



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR  
ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA

April 25, 2013

June Lagmay, City Clerk  
Office of the City Clerk  
City of Los Angeles  
200 N. Spring Street, Room 360  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Re: **Submission of Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program: Year 3 Final Report Revised (C.F. 12-0923-S1)**

Dear Ms. Lagmay,

The Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development submitted a report to members of Council requesting authority to execute a new contract and amend an existing contract with contractor, Urban Institute (C.F. 12-0923-S1), dated April 10, 2013. Attachment C included the program's Year 3 report in draft format.

Enclosed is the final evaluation report: **Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program: Year 3 Final Report** submitted by Urban Institute (updated 04/25/2013). Please allow this report to be included in C.F. 12-0923-S1 as a replacement to Attachment C. The Year 3 report, Attachment C Executive Summary and Appendices were not revised and therefore do not require replacement documents.

If you have any questions related to this request please contact Mildred M. Lopez directly at (213) 473-7798.

Thank you for your consideration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Guillermo Cespedes", written over a circular stamp or seal.

Guillermo Cespedes, MSW  
Deputy Mayor  
Gang Reduction and Youth Development



# Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### I.1 OVERVIEW OF THE GRYD PROGRAM

The GRYD program was established within the Los Angeles Mayor's Office in the summer of 2007 to address the problem of gang crime and gang violence in Los Angeles in a comprehensive, collaborative, and community-wide manner. GRYD was also designed to build upon previous approaches to gang control and to integrate existing public and private sector services, rather than just implement limited and targeted programs to address gang issues. The GRYD program was gradually implemented during 2009, went through adjustments and modifications during 2010, and produced a written *Comprehensive Strategy*<sup>1</sup> in 2011.

Early steps taken by the program produced community based assessments that identified areas in Los Angeles where gang problems were endemic.<sup>2</sup> This led to the establishment in 2008 of 12 GRYD Zones for full prevention and intervention activities, and four other zones, designated "Non-GRYD locations" at that time, that would receive lower levels of support. Subsequently five additional areas were added and the term "Secondary Areas" was adopted for all nine in the *Comprehensive Strategy*.<sup>3</sup>

Beginning in the summer of 2008, Los Angeles began operating the Summer Nights Lights (SNL) program, an annual city-sponsored event, running from July 4 through Labor Day each year. This program operates in parks and recreational centers and offers food, games, and other activities at no cost to residents. There were eight locations in 2008. Subsequent expansions increased the number of locations to 32 by 2011.

The GRYD program has established widespread geographic coverage of the locations in the city of Los Angeles where gangs are most active. A listing of the 12 GRYD Zones, the 9 Secondary Areas, and the 32 SNL Areas is as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "Comprehensive Strategy," The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD). The Strategy contains a full account of the background and formulation of the GRYD program, as well as details on all aspects of the program.

<sup>2</sup> Community Needs Assessment Reports, along with maps of the GRYD program areas, can be found at: <http://www.ci.la.ca.us/Mayor/villaraigosaplan/PublicSafety/GangReductionStrategy/index.htm>

<sup>3</sup> The 12 Zones are each allocated \$1,000,000 annually for prevention and \$500,000 for intervention. However, in FY 2011-2012, as part of a larger effort to save money across the City, the GRYD Office cut budgets by 10 percent for some prevention service providers. The funding levels for intervention contractors remained the same during the 2011-2012 year.

### ***The 12 GRYD Zones***

77th (II), Baldwin Village/Southwest, Boyle Heights/Hollenbeck, Cypress Park/Northeast, Florence-Graham/77th, Newton, Pacoima/Foothill, Panorama City/Mission, Ramona Gardens/Hollenbeck, Rampart, Southwest (II), Watts/Southeast.

### ***The 9 Secondary Areas***

Belmont (Rampart), Canoga Park, Highland Park, San Pedro, Sun Valley (San Fernando Valley), Venice/Mar Vista, Watts, Wilmington, Wilshire.

### ***The 32 SNL Areas***

Algin Sutton Recreation Center, Costello Recreation Center, Cypress Park Recreation Center, Delano Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center, Glassell Park Recreation Center, Green Meadows Recreation Center, Highland Park Recreation Center, Hubert Humphrey Park, Imperial Courts Housing Development, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Jim Gilliam Park, Jordan Downs Housing Development, Lafayette Recreation Center, Lanark Recreation Center, Lemon Grove Park, Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center, Montecito Heights Recreation Center, Mount Carmel Park, Nickerson Gardens Housing Development, Normandale Recreation Center, Ramon Garcia Park, Ramona Gardens Housing Development, Ross Snyder Park, Sepulveda Park, Slauson Recreation Center, South Park Recreation Center, Sun Valley Recreation Center, Toberman Recreation Center, Valley Plaza Recreation Center, Van Ness Recreation Center, Wilmington Recreation Center.

Annual competitive solicitations begun in 2008 have resulted in awards to gang prevention and gang intervention service providers in the 12 zones and in other Secondary Areas. Staff from these providers also work in the SNL Areas during the two SNL months each year. Prevention services focus on youth considered at-risk for gang joining. Intervention services focus on youth already in gangs and on the communities in which gang activity takes place.

Evaluation services were also competitively solicited in 2008. The Urban Institute began evaluation of the GRYD program in the spring of 2009.<sup>4</sup> This document reports on the third year of that evaluation. Two prior annual interim reports have been produced. The first (August 2010) was a qualitative examination of the program's implementation process. The second (August 2011) contained preliminary descriptive empirical analyses of the GRYD prevention program and of general gang crime trends in GRYD Zones and Summer Night Lights Areas.<sup>5</sup> The current report extends the earlier work on the prevention component of the GRYD program, focusing on changes in the attitudes and behavior of youth who received services, and uses new evidence to assess GRYD's impact on gang violence.

GRYD is a comprehensive and evolving program that has many components. Activities of the GRYD program include the following:

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<sup>4</sup> The evaluation was initially limited to the 12 Zones. Subsequently, SNL Areas were added. No evaluation of the Non-GRYD Areas has been conducted.

<sup>5</sup> Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., Lyons, M., and Denver, M. August 2010. "Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program: Y1 Report." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., and Denver, M. July 2011. "Y2 Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Evaluation reports are available through the Urban Institute website: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412409.html>.

- A prevention program that seeks referrals from individuals/families/schools/agencies in GRYD Zones that have identified youth considered at-risk for gang joining and engaging in delinquent/criminal behavior, with family and youth counseling and support services being provided to youth considered to be at high risk levels.
- An intervention program that targets youth who are already engaged in gang activity and seeks to identify challenges the youth faces and provide alternatives that will encourage youth to leave the gang life.
- A crisis response system involving Los Angeles Police Department officers (LAPD), Community Intervention Workers (CIWs), and GRYD Regional Managers (RMs), all of whom respond to street level incidents, such as homicides and shootings, that are considered to be threatening to community well-being.
- The Summer Night Lights (SNL) program, which became operational in eight recreational locations (hereafter, SNL Areas) in July-August of 2008, expanded each year since then, and operated in 32 Areas during July-August of 2011.
- The Gun Buy-Back program, which has taken place on Mother's Day in each of the last four years and has provided Los Angeles residents with the opportunity to anonymously turn in firearms to the police.
- Community Action Teams, which commenced in 2011 and were intended to create and support community-based working groups that organize programming to target the unique needs of GRYD Zone communities.
- The Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy, which began in 2010 and offers intervention training and certification to intervention service providers.
- The Community Education Campaign, which engaged GRYD staff in presentations and discussions at numerous communities and schools in Los Angeles with the hope of generating support for, and referrals to, the GRYD prevention program. and
- The coordination of post-suppression services to community members, and additional community-based activities involving law enforcement and other agencies.

## I.2 GRYD'S COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

To document and formalize this increasingly complex program, the GRYD Office has developed a *Comprehensive Strategy*,<sup>6</sup> which explains the key underlying assumptions behind its multi-faceted model, provides a conceptual framework to guide practice, specifies program-wide goals and objectives, and identifies the location and role of each of its activities within the program's strategy. The plan is also designed to broadly link the various components in a comprehensive manner.

The Strategy has five main elements:

- **Primary Prevention**  
Community-oriented activities designed to build resistance to gang activities. The Gun

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<sup>6</sup> Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development Comprehensive Strategy." Los Angeles, CA: GRYD Office.

Buy-Back program and the Community Education Campaign are examples of activities within this component. Primary prevention activities are intended to engage the entire community.

- **Secondary Prevention**

Youth and family-oriented services intended to inhibit gang-joining by at-risk youth 10-15 years of age who are not currently gang members. Services are provided by GRYD-funded provider agencies in each zone.

- **Intervention**

The Intervention component has two focal points: family case management, and crisis response and proactive peace-making in the community.

- Family case management activities by intervention specialists focus on youth 14-25 years of age who are already in gangs, and emphasize individual client assistance through the provision of service referrals, such as mentoring or counseling. Intervention agencies place particular emphasis on reentry services.
- Crisis response and proactive peacemaking activities provide for an immediate response by Community Intervention Workers to gang-related violent incidents, and focus on maintaining peace both before and after such incidents occur.

- **Community Engagement**

GRYD seeks to engage communities and law enforcement in a community policing capacity; to support this goal, community engagement is an objective of all GRYD activities.

- **Suppression**

The GRYD Office does not engage directly in suppression activities conducted by police or collaborate with police in suppression, but instead seeks to sustain regular communication with law enforcement agencies and coordinate prevention and intervention activities with police actions.

Together, these five main components are intended to address the mission of the GRYD Office to reduce gang violence in GRYD Zones and SNL Areas where gang violence is endemic by:

- Reducing gang joining among youth at high risk for gang membership;
- Helping young people who have already joined a gang to desist from gang activity;
- Providing effective, proactive peace-making and responses to incidents of violence when they occur; and
- Improving communication and collaboration within and across government agencies, community-based organizations, and community residents.

As stated in the *Comprehensive Strategy*, the GRYD Office utilizes a theory of change to guide the program's objectives and implementation, incorporating elements of prior gang literature and research, and principles drawn from family systems theory.<sup>7</sup> Prior gang research and literature provide the basis for understanding the conditions that lead to gang involvement, while the conceptual

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<sup>7</sup> The GRYD Office's theory of change utilizes family systems theory principles presented in the work of James Alexander, Ph.D., Functional Family Therapy Founder; Elaine Bobrow, M.S, MRI's Strategic Family Therapy Training Center; John Rolland, M.D.; and Froma Walsh, Ph.D., Chicago Center for Family Health. For further reading on this theory, see Bowen, M. (1993). *Family Therapy in Clinical Practice*. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc.

framework that guides the GRYD Office's response to the identified risk factors is largely shaped by family systems theory and practice.

GRYD shares the family systems theory perspective that social context is the starting point for making change. Therefore, GRYD activities seek to target both micro and macro level systems. At the micro level, program activities are focused on changing behaviors at the individual, family, and peer levels by focusing on community strengths, the family structure or living context, youths' internal decision-making processes, peer level interactions, and the absence of pro-social alternatives to gang involvement. At the macro level, program activities are intended to alter community norms that tolerate violence through the development of community-level support systems. In support of these program objectives, the *Comprehensive Strategy* establishes six guiding principles to shape practices aimed at changing both system levels:

- All families, all individuals, and all communities have the inherent capacity to transform themselves and change the narratives of their lives.
- The concept of family in the GRYD Strategy is defined through the broad lens of multi-generations, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, great grandparents, and so on.
- When biological family members are not present in a youth's life, the concept of family extends to caretakers, adults, and any other networks viewed by the youth as significant to his/her life.
- It is equally as important to identify and affirm the strengths of a youth and his/her family as it is to identify his/her deficits.
- It is equally as important to identify and affirm the strengths of a particular neighborhood as it is to identify the places that are vulnerable to counterproductive behavior.
- It is preferable to view a youth's functional and/or dysfunctional range of individual behaviors in the context of his or her living situation, which includes his/her family, peer, and community environment.

In addition, the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* draws on six family systems theory concepts to provide a framework for the program's five major strategy components: primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, community engagement, and suppression. Each is discussed briefly below in relation to relevant GRYD strategy approaches:

- **The Family Life Cycle**  
The family life cycle theory suggests that critical periods exist across life cycles, and each life stage introduces age and gender-specific risks and needs for different interventions. The family health cycle model provides that family health as a whole shapes the well-being of individual family members, while the family structure is also impacted by external conditions and community-level inputs. The theory helps to identify the types of intervention that will most likely be effective at different life stages, and provides a guide for the most beneficial uses of scarce resources. In particular, connections can be made between the family life cycle model and GRYD's primary prevention, secondary prevention, and intervention activities.
- **Self-Differentiation**  
According to the *Comprehensive Strategy*, the theory of self-differentiation predicts that individuals with low levels of self-differentiation are more likely to lose their sense of self in response to the pressures and norms of a group. The theory suggests that one-to-one multi-

generational relationships will support an individual's development of increased self-differentiation, which in turn informs the GRYD program's work in both prevention and intervention services.

- **The GRYD Vertical Strategy: Multigenerational Coaching**  
The vertical strategy emphasizes long-term family resiliency, family engagement, and individual development of each GRYD client through multigenerational coaching and the cultivation of family history knowledge across generations. Multigenerational coaching is a strategic approach to heightening youth self-differentiation by which individuals or families are provided instruction to develop positive, one-on-one relationships across family generations (through activities such as letter writing and family visits). Both prevention and intervention program activities incorporate the multigenerational coaching approach. The vertical strategy also informs practice for community-level activities.
- **The GRYD Horizontal Strategy: The Problem-Solving Approach**  
The horizontal level strategy emphasizes the relationship between family members/caretakers who reside together in one household, and aims to reinforce parental/caretaker authority, identify problems, and design problem-solving interventions specific to clients' social contexts. The goal of the horizontal strategy is to help individual youth and households develop problem-solving skill sets. The horizontal strategy intersects directly with the vertical strategy, and likewise defines practice for prevention, intervention, and community-level activities.
- **The Relationship-Based Community Intervention Approach**  
GRYD's intervention practice adopts a multi-systemic approach that assumes behaviors associated with gang involvement are embedded and encouraged by structures at all different levels, such as beliefs and rituals, family dynamics, and neighborhood-community legacies. GRYD's intervention practice thus seeks to focus on the individual gang member, the peer group/gang, the family, and the community in which the gang or gang member claims membership. The relationship-based community approach requires that intervention workers engage and influence the many structures that shape gang involvement, and provides a guiding framework for GRYD's case management and violence interruption intervention activities.
- **Relational Triangles**  
Family systems theory provides that relational triangles are the building blocks of the family emotional system, and can serve as both a source of dysfunction and a source of stability. When the interaction between the three entities within the triangle affirms the roles and boundaries of each, the relational triangle serves as a source of stability and collective competence. In the context of the GRYD program, the three entities are the community intervention workers, law enforcement personnel, and GRYD staff members. According to the *Comprehensive Strategy*, relational triangles are instrumental to GRYD's crisis response model, and all three entities are expected to work together towards the GRYD Office's broader objective to reduce gang involvement and violence. The relational triangle model directly informs the program's crisis intervention, community engagement, and suppression activities.

### **I.3 DATA AND METHODS IN Y3 EVALUATION**

A variety of qualitative and quantitative data were collected over the course of the third year of the evaluation. These can be categorized as: individual-level participant data, GRYD stakeholder and GRYD staff perceptions; program assessments by Los Angeles Police Department officers who work in GRYD Zones and Summer Night Lights Areas; macro level crime incident data from the Los Angeles Police Department; comparable data from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; and program data for specific GRYD components. In addition, where relevant, GRYD Office internal assessment reports were used and cited in this report.

The individual-level data consists of outcomes from the initial youth assessment through the Youth Services Eligibility Tool, which is administered at the time of referral to the program, and a retest of the youth conducted not sooner than six months later. As Chapter V details, the analysis considers both youth enrolled in GRYD prevention programs and those that were deemed not-eligible for enrollment. The report documents the extent to which youth receiving services under the program changed the attitudes and behavior that place them at risk for gang joining and criminal/delinquent behavior.

Crime incident data were obtained from the Los Angeles Police Department's crime incident records management system. The city-wide incident data span January 2005 through December 2011. County-level incident data for the same period were also provided by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. These data constitute the foundation for an examination of violent gang crime in primary GRYD Locations, and Los Angeles County. Analyses of gang-related violence across the seven years of available data are made, and estimates of the effects of the GRYD program on gang violence are reported.

Views about GRYD and its effectiveness have been collected through surveys of LAPD officers, Community Intervention Workers, and GRYD Office Regional Managers. Results of the surveys are documented.

The report also presents qualitative assessments of community-level GRYD activities that are complementary to the components of the program, and that directly focus on prevention of gang joining and control of gang violence. These include the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy, the Community Education Campaign, and the Gun Buy-Back program.

### **I.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT**

In subsequent chapters, the report is organized as follows:

#### **Chapter II Measuring Gang Violence in Los Angeles**

An overview is presented of the research questions that the evaluation is considering as it assesses the gang violence situation in Los Angeles. The chapter then discusses the ways in which an assessment of the GRYD program's impact on gang violence can be conducted. The strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches are reviewed, and the decisions made by the evaluation team are documented.

### **Chapter III      Gang Violence Before and After GRYD**

This chapter focuses on gang violence in GRYD's Primary Locations (12 GRYD Zones and associated SNL Areas). Seven year trends are examined and compared to trends over the same period of time in Los Angeles County locations that are comparable to the GRYD Zones. Predictions are made of the levels of gang-related violent crime that could have been expected had trends in existence prior to the inception of GRYD simply continued. These are compared to the actual levels that occurred from program inception in 2009 to the end of 2011.

