS Osden, H Wakeman, FE Resnik, A Bawley, G Weissman, H Cullman, J Morgan; RJ Reynolds: A Rodgman, K Hoover, C Teague, FG Colby, M Senkus, DE Townsend; Lorillard: AW Spears, RD Carpenter, DM Conning, CRE Coggins (also worked for RJ Reynolds); Brown and Williamson/BAF: RB Griffith, CD Ellis, J Wigand; American Tobacco: PM Hahn, HSN Green, RK Heimann; Liggett and Myers: JD Mold; TIRC/CTR: CC Little, JF Glenn, GH Sato, SC Sommers, HC McAllister.

fully accepted the proposition that smoking cigarettes is dangerous to health" and that "the American public is presently uninformed [about smoking] by almost any definition of informed."⁴⁴ Evidence from recent surveys of smokers' knowledge and beliefs, as summarised in table 1, suggests that smokers continue to be misinformed about smoking.^{46-48 50 51} Cohen reported results of a national probability telephone survey, in which he found that few smokers knew the tar levels of their own cigarettes and most did not know how to interpret the tar ratings.⁴⁴ Filter vents are key to reducing the standard tar and nicotine yields of cigarettes. All Ultra Light (1-5 mg tar) and Light brands (6-15 mg tar) of cigarettes have ventilated filter tips. Vent blocking during smoking will increase the amount of tar the smoker will be exposed to. Thus, it is important for smokers to be aware of the filter vents in their cigarettes so they are not blocked during smoking. Kozlowski and colleagues found that few Massachusetts cigarette smokers were aware of the filter vents in their cigarettes.⁴⁶ Hastrup and colleagues recently reported the results of a convenience survey of 52 current and 24 former smokers, which found that 58% incorrectly believed that the addition of a filter would make the cigarette safer.⁴⁹ Cummings found a similar result from a nationwide sample of 1046 smokers who were asked whether the addition of filters or the reduction of tar levels in cigarettes has made smoking safer.⁵¹ Finally, Ayanian and Cleary reported the results of a 1995 nationwide survey, which found that 30-40% of smokers failed to acknowledge their higher average risk of heart disease and cancer caused by smoking.⁴⁷ Previous reviews of industry documents related to the marketing of low tar cigarettes have demonstrated an awareness on the part of the cigarette companies that smokers did not appreciate that switching to a low tar cigarette was no safer than smoking a regular cigarette because of compensatory smoking (that is, puffing harder, smoking more of each cigarette, smoking more cigarettes per day).^{29 30}

DISCUSSION

The cigarette companies that signed the 1954 "Frank Statement" did not fulfill the promises made to the public in that advertisement. Cigarette smoking is clearly injurious to health, a fact that cigarette companies have only very recently begun to acknowledge to the public.³ However, the question remains as to when the cigarette companies could have known that their products posed a serious risk to their consumers.

The tobacco documents show that the cigarette companies were carefully monitoring the scientific literature on smoking and health before 1950, and that at least some of their scientists recognised that cigarette smoking was unsafe by the mid 1950s. The conclusion reached by Reynolds' scientist Claude Teague in 1953, that long term heavy smoking was a health risk, is reflected in the writings of other industry scientists during the later part of the 1950s and subsequently. For example, a decade following Teague's 1953 report, RJ Reynolds scientist Dr Alan Rodgman characterised the amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoking as a health risk as "overwhelming" while the evidence challenging such an indictment was "scant".³³

The failure of cigarette manufacturers to honour the promises made in the "Frank Statement" has contributed to a public that even today remains misinformed about the tobacco products that they consume.^{46-51 73 91} Notwithstanding the cigarette companies' demonstrated expertise in advertising and marketing, and the extraordinary financial resources at their disposal, the companies have not even been successful in communicating to consumers their newfound belief that cigarette smoking is hazardous. Nearly 60% of smokers in a recent (2001) nationwide poll agreed with the statement: "[c]igarette companies still do not believe that smoking can cause cancer".⁵¹ Misperceptions about the relative health risks of