### **Chapter IV      The Summer Night Lights Program**

In this chapter, an overview of the SNL program is provided, followed by a summary of survey data collected after the summer of 2011. Three topics of interest are reviewed – assessments of the communities where the SNL recreation centers are located, community residents' experiences at SNL, and perceptions of communication and effectiveness of the SNL program staff

### **Chapter V      Prevention**

This chapter contains assessments of primary and secondary prevention. The first part of the chapter covers the Gun Buy-Back program and the Community Education Campaign. Participant perceptions of both are discussed. The second part of the chapter includes an overview of the prevention service referral process, documentation of the GRYD program's procedures for determining which at-risk youth will receive services, an assessment of the effects of the services on the attitudes and behaviors of a subset of youth enrolled in the program, and a comparison of those effects to similar measures from a sample of youth not involved in the program.

### **Chapter VI      Intervention**

This chapter describes the intervention activities of the program. Limited empirical data about the activities and their effects is available at the present time, so it is not possible to directly assess the impact of GRYD's intervention efforts on gang violence. The Crisis Response System – what is designated by GRYD as the Triangle Partnership (comprised of the Los Angeles Police Department, Community Intervention Workers, and GRYD Regional Managers) – is reviewed. The results of two surveys are reported: one summarizes the views of the Triangle partners on a selected number of crisis incidents; the other captures more general views of the GRYD program provided by a sample of LAPD officers working in GRYD Zones and SNL Areas. Findings from focus groups with

participants in the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy are presented, and GRYD's Family Case Management system is summarized.

## **Chapter VII Conclusions**

A summary of the evaluation's findings is presented in this chapter.

**Executive Summary** An Executive Summary is available in a separate document.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., Lowry, S., Kim, K., Kotonias, C., and Pacifici, L. "Executive Summary: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. It is anticipated that the Executive Summary, and this report, will be available on the Urban Institute website in April, 2013.

# CHAPTER II

## MEASURING GANG VIOLENCE IN LOS ANGELES

### II.1 INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of the GRYD program, as defined in the *GRYD Comprehensive Strategy*,<sup>9</sup> is to reduce gang violence in Los Angeles communities with the most prevalent gang problems. It is hypothesized that primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention, community engagement, and law enforcement suppression<sup>10</sup> will in combination contribute to reducing violence between gangs and produce a decline in violent crime – most particularly gang-related violent crime.

To maximize the potential for achieving this goal, the GRYD program operated in 12 GRYD Zones, 9 Secondary Areas, and 32 Summer Night Lights (SNL) Areas in 2011. In addition, the program's Crisis Incident Response system operated city-wide. The 12 Zones were identified in 2008 as containing the most serious levels of gang activities in Los Angeles. At the same time, four "Non-GRYD Zones" were also identified, but they focused on areas with less severe gang crime levels and were provided with substantially less funding than the other GRYD targeted communities. There was a subsequent expansion of these other areas to nine locations, renamed "Secondary Areas" by the GRYD Office. The 32 SNL Areas consist of locations in and around parks/recreation centers where gang activity is also considered serious. These were added to the GRYD program in annual increments beginning in 2008.

In the next two chapters, we assess whether there is empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the GRYD program has had the intended effect on violent gang-related crime.

### II.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS

This chapter focuses on the data sources the evaluation uses and the methodological challenges it faces. Chapter III considers trends in the levels of gang violence from 2005 to 2011. In both chapters, we look at the specific levels of violence in the city of Los Angeles, and compare those levels to Los Angeles County. We address the following basic questions:

#### **Chapter II Measuring Gang Violence in Los Angeles**

- 1) What data sources were used to analyze potential changes in gang-related violence in Los Angeles city and Los Angeles County?
- 2) What methodological approach should be utilized to assess the potential effects of GRYD program activities on Los Angeles gang violence?

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<sup>9</sup> Op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> The GRYD program does not directly engage in law enforcement or suppression, but does coordinate and work with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) through, for example, the crisis response partnership between GRYD Regional Managers, GRYD's Community Intervention Workers, and LAPD officers and SNL participation.

### Chapter III Gang Violence Before and After GRYD

- 3) From 2005 to 2011, how much gang violence has there been in Los Angeles?
- 4) How much of the violence has occurred in the locations where GRYD (a) is operating, and (b) is not operating?
- 5) What are the trends in gang-related violent crime in GRYD locations and how do they compare to the trends in similar high violent gang crime locations in Los Angeles County?
- 6) Since the GRYD program commenced, how do actual levels of gang violence in GRYD locations and in Los Angeles County compare to levels predicted on the basis of trends prior to GRYD's inception?
- 7) What comparisons can be made between predicted/actual levels of gang violence in GRYD locations and similar predicted/actual levels in Los Angeles County?
- 8) What conclusions about GRYD's impact on GRYD Zone violence can be drawn?

## II.3 DATA SOURCES

The violent gang crime analyses are based on city and county incident records on crime obtained from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)<sup>11</sup> and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD).<sup>12</sup> Both agencies provided copies of their incident specific databases for reported crimes from January 2005 through December 2011. All incidents were flagged as gang related or not by each department.<sup>13</sup> Homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults (including assaults with a deadly weapon) were designated as the violent crime types that are used in this report, and these were extracted from both data sets. The crime records were geo-coded using LAPD's and LASD's reporting district classifications (RDs, hereafter).<sup>14</sup> For Los Angeles city, this permits the allocation of incidents to specific GRYD program areas.

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<sup>11</sup> We are grateful for the support and cooperation of LAPD and particularly of Nathan Ong, of the LAPD Compstat unit, who was diligent and effective at pulling the necessary data together for us.

<sup>12</sup> We are grateful for the cooperation of Wendy Harn, Assistant Director of the Crime Analysis Program at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, who went out of her way to provide the evaluation team with LASD data from 2005-2011, with gang flags attached.

<sup>13</sup> It is important to note that gang flags are derived from independent systems of identifying gang crimes used by LAPD and LASD. These determinations rely on experience, judgment and practice by LAPD and LASD officers and staff. However, there are likely to be some incidents classified as gang-related that are not; and others not classified as gang-related that are. In addition, the extent of violent crime and violent gang-related crime in communities is not fully captured by the number of reported crime incidents. It is highly probable that a significant though unknown number of violent crimes are not reported to the police due to fear of retaliation, a lack of faith that the police response will produce positive results, and other reasons. Our view is that, as a consequence of these factors, the gang crimes identified by each department are more likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate of criminal gang activity, but we have no satisfactory way of estimating the extent of the underestimation.

<sup>14</sup> The city and the county both use RDs to designate the geographic location of every reported incident. Each RD encompasses a relatively small area and is assigned a unique number. The size of RD areas varies somewhat in both departments, being dependent upon street boundaries and other delineating factors that the departments consider significant (e.g. population density – the more dense the population, the smaller the RD). Both departments assign an RD number to all incidents that are entered into their computerized records systems.

To illustrate the geographic distribution of gang violence in Los Angeles, Figure II.1 presents a map of the Los Angeles city boundaries, showing the locations of the 12 GRYD Zones, the 9 Secondary GRYD Areas and 32 SNL Areas. GRYD Zones have red boundaries; SNL Areas have blue boundaries; and the Secondary Areas are solid green. To enhance readability of the map, the names of each of the 53 GRYD locations have not been included<sup>15</sup>. The 2011 violent gang-related incidents are superimposed at the geographic locations where they occurred.<sup>16</sup> Gang violence is represented as points on the map with the result that multiple violent incidents in the same or nearby locations are shown as a single point. This was needed to preserve clarity, but it conceals the density of gang violence in the GRYD Zones, as compared to the Secondary Areas. Data on the numbers of incidents in each of the three groups shown on the map are presented below in Chapter III, Table III.1.

The map clearly indicates the following: first, that gang violence is concentrated in specific areas of the city; and second, that the GRYD Zones and most of the SNL Areas are located in the neighborhoods and communities where gang violence is most serious. In 2011, 1,762 violent gang-related incidents were reported from the 12 GRYD Zones and the 32 SNL Areas and 742 were reported from the 9 Other GRYD Areas.<sup>17</sup> Another 1,483 incidents occurred in other areas of the city. However, though these 1,483 incidents are beyond GRYD program boundaries, many of them are quite close to those boundaries, especially in the SE quadrant of the city. This creates the obvious possibility, and in fact likelihood in our view, that GRYD program efforts in designated target areas spill over into adjacent areas. This creates challenges (discussed in the next section) with respect to developing valid comparisons to GRYD program areas.


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<sup>15</sup> See above in Chapter I, section I.1 for the names of the 12 GRYD Zones, the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas, and the 32 SNL Areas.

<sup>16</sup> Though the incidents included are from a single year (to avoid rendering the map too densely populated to be intelligible), the geographic distributions from other years were similar.


<sup>17</sup> See Table III.1 in Chapter III for frequencies of gang violence incidents.

Figure II.1 Geographic Distribution of 2011 Gang Crime in Los Angeles



The area of Los Angeles County that was examined for selection of comparison areas to the city is mapped in Figure II.2. Within this area there are high gang crime areas that are comparable in severity to those in the city of Los Angeles, and in addition the fact that the eastern section of the city and the western section of the county have similar demographic characteristics makes this part of Los Angeles County a plausible comparison area. Details on the levels of gang violence in the area and the county RDs selected for comparison are presented in Chapter III.

Figure II.2 Comparison Area in the County of Los Angeles



## II.4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

It is perhaps tempting to think that assessments of program effectiveness can be made by comparing pre-program measures with post-program measures, accompanied by the conclusion that the program was effective if the latter differ from the former in the desired direction by some arbitrarily specified amount – for example, by 5 percent, 10 percent, or some similar number. In fact, programs often use changes of this type as criteria for determining whether a program was successful in bringing about hoped-for outcomes.

While this approach has value for examining short-term differences in gang violence, problems arise if such measures are used alone. The most obvious is that long- or short-term trends may exist that are moving gang violence levels up or down regardless of program activities. When the trends are downward, there is a risk that the continuing decline may be interpreted as an indicator of program

success when, in fact, the program may not have a causal influence on the decline. When trends are upward, the opposite risk exists – that an erroneous conclusion of failure may be made.

This problem has to be addressed by comparing change in the program's target areas to change in locations where the program is not operating. The target areas and the comparison areas need to be as similar as possible with respect to the levels of gang violence. This objective is best realized through the use of a randomized control trial (RCT) evaluation design, in which equivalent program and comparison groups would be randomly selected before the program began operations. In the GRYD context, for instance, 24 communities with more or less equal levels of gang crime problems might have been identified. A random selection from among these communities could have established 12 GRYD Zones. The other 12 would have been controls. Data from before and after GRYD commenced could have been gathered from both groups and the comparison between the two data sets would have been the basis for assessment of the GRYD program's impact.

However, such a design is rarely possible for real-world programs, usually because it is ethically and politically problematic, and also because the way program focus is determined makes the establishment of suitable controls infeasible. This is the situation with respect to the GRYD program. The GRYD Zones and SNL program areas were identified on the basis of greatest need and highest severity of gang problems. This is obviously a completely sensible and appropriate approach, but it prevents a randomized design for evaluation. Thus, in the absence of an RCT design, we must rely on less rigorous descriptive and quasi-experimental approaches to evaluate the GRYD program's potential impact.

The approach we took to this problem in the second year evaluation report<sup>18</sup> was to compare the 12 GRYD Zones and the 32 SNL Areas to the remainder of the city – those places where GRYD was not operating at all, or was operating at a lower level. Data on all gang-related crime were developed for these three groups, and differences in the magnitude and trends of those measures were presented and analyzed. The analysis showed that gang crime in Los Angeles, like all crime, had steadily risen from 2005 to the middle of 2007 and had then declined through 2011. However, in the locations where GRYD was concentrating its primary effort (the 12 Zones and the 32 SNL Areas), gang crime had declined at a modestly faster rate than elsewhere. This offered support for the view that the GRYD program was having a positive effect on gang crime, albeit small, but, as was pointed out in the report, it was not possible to be conclusive about this effect. That was primarily because the GRYD program was focusing the majority of its resources and activities on the worst gang crime areas in the city, with the result that the rest of the city was, by definition, not sufficiently comparable to the GRYD program areas with respect to the number and types of gang crimes.

To mitigate that issue in this report's focus on violent gang crime we have revised the approach to the comparison areas in two ways: we have redefined the geographic groupings of Los Angeles locations within which the frequencies of violent gang crime will be aggregated (see below for

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<sup>18</sup> Dunworth et al., 2011, op. cit.

specifications), and we have obtained data from Los Angeles County so that gang activity in a separate though similar jurisdiction can be introduced as a supplementary comparison area.

The groupings we use are identified below. They are intended to permit an assessment of the Primary locations where gang violence is highest and GRYD's maximum effort is being expended (all 12 GRYD ones plus 21 of the 32 SNL Areas), while also permitting a comparison of those locations with Secondary Locations (9 Secondary Areas the remaining 11 SNL Areas), and Non-GRYD locations. Because the Secondary and Non-GRYD locations do not constitute satisfactory controls in the experimental sense (because they are not, strictly speaking, sufficiently similar to the Primary Locations in gang crime levels), we also introduce a fourth category consisting of locations in Los Angeles County that have significant levels of gang activity.<sup>19</sup> This group is made up of the 174 Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department reporting districts (RDs), with the highest number of violent gang crimes from 2005 to 2011, chosen from the southeastern portion of the County adjoining the city of Los Angeles. These 174 were selected to match as closely as possible the 174 RDs for the Primary GRYD locations.

The three geographic categories for the City and the Comparison locations for the County are defined as follows:

1) **Primary GRYD Locations**

These are the areas where GRYD is operating at the most intense level and has the greatest investment of effort and funding. They consist of the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 SNL Areas associated with them. We consider an SNL area to be associated with a Zone if it has a common border with a Zone or partially overlaps the area of a Zone. The GRYD Office considers that the 12 zones and these 21 associated SNL Areas are more or less integrated entities with respect to the implementation of the GRYD program.<sup>20</sup>

2) **Other GRYD Locations<sup>21</sup>**

These are the 9 Other GRYD Areas and the 8 SNL Areas associated with them. We also include the 3 remaining SNL Areas in this category, even though they are not associated with any GRYD Zone.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> These data are new to the annual GRYD program evaluation. County gang crime data were not available when the second year report was written.

<sup>20</sup> The 21 SNL Areas in the Primary Locations group are: Algin Sutton Recreation Center, Costello Recreation Center, Cypress Park Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center, Glassell Park Recreation Center, Green Meadows Recreation Center, Hubert Humphrey Park, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Jim Gilliam Park, Lafayette Recreation Center, Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center, Montecito Heights Recreation Center, Mount Carmel Park, Nickerson Gardens Housing Development, Ramon Garcia Park, Ramona Gardens Housing Development, Ross Snyder Park, Sepulveda Park, Slauson Recreation Center, South Park Recreation Center, Van Ness Recreation Center.

<sup>21</sup> The term Secondary Location has a different meaning in this report than the term Secondary Area in the GRYD Comprehensive Strategy. The former is a term of art we utilize in this report. The latter is used by the GRYD program to identify lower priority locations that do not have funding or staffing at the same level as the 12 main GRYD Zones. The two terms do not have the same meaning.

<sup>22</sup> The Secondary SNL Areas are: Delano Recreation Center, Highland Park Recreation Center, Imperial Courts Housing Development, Jordan Downs Housing Development, Lanark Recreation Center, Lemon Grove Park,

- 3) **Non-GRYD Locations**  
These locations are not associated with the Primary or Other GRYD locations and consist of the remainder of the city.
- 4) **County Comparison Locations**  
These locations are most similar to the Primary GRYD locations in terms of gang violence levels and are used as a basis of comparison to the Primary GRYD locations.

To further help compensate for the methodological constraints associated with evaluating a field-based program not amenable to experimentation, we also adopt a multi-faceted analytic approach, using tables, flow charts, segmented regressions, interrupted time series analyses, and difference-in-differences analyses.

The tabular approaches provide descriptive summaries of the annual frequencies of violent gang crimes for the four groups. Because of their basic descriptive nature, only limited outcome conclusions may be drawn from them.

The next approach, regression-based analysis of crime trends, calculates straight line estimates of the extent to which these measures increased or decreased on average before and after the implementation of GRYD programs. The trends for the Primary GRYD Locations are compared to trends for the Los Angeles County locations. In addition, a segmented approach was incorporated in order to describe 2005 to mid-2007 trends when gang crime peaked, 2007 to 2009 trends until programs began, and then post-implementation trends from 2009 through 2011. While this approach is relatively straightforward, and provides a simple comparison between the Primary GRYD Locations and the County locations, it is still largely descriptive and is not a fully satisfactory basis for making definitive conclusions about program impact.<sup>23</sup>

An interrupted time series (ITS) analysis is a design typically used when researchers have available time series (of sufficient length) on an outcome of interest (e.g., monthly series of violent crime incidents) covering a period before and after a program's implementation. Given that we have incident data for both the Primary GRYD Locations and the County Locations from 2005 through 2011, an interrupted time series design is a viable option. The Auto Regressive Interactive Moving Average (ARIMA) model, a feature of ITS, allows for modeling how crimes were evolving prior to GRYD implementation and for projecting estimates of expected levels of violent gang crime had the pre-program trends continued. A comparison between these estimates and the actual levels for both the

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Normandale Recreation Center, Sun Valley Recreation Center, Toberman Recreation Center, Valley Plaza Recreation Center, Wilmington Recreation Center.

<sup>23</sup> Perrin, N. October 2009. "Analysis of Interrupted Time Series with Segmented Regression." Center for Health Research.

City and the County provides evidence of the possible effects of the GRYD program. ITS is particularly useful in identifying short-term (temporary) versus longer-term (permanent) effects of the program.<sup>24</sup>

The last component design — the Difference-in-Difference analysis (DID in shorthand, hereafter)<sup>25</sup> — focuses on both the pre- and post-implementation periods for the Primary GRYD Locations and the County Locations. In its simplest form, the DID design is based on the assumption that if GRYD decreased crime in the Primary GRYD Locations (between the pre- and post-2009 periods), it should have done so by a magnitude larger than any decrease in crime observed in the 174 County RDs (between the pre- and post-2009 periods). In other words, the effectiveness of GRYD can be inferred to be the difference between the 174 GRYD RDs and the 174 County RDs in the period before GRYD commenced compared to the difference between the GRYD RDs and the County RDs in the same amount of time after GRYD commenced. The comparison can be extended for as much time as desired before and after program commencement. This is the source of the name – Difference-in-Differences.

Although the DID design seems to mitigate some of the drawbacks of the segmented regression and ITS designs by incorporating comparisons between an equal number of more or less equivalent locations, it has some drawbacks as well. Most important is that it focuses only on the levels of crime in limited time periods – one year before and after implementation, two years before and after, and so on. But, if the series under question are trending (decreasing or increasing over time for reasons that may have nothing to do with the GRYD program), the traditional DID analysis ignores this feature. Since, in fact, this is precisely the Los Angeles situation (as will be demonstrated in Chapter III), findings of the effectiveness of GRYD may be sensitive to this. It is therefore to be expected that different effect sizes will result from comparing a one year window around program commencement (2008 and 2009), than from comparing a two year window (2007-2008 versus 2009-2010) around the intervention period. In addition, the approach produces summary statistics that are not easily connected to the real world trends that the descriptive and predictive techniques display.

It is because of the limitations of most techniques (other than randomization) that we have decided to pursue these various approaches. The reader is cautioned that none of the designs—in and of themselves—can provide definitive answers to the question of GRYD's effectiveness. However, when considered together, they provide a more robust assessment of the effects that GRYD might have played in reducing gang violence, and help guard against drawing spurious conclusions about the program's impact.

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<sup>24</sup> Hartmann, D., Gottman, J., Jones, R., Gardner, W., Kazdin, A., and Vaught, R. 1980. "Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Its Application to Behavioral Data." *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis* 13 (4): 543-559.

<sup>25</sup> For somewhat opposing views on Difference-in-Differences, see the following two articles:  
European Commission. September 2012. "Difference-in-Differences," available through [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/sourcebooks/method\\_techniques/couterfactual\\_impact\\_evaluation/difference-in-differences/difference-in-differences\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/sourcebooks/method_techniques/couterfactual_impact_evaluation/difference-in-differences/difference-in-differences_en.htm);

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (1):249-275. Available through <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/119/1/249.abstract>.

# CHAPTER III

## GANG VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER GRYD

### III.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the empirical analysis of violent gang crime trends. It begins with an examination of trends in Los Angeles from January 2005 to December 2011. Tabular analysis is used to compare the Primary GRYD locations, Other GRYD locations, and Non-GRYD locations. Comparison locations from Los Angeles County are then introduced. Violent gang crime levels and trends in these locations are compared to the Primary GRYD locations, using tabular analysis, segmented regressions, predicted versus actual levels of violent gang crime, and difference-in-differences analysis. The chapter concludes with a summary and interpretation of the findings.

### III.2 ANNUAL TRENDS IN VIOLENT GANG CRIME IN LOS ANGELES

Table III.1 provides counts of violent gang crime in the city of Los Angeles from 2005 to 2011.

<b>Table III.1</b>							
<b>Gang Violence Incidents in Los Angeles as Percentage of City-Wide Annual Totals</b>							
<b>January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2011</b>							
<b>Year</b>	<b>City-wide</b>	<b>Primary GRYD Locations</b>		<b>Other GRYD Locations</b>		<b>Non-GRYD Locations</b>	
		<b>N</b>	<b>% of City-wide Annual Total</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>% of City-wide Annual Total</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>% of City-wide Annual Total</b>
2005	5922	2282	38.5%	1211	20.4%	2429	41.0%
2006	6720	2680	39.9%	1272	18.9%	2768	41.2%
2007	6483	2542	39.2%	1103	17.0%	2838	43.8%
2008	5862	2256	38.5%	1074	18.3%	2532	43.2%
2009	5161	2184	42.3%	892	17.3%	2085	40.4%
2010	4658	1995	42.8%	708	15.2%	1955	42.0%
2011	3987	1762	44.2%	742	18.6%	1483	37.2%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>38793</b>	<b>15701</b>	<b>40.5%</b>	<b>7002</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	<b>16090</b>	<b>41.5%</b>
Source: LAPD Computerized Crime Incident Records							
Primary GRYD locations include the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 associated SNL Areas. Other GRYD locations include the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas and 11 SNL Areas not associated with the Primary GRYD locations. Eight of these 11 are associated with Secondary Areas. Non-GRYD locations are the rest of the city.							

Annual frequencies of violent gang incidents in Primary GRYD locations, Other GRYD locations, and Non-GRYD locations are expressed as percentages of the city-wide totals for each year. For example, the 2,282 incidents that were reported in Primary GRYD locations in 2005 are 38.5 percent of

the 5,922 incidents that were reported city-wide in the same year. Incidents reported in 2005 in Other GRYD locations and Non-GRYD locations were 20.4 percent (1,211 incidents) and 41.0 percent (2,429 incidents), respectively.

The table documents a substantial reduction in the number of gang-related violent incidents from 2006 to 2011. City-wide, the total fell from 6,720 in 2006 to 3,987 in 2011. In Primary GRYD locations, the drop was from 2,680 to 1,762 during this same period of time. In Other GRYD locations, the decline was from 1,272 to 742, and in Non-GRYD locations it was from 2,768 to 1,483.

The table also shows that from 2005 to 2008, the Non-GRYD locations had greater numbers of gang violence incidents than the Primary GRYD locations, but that this relationship reversed in 2009 when the Primary GRYD locations reported 2,184 incidents and the Non-GRYD locations reported 2,085. In 2010 and 2011, this relationship persisted.

A standardized comparison of these patterns can be made from the annual percentages in the table. After holding relatively steady at around 39 percent from 2005 to 2008, the percentage of gang violence that occurred in Primary GRYD locations rose to 42.3 percent in 2009, 42.8 percent in 2010, and 44.2 percent in 2011. In the Other GRYD locations in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the three year rates were 17.3 percent, 15.2 percent, and 18.6 percent, respectively. In Non-GRYD locations during these same years, the corresponding percentages were 40.4, 42.0, and 37.2. These figures indicate that, although gang violence has been declining everywhere in the city, it has declined more slowly in the Primary GRYD locations than in other locations.

Table III.2 presents another way of looking at these patterns. The cells in the table contain the year-to-year percentage changes in gang violence incidents in Los Angeles for the four geographic groupings. The final row presents these changes by geographic grouping over the seven year (2005-2011) span of time.

Since the percentages in Table III.2 are based on the frequencies in Table III.1, they follow the patterns depicted there. Thus, year-to-year declines occurred in Primary GRYD locations in every year after the first. There were declines in the Other GRYD locations in every year except the first and last, and in Non-GRYD locations in every year except the first and second. However, the year-to-year percentage changes are not systematic across the three groupings. That is, a relatively large percentage change in one group in a given year is not necessarily accompanied by a similarly large percentage change in the other two. For example, between 2009 and 2010, gang violence incidents in Primary GRYD locations declined 8.7 percent, in Other GRYD locations declined 20.6 percent, and in the Non-GRYD locations declined 6.2 percent. But, in the following year, Primary GRYD locations experienced an 11.7 percent decline, while Other GRYD locations experienced a 4.8 percent increase and Non-GRYD locations dropped 24.1 percent.

<b>Table III.2</b>				
<b>Yearly Changes in Gang Violence Incidents in Los Angeles</b>				
<b>January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2011</b>				
<b>Years</b>	<b>City-wide</b>	<b>Primary GRYD Locations</b>	<b>Other GRYD Locations</b>	<b>Non-GRYD Locations</b>
2005-2006	+13.5%	+17.4%	+5.0%	+14.0%
2006-2007	-3.5%	-5.1%	-13.3%	+2.5%
2007-2008	-9.6%	-11.3%	-2.6%	-10.8%
2008-2009	-12.0%	-3.2%	-16.9%	-17.7%
2009-2010	-9.7%	-8.7%	-20.6%	-6.2%
2010-2011	-14.4%	-11.7%	+4.8%	-24.1%
<b>2005-2011</b>	<b>-32.7%</b>	<b>-22.8%</b>	<b>-38.7%</b>	<b>-38.9%</b>
Source: LAPD Computerized Crime Incident Records				
Primary GRYD locations include the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 associated SNL Areas.				
Other GRYD locations include the 9 GRYD Secondary Areas and 11 SNL Areas not associated with the Primary locations. Eight of these 11 are associated with GRYD's Secondary Areas.				

These variations suggest that the factors that determine the levels of gang violence in communities vary from place to place and time to time. Because of this, it seems likely that these external factors may make gang violence levels more resistant to programmatic influence, and also may make year-to-year changes in these levels an unsatisfactory indicator for assessing program impact.

When longer-term trends are considered, a more consistent picture emerges. For example, across all seven years, gang violence in the Primary GRYD locations declined much less than in either the Other GRYD locations or the Non-GRYD locations. From 2005 to 2011, gang violence in Primary GRYD locations declined 22.8 percent, compared to 38.7 percent and 38.9 percent, respectively, for the Other GRYD locations and the Non-GRYD locations.

When changes in levels of gang violence during the three years of the GRYD program are considered (not presented in the Table III.2 – see Table III.1 for the frequencies), a similar pattern is revealed. Gang violence in Primary GRYD locations declined 21.9 percent (from 2,256 incidents in 2008 to 1,762 in 2011), but Other GRYD locations declined 31.9 percent (from 1,074 to 742), and Non-GRYD locations declined 42.4 percent (from 2,532 to 1,483). However, the Primary GRYD locations did experience increasing declines each year (3.2 percent from 2008 to 2009, 8.7 percent from 2009 to 2010, and 11.7 percent from 2010 to 2011). That kind of trend did not occur in the other two groups, and may be consistent with the view that GRYD is having an additive effect, over time. Data from future years will shed light on this matter.

What these analyses of aggregate annual data have disclosed can be briefly summarized as follows: First, gang violence has declined everywhere in the city from 2006 on. Second, when 2011 levels are compared to 2006 levels, the overall declines have been most rapid in Non-GRYD locations and least rapid in Primary GRYD locations. Third, the three year trend since GRYD commenced has seen

increasing year-to-year declines in the Primary GRYD locations, but not in the Other GRYD locations or in the Non-GRYD locations. However, using the gang violence frequency data for Los Angeles alone to assess the GRYD program's effects on gang violence is problematic for the reasons we have discussed earlier in some detail – the main concern is that the Other GRYD locations and the Non-GRYD locations are not equivalent to the Primary GRYD locations with respect to gang activity generally and gang violence in particular. This makes them less than satisfactory comparison areas. To supplement the city data, we now introduce information from Los Angeles County.

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) both record criminal incidents by geographic areas known as reporting districts (RDs). There are the 174 LAPD RDs in the Primary GRYD locations. We identified the County Comparison locations by selecting 174 LASD RDs from the area of the county shown above in Figure II.2 that had the most serious gang violence levels from 2005 to 2011. The size and shape of the RDs in the two jurisdictions are not identical (LASD RDs tend to be smaller than LAPD RDs), thus making the two measures less than completely equivalent. Nevertheless the 174 LASD RDs we have selected contain 94 percent of all the gang violence that occurred in the county area shown in Chapter II's Figure II.2, and we therefore consider them to be a useful, though not perfect, comparison group.

Table III.3 contains the gang violence frequency data for the Primary GRYD locations (also presented earlier in Table III.1) and comparable data from the County Comparison area (depicted above in Chapter II, Figure II.2).

Year	Primary GRYD Locations		County Comparison Locations	
	N	% of Seven Year Total	N	% of Seven Year Total
2005	2282	14.5%	1870	15.1%
2006	2680	17.1%	2005	16.2%
2007	2542	16.2%	1951	15.8%
2008	2256	14.4%	1779	14.4%
2009	2184	13.9%	1671	13.5%
2010	1995	12.7%	1619	13.1%
2011	1762	11.2%	1449	11.7%
<b>Seven Year Totals (2005-2011)</b>	<b>15701</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>12344</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: LAPD and LASD Computerized Crime Incident Records

Primary GRYD locations include the 174 LAPD RDs in the 12 GRYD Zones and 21 associated SNL Areas. The County Comparison area is comprised of the 174 county RDs with the highest incidence of violent gang crime from among 438 southeastern County RDs adjacent to the City from 2005 through 2011.

Though the number of the Primary GRYD location incidents is greater than the number of County incidents (15,701 across all seven years compared to 12,344), it is clear that the trends in the two jurisdictions are similar. Both jump between 2005 and 2006, and then decline in each following year through 2011. As we have already noted, the Primary GRYD locations declined 22.8 percent from 2005 to 2011 (from 2,282 incidents to 1,762 incidents); the County locations declined 22.6 percent (from 1,876 incidents to 1,449 incidents). Further, the percentage of seven year gang violence that is reported in any given year is quite similar for both jurisdictions – for example, 14.5 percent for Primary GRYD locations in 2005, 15.1 percent for County locations; 14.4 percent in 2008 for the Primary GRYD group, 14.4 percent for the County; 11.2 percent for the Primary GRYD group in 2011, 11.7 percent for the County; and so on.

These observations tell us two things. First, the 174 County RDs we have selected are a reasonable comparison group to the 174 GRYD RDs. Second, the violent gang crime trends for the two jurisdictions from 2005 to 2011 are quite similar.

However, when the change from GRYD program inception through the end of 2011 is calculated, a somewhat different picture emerges. The Primary GRYD locations declined from 2,256 incidents in 2008 to 1,756 incidents in 2011, a drop of 22.2 percent. The County figures for the same periods declined from 1,779 to 1,449, a drop of 18.5 percent. Thus, during the years in which the GRYD program has operated, gang violence in Primary GRYD locations declined faster than in comparable County locations.

These relationships will be explored further at a subsequent point in this chapter. Before we present those analyses, however, we consider the suitability of the 174 County RDs as a comparison group from another standpoint.

We have already pointed out why comparisons of the Primary GRYD locations with other areas of the city are methodologically problematic. Below, in Table III.4, we present further evidence of why that is so. We also present evidence indicating why the County Comparison group, although also imperfect for a number of reasons<sup>26</sup> is a better comparison group than either the Other GRYD locations or the Non-GRYD locations. We base this conclusion on comparisons of the average number of violent gang crimes occurring each year in each of the RDs in the city and county groups.

The cell entries in Table III.4 are the frequencies of violent gang crimes each year divided by the number of RDs in the group (Primary GRYD locations = 174 RDs, Other GRYD locations = 916 RDs, Non-GRYD locations = 1,011 RDs, and Los Angeles County = 174 RDs). Thus, the 174 Primary GRYD location RDs experienced an average of 13.1 violent gang crimes in 2005; the 196 Other GRYD location RDs averaged 6.2; the Non-GRYD locations averaged 2.4; and the 174 County RDs averaged 10.7. Aggregated across all years, the averages for the Primary GRYD locations, Other GRYD locations, Non-GRYD locations, and the Los Angeles County RDs are 90.2, 35.7, 15.9, and 70.9, respectively.

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<sup>26</sup> In particular, it is not known at present the extent to which Los Angeles County may be conducting gang prevention or intervention activities in these high gang crime areas.

Year	Primary GRYD Locations (174 RDs)	Other GRYD Locations (196 RDs)	Non-GRYD Locations (1011 RDs)	Los Angeles County (174 RDs)
2005	13.1	6.2	2.4	10.7
2006	15.4	6.5	2.7	11.5
2007	14.6	5.6	2.8	11.2
2008	13.0	5.5	2.5	10.2
2009	12.6	4.6	2.0	9.6
2010	11.5	3.6	1.9	9.3
2011	10.1	3.8	1.5	8.3
<b>Seven Year Totals (2005-2011)</b>	<b>90.2</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>70.9</b>

Annually, gang violence levels are two to three times greater in Primary GRYD locations than in the Other GRYD locations, and five to six times greater than in Non-GRYD locations. This reinforces our earlier observation that neither of the Los Angeles city groups work well as comparison areas. The county averages are also not perfectly appropriate. Primary GRYD locations have roughly 25 percent more gang violence per RD than the County locations.<sup>27</sup> However, for comparative purposes, the County group is clearly better than the other Los Angeles city groups.

We move now to the more detailed analysis of monthly trends, using segmented regressions, interrupted time series forecasts, and difference-in-differences analysis to compare violent gang crime in the Primary GRYD locations to the County Comparison area.


### III.3 MONTHLY TRENDS IN VIOLENT GANG CRIME

In Figure III.1 we plot the monthly violent gang crime levels from January 2005 to December 2011 for the Primary GRYD locations and for the County Comparison area.