What this paper adds

This paper provides an analysis of the extent to which the promises made to the American public by the tobacco industry in the infamous "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" were fulfilled. While most of the industry documents reviewed in this paper have been uncovered previously, an analysis of these documents in terms of the Frank Statement promises, and the industry's record of not carrying them out, is new. This paper should prove to be a very important tool for tobacco litigation, since the Frank Statement has been a centerpiece of most of the cases, which have involved exposing the industry's bad faith at the very beginning, failure to comply thereafter, and the resulting misinformation among the consuming public.

cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products, and nicotine medications may prevent smokers from switching from cigarettes to less dangerous forms of nicotine delivery.⁷³ Cigarette companies should be held accountable for making sure that persons using their products are adequately informed about the health risks involved.

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In January 1954, U.S. tobacco manufacturers jointly sponsored an advisory advertisement entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" which appeared in 448 newspapers in 338 cities reaching an estimated 43,145,000 Americans.

THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITTEE

A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers

All Rights Reserved by the Tobacco Manufacturers

...in the past, the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...

...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...

...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...

...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...

...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for...

THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, INC.
 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA
 HERRING & HERRING
 2000 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, N.Y.

ROBERT W. HERRING, President
 "We believe the cigarettes we...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for..."

ROBERT W. HERRING, President
 "We believe the cigarettes we...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for..."

ROBERT W. HERRING, President
 "We believe the cigarettes we...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for..."

ROBERT W. HERRING, President
 "We believe the cigarettes we...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for..."

ROBERT W. HERRING, President
 "We believe the cigarettes we...
 ...the industry has been held responsible for..."

THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITTEE

Account in
in this case,
Account in
Legislative
Committee
State Capital

Don was
contacted
from
accounts that
consistently
itemized
expenditures
by state and
by year

The following table shows the...
 and...
 1994
 1995
 1996

State	1994	1995	1996
ALABAMA	18,000	19,000	20,000
ALASKA	40,000	40,000	40,000
ARIZONA	40,000	40,000	40,000
ARKANSAS	18,000	18,000	18,000
CALIFORNIA	100,000	100,000	100,000
COLORADO	40,000	40,000	40,000
CONNECTICUT	40,000	40,000	40,000
DELAWARE	20,000	20,000	20,000
FLORIDA	20,000	20,000	20,000
GEORGIA	20,000	20,000	20,000
HAWAII	20,000	20,000	20,000
IDAHO	20,000	20,000	20,000
ILLINOIS	20,000	20,000	20,000
INDIANA	20,000	20,000	20,000
IOWA	20,000	20,000	20,000
KANSAS	20,000	20,000	20,000
KENTUCKY	20,000	20,000	20,000
Louisiana	20,000	20,000	20,000
MAINE	20,000	20,000	20,000
MARYLAND	20,000	20,000	20,000
MASSACHUSETTS	20,000	20,000	20,000
MICHIGAN	20,000	20,000	20,000
MINNESOTA	20,000	20,000	20,000
MISSISSIPPI	20,000	20,000	20,000
MISSOURI	20,000	20,000	20,000
MONTANA	20,000	20,000	20,000
NEBRASKA	20,000	20,000	20,000
NEVADA	20,000	20,000	20,000
NEW HAMPSHIRE	20,000	20,000	20,000
NEW JERSEY	20,000	20,000	20,000
NEW MEXICO	20,000	20,000	20,000
NEW YORK	20,000	20,000	20,000
NORTH CAROLINA	20,000	20,000	20,000
NORTH DAKOTA	20,000	20,000	20,000
OHIO	20,000	20,000	20,000
OKLAHOMA	20,000	20,000	20,000
OREGON	20,000	20,000	20,000
PENNSYLVANIA	20,000	20,000	20,000
RHODE ISLAND	20,000	20,000	20,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	20,000	20,000	20,000
SOUTH DAKOTA	20,000	20,000	20,000
TENNESSEE	20,000	20,000	20,000
TEXAS	20,000	20,000	20,000
UTAH	20,000	20,000	20,000
VIRGINIA	20,000	20,000	20,000
WASHINGTON	20,000	20,000	20,000
WEST VIRGINIA	20,000	20,000	20,000
WISCONSIN	20,000	20,000	20,000
WYOMING	20,000	20,000	20,000

94001500

Our Commitment
National
Healthcare
State Activities
Division
Tobacco Issues

We need
your help

Legislative
Committees
60% of State
Lobbyists
60% of State
Lobbyists
Special Projects
75% of State
Local Lobbying
Projects

TC

Failed promises of the cigarette industry and its effect on consumer misperceptions about the health risks of smoking

K M Cummings, C P Morley and A Hyland

Tob Control 2002 11: i110-i117

doi: 10.1136/tc.11.suppl_1.i110

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It's time we
made smoking
history.