The trends for the GRYD locations are in red and their monthly frequency levels are denoted by the left vertical axis. Those for the county are in blue with monthly frequencies denoted by the right vertical axis. Both scales have been standardized so that each interval approximates a 10 percent change in violent crime, thus making it possible to directly compare the shapes of the two monthly trend lines.

<sup>27</sup> Note, though, that there is variation, both in the city and in the county, in the actual size of reporting districts, with the result that calculations per RD are not precisely comparable within each jurisdiction or across jurisdictions. This is an unavoidable constraint because RD size measurements were not available for this report.

**Figure III.1**  
**Gang-Related Violent Crimes – Pre/Post GRYD**  
**GRYD Primary Locations and High Crime Locations in LA County**  
**January 2005 to December 2011**



The left vertical axis represents GRYD violent gang crimes and the right vertical axis represents high crime areas in the County. Both have been standardized with each interval representing approximately a 10% change in crime.

To summarize the monthly fluctuations in violent gang crimes for the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison area, linear trends<sup>28</sup> were calculated for three time periods: January 2005 - June 2007; July 2007 - December 2008, and January 2009 - December 2011. The first segment encompasses a period when gang violence was generally rising in the city of Los Angeles. The second segment begins when gang violence began to decline and runs up to the implementation of the GRYD prevention and intervention program. The last segment is for the post-implementation period through the end of the currently available crime incident data series. The percentage changes noted on the chart indicate the change in gang violence levels that are based on the beginning and ending values of each trend line (not the beginning and ending numbers of monthly incidents). For example, the GRYD change of +24.7 percent for the leftmost trend line indicates that the end point of the GRYD trend line is

<sup>28</sup> A linear trend line (sometimes referred to as the least-squares line) is a visual representation of the relationship between two variables. For this section, it represents the association between the number of violent gang crimes per month and the number of months in a time period. It is calculated to minimize the squared distances between the actual monthly levels of crime over the period and a straight line derived from the formula  $Y = a + b(X)$ . For more information on the assumptions and mathematical calculations for least squares regression trend analysis, see Babbie, E. (2012) *The Practice of Social Research*, Stamford, CN: Cengage Learning.

24.7 percent greater than the beginning point. The same logic applies to all the percentages. Because the two axes are standardized, the city and county percentages can be directly compared.

In general terms, the two trend lines are quite similar. The County experienced monthly fluctuations and seasonal trends that, though smaller in magnitude, are mostly comparable to those for the Primary GRYD locations in seasonal timing and direction. Further, the slopes of the segmented regression lines are upwards for both in the first time period, and downward for both in the last. Had there not been the 2007 GRYD Zone spike that was more than double the level from a couple of months earlier, the middle period slopes would have been similar as well.

From 2009 to 2011, both areas demonstrated declining trends. However, the proportional decline in the GRYD Zones was higher than in the county – a drop of 29.4 percent in the Zones, compared to a 23.0 percent drop in the County.

### III.4 ACTUAL AND PROJECTED VIOLENT GANG CRIME


A common challenge in program evaluation involves accounting for temporal trends before drawing conclusions about program effects. This is particularly challenging with respect to violent gang crime in Los Angeles due to its substantial monthly fluctuations and seasonal variation. The interrupted Time-Series analysis (ITS) approach is commonly used to address this challenge. It is particularly suitable for the analysis of GRYD program effects because of the availability through LAPD records of repeated measures of the outcome variable of interest (the number of gang-related violent crimes from 2005 to 2011).

In this section, we use ITS to generate projections of the monthly levels of violent gang crime that would have occurred in Primary GRYD locations from 2009 to 2011 had the trends observed from 2005 to 2008 simply continued. These estimates are then compared to the actual levels of violent gang crime that were reported. We repeat this process for the Los Angeles County Comparison area using LASD data. We then compare the two projections.

#### III.4.1 Projections for the City of Los Angeles

The forecast versus actual results for the Primary GRYD locations are presented in Figure III.2. The solid red line in the figure maps the actual monthly levels of violent gang crime in the Primary GRYD locations. The dotted line represents the ARIMA projections. The question we seek to answer is: to what extent are the actual numbers of gang-related violent crimes different than what would be projected using ARIMA procedures? In other words, have the Primary GRYD locations fared better than projected?

**Figure III.2**  
**The Primary GRYD Locations**  
**Gang-Related Violent Crimes – Forecast vs. Actual**  
**Post-Implementation**  
**January 2009 to December 2011**




The forecast is based upon a *One-Step ARIMA* estimate of post-implementation incidents

The projections in Figure III.2 are well above the actual levels in all but 6 of the 36 months of the 2009-2011 time period. The monthly average of the actual levels (5,941 total over 36 months) was 165 violent incidents. The monthly average of the projections (totaling 6,461 across the three years) was 179. Thus the number of actual violent gang crimes per month was, on average, more than 14 less than projected. In percentage terms, there were 8 percent fewer violent gang crimes than prior experience would have predicted.

### III.4.2 Projections for Los Angeles County

In Figure III.3 we present the actual and projected levels of gang violence in the 174 Los Angeles County RDs being used as a comparison area in this analysis. The ITS methodology employed is the same as used for the city projections discussed above, and the layout of the figure is set up in the same way – solid red maps the actual monthly levels of gang violence; dotted blue maps the predicted levels of gang violence.

**Figure III.3**  
**High Violent Gang Crime Areas in Los Angeles County**  
**Gang-Related Violent Crimes – Forecast vs. Actual**  
**Post-Implementation**  
**January 2009 to December 2011**



The forecast is based upon a *One-Step ARIMA* estimate of post-implementation incidents

It is clear that, for the County, actual and predicted levels appear closer to each other than they did for the city, but it is still the case that for 17 of the 36 months, the predicted level is higher than the actual level, and, in many of the other months actual and predicted levels are quite similar. The specific numbers of incidents provide further information. Across 2005 to 2008, 7,605 violent gang crimes were reported, a monthly average of 158. From 2009 to 2011, the total was 4,739, a monthly average of 131.<sup>29</sup> The specific monthly frequency in January 2009 was 149; by December 2011 it had dropped to almost 80. The predicted total of 5,132 incidents over that period was 393 greater than the actual level (N=4,739), a 7.7 percent decline. The average monthly drop was 10.9.

### III.4.3 City-County Comparisons of Actual/Predicted Violence

The analyses of predicted and actual gang violence for the City and the County of Los Angeles disclose only small differences between the two jurisdictions. Primary GRYD location declines across the three years of GRYD's operation were 8.0 percent; County Comparison area declines in the same period were 7.7 percent. Thus, the Primary GRYD locations have experienced a modestly greater improvement in gang violence levels than the County since GRYD began operations in 2009.

<sup>29</sup> Again, see Table III.3 and Figure III.1 above for specific frequencies.

### III.5 DID ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT GANG CRIME

In this section, we use Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis to consider further the comparison between the Primary GRYD locations and the County locations.

As outlined at the start of this chapter, the DID analyses compare the 174 RDs that comprise the Primary GRYD locations with the 174 County Comparison location RDs that had the most serious levels of gang violence in 2008. The objective is to determine whether the changes from pre-intervention to post-intervention are greater for the RDs in the Primary GRYD locations than for the RDs in the County Comparison Area.

For both, there are three models:

- A One Year Model compares gang violence occurring in each jurisdiction the year before GRYD began (2008) with violence occurring during GRYD's first year (2009).
- A Two Year Model compares 2007-2008 to 2009-2010.
- A Three Year Model compares 2006-2008 to 2009-2011.

This makes it possible to consider any changes in the differences over GRYD's three year life and to also consider what progression the GRYD program has made, relative to the County, year by year, across those three years.

### III.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Results

Table III.5 contains the three model DID analysis.

<b>Table III.5</b> <b>Differences-in-Differences Analysis</b> <b>Primary GRYD Locations and County Comparison Locations</b> <b>Gang-Related Violent Crimes Pre-Post GRYD Implementation</b>				
	N of RD Data Points 1 Year	2008 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	2009 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	Pre-Post Difference
<b>1 Year Model</b>				
Primary GRYD Locations	174	13.0	12.6	-0.4
County Locations	174	10.2	9.6	-0.6
Difference		2.8	3.0	<b>0.2 (DID)</b>
	N of RD Data Points for 2 Years	2007 to 2008 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	2009 to 2010 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	Pre-Post Difference
<b>2 Year Model</b>				
Primary GRYD Locations	348	13.8	12.0	-1.8
County Locations	348	10.7	9.5	-1.3
Difference		3.1	2.6	<b>-0.5 (DID)</b>
	N of RD Data Points for 3 Years	2006 to 2008 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	2009 to 2011 Average Violent Gang Crimes Per RD Data Point	Pre-Post Difference
<b>3 Year Model</b>				
Primary GRYD Locations	522	14.3	11.4	-2.9
County Locations	522	11.0	9.1	-1.9
Difference		3.3	2.3	<b>-1.0 (DID)</b>

Averages are rounded to one decimal point. Differences are between the rounded up averages. RD Data points are 174 for Year 1 (the actual N of RDs for each jurisdiction), 374 for the Year 2 model (since we have 2 years of observations), and 522 for the Year 3 model (since we have 3 years of observations).

The table contains pre- and post-means of the annual number of violent gang crimes occurring in the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison locations for each of the three models. The entries in the cells can be interpreted as follows:

#### **Interpretation of the 1 Year Model**

In the 2008 column, 13.0 is the average number of violent gang crimes per RD data point per year in the Primary GRYD locations for the pre-GRYD one year period. This average is derived from the frequencies presented above in Table III.3 (e.g., 2,256 violent gang crimes in 2008 divided by 174 RDs). Below the GRYD average, also in the 2008 column, is the equivalent average for the County RDs: 10.2 (1,779 violent gang crimes divided by 174). In the "Differences" row, again in the 2008 column, the difference between the two means is 2.8. The 2009 column contains equivalent numbers for GRYD's first year. Averages are again derived from Table III.3. The Primary GRYD locations average is 12.6, the County Comparison locations average is 9.6, and the difference between them is 3.0.

The averages do not disclose anything we did not already know from Table III.3 – the 174 GRYD RDs had greater levels of gang violence than the 174 County RDs. The key contribution of the difference-in-differences analysis is contained in the Pre-Post Differences column. This contains the change from the first year to the second for each jurisdiction. For the GRYD locations, the difference was -0.4, indicating a decline in the level of violence. For the County locations, the difference was -0.6. The difference between these is a positive number, 0.2.

This difference indicates that from 2008 to 2009, the County Comparison locations experienced a relatively greater decline in gang violence than the Primary GRYD locations. If the difference had been zero, the experience of the two jurisdictions, relatively speaking, would have been the same. If it had been negative, the GRYD locations would have had a relatively greater decline than the County.

#### **Interpretation of the 2 Year Model**

The 2 Year Model is organized in the same way as the 1 Year Model, except that there are double the number of RD data points (348 rather than 174) since RD frequencies are derived from a two year period.

Compared to the 1 Year Model, the averages for both jurisdictions increase for the two years prior to GRYD commencement because a higher violence year (2007) is added. The averages for both fall after GRYD commencement because a lower violence year (2010) is added.

Interpretation of the model's findings again lies in the DID numbers. However, in this model, the decline for the Primary GRYD locations (-1.8) is greater than the decline for the County locations (-1.3). Consequently, the DID summary number is also negative (-0.5), and indicates that when the first two years of GRYD's operation are combined, the Primary GRYD locations experienced a relatively more rapid decline in gang violence than did the County.

### Interpretation of the 3 Year Model

The 3 Year Model is also organized like the other two models, but has 522 RD data points since it covers three years before GRYD and three years after. It continues the patterns just discussed for the 2 Year Model. Gang violence averages prior to GRYD's commencement are higher (another high violence year – 2006 – is added) and averages for the three years after GRYD commenced are lower (2011 has the lowest gang violence of all seven years for both jurisdictions so the averages have to go down).

The difference-in-differences between Primary GRYD locations and County locations is even greater than it was for the 2 Year model. The averages in GRYD locations declined by 2.9, but in the County they declined by 1.9, producing a DID of -1.0. This indicates that GRYD locations are, over the life of the GRYD program, experiencing an increasing rate of decline in gang violence, when compared to the County.

## III.6 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have utilized four different analytic approaches to assess the level and progression of gang violence in GRYD's Primary locations:

- Tabular analysis of annual frequencies for the Primary locations compared to the Other GRYD locations and Non-GRYD locations;
- Segmented regression analyses of monthly trends in gang violence in the Primary GRYD locations compared to locations in Los Angeles County;
- ITS (ARIMA) projections of expected gang violence levels from 2009 to 2011, based on 2005 to 2008 trends, with comparisons between predictions for Primary GRYD locations and for Los Angeles County Comparison locations; and
- Difference-in-Differences analyses to compare the relative pre-post gang violence changes in Primary GRYD locations to those in County Comparison locations.

All four analyses documented the general declines in gang violence that have taken place since mid-summer 2007. The tabular analysis showed that the rate of decline in GRYD's Primary locations was slower than in either Other GRYD locations or Non-GRYD locations. However, it also showed that Primary GRYD location declines were progressively greater from 2009 to 2011 (this not being the case for the other areas in the city). It was also demonstrated that Primary location declines occurred at a somewhat faster rate than in the Los Angeles County Comparison locations.

The segmented regression comparisons between GRYD and the County showed that the rate of decline in violent gang crime in the Primary GRYD locations was greater than in the County locations (down 29.4 percent in GRYD locations, compared to 23.0 percent in County locations).

The Actual-vs.-Predicted analyses showed that gang violence in the Primary GRYD locations dropped by 520 incidents over the three years of GRYD's life (a monthly average decline of 14.4). This constituted an 8 percent decrease. The comparable County decline was 7.7 percent.

The Difference-in-Differences analysis showed that in the first year of the GRYD program, the decline in violence in the Primary GRYD locations was relatively slower than in the County Comparison locations. However, when the analysis was extended to 2 years and 3 years, GRYD program declines outpaced County declines by increasing amounts over time.

#### **Interpretation of Violent Crime Findings**

Violent gang-related crime throughout the City of Los Angeles has been steadily declining since the summer of 2007. This trend is consistent with declines in violent crime experienced during the same period nationwide. Downward trends were observed in both the areas where GRYD program activities were targeted and in other areas of the City that were not targeted. This suggests that violent gang crime is being affected by not just the GRYD program, but also by unidentified social or environmental factors.

In contrast to previous evaluation findings about overall gang crime, violent gang crime declined somewhat more rapidly in Non-GRYD locations, when compared to the Primary GRYD locations. Since GRYD logically focused its programs in the areas of the City where violent gang-related crime is most concentrated, this suggests that gang violence is more intractable in those communities than elsewhere. This seems particularly plausible given the multi-generational and geographically delimited nature of Los Angeles street gangs. Moreover, because of the large differences in violent gang-related crime incidence between the two areas, and also between Primary GRYD locations and Other GRYD locations, direct comparisons are not satisfactory from an evaluation point of view.

However, when comparing the trends in violent gang crime to more similar areas in Los Angeles County, the Primary GRYD locations had modestly larger declines. Multiple measures consistently supported this finding. In the aggregate, the preponderance of the evidence from this year's evaluation supports the hypothesis that GRYD is associated with declines in gang violence consistent with the Comprehensive Strategy's goal.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS PROGRAM

### IV.1 OVERVIEW OF THE SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS PROGRAM

The Summer Night Lights (SNL) program was established by the GRYD Office in 2008.<sup>30</sup> Starting with eight parks/recreational areas in the city of Los Angeles in 2008, it added eight additional locations in 2009, ten more in 2010, and nine more in 2011. Two locations were dropped in 2010 and one was dropped in 2011, resulting in a total of 32 participating parks and recreation centers by the summer of 2011.

SNL is designed to engage all members of the community. Anyone may attend and attendance is free. SNL seeks to integrate prevention, intervention, and community engagement strategies to reduce violence through the provision of a wide variety of activities and programs in parks and recreation centers throughout the city. SNL programming is provided to local residents in the 32 SNL Areas from 7:00 p.m. until midnight, Wednesday through Saturday, from July 4<sup>th</sup> through Labor Day weekend. There are four major program components, as defined in the *Comprehensive Strategy*:

- **Extended Programming**  
Extended programming includes a variety of on-site activities such as the provision of free meals for all attendees and their families, cooking classes, athletic programming, arts programming and other skill-based programs. This aspect of SNL contributes to the primary prevention component of the overall Strategy.
- **The Youth Squad**  
The Youth Squad hires youth from the community who are thought to be at-risk for gang involvement and engaging in gang violence. Youth Squad members are then given training in five areas: career building, financial literacy, violence awareness, asset mapping, and health. This aspect of SNL directly addresses the secondary prevention portion of the Strategy.
- **The Intervention Component**  
Community Intervention Workers are hired from the community to engage in proactive peace-making activities as well as violence interruption strategies throughout the SNL program.<sup>31</sup> This aspect of SNL directly addresses the intervention portion of the Strategy.
- **The Law Enforcement Engagement Component**  
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is an active partner in the programming of SNL. Law enforcement presence at SNL sites takes the form of participation and interaction with community members in sports, cooking, and arts activities.

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<sup>30</sup> The SNL program was modeled on the "Summer of Success Baldwin Village Program," which was implemented in 2003 at Jim Gilliam Park under the direction of Guillermo Céspedes, the current Deputy Mayor and Director of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Office.

<sup>31</sup> Most Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) also provide intervention services in the GRYD Zones during the entire year, although temporary CIWs are also hired for just the SNL period.

During the 2011 Summer Night Lights program, the GRYD Office conducted on-site surveys of its program staff and of residents who attended SNL programming. The complete results of these surveys are detailed in a separate Urban Institute report.<sup>32</sup> In the first part of this chapter, we summarize the main findings of that report, concentrating on the following topics: 1) how staff and attendees view the health and well-being of their communities; 2) staff and attendees' perceptions of LAPD; 3) staff and attendees' assessments of community safety levels; and 4) staff and attendees' opinions about the Summer Night Lights program.<sup>33</sup>

## IV.2 SNL SURVEY RESULTS

The 2011 surveys were conducted with four SNL groups: Youth Squad members (N=320), Lead Community Intervention Workers (N=35) who coordinated CIW activities at each park, other Community Intervention Workers (N=141), and community residents (herein, Community Members) attending SNL (N=3,850).<sup>34</sup> The surveys of the first three groups can be considered representative of the groups since most members were surveyed. However, the community resident surveys, which were voluntary and anonymous, were obtained by GRYD staff on an ad hoc basis on the SNL area grounds. In that sense, they are a convenience sample and should not be considered statistically representative of all SNL attendees (informally estimated to have been in the hundreds of thousands over the two months of the program). There may have been inadvertent bias introduced by the fact that surveyors had to obtain agreement from respondents (the likelihood of agreement perhaps being greater among those who had strong feelings, one way or the other, about SNL). For these reasons, the analytic approach used in this report is descriptive only; the perceptions and viewpoints of the surveys completed at the end of SNL by the four groups are summarized. Despite this caveat, we consider the surveys useful to the GRYD Office as it seeks to assess SNL's value to communities and residents.

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<sup>32</sup> Hayeslip, D., Dunworth, T., and Denver, M. July 2012. "Summer Night Lights Supplemental Y3 Report." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Also available from the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development.

<sup>33</sup> For details on gang crime trends in SNL Areas separate from GRYD Zones, see Dunworth, T., Hayeslip, D., and Denver, M. July 2011. "Y2 Report: Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction Program." Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Evaluation reports are available through the Urban Institute website: <http://www.urban.org/publications/412409.html>,

<sup>34</sup> GRYD also conducted surveys at the beginning of SNL with the hope of being able to measure pre- and post-change in attitudes and opinions. This proved infeasible and so we instead concentrate here on what can be considered the 'exit' surveys. See the report cited in Footnote 4 for further details.

A summary of the information sources is provided in Table IV.1.

The data collection instruments were group specific, with some items asked of only a particular group and some items asked of each of the four groups. As a result, not all items could be compared across all groups because of the different purposes of each survey.

<b>Table IV.1 – Information Sources for SNL Perspectives</b>	
<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Who participated</b>
<b>Youth Squad Members</b>	A survey of Youth Squad members hired to facilitate SNL activities in each of 32 parks during the summer of 2011
<b>Community Intervention Workers</b>	A survey of Community Intervention Workers hired to engage gang-involved youth and to assist in peace-keeping activities as part of the SNL program in each of the 32 parks during the summer of 2011
<b>Lead Intervention Workers</b>	Interviews of the Lead Intervention Workers in each of the SNL locations during the summer of 2011
<b>Community Members</b>	A convenience sample in each SNL Area of approximately 120 residents attending SNL activities during the summer of 2011

The 32 2011 SNL parks were organized by eight regions for administrative purposes by the GRYD Office.<sup>35</sup> The numbers of survey respondents in each SNL region are listed in Table IV.2.

<b>SNL Region</b>	<b>Youth Squad</b>	<b>Other CIWs</b>	<b>Lead CIWs</b>	<b>Community Members</b>
East	40	5	4	480
Northeast	37	10	4	481
Central	29	7	3	362
Watts	31	15	4	361
South	71	18	8	842
Harbor	22	3	2	240
Valley	56	10	6	722
West	29	4	3	362
Worked in Two Regions	0	1	1	N/A
<b>Totals</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>3850</b>

<sup>35</sup> Parks/Recreational Centers in the SNL regions are: *East* (Ramon Garcia Park, Ramona Gardens Housing Development, Costello Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center); *Northeast* (Cypress Park Recreation Center, Glassell Park Recreation Center, Highland Park Recreation Center, Montecito Heights Recreation Center); *Central* (Ross Snyder Park, South Park Recreation Center, Slauson Recreation Center); *Watts* (Nickerson Gardens Housing Development, Jordan Downs Housing Development, Imperial Courts Housing Development); *South* (Algin Sutton Recreation Center, Green Meadows Recreation Center, Jim Gilliam Park, Mount Carmel Park, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center, Van Ness Recreation Center); *Harbor* (Normandale Recreation Center, Wilmington Recreation Center); *Valley* (Hubert Humphrey Park, Sepulveda Park, Valley Plaza Recreation Center, Delano Recreation Center, Sun Valley Recreation Center, Lanark Recreation Center); and *West* (Lemon Grove Park, Lafayette Recreation Center, Toberman Recreation Center).

## IV.2.1 Survey Sample Demographics

Table IV.3 presents self-reported demographic characteristics of each of the three respondent groups. CIWs were predominantly male, about 40 years old, and split more or less evenly between African American and Latino ethnicity. A slight majority of Youth Squad members were male, the average age was 18, and more than 70 percent were Latino. Community Members were split evenly by gender, averaged 24.6 years of age, and were also predominantly Latino (64.6 percent). Almost 90 percent of all three groups reported living in the community where the SNL they were attending was held.

<b>Table IV.3 – Survey Respondent Characteristics</b>			
	<b>Youth Squad</b>	<b>Other CIWs</b>	<b>Community Members</b>
Male	148 (53.2%)	61 (84.7%)	1906 (49.5%)
Female	130 (46.8%)	11 (15.3%)	1944 (50.5%)
Average Age (Years)	18.3	39.5	24.6
African American	75 (27.0%)	35 (47.9%)	1091 (28.3%)
Latino	198 (71.2%)	36 (49.3%)	2489 (64.6%)
Other Ethnicity/Race	5 (1.9%)	2 (2.7%)	244 (6.3%)
Live in SNL Community	248 (89.2%)	64 (87.7%)	3420 (88.9%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>3850</b>

With respect to levels of educational attainment, about a third (30.6 percent) of Youth Squad respondents reported that they were not currently attending school, as did slightly less than half (45.1 percent) of Community Members. Currently attending college was the highest proportional response for the Youth Squad (40.6 percent). On the other hand, attending high school was the highest for Community Members (27.4 percent). The most common reported level of educational attainment for both the Youth Squad and Community Members not currently in school was high school/GED (61.6 percent and 39.4 percent, respectively). Less than ten percent of the Youth Squad group reported having completed some college, while about 28 percent of Community Members indicated that they had completed some college or had earned college degrees.

## IV.2.2 Community Assessment

Community assessment was explored in the survey through questions regarding community relationships, relationships with the police, and perceptions of community safety.

### *Community Relationships*

A primary area of interest for the GRYD Office was to better understand respondents' perceptions about certain characteristics of their neighborhoods and the SNL parks and recreation centers.

Because surveys were slightly different for each of the four groups, not all groups responded to questions associated with each topic. In particular, Lead CIWs were not asked about community relationships or park safety, and CIWs were not asked about relationships with LAPD. Youth Squad and community attendees were asked about all three topics.

The survey staff asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statements about the neighborhood they lived in: people care about the neighborhood; people get along well; people can be trusted; neighbors care for one another; people share the same values; and racial/ethnic tensions are low.<sup>36</sup>

The majorities of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that people in their neighborhood cared about the neighborhood. However, these levels of agreement varied across the three groups for this item: 53.2 percent of Youth Squad respondents, 61.9 percent of Community Members, and 85.5 percent of CIWs.

While majorities of all three groups somewhat or strongly agreed that people in their neighborhoods generally get along with each other, only the CIW group responded with a majority indicating they somewhat or strongly agreed that people in their neighborhood could be trusted (69.6 percent) and that people in their neighborhood shared the same values (66.1 percent). None of the three respondent groups showed a majority either agreeing or disagreeing with the statement that there is a strong level of trust and credibility between the police and residents. Modest majorities for the CIW and Community Member groups responded that they somewhat or strongly agreed with the statement that tensions were low between different racial and ethnic groups in their neighborhoods (50.7 percent and 56.6 percent, respectively), although only 37.1 percent of the Youth Squad were in agreement.

### *Relationships with the Police*

Three questions on the surveys focused on relationships with LAPD: how comfortable respondents were 1) reporting a crime, 2) calling for help in an emergency, and 3) just asking for assistance.


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<sup>36</sup> These questions ask respondents to draw on experiences in their own neighborhoods, which could be different than the SNL Areas.

The Community Members' responses from each area are presented in Figure IV.1

Community Members across six different SNL regions felt most comfortable calling LAPD in the case of an emergency (more than 60 percent in 6 regions). However, their levels of agreement with how comfortable they were reporting a crime were lower: in only two of the regions (Valley and West) did a majority indicate they were comfortable doing so, and several other regions were below 40 percent. In the Central region, only a third of respondents were comfortable calling in a crime. Proportions indicating being comfortable or very comfortable were slightly higher across all eight regions for calling for assistance than calling to report a crime. Once again, respondents in the Central region appeared least comfortable, while those in the Valley region were most comfortable with calling for assistance.

Figure IV.1 – Proportion of Community Members Reporting They Are Comfortable (Or Very Comfortable) Calling LAPD



About two-thirds of the Lead CIWs indicated that they felt uncomfortable or very uncomfortable calling LAPD to report a crime (63.6 percent), compared to about one-third of the Youth Squad having the same opinion.

However, about one-half of the Youth Squad and 62.7 percent of Community Members indicated that they felt comfortable calling LAPD for help in an emergency. In addition, over two-thirds of Lead CIWs shared this level of comfort in emergencies. Only about one in five across all the groups reported that they felt uncomfortable or very uncomfortable calling LAPD for help.

When these responses are considered, it becomes clear that substantial numbers of citizens are not comfortable engaging with law enforcement in various ways. Two caveats are needed with respect to this finding. First, the community respondents cannot be assumed to be representative of the entire community (due to the convenience nature of the sample); and second there is no information at present on whether or not attitudes towards the police are changing. Future surveys will be able to repeat these questions and thus facilitate an assessment of any trends in the issue.

### *Perceptions of Community Safety*

The community assessment component also sought to understand perceptions of public safety issues in and around the SNL parks (both during the day and at night), as well as perceptions of how safe the SNL parks would be after SNL ended.

Perceptions of Daytime Safety. When the Youth Squad and Community Member groups were asked how they felt about safety *before* SNL started in the park where they were working, most (60.1 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively) said they felt safe or very safe. On the other hand, only 46.6 percent of the CIWs indicated that they felt safe in the parks during the daytime *before* SNL. Less than 15 percent of all three groups reported feeling unsafe or very unsafe during the day *before* SNL.

When asked about *current* perceptions of SNL daytime safety, the proportion of respondents feeling safe or very safe rose for Youth Squad members (to 83.4 percent), CIWs (to 82.2 percent) and Community Members (to 89.2 percent). Only 2.0 to 3.3 percent of each group reported feeling currently unsafe or very unsafe.

The perceptions of how safe the parks would be during the day *after* SNL ended were lower across all three groups, although the majorities of the three groups still thought it would be safe or very safe in the future.

Perceptions of Nighttime Safety. Less than half of two respondent groups reported that they felt safe or very safe at the park at night *before* SNL started (41.7 percent of the Youth Squad group, and 42.6 percent of the CIW group), while 50.6 percent of Community Members reported feeling safe. About 30 percent of the Youth Squad and slightly less than 30 percent of the other two groups indicated that they felt unsafe or very unsafe at the park at night *before* SNL started.

Perceptions about park safety at night also jumped markedly for all three groups when asked about their views while at SNL (which runs from 7 p.m. until midnight). The proportion of Youth Squad members indicating they felt safe or very safe jumped to 70.9 percent. The percentage of CIWs who felt safe or very safe rose to 72.0 percent, and among Community Members, this rose to 83.6 percent. While all three groups did report feeling less safe at night than during the day, at the end of SNL these opinions were expressed by only 7.6 percent of the Youth Squad, 5.8 percent of the CIWs, and 4.7 percent of Community Members.

Just over half of each of the three respondent groups indicated that that they felt the park would be safe or very safe at night *after* SNL ended. Approximately 52 percent of members of the Youth Squad suggested that it would be safe or very safe in the future (down about 20 percent from feelings during SNL but about 10 percent higher than *before* SNL). Fifty-five percent of CIWs felt the park would be safe or very safe in the future (down 17 percent from *current* but about 13 percent higher than *before* SNL). Nearly 54 percent of Community Members said the park would be safe or very safe in the future (down almost 30 percent from *current* and about 3 percent higher than views of safety *before* SNL).

Perceptions of Safety Across SNL Regions. As shown in Figure IV.2, similar patterns of perceptions of park safety were seen across the eight SNL regions. More participants indicated they felt safe or very safe *during* SNL than *before* SNL, but perceptions of safety declined for the *future*. The lowest proportions of pre-SNL nighttime feelings of safety were expressed in the Harbor and West Regions, while the highest daytime feelings of safety before SNL were in Northeast and Watts. The highest current safety levels were registered in the Valley Region (daytime), East (daytime) and Northeast (daytime). Future safety predictions were lowest in the Harbor Region (nighttime) and Valley Region (nighttime).

**Figure IV.2 – Proportion of Community Members Reporting Feeling Safe (or Very Safe) in Their Park Before SNL, During SNL and in the Future by SNL Region**





Figure IV.2 (cont.) – Proportion of Community Members Reporting Feeling Safe (or Very Safe) in Their Park Before SNL, During SNL and in the Future by SNL Region



Perceptions of Biggest Park Safety Issues. Youth Squad, CIWs and Community Members were all also asked to indicate which items in a list of safety issues were the most pressing at the time they were surveyed near the end of SNL programming. Respondents could select any number of issues. Views of the three groups regarding the most serious safety issues varied, as can be seen in Table IV.4. Drinking/Alcohol, Drug Use, Fights and Shootings were prioritized in that order by the majority of Youth Squad members. On the other hand, only Drinking/Alcohol was cited as the biggest safety issue by a majority (68.1 percent) of CIWs. None of the seven issues received a majority of responses from Community Members, although Fights and Drug Use received the most responses (39.3 percent and 38.3 percent, respectively). It should also be noted that Gang Intimidation was not highly rated by any of the groups as being the biggest safety issue in and around the park at the time of the surveys.

<b>Table IV.4 What Do You Think Are Some of the Biggest Safety Issues In and Around Your Park?</b>			
	<b>Youth Squad</b>	<b>Other CIWs</b>	<b>Community Members</b>
Shootings	126 (54.7%)	30 (43.5%)	1260 (32.7%)
Drug use	186 (66.9%)	32 (13.0%)	1476 (38.3%)
Drug sales	136 (48.9%)	17 (24.6%)	1021 (26.5%)
Fights	173 (62.2%)	30 (43.5%)	1513 (39.3%)
Assaults	85 (30.6%)	9 (12.3%)	707 (18.4%)
Drinking/alcohol	187 (67.3%)	47 (68.1%)	1229 (31.9%)
Gang intimidation	125 (45.0%)	20 (29.0%)	1136 (29.5%)

In summary:

- 1) Most Youth Squad, CIWs, and Community Members felt at the time they were surveyed that people cared for their neighborhoods, got along with one another, and that racial and ethnic tensions were low. There was some disagreement about whether other residents in the respondents' neighborhood shared the same values, could be trusted, or trusted law enforcement.
- 2) Most respondents felt comfortable calling the police in emergencies but less so to report a crime.
- 3) Most respondents reported that they considered the local parks to be relatively safe before SNL. Perceptions of safety rose markedly when asked about the safety during SNL, and then declined somewhat when looking ahead, though not to pre-SNL perception levels.

### IV.2.3 The SNL Experience

The second main topic the SNL survey explored with attendees was their participation in SNL activities and how satisfied they were with these activities. While most questions were put to Community Members, Youth Squad members were asked about frequency of park use before SNL as well. CIWs and Community Members were all asked about the amount of time they spent with people in different age groups. This item is important since it seeks to measure the extent to which different groups were responding to the overall objective of GRYD programs to foster relationships across the entire family life cycle.

#### *Participation in SNL Park Activities*

There were five questions on the Community Member surveys that addressed participation in park and SNL programs, one of which was also included on the Youth Squad surveys. These questions asked about how frequently attendees came to the parks before SNL was implemented, how Community Members learned about and got involved in SNL, how frequently attendees came to the parks during SNL, in which specific programs attendees participated, and how much time the different groups spent with others across different age groups.

Youth Squad and Community Members both reported that they frequented their local SNL parks relatively often before SNL was implemented. About one-third of the Youth Squads and over 40 percent of Community Members reported that they came to the parks either daily or four to five times per week before SNL. Majorities of both groups indicated that they frequented the parks at least twice a week, while only 16.8 percent of the Youth Squads and 14.3 percent of Community Members reported that they had never come to the park before SNL.

Community Members responded that they heard about or got involved in SNL through a variety of ways, as shown in Table IV.5. The largest proportion (24.9 percent) said that they heard about SNL through a friend. Between 10 and 17 percent of respondents indicated that they learned about or got involved in SNL because of a program flyer, from recreation/park staff, through a family member or because the respondent participated last year. Very few reported learning about SNL from the police, through faith-based organizations, or through other community organizations.