From the First to the Last Ash: The History, Economics & Hazards of Tobacco

Unit 1: History & Economics of Tobacco

Download Curriculum
as a PDF file.

Title Page

Economics of Tobacco

Read More:

Introduction

Economics deals with the making and selling of products and services to consumers. Products are things like chewing tobacco, cigarettes, televisions, houses, and cars. Services include medical care, education, and insurance. Consumers are the people like ourselves who buy or receive the products and services.

The Greg
Louganis Story

Unit 1

- What is Tobacco?
- History of Tobacco
- Economics of Tobacco

When Ronald
Reagan was
campaigning for
President in 1980,
he wrote the
following letter:

• Reading & Writing

Activities: Finding
Important Facts/Details

The U.S. has a capitalist economic system. Under this system, one or more people get together and form a company to make and sell something. They do this to make money. The money that they make after paying off their bills or expenses is called profit. In other words, a profit is the money they have for themselves after paying rent, salaries, utility bills (electricity, gas, telephone) and buying machines/computers and any other equipment they need to make their product and run their business.

Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 4

Unit 5

Unit 6

Bibliography

When companies sell more than they spend, they make a profit. Selling their products to other countries is called exporting. The product that is sold is called an export. Buying from other countries is called importing, and what U.S. companies buy is called an import. For example, if Ford Motor Company buys steel from Japan to make a car, it is importing a product. Steel is the import. When Ford sells its cars to Brazil, it is exporting. Cars are the exports.

When companies or governments export more than they import, they have a trade surplus. A trade surplus is another way of saying a profit. On the other hand, when they import more than they export, they have a trade deficit. A deficit means a debt or money owed to someone else.

Throughout history, tobacco companies have had a trade surplus. That is one big reason why they have been important to the economy of the U.S. In 1992 the tobacco industry reported a \$5.65 billion dollar trade surplus. In the first half of 1992, tobacco exports were \$2 billion more than imports. The taxes that the tobacco companies pay provide a lot of money for the U.S. government. In 1992, Philip Morris alone paid \$4.5 billion in taxes. This makes it the largest tax payer in the U.S.

“We have the best partners in the world: the governments. In a lot of countries, it's incredibly important to the whole welfare state that we sell our products to collect taxes.”

— David E. R. Daugood, executive vice president,
Philip Morris International

Credit: Copyright © 1994 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission. "How Do They Live With Themselves?" Roger Rosenblatt, *The New York Times Magazine*, 3/20/94

Tobacco companies export their products (cigarettes, cigars, chewing tobacco) to at least 146 countries around the world. They sell to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Korea, Singapore, China, Russia, and many more countries. In 1992 Philip Morris sold 11 billion cigarettes to Russia alone.



Credit: Associated Press, 1/26/94

One of the reasons tobacco growing is so profitable is

because its costs are so low. There are only about 800,000 people working in the tobacco industry. There are 136,000 tobacco farms in more than 16 states.

**Tobacco Acres Harvested by
State in 1991**

State	1991 Acres
Connecticut	1,750
Florida	6,700
Georgia	40,000
Indiana	7,200
Kentucky	223,150
Maryland	7,400
Massachusetts	480
Montana	3,000
North Carolina	274,000
Ohio	1,0,500
Pennsylvania	10,500
South Carolina	51,000
Tennessee	61,700
Virginia	53,600
West Virginia	1,800
Wisconsin	7,400
United States	761,080

Credit: Dr. Joel Dunnington,
Tobacco Almanac, Revised,
May 1993

The making or manufacturing of cigarettes is almost completely automated. It is done by machines without people. Machines crush and clean tobacco leaves and add chemicals like nicotine. They also roll cigarettes, put on filters, cut them to length, and then package them.