<b>Table IV.5 – How Did You Get Involved or Hear About the SNL Program?</b>	
	<b>Community Members</b>
Recreation/park staff	455 (11.8%)
Police	16 (.4%)
Family member	512 (13.3%)
Participated last year	438 (11.4%)
Faith-based organization	30 (.8%)
Neighbor	148 (3.8%)
Friend	958 (24.9%)
Community organization	66 (1.7%)
Youth squad member	162 (4.2%)
Flyer	421 (10.9%)
Other	643 (16.7%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>3849</b>

About 45 percent of Community Members reported that they attended SNL daily during the two months, compared to 30 percent who came to the park daily before SNL. A similar proportion said they participated in SNL at least twice a week, which was an increase of almost 20 percent over such attendance prior to SNL.

Community Members were also asked about their participation in 11 specific SNL activities. The largest majority (83.5 percent) indicated that they had consumed free meals. Sports activities were the next most common: 68.6 percent indicating that they engaged in sports league activities and 58.5 percent said they were involved in non-league sports. A slight majority stated that they participated in music (57.5 percent) and arts (55.8 percent) activities. Dance, crafts and theatre were engaged in by slightly less than half of attendees, while educational, writing and history/cultural programs were attended by substantially fewer SNL participants.

As can be seen in Figure IV.3, there was substantial variation in activity participation across the eight SNL regions. While large majorities took advantage of the free meals in all the regions, a lower proportion did so in Watts. League sports participation was highest in Watts and lowest in the Valley region, as was non-league sports participation. Music participation was highest in Central and Watts, but lowest in Northeast. Arts and crafts participation was similar across most regions with the exception of lower participation in Northeast, Valley and West. Writing was most popular in Watts and least popular in Valley and West, as were history and theatre activities.

**Figure IV.3 - Percentage of Residents Reporting They Participated in Activities by Region**





Figure IV.3 (cont.) - Percentage of Residents Reporting They Participated in Activities by Region



One of the GRYD program's family life-cycle objectives is to increase inter-generational engagement and the survey explored this issue. Self-reports of the amount of time that different groups spent with friends, family, neighbors, and others across age categories varied, and correlated with respondent ages; people seemed more likely to spend the most time with others of similar age. Youth Squad members indicated that they spent most of their time with others from 13 to 18 years of age. Youth Squad members also reported spending time with the 19 to 29 year-old group, and only 18 percent reported spending a lot of time with those over 50 years of age. On the other hand, large proportions of CIWs indicated that they often spent time (or spent all of the time) with all age groups. Fifty-six to 66 percent of Community Members indicated that they spent a lot of time with each of the age groups under 30 years of age, and 41 percent said they often spent time (or spent all of the time) with 30 to 49 year olds. Only 26.8 percent responded similarly for the over 50 years old age group.

### *Program Satisfaction*

Large majorities of both Youth Squad and Community Members responded that they felt comfortable (or very comfortable) coming to their SNL park (75.9 percent and 80.2 percent, respectively) and participating in park activities (78 percent and 79 percent, respectively).

Among Community Members who said they participated in SNL activities, the sports league program had the largest proportion who somewhat liked or liked any activity a lot (93.0 percent). The

next highest rated activities were music (86.9 percent) and non-league sports (86.1 percent). With the exception of writing and history/cultural activities, all of the remaining SNL activities garnered positive responses from at least 80 percent of respondents. However, even writing and history, while the lowest, still had 74.2 percent and 77 percent of Community Members indicating that they somewhat liked or liked these activities a lot. Regarding levels of satisfaction with the SNL activities overall, 93 percent responded that they were somewhat or very satisfied, and almost 94 percent of the Community Members surveyed responded that they were either somewhat or very satisfied with the SNL staff. Satisfaction with the overall SNL experience received the highest positive reaction, with 94.1 percent of Community Members responding they were somewhat or very satisfied.

In summary:

- 1) Most respondents reported that they came to their local park/recreation center relatively often before SNL. Respondents' use of the parks/centers increased substantially while SNL was in operation.
- 2) Community Members learned about SNL through a variety of means; the most commonly cited method was hearing about SNL from a friend.
- 3) The most popular SNL activity was the free meals, followed by sports.
- 4) CIWs reported spending time at SNL events with friends, family and others across different age groups more so than other respondent groups did.
- 5) Most Youth Squad and Community Members were comfortable coming to the parks during SNL and participating in SNL activities.
- 6) Those who said they participated in a variety of SNL activities were overwhelmingly positive about such activities. About three-quarters of Community Members reported being very satisfied with SNL, SNL staff, and SNL activities.

#### **IV.2.4 Communication and 2011 SNL Effectiveness**

The final survey topic explored CIW views on working relationships and program effectiveness. This included the nature and effectiveness of relationships between CIWs and other stakeholders, including LAPD, GRYD staff, Youth Squad Supervisors, Community Outreach Supervisors, the Leads of the Youth Squads, and staff members from the Department of Recreation and Parks.

##### ***Effectiveness of Communication***

About two-thirds (68.1 percent) of the CIWs responded that they felt that communication with the LAPD was effective or somewhat effective, and only 8.7 percent indicated that it was somewhat or very ineffective. Lead CIWs were just as positive about the effectiveness of LAPD communication, with 68.6 percent responding that this communication was very or somewhat effective, and only a single Lead CIW indicating that it was somewhat ineffective.

CIWs and Lead CIWs were even more affirmative about communication with the GRYD Office staff. All of the Lead CIWs rated GRYD staff communications as effective. Nearly all CIWs (92.8 percent) agreed.

Communication with Youth Squad Supervisors was also highly rated by both CIWs (95.6 percent) and Lead CIWs (97.2 percent). In addition, large majorities of both the CIWs (88.2 percent) and Lead

CIWs (97.2 percent) also felt that communications with Community Outreach Supervisors were effective.

A large majority of Lead CIWs (86.8 percent) said that communication was somewhat or very effective with the staff at the Department of Recreation and Parks.

### *Perceptions of SNL Effectiveness*

CIWs and Lead CIWs were asked about the ease of implementing SNL and their views on the overall effectiveness of the program. Nearly the same proportions of respondents from both the CIW and Lead CIW groups (84.1 percent and 85.7 percent, respectively) indicated that they felt the intervention component of SNL was easy to implement in their parks during the summer of 2011. Although some obstacles were mentioned (ranging from concerns about other stakeholders' practices to lighting and equipment problems), all were reported as having been overcome.

The vast majority of Lead CIWs (94.3 percent) also reported that they felt that the SNL program successfully engaged gang-involved youth and adults. In addition, they all reported that they saw the SNL experience as providing opportunities for multigenerational family time together. Lead CIWs noted that they observed many families coming to the park together and participating in sports and other activities. They also noted that some families reported that they would not normally come to the park but felt safe doing so during SNL.

A large majority (88.6 percent) of the Lead CIWs indicated that they thought that community intervention work during SNL in 2011 was responsible for reductions in violence. Common reasons cited by the Lead CIWs were that the park activities gave people a safe haven during the summer and that youth were engaged in activities in the evenings instead of just congregating and getting into trouble. Several also pointed to SNL's success in building relationships and understanding other members of the community.

Furthermore, all of the Lead CIWs reported that the intervention component was effective during the summer of 2011. Most CIWs (92.7 percent) shared this positive view. Getting to know people, building relationships, and being able to effectively communicate with both gangs and members of the community were commonly cited as illustrations of intervention effectiveness.

In summary:

- 1) CIWs and Lead CIWs expressed overwhelmingly positive views about effective communication with most other SNL stakeholder organizations, such as the Youth Squads and Community Outreach Supervisors. However, less than half of the CIW respondents reported effective communication with LAPD.
- 2) CIWs reported that implementation of intervention programs during SNL was relatively easy and that they were able to overcome initial obstacles.
- 3) Overall, SNL intervention activities were viewed as effective by CIWs.

### **IV.3 CONCLUSIONS**

The evidence from the analysis of the surveys of Youth Squad members, CIWs, and Community Members suggests that community relationships were positive, the community was satisfied with their SNL experiences, program stakeholder communications were generally effective, and intervention programs in particular were viewed as having positive effects.

# CHAPTER V PREVENTION

## V.1 INTRODUCTION

Two central components of the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* are primary and secondary prevention. Primary prevention is oriented toward communities, and in particular, this component seeks to provide activities and services that are designed to build community-level resistance to gang joining and gang violence. Whereas primary prevention activities are intended to target the entire community, and efforts are made to include residents of all ages, the secondary prevention component focuses more on individual youth and families, with an emphasis on services and programming for youth 10-15 years of age who are at-risk for joining gangs and not yet gang members.

The GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* includes four programs as part of the primary prevention component:<sup>37</sup> Gun Buy-Back; the GRYD Cabinet; Community Action Teams; and the Community Education Campaign. This chapter provides an overview of the objectives and recent activities of the Gun Buy-Back program and the Community Education Campaign. Findings are drawn from two main sources: surveys of participants from the 2012 Gun Buy-Back program and surveys from those who attended Community Education Campaign presentations. Though some preparatory activities and limited programming were undertaken by the GRYD Cabinet and the Community Action Teams, neither had developed to the point where evaluation of the activities would be meaningful. Therefore, these components were excluded from this Year 3 report.

The remaining sections of the chapter describe and analyze the activities associated with the secondary prevention component. First, the numbers of different types of community referrals of at-risk youth to the GRYD program are considered. Next, the University of Southern California's Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), used by GRYD to identify youth whose attitudes and behavior are considered to make them at-risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal or delinquent behavior, is reviewed. The results of that process are then presented. Finally, an analysis is made of the effects of the GRYD program on the Eligible youth who received services. Comparisons are made: (1) between the initial YSET scores and retest YSET scores for youth enrolled in programming (referred to throughout this chapter as Enrolled youth); and (2) between the attitudinal and behavioral changes observed for Enrolled youth and those observed for a sample of youth found to be ineligible for services based on the initial YSET assessment (referred to throughout this chapter as Not-Eligible youth). In the last part of the chapter, conclusions are presented about the potential impacts of the GRYD program's prevention component.

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<sup>37</sup> Op. cit.

## V.2 PRIMARY PREVENTION

### V.2.1 The Gun Buy-Back Program

The Gun Buy-Back (GBB) program began in 2009 and has continued in all subsequent years since then. On Mother's Day each year, the program provides Los Angeles residents with the opportunity to anonymously turn in firearms to the police. In return, participants receive up to \$100 gift cards for handguns, shotguns, and rifles, and up to \$200 gift cards for assault weapons. GRYD Office staff partner with LAPD to operate six drop-off locations throughout the city. GRYD prevention and intervention agencies also partner with the GRYD Office and LAPD to staff the locations. Police check the guns that are turned in to determine whether they are operational or not, and the value of gift cards is reduced if they are not.

The local media outlet KCBS/KCAL 9 is a program sponsor and, prior to the start of each year's GBB program, the station features nightly media segments that examine the effects of gang and gun violence in Los Angeles. These annual events mark the beginning of the GRYD summer violence reduction effort and serve as a precursor event to the Summer Night Lights (SNL) program.<sup>38</sup>

On May 14, 2012, the Los Angeles Mayor's GBB press release reported that 1,673 firearms – 791 handguns, 527 rifles, 302 shotguns and 53 assault weapons – were turned in across six GBB locations at the 2012 event, with a total of 7,942 firearms collected through the initiative during the four years of its operation.<sup>39</sup> A reasonable presumption is that most, if not all, of the firearms turned in were illegally owned (that is, not the possessions of owners with licenses to carry and/or own them).

At the 2012 GBB locations, GRYD staff gave drive-up participants a survey focusing on their experience with the GBB program. The survey could be completed anonymously, either while in line or later. There were 732 respondents. Seventy percent were male and the majority was 50 years of age or older (62 percent). Thirty-two percent were 30-49 years old, 5 percent were 19-29 years old, and 1 percent was 13-18 years old.

The GRYD Office reports that most respondents expressed positive views of the program – which was to be expected given that respondents had voluntarily brought guns to turn in, and that the survey, like the program itself, was anonymous and optional. Most participants (84 percent) said they learned about the program from the local media and felt that the community would be safer because of the event (91 percent). In addition, 95 percent felt “very comfortable” or “somewhat comfortable” participating in the event and 94 percent felt that it was “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to participate.

GBB programs generally have two objectives: to reduce gun violence by taking guns off the street, and to increase public awareness of gun violence, with the hope that increased awareness will

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<sup>38</sup> The Summer Night Lights program is discussed above in Chapter IV.

<sup>39</sup> [http://mayor.lacity.org/PressRoom/LACITYP\\_020391](http://mayor.lacity.org/PressRoom/LACITYP_020391)

influence gun use. We have no data other than the survey that permits evaluation of the effectiveness of the GBB.<sup>40</sup>

## V.2.2 Community Education Campaign

Under the secondary prevention component (discussed in more detail below), the GRYD program offers gang prevention services, provided by GRYD-funded agencies in each zone, to youth, and their families, that are determined to be at-risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal/delinquent activity. This component is dependent upon referrals from schools, other agencies, and the community at large. To increase community awareness of the GRYD program and to encourage referrals to secondary prevention services, the GRYD Office has operated a Community Education Campaign (CEC).

The CEC targets community members (typically parents) and school professionals and staff at elementary, middle and high schools in and around the GRYD Zones. Through school-based forums, GRYD staff present information to the community and schools to increase knowledge and awareness of gang risk factors and gang-joining. School staff and community members are urged to refer youth they believe to be at-risk for gang-joining to their local gang prevention provider, and referral forms to do so are distributed during these community education forums. The referral process is voluntary and not under the direct control of the GRYD program.

The GRYD Office launched the Community Education Campaign at the beginning of the 2010-2011 fiscal year, and made 44 presentations about the GRYD program at schools in and around GRYD Zones. In the 2011-2012 school year, 56 additional schools were identified for CEC presentations to community members and staff. Fifteen presentations were made to community members, and eight presentations were made to school staff. Campaign materials were distributed at 49 of the 56 schools. However, the GRYD Office reported that the remaining planned presentations at these schools have not taken place because the schools were unresponsive, declined an invitation from the GRYD program to participate in CEC presentations, or cancelled presentations after they were scheduled.

Following the Community Education Campaign presentations given in January through April 2012, GRYD staff conducted surveys with participants in both the teacher and community member forums to gather information regarding their experiences with the CEC presentation they attended and participants' knowledge and utilization of GRYD services within their communities. Ninety-seven presentation attendees responded to the survey – 14 teachers, 72 parents, 2 school personnel, 2 students, and 1 grandparent. Six respondents did not specify their identity.<sup>41</sup>

Results from the survey indicated that a large majority of attendees understood the role of the GRYD program in their communities following the Community Education Campaign presentations. Ninety-four percent of presentation participants "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that they understood the

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<sup>40</sup> For assessments of GBB programs generally, see BJA JRSA Evaluation News, April/May 2010, accessible at <http://www.bja.gov/evaluation/e-news/apr-may10.pdf>.

<sup>41</sup> 13 of the surveyed teachers and 1 respondent who did not specify identity attended a staff presentation; 1 teacher, 72 parents, 2 school personnel, 2 students, 1 grandparent, and 5 survey respondents who did not specify identity attended community member presentations.

role GRYD plays in reducing gang violence in their communities *after* attending the presentation. Ninety-five percent expressed that they “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they understood the types of services that GRYD funds to *prevent* youth at-risk from joining gangs in their communities. And, ninety-four percent of participants indicated that they “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they understood the types of services GRYD funds to help young people in gangs *reduce their involvement* in gang violence. Ninety-five percent of program participants also indicated that they understood how GRYD is helping community leaders and residents reduce gang violence.

Following the presentation, the majority of attendees responded positively about their own ability to assess youth risk and their knowledge of GRYD’s referral system. Eighty-seven percent of survey respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they felt confident that they could identify risk factors for gang membership among youth between the ages of 10 to 15. In addition, 89 percent of the participants reported that they now knew how to make a referral to an agency providing GRYD prevention services.

CEC attendees were also asked to consider the frequency with which they made referrals to GRYD services prior to attending the presentation, and how often they anticipated making referrals following their attendance at the CEC presentation. Forty-six percent of survey respondents indicated that they had “never” or “rarely” referred a youth to GRYD services, while only 24 percent responded that they referred youth to GRYD services “often” or “all the time.” When then asked how often participants thought they would refer youth to GRYD services following the presentation, more than half of the participants (63 percent) indicated that they would refer youth to GRYD services “often” or “all the time,” and only a small number of respondents (7 percent) indicated that they anticipated referring youth to GRYD services “never” or “rarely” following their attendance at the presentation.<sup>42</sup> Most striking are the number of “never” responses before and after the presentations. While 43 percent of respondents indicated that they never made referrals to GRYD services prior to attending the CEC presentation, only 2 percent of survey respondents reported that they believed they would never refer youth to GRYD services following the presentation.

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<sup>42</sup> “Sometimes” responses and missing data account for the remaining percentage of participant responses to both the pre-CEC presentation and post-CEC presentation referral questions.

## V.3 SECONDARY PREVENTION

### V.3.1 Introduction

As mentioned above, the secondary prevention component of the GRYD program provides services to youth who are considered at-risk of joining gangs and engaging in criminal/delinquent behavior. During the third year of the program, GRYD adopted a new family services orientation to prevention. In order to guide the implementation of GRYD services, the GRYD Office defined a "GRYD Gang Prevention Model of Practice" in its *Comprehensive Strategy*. The Model utilizes both a vertical strategy of multi-generational coaching and a horizontal strategy of problem-solving techniques to guide activities at each of seven stages of a six-month programming cycle. The vertical strategy emphasizes individual development, family engagement, and family resiliency; whereas, the horizontal strategy is intended to cultivate problem-solving interventions that are specific to the youth's household situation and broader social context.

Beginning on September 1, 2011, all youth enrolled in the GRYD program, including those that were previously enrolled and new youth enrolled moving forward, were assigned to one of two groups: the GRYD Model Group, guided by the principles stated in GRYD's Model of Practice; or the Traditional Programming Group, for which standard counseling approaches are continued. To accomplish this, providers were given the discretion to select up to 100 youth enrolled prior to September 1, 2011 for the Model Group, based on the provider's assessment of youth need. Subsequently, to facilitate future evaluation, all new clients enrolled on or after September 1 were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. For additional information on the random assignment process, see Appendix B.

All youth, regardless of Model Group or Traditional Group program assignment, are provided services in six-month cycles. Cycles are broken into monthly service phases. Each phase is considered complete once a youth has finished all required activities for the specific phase. While both the Model Group and Traditional Programming Group contain an assessment and reassessment period, the specific activities required for each programming group differ in both the number and type of services.

Training for GRYD staff and providers regarding the Model Group and Traditional Group programming commenced during the third year of the program. While the Model Group and Traditional Group programming framework has been implemented, data on services provided and youth outcomes based on program type have not yet been developed, and thus analysis of change in attitudes and behaviors between the two programming groups is not yet possible.

The following sections of this chapter provide a review and analysis of GRYD's secondary prevention program. We first offer a description of the referral process and the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET), which is used to determine whether referred youth are eligible for program services. We then consider the results of the referral process, and provide summary information on the types and numbers of referrals received by the GRYD program since its inception in 2009 through mid-June 2012. We then describe the retest process, through which enrolled youth take another YSET interview to assess their progress in the program. Using data collected through the retesting process, the difference

in risk-level and behavioral change between samples of Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth are described. Then, a regression discontinuity analysis is used to assess the impacts of the GRYD program on the observed changes.

### V.3.2 The Referral Process

Since the inception of the GRYD program in 2009, youth between the ages of 10-15 who are perceived to be at-risk for gang involvement were referred to the GRYD program's prevention service providers in each GRYD Zone by schools, law enforcement agencies, social service agencies, and parents.<sup>43</sup> Potential referral sources have been made aware of the GRYD program through publicity, the Community Education Campaign, and new or pre-GRYD relationships established by GRYD's service providers. There are also a few instances of youth self-referring by contacting service providers directly.

#### *Deciding Eligibility for Services: The Youth Services Eligibility Tool*

Referred youth are all believed to be in need of help by those making the referrals. However, GRYD program resources are finite and a program decision was made at the outset that services could only be offered to those youth who are at highest risk of joining a gang and engaging in criminal or delinquent behavior. To make this determination, GRYD gang prevention agencies in each of the 12 zones interview referred youth and administer the YSET

During the introductory interview with each youth, the GRYD service provider administers the YSET by asking a series of questions about their attitudes and self-reported delinquent behavior.<sup>44</sup> Specifically, the YSET utilizes nine measurement scales: seven are attitudinal and two are behavioral. The scales, the number of items in each scale, and the range of possible responses to the items in a scale are presented in Table V.1.

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<sup>43</sup> Referrals are made to four non-GRYD Zones as well as to the 12 GRYD Zones. Since the evaluation focuses on the GRYD Zones only, the Non-GRYD Zone referrals (about 1,300 over the life of the GRYD program) are not included in the analyses presented in this report.

<sup>44</sup> There have been some adjustments to the factors and the items in the YSET since the program commenced, but the general principles and structure of the risk measurement approach have been consistent.

Table V.1 Structure of the YSET Risk Scales					
Risk Scales		Scale Structure			
		Number of Scored Items on Each Scale	Range of Responses	Maximum Possible Risk Score	Risk Threshold Score if 12 Yrs Old or Younger
A	Anti-Social/Pro-Social Tendencies	6	1 - 5	30	16
B	Parental Supervision	3	1 - 5	15	7
C	Critical Life Events	7	0 - 1	7	4
DE	Impulsive Risk Taking	4	1 - 5	20	14
F	Neutralization	6	1 - 5	30	19
G	Negative/Positive Peer Influence	3	1 - 5	15	10
H	Peer Delinquency	6	1 - 5	30	12
IJ	Self-Reported Delinquency or Substance Abuse	17	0 - 1	17	4
T	Family Gang Influence	2	0 - 2 <sup>45</sup>	2	2

Most scales consist of questions with five response options for each question, rank ordered from low to high risk. A value of 1 is assigned to the lowest risk response and a value of 5 is assigned to the highest risk response. To obtain a score for a respondent on any scale, the responses to the items on that scale are summed. The result is then compared to the risk threshold USC has established for the scale to determine if the youth is at-risk with respect to that scale. On Scale A for instance, which has a maximum possible risk score of 30 (6 items, with 5 being the highest risk response on each item), a youth between the ages of 10-12 is considered at-risk with a score of 16 or more. The same approach is used on each scale that has items with a risk range of 1-5 (Scales B, DE, F, G, and H). Thus, the score for each youth on each item is calculated by assigning 1 to the lowest risk response for a single item within a risk scale (e.g., "Strongly Agree" on such items as "I do as I am told") and 5 to the highest risk response (e.g., "Strongly Agree" on such items as "I take things that are not mine from home, school, or elsewhere").

For scales that have questions with Yes/No responses, the range is 0 (no) to 1 (yes). This produces a lower maximum risk score but the logic behind making the decision on the level of risk is the same. On Scale C, Critical Life Events, for instance, a score of 4 puts a 12-year-old above the at-risk threshold. There are modest upward adjustments in the risk threshold for older youth (13 - 15 years of age) on some of the scales. However, the same decision rules are applied. A youth is deemed Eligible or

<sup>45</sup> The two items in this scale are open-ended quantitative questions; however, the scoring structure assigns zero, one, or two points for this scale overall, based on responses to the two items.

Not-Eligible for GRYD services based on the number of scales for which the youth has scores above the at-risk threshold. A youth who is at-risk on four or more scales is deemed Eligible to enroll in the program and receive GRYD services.

To arrive at this decision for each youth who completes the YSET interview, the provider agency sends the responses given by the youth to a USC team for scoring. The USC team calculates the scores, makes the eligibility determination, and returns the information to the originating provider agency using a feedback report that identifies for each scale whether the youth is above or below the at-risk threshold.<sup>46</sup> The provider may challenge the USC decision and submit evidence supporting the challenge to the GRYD Prevention Review Committee. The Committee has the authority to change the eligibility classification made by USC. This has resulted in some youth being offered services even though their YSET results were below the risk threshold. The provider then seeks to enroll Eligible youth in the GRYD prevention program, develops a case plan for those who do enroll, and begins service delivery.<sup>47</sup> Based on GRYD Office policy, a youth may be enrolled in the program for up to two retest cycles (one year), and possibly longer if the periodic youth reassessment that the provider conducts provides evidence of a necessary extension. The reassessment form includes changes among the youth's YSETs, other indicators of improvement, such as provider staff assessments of progress, and family assets and strengths. Several indicators in each category are summed, and this raw number is used to determine whether the client is ready to graduate, should continue services, or if the case needs to be further reviewed by the GRYD Office.

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<sup>46</sup> Youth who are already gang members are considered Not-Eligible for prevention services and are referred to GRYD's intervention program. However, in certain situations, youth in gangs are approved for prevention services due to unique circumstances that make them more suitable for prevention versus intervention programs.

<sup>47</sup> The YSET component of the retest process is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

### *Results of the Referral Process: 2009-2012*

The Eligible and Not-Eligible decisions for the youth referred to the GRYD program between its commencement in 2009 and mid-June 2012 are presented in Table V.2.<sup>48</sup>

Time Periods	Eligible		Not-Eligible		All cases
	Total (N)	%	Total (N)	%	Overall Total (N)
Start of program through June 2009	615	45.3%	744	54.7%	1,359
July 2009 through June 2010	1,700	61.6%	1,059	38.4%	2,759
July 2010 through June 2011	921	67.5%	443	32.5%	1,364
July 2011 through mid-June 2012	604	66.5%	304	33.5%	908
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3,840</b>	<b>60.1%</b>	<b>2,550</b>	<b>39.9%</b>	<b>6,390</b>

Referrals to the prevention program were modest in the first few months of 2009 but had picked up very rapidly by the end of June 2009, resulting in more than 1,300 new cases for YSET screening by that time. Approximately 45 percent of those cases were found eligible. Referrals more than doubled over the next year (N=2,759), with 62 percent determined to be eligible, bringing the cumulative total of youth referrals to more than 4,000 since the program's inception. In July 2010 through June 2011, there were far fewer referrals (N=1,364), with a slightly higher group of eligible youth (68 percent), but a referral rate similar to what was experienced in the first few months of the program. In the most recent year, there were 908 referrals, with 67 percent of these cases being eligible.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, the Table V.2 data indicate that the volume of referrals to the program has been declining as the program has matured (from 2,759 in the 12 months from July 2009 to June 2010 to 908 in the 11 ½ months from July 2011 to mid-June 2012). The proportion of referrals judged eligible appears to have stabilized at about two thirds.

The reasons for this decline in referrals are not clear. It is possible that participating referral sources have declining numbers of youth, not already referred, that they consider at-risk. It is also

<sup>48</sup> Some youth referred to the GRYD prevention program are already in gangs, or for other reasons are considered unsuitable for the prevention approach. Such youth are generally transferred to the intervention services component (discussed below in Chapter VI).

<sup>49</sup> Full referral data for the month of June 2012 were not available for the Year 3 evaluation report. However, it seems highly probable that the full 12 month total, when available, will be less than the prior year.

possible that as service providers have become more familiar with the YSET eligibility instrument, they have become better at identifying the type of youth who will score above the at-risk cut-point, and so do not accept or test referrals they think will fall below it. It has not been possible, to this point, to obtain the kinds of data that would support assessment of these possibilities.

After an eligibility determination is made, providers must then complete the enrollment process for the youth before services can be given. This involves obtaining an informed consent for the youth to participate from both the youth and the parents or guardians and making arrangements for youth to attend prevention programming at the provider's facilities. The youth or the youth's family may decline at that point, for any reason, and this results in drop-outs by some eligible youth. Consequently, the number of Enrolled youth will generally be less than the number of Eligible youth. At present, information systems documenting enrollment have not reached the stage where reliable measures of enrollment levels can be calculated. It is expected that this condition will be fixed during the next year of the GRYD program.

From the beginning of the GRYD prevention program in 2009 through mid-June 2012, over 6,300 youth were referred to the program. The sources of referrals in each of the 12 GRYD Zones are presented in Table V.3. Consistent with previous years, the table illustrates that most referrals were made by family, friends, and peers (42%), followed by school staff (39%), and smaller percentages of referrals from law enforcement or other sources.

Referral levels range from a high of 841 (Newton) to a low of 214 (Florence-Graham). At the outset of the program, GRYD established 200 individuals per zone as the target number of youth to receive services (later modified to 150-200 for the Model program and 50 for the Traditional program). The exact number of youth who have received services was not available. However, since the average number of referrals deemed eligible for services is 60.1 percent (see Table V.2 above), and using that as a surrogate for the number of youth actually receiving services, it seems likely that most of the zones met their targets.

<b>Table V.3 GRYD Prevention Program Referral Sources From Program Commencement Through Mid-June 2012</b>						
<b>GRYD Zone</b>	<b>Referral Source</b>					<b>Total</b>
	<b>School</b>	<b>Family, Self, Or Peers</b>	<b>Law Enforcement Or Probation</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Source Missing</b>	
77 <sup>th</sup> Division II	398	180	17	24	3	622
Baldwin Village	128	264	89	74	9	564
Boyle Heights	302	163	22	53	9	549
Cypress Park	226	181	26	73	9	515
Florence-Graham	136	68	1	8	1	214
Newton	125	605	2	107	2	841
Pacoima/Foothill	224	210	45	82	22	583
Panorama City	150	193	90	53	5	491
North Hollenbeck	136	162	30	45	33	406
Rampart	347	133	12	150	9	651
Southwest II	181	123	5	40	12	361
Watts/Southeast	159	380	10	38	6	593
<b>Totals N (%)</b>	<b>2,512 (39%)</b>	<b>2,662 (42%)</b>	<b>349 (5%)</b>	<b>747 (12%)</b>	<b>120 (2%)</b>	<b>6,390</b>

Note: the "Other" category includes referrals from churches or religious groups, SNL or GRYD outreach, other city or community programs, events, the Department of Children and Family Services, and intervention workers.

## V.4 THE RETESTING PROCESS

### V.4.1 Overview

In order to measure change, if any, in risk propensity for each Eligible youth during the period that services are being provided, the Urban Institute developed a retesting process using the same YSET scales contained in the initial eligibility interview. Prevention agencies began retesting youth under this system in late 2010. To distinguish between these two tests, the initial YSET is termed YSET-I, and the retest YSET is termed YSET-R. At this point, many youth have had two or even three retests. To ensure that the most up-to-date information is used to assess each youth's progress in the program, we

concentrate on the most recent retest in this chapter. For example, if a particular youth has taken three retests, we have included in our analyses the initial YSET compared to the third retest rather than those that fall between these two surveys or time points.

Since the YSET-R was developed, the GRYD Office has adopted it as a reassessment procedure. Providers have been instructed to administer the YSET-R to all youth at approximately six month intervals after they enroll in the GRYD program. Providers have not yet reached that goal in part due to retesting backlogs, but they are currently working through retests of the backlog of youth who have been in the program longer than six months. The YSET-R forms are sent to the evaluation team for analysis and scoring. This scoring procedure is conducted in exactly the same manner as the USC initial scoring. Results are then returned to the originating provider. This information is expected to aid providers in determining how to adjust service provision on a case-by-case basis on evidence-based grounds and has the potential to help determine which types of services are, or are not, effective.<sup>50</sup> In addition, by providing new scores for each retest, with the goal of retests being conducted at six-month increments, the providers have the means to measure change in risk by comparing the various feedback reports, which can help to decide when a youth can “graduate” from the GRYD program.<sup>51</sup>

Table V.4 presents zone-by-zone counts of youth referred to the program since its inception in 2009, and the number deemed eligible or not-eligible on the basis of their YSET scores. The total number of referrals is 6,390. Of these, 3,840 were deemed at a high enough risk to be eligible, and 2,550 were not.

Not all youth who are deemed eligible actually enroll in the program and receive services, and some do drop out at a later time. At present, the exact number of youth actively engaged in the program is not known and therefore enrollment status is based upon YSET information. However, the GRYD Office has implemented information gathering systems during the past year that are expected to generate complete counts of active youth.

For the purposes of this report, we have identified subsets of enrolled and not-eligible youth for whom we have both initial YSET-I results and YSET-R results. Their zone-by-zone counts are also listed in Table V.4. There are 1,288 Enrolled youth and 397 Not-Eligible youth in these subsets. It is important to note that the retest numbers are a subset of youth in the program, not counts of all youth in the program.

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<sup>50</sup> Assessment of the differential effects of different services requires information on the specific kinds of services each youth receives and how much service is provided. The GRYD program is developing an information system to gather such data, but it has not yet reached sufficient maturity to be a dependable basis for evaluating which services and how much of each service has the best effect.

<sup>51</sup> Beginning September 1, 2011, the GRYD program started implementing a structured process to assess whether youth receiving services manifest a sufficiently reduced risk level to move out of the program. The process is still underway and is expected to be operational sometime during the fourth program year (July 2012 to June 2013).

Table V.4 Summary of Eligibility Testing by GRYD Zone					
Zone	# of Youth Tested for Eligibility through mid-June 2012	# Deemed Eligible for Services	# Deemed Not-Eligible for Services	# of Enrolled Youth for Whom Re-test Information Was Available through mid-June 2012	# of Not-Eligible Youth for Whom Re-test Information Was Available through mid-June 2012
77 <sup>th</sup> Division II	622	489	133	145	48
Baldwin Village	564	354	210	140	74
Boyle Heights	549	270	279	109	34
Cypress Park	515	312	203	160	24
Florence-Graham	214	116	98	11	6
Newton	841	450	391	134	50
North Hollenbeck	406	237	169	60	6
Pacoima/Foothill	583	283	300	186	60
Panorama City	491	263	228	53	21
Rampart	651	413	238	111	74
Southwest II	361	270	91	65	0
Watts/Southeast	593	383	210	114	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>6,390</b>	<b>3,840</b>	<b>2,550</b>	<b>1,288</b>	<b>397</b>


Note: The 1,288 youth whose retests are used in this report are a subset of active cases, not a statement of all active cases receiving services. The 397 Not-Eligible youth are a sample of all not-eligible youth whose retests were conducted by providers at the request of the evaluation team. Not-eligible youth are not routinely retested.

## V.4.2 Comparison of Enrolled Youth to Not-Eligible Youth

This section measures change in the nine risk scales for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible youth who had completed at least one YSET-R by mid-June 2012.<sup>52</sup> The attitudinal scales and the behavioral scales are discussed separately. To avoid the possibility of misinterpretation and/or distortion that might occur due to the low numbers of completed YSET-Rs in some GRYP Zones, results have been aggregated and are presented as a composite for the GRYP program as a whole.

The changes in the average YSET-I to YSET-R scores on the seven Attitudinal Risk Scales are depicted in Figure V.1 for samples of 1,288 GRYP Enrolled youth and 397 Not-Eligible youth.