All of the six U.S. companies producing cigarettes are large and powerful. They are so strong that not even all the medical reports of the health dangers of smoking and all the laws restricting smoking and advertising have been able to weaken them. They are still able to make big profits by buying up other non-tobacco companies in the U.S. and by selling and making cigarettes outside the country. For example, Philip Morris bought Miller

Beer and Kraft General Foods, and R.J. Reynolds bought the Nabisco Food Group and General Entertainment Corporation.

Tobacco Companies: The Companies They Own & The Products They Make

Philip Morris		
Bird's Eye	Louis Kemp Seafood	Jello
Louis Rich Meats	Light 'n Lively	Kool-Aid
Crystal Light	Lender's Bagels	Kraft
Minute Rice	Oscar Mayer	Tang
Post Cereals	Claussen Pickles	Lowenbrau
Stove-Top	Log Cabin	Country Time
Millers Beers	Maxim Coffee	Maxwell House
Shake and Bake	Baboli Bread	Seven Seas
Miracle Whip	Louis Rich	Cool Whip
Milwaukee's Best Beer	Sharp's Beer	Bulls Eye Sauce
Knudson	Meister Brau Beer	Parkay Margarine
Capri Sun	DiGiorno Pasta	Food Club
Entenmanns	Sealtest Ice Cream	Bakers Chocolate
Chiffon	Richmix Candy	Breyer's IceCream

Brooke Group (formerly Liggett & Myers)

MAI (computers, information systems)	NBA Hoops (baseball cards)
Basic Four	LineDrive Pre- rookie(baseballcards)

Distributor of football & hockey cards	Marvel superhero cards
GI Joe cards	World Championship Wrestling cards
Terminator II movie cards	Disney cards
NFL Proline Portraits	1992 Olympic cards
Star Trek	X-men
Full House	Perfect Strangers
Family Matters	DC comic book characters

Lorillard

Loews Hotels	Loews Theatre Management Corp.
CNA Insurance Co.	Bulova Corp. (watches, clocks)
Diamond M.	Majestic Shipping
Offshore Drilling	Corp,
Regency Hotel, New York	Summit Hotel, New York

R. J. Reynolds

RJR Nabisco Products (non tobacco) Annual Report 1991

cookies -

Almost Home		
Family Style	Bakers Bonus	Lorna
Cookies	Oatmeal Cookies	Doone
Barnum's		
Animal Crackers	Bugs Bunny	Cookie
	Graham Crackers	Break
Biscos	Cameo	Chips
		Ahoy
Cookies 'N		
Fudge	Heyday	Ideal
Made 'em		
Myself	Mallomars	Mystic
National		
Arrowroot	Nilla Wafers	Nutter
		Butter
Social Tea	Suddenly S'mores	Teddy

		graham
Newtons	Oreo	Pinwheels
crackers -		
American	Better Cheddars	Cheddar
Classic		Wedges
Chicken in a	Crown Pilot	Dip in a
Biskit		Chip
Harvest Crisps	Honey Maid	Nips
Oysterettes	Premium	Ritz Bits
Royal Lunch	Sociables	Swiss
		Cheese
Twigs	Uneeda	Vegetable
		Thins
Wheatworth	Wheat Thins	Zings
Tid-Bit	Graham Cracker:	Oat Thins
Ritz	Triscuit	Waverly
cereals -		
Nabisco 100% bran	Shredded Wheat	Team
other products -		
Comet Cups	Doo Dads	Easy
		Cheese
Mister Salty	Mr. Phipps	Mr. Phipps
Pretzels	Pretzel Chips	Dips
NAB Packs	Cracker Meal	
specialty products -		
AI Steak Sauce	Brer Rabbit Syrup	College Inn
Cream of Wheat	Davis Baking Powder	Milk bone
Grey Poupon Mustard	Ortega Mexican Food	Regina Wines & Vinegars
	Fleischmann's Egg	
Royal Gelatins	Beaters and Margarines	My T Fine
Blue Bonnet Margarine	Cream of Rice	
Canada Products -		
Aylmer	Christie	Coronation condiments
Dad's cookies	Del Monte	Harnois Cookies
Ideal Canned	Magic Baking	