**Figure V.1**  
**Percent Improvement/Deterioration in Average Risk Factor**  
**Scores: YSET-I to Most Recent YSET-R**  
**GRYP Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth**



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)  
 \* Statistically significant  $p < .05$

These numbers represent youth for which both a YSET-I and YSET-R have been conducted and were available. They are therefore a subset of all referrals (about 34 percent of eligible youth, and 16 percent of Not-Eligible youth). The upper bar indicates the percent improvement/deterioration in the average scores for Enrolled youth and the lower bar displays the same change for those who were considered not-eligible at initial screening. A positive percentage change reflects a decrease in risk, and

<sup>52</sup> Some youth declined to respond to some YSET questions, resulting in counts below 1,288 and 397 in some of the charts.

therefore an improvement. On the Antisocial scale for instance, the Enrolled youth, on average, had scores at retest that were 24.7 percent better than their scores at initial YSET. Alternatively, a negative percentage change shows an increase in risk on that scale. On the Peer Influence scale for instance, Not-Eligible youth had scores that on average were 2.5 percent worse than their scores at initial YSET. An asterisk beside each percentage change indicates that the difference between the two time points is statistically significant at the .05 level.<sup>53</sup>

The differences in change for the Enrolled and Not-Eligible groups are striking. Enrolled youth improved across all seven risk factor scales. These improvements ranged from 14 percent for the Peer Delinquency Scale to 34 percent for Critical Life Events, and all of the changes were statistically significant. Not-Eligible youth improved, but only very slightly on five of the scales (Antisocial, Parental Supervision, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, and Neutralization) and worsened on the other two (Peer Influence and Peer Delinquency). The largest improvement for the Not-Eligible group was 12 percent on the Critical Life Events scale, but this was only slightly more than one-third of the improvement demonstrated by Enrolled youth.


Caution is needed, however, when considering how to interpret these comparisons. Not-Eligible youth have lower scores than Eligible youth on these scales at the time of referral (otherwise they would not be deemed Not-Eligible). They therefore have less room for improvement, and a simple comparison of magnitude of change may be misleading.

To examine the differences from another perspective, Figures V.2 (Enrolled Youth) and V.3 (Not-Eligible Youth) report the percentages of each group that improved or deteriorated between the initial test and the most recent retest.

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<sup>53</sup> Measurement of change was calculated using repeated measures t-tests, with significance indicated at  $p < .05$ .


**Figure V.2**  
**Percentage and Number**  
**of Enrolled Youth that Improved or Not**  
**Self-Reported Risk Factor Scores**  
**YSET-I to Most Recent Retest**



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)

The percentages and numbers of youth that improved on each risk scale are on the right of the charts, while percentages and numbers of youth that deteriorated are on the left. For example, on the Antisocial scale, 1,046 youth – a little more than 80% of the total – improved, and 239 – a little less than 20% – deteriorated. Each scale can be interpreted this way.

**Figure V.3**  
**Percentage and Number**  
**of Not-Eligible Youth that Improved or Not**  
**Self-Reported Risk Factor Scores**  
**YSET-I to Most Recent Retest**



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)

It is clear that the large majority of youth that were enrolled in GRYD prevention programs improved on their risk for joining gangs from the time of initial screening to the most recent retest. The largest improvement was for Antisocial Attitudes, where over 80 percent of Enrolled youth showed improvement. The lowest improvement was on the Peer Delinquency scale, which has just over 60 percent of Enrolled youth showing improvement. Improvements on the other scales were all near 70 percent.

In contrast, as shown in Figure V.3, slight majorities of Not-Eligible youth deteriorated between the initial YSET and the retest YSET. The largest changes in this direction were for the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency risk scales, each of which were over 60 percent deterioration. The most positive change for this group was for Antisocial risk, where just over 50 percent showed improvement.

It is clear from both the perspective of average scale scores and an examination of the proportions of youth demonstrating improvement or deterioration that those enrolled in GRYD prevention programs changed positively over the course of receiving GRYD services. Not-Eligible youth showed little change on average scores and, as a group, a greater likelihood of worsening or experiencing no change on the risk factors.

### *Changes in Reported Behavior – Enrolled and Not-Eligible Youth*

In addition to the seven scales discussed above, both the YSET-I and the YSET-R contained twenty items that asked youth to report previous involvement in delinquency and use of illicit or prohibited substances, as well as activities associated with gangs. Each of the items was asked in three ways: whether the youth had ever engaged in a given behavior; whether the youth had engaged in the given behavior in the past six months; and if the youth was a gang member, whether the youth had engaged in the behavior with other gang members. These questions were repeated at retest to determine if the youth consistently engaged in delinquency or reduced the level of such behaviors after receiving services.


For this analysis, we report on the behaviors over the six months prior to the test, and group the behavioral response items into the following four categories: gang-related activities (four questions), violent criminal behavior (four questions); substance use or abuse (four questions); and non-violent criminal behavior (nine questions). Given the explicit GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* mission of reducing gang violence in Los Angeles, the following YSET change analysis focuses only on gang-related activities and violent criminal behavior. The figures below again compare these categories between the YSET-I and the most recent YSET-R. Within each chart the specific YSET items for the given category are presented. The bars depict the proportion and changes in the percentages of youth that responded that they had engaged in the activities within six months prior to the YSET surveys. The difference between the YSET-I and YSET-R percentages is also noted in the chart, as are the total numbers that responded affirmatively to each item.

Comparisons between Enrolled youth and Not-Eligible youth are somewhat problematic for the Behavior Scales because of the low numbers of Not-Eligible youth who reported engaging in some kinds of behaviors. The fact that some numbers are low is of course to be expected – low levels of criminal/delinquent behavior are one of the reasons why the youth were deemed Not-Eligible in the first place.

### *Changes in Gang-Related Behavior*

Figure V.4 presents the number and percentages of youth who reported engaging in gang-related behaviors at initial YSET and retest YSET, and the percent change between the two. For example, 209 youth, 16.2 percent of the 1,288 Enrolled youth, reported having engaged in gang fights during the six months preceding referral. At retest, the number had dropped to 118, 9.2 percent of the total. Thus, the decline between tests in the percentage of youth reporting this behavior was 7.0 percent. More than 50 percent (N=674) of the Enrolled group said that they had “hung out with gang members” prior to starting GRYD, compared to 32.4 percent (N=417) at retest – a 19.9% improvement. Far fewer reported “participating in gang activities” before GRYD, but this number also dropped slightly by retest. All of these changes were statistically significant. In contrast, reports of being a “member of a gang” increased between the initial YSET and most recent retest, but this change was very small in comparison to the total number of youth enrolled (8 youth out of over 1,200) and was not statistically significant.


**Figure V.4**  
**Change in Percentages of Self-Reported Gang-Related Behaviors**  
**GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest**



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)  
 Differences are statistically significant  $p < .05$  (n.s. – difference is not significant)

The number of Not-Eligible youth responding affirmatively to the YSET behavior items was quite low during both testing periods (YSET-I and YSET-R), and this is evident in the gang-related behavior items presented in Figure V.5. Fewer than 15 out of the 397 Not-Eligible youth said that they had been in “gang fights,” “participated in gang activities” or had joined a gang in the six months prior. There were 61 youth that said they had, in the six months prior, “hung out with gang members” before taking the YSET-I and this increased to 71 youth by the most recent retest. None of the differences in self-reports were statistically significant.

**Figure V.5**  
**Change in Percentage of Self-Reported Gang-Related Behavior**  
**Not-Eligible Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest**




Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)  
 Differences are statistically significant  $p < .05$  (n.s. = difference not significant)

### *Changes in Violent Criminal Behavior*

The four items that tested violent criminal behaviors are presented in Figure V.6 for Enrolled youth. There were declines in the number of youth reporting that they had engaged in violent activities in the past six months from the initial screen to the most recent retest across all four behaviors, and, with the exception of “attacking someone with a weapon,” the decreases were statistically significant. The largest change was for “hitting someone to hurt them.” Over half of the Enrolled youth reported “yes” to this question at YSET-I while just over a quarter did so on the retest. Very few acknowledged that they had “attacked someone with a weapon” or “used force to steal,” and the decreases were modest. Two hundred and forty-six Enrolled youth reported that they “carried a hidden weapon” in the six months prior to completing the YSET-I, but this dropped to 174 for the six months prior to YSET-R, a difference of about six percent.


**Figure V.6**  
**Change in Percentage of Self-Reported Violent Criminal Behavior**  
**GRYD Enrolled Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest**



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)  
 Differences are statistically significant  $p < .05$  (n.s. – not statistically significant)

Figure V.7 shows that very few Not-Eligible youth acknowledged engaging in any of the violent criminal activities. Less than five admitted to “attacking someone or using force to steal.” Eighty-four did state that they had “hit someone to hurt them” in the six months prior to the initial survey, but this declined to 65 at the most recent retest, although the change was not statistically significant. The number of Not-Eligible youth that acknowledged “carrying a hidden weapon” increased, but again, in comparison to the total number in this group, the increase in number of youth was quite small (24 out of 397).

**Figure V.7**  
**Change in Percentage of Self-Reported Violent Criminal Behavior**  
**Not-Eligible Youth, YSET-I to Most Recent Retest**



Source: Youth Services Eligibility Test (YSET I = initial screen, YSET R = retests at about 6 month intervals)  
Differences are statistically significant  $p < .05$  (n.s. – difference not significant)

In summary, then, the conclusion to be drawn from the information presented in Tables V.1 to V.7 is that Enrolled youth exhibited improvements on all attitudinal scales and behavioral measures that were significantly greater than those shown by Not-Eligible youth.

### *Changes in Eligibility*

The objective of the prevention program is to take youth who are at-risk with respect to joining gangs and participating in gang-related activities and, through the provision of services, help them to change. A key question therefore is whether youth considered eligible on the initial YSET-I would also be considered eligible based on their scores on the YSET-R. In addition, it is important to know whether youth not receiving services because of low scores on the YSET-I have continued to score below the at-risk threshold or whether the retest indicates that they are above the threshold.

To assess these questions, each of the retests we conducted was scored using the USC at-risk standards (see above for details), and a determination of Eligibility/Non-Eligibility was made. For the Enrolled youth who were retested, the findings are presented in Table V.5. Results for Not-Eligible youth are presented in Table V.6.

<b>Table V.5 Changes in Eligibility from YSET-I to YSET-R for Enrolled Youth</b>			
	<b>Total Eligible on YSET-I and Enrolled</b>	<b>Still Eligible at YSET-R</b>	<b>Changed to Not-Eligible at YSET-R</b>
77th II	145	59	85
Baldwin Village	140	41	99
Boyle Heights	109	45	63
Cypress Park	160	68	92
Florence-Graham	11	4	7
Newton	134	50	84
Pacoima/Foothill	186	101	85
Panorama City	53	32	21
North Hollenbeck	60	28	32
Rampart	111	55	56
Southwest II	65	36	29
Watts/Southeast	114	53	61
<b>Totals (%)</b>	<b>1288 (100%)</b>	<b>572 (44.5%)</b>	<b>714 (55.5%)</b>

Note: One youth is excluded from the above table due to missing age; another was removed due to missing data that prevented the risk score calculation.

Table V.5 shows that 55.5 percent of Enrolled youth scored below the eligibility level on their most recent retest. Thus, had the retest scores for this group been the ones recorded at the time of referral, they would not have been offered entry into the program. This demonstrates a substantial improvement in attitudes and behavior during their time in the program. The median time in program for the 714 youth in this group was approximately 16 months, 26 days longer on average than the 572 youth whose retest scores were still above the eligibility level (475 days compared to 449 days).

There is some variability across zones with respect to this measure. Nine of the zones had more youth retesting below eligibility risk levels than continuing at risk; three did not. To date, zone specific assessments of changes in youth attitudes and behavior have not been feasible; consequently, there is currently no explanation for this difference.

<b>Table V.6 Changes in Eligibility at Retest for Not-Eligible Youth</b>			
	<b>Total Not-Eligible on YSET-I</b>	<b>Still Not-Eligible at Retest</b>	<b>Changed to Eligible at Retest</b>
77th II	48	46	2
Baldwin Village	74	64	10
Boyle Heights	34	30	4
Cypress Park	24	23	1
Florence-Graham	6	4	2
Newton	50	43	7
Pacoima/Foothill	60	46	14
Panorama City	21	21	0
North Hollenbeck	6	6	0
Rampart	74	61	13
Southwest II	0	0	0
Watts/Southeast	0	0	0
<b>Totals (%)</b>	<b>397 (100%)</b>	<b>344 (86.6%)</b>	<b>53 (13.4%)</b>

Table V.6 shows that for youth found not eligible on the YSET-I at referral, only 13.4 percent were found to be above eligibility risk levels at the time of the retest. The vast majority maintained a not-eligible status. All zones that conducted retests had similar outcomes.

## V.5 ASSESSING GRYD IMPACTS ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

### V.5.1 Introduction

This section describes findings from applying a Regression Discontinuity design to more rigorously evaluate the effects of GRYD's prevention program on the attitudes and self-reported delinquency of youth who enrolled in the program and who were subsequently retested. Enrolled youth are compared to a sample of youth who were referred to the program but who were not deemed sufficiently at-risk to be eligible for GRYD services (i.e., the Not-Eligible youth).

A major challenge for the evaluation has been to identify a group of youth who are similar in demographic characteristics and behavior to the youth receiving prevention services, but who are not themselves receiving services. If such a group could be identified, and if information about the youth in the group could be developed, comparisons between the two groups could help determine whether changes in the youth enrolled in GRYD prevention programming are a consequence of services received. The optimal approach – a randomized design in which youth referred to the GRYD program would be randomly assigned to an experimental group (receiving services) or to a control group (not receiving services) – was declared infeasible by GRYD for ethical reasons at the beginning of the GRYD program. Further, because of insurmountable practical and privacy/security difficulties, finding such a group from the general population of Los Angeles youth was also ruled out.

We have therefore focused on the possibility of comparing Enrolled youth to Not-Eligible youth, within the context of the GRYD prevention program. Youth are separated into these two groups at the time of referral because they have varying risk levels, which mean they are not as equivalent as we would like for evaluation purposes. Thus, the simple comparison of changes in attitude and behavior between them that we have performed, though informative and accurate, is not completely satisfactory because there is a possibility that the differences we have noted may be partly due to the non-equivalency of the groups. To partially compensate for these methodological realities, we complement the descriptive analysis with the Regression Discontinuity design because it is suitable for analyzing a program such as GRYD, where eligibility for GRYD prevention services is based on reaching a specific cut-point on a scale of risk factors measured by the Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET).<sup>54</sup>

### V.5.2 A Hypothetical Illustration of Regression Discontinuity

To illustrate how the Regression Discontinuity design works, we present a hypothetical illustration in Figure V.8. Assume that eligibility for a program such as GRYD is based on a scoring

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<sup>54</sup> Schochet, P., Cook, T., Deke, J., Imbens, G., Lockwood, J.R., Porter, J., and Smith, J. 2010. "Standards for Regression Discontinuity Design." Retrieved from What Works Clearinghouse website: [http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/pdf/wwc\\_rd.pdf](http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/pdf/wwc_rd.pdf).

scheme that ranges from 0 to 50, and that youth scoring above 25 are to be considered eligible for a program. Now consider that the outcome of interest is some measure of gang-joining over time (e.g. six months or a year after the scores are obtained). The vertical axis in Figure V.8 represents the gang-joining rate (from 0-100 percent), and the horizontal axis represents the at-risk score. The vertical line in the center of the figure is the cut-point (a score of 25). The dark S-shaped curve plots the at-risk scores of our hypothetical group. The line to the left of the cut-point plots not-eligible scores below the cut-point; the line to the right plots eligible scores above the cut-point. The dotted continuations of each solid line simply illustrate how the actual scores would have continued to 0 or 100 percent.


As in the real world of the GRYD program, we assume that there can be multiple individuals scoring at any given level. The plots show how gang-joining rates rise as the at-risk levels of the youth (eligible versus not-eligible) also rise. Because the eligible group is higher risk, we can expect them to join gangs at a higher rate. Thus, the dark line to the right of the cut-point is (on average) much higher than the dark line to the left. Indeed, it would appear that, in this hypothetical presentation, the average gang-joining rate for the eligible group is about 75 percent, whereas the average gang-joining rate for the not-eligible group is about 35 percent.

This would indicate that in the time period after the scores were obtained, the eligible group performed much worse with respect to gang joining. However, this difference should not be used to suggest that the program was the cause of the difference. It would be more meaningful to compare the hypothetical sample members around a score of 25 because at that point – the point of discontinuity or cut-point – they have similar at-risk levels. The plot shows that, at the point of discontinuity, there is a sharp decline in the gang-joining rate. Some eligible youth joined gangs at a lower rate than not-eligible youth. Hence, even though the average gang-joining rate for the eligible group may be higher than that of the not-eligible group, when the sample members who are similar are compared, the conclusion would be that the program reduced gang-joining. A technical appendix to this chapter, Appendix D, documents how the Regression Discontinuity design supports an estimation of that drop in the outcome at the point of discontinuity.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Appendix D also provides further details on the regression discontinuity approach.

Figure V.8 Graphical Depiction of the Regression Discontinuity Design



There are several advantages to using a Regression Discontinuity design in this context. First, it would be difficult to apply other quasi-experimental designs to evaluate the effectiveness of the GRYP program because most of them rely on attempting to account for the differences between the not-eligible and enrolled youth. There is very little overlap between the two groups in terms of riskiness or how likely it would be that youth in each group would join a gang, given that the Not-Eligible youth are by design considered to be at a lower risk level, and standard quasi-experimental designs would not accomplish the balance between the two groups. This could bias the results and lead to erroneous conclusions