Vegetables	Powder	Milk bone
Nabisco		Royal
Cereals Peek	Red Oval Farm	Rose
Freans		Vegetables
Nabisco Int. -		
Anselmi		Bubble
Cookies	Aurora Gelatins	Yum
Chips Ahoy	Del Monte	Famosa
		Honey
Fleischmann	Gloria Milk Products	Bran Cracker
Konitos	Lifesavers	Martinson
Cookies		
Oreo Cookies	Pepito Bubble Gum	Planters Snacks
Portenas	Premium Crackers	Ritz Crackers
Royalina	Saroma	Snuki
Universal	Cameo	Fiesta
Kraker Bran	Omega Bun	Pommy
Royal Gelatins	Trakinas	
Planters Div. -		
Planters Nuts and snacks		
Lifesavers Div. -		
		Breath
Lifesavers	Gummi Savers	Savers Mints
Breath Savers	Carefree	Beechnut
Mints	Sugarless Gum	Gum
Bubble Yum Gum	Fruit Stripe Gum	

American Brands

Franklin Life insurance	British Navy Pussers Rum
Jim Beam	Kamchatka Vodka
Ron Rico Rum	The Claymore
Wolfschmidt Vodka	Crawfords
Gilbey's Gin	Tomintoul-Glenlivet
DeKuypen Schnapps	Old Fettercairn
Windsor Canadian	Vladivar Vodka
Whyte and Mackay	Moen Faucets

Scotch	
Lord Calvert	Touch Control
Whiskey	
LeRoux Brandy	Chicago Specialty
Kessler Whiskey	Dearborn Brass
The Dalmore Scotch	Hoov-R-Line
Gilbeys Vodka	Anchor Brass
Old Grand Dad	AristoKraft Cabinets
Kamora	Decora
ACTUA	Soft-Joys Shoes
Masterlocks	STA-SOF Gloves
Waterloo Toolboxes	Weather SOF Gloves
Craftsman	Doland and Aitchinson
Toolboxes	Optics (UK)
	Acushnet Rubber
All American	Products
Swingline Staplers	Golden Belt - Cigarette Filters
Pocket Day-timer	Prestige Pressure cookers
ACCO Staples	Dexter Locks
ACCO paperclips	Wilson Jones Pads and binders
	Kensington
Perma Products	Microwave Computer Access.
Vogel Peterson	ACCO data
Eastlight (UK)	Rexel (UK)
Sasco (UK)	Twinlock(UK)
ValRex (France)	King-Mec (Italy)
Office Products International (Australia)	Marbig-Rexel (Australia)
Hetzel (Germany)	Titleist Golf Balls and Accessories
Foot-Joy Golf	Titleist Irons
Pro Trajectory Clubs	Classics Golf Shoes

Brown & Williamson
Appleton Papers Inc.


Saks Fifth Ave.
 Marshall Field's
 Ivey's
 Breuners
 Farmers Group Inc.

Credit: Dr. Joel Dunnington, Tobacco Almanac, 1993

We can see the power of the tobacco companies by reading about what happened to Greg Louganis, an Olympic diver.

The Greg Louganis Story

The U.S. government and the tobacco companies help each other. Since 1964 all the Surgeon Generals of the U.S. have talked and written about the health dangers of cigarettes. Still, cigarettes are made, advertised, and sold. The tobacco industry gives thousands of dollars to help cover the costs of political campaigns of people running for political office. These are people who want to be elected or reelected as Senators, Representatives, Vice-President, and President. In turn the politicians help the tobacco industry.



One way politicians help is continuing the tobacco price support system. Under the price support system, tobacco can only be grown on a certain number of government-approved farms. The government gives farms special, low interest loans to help cover the costs of growing tobacco. The U.S. Department of

Agriculture allows a certain amount of tobacco to be grown each year. This is called a quota. It also sets a minimum price for tobacco. When the farmer takes his/her tobacco to the market, any tobacco not sold one cent above the government price is bought by grower cooperatives and stored to be sold another year.

next section >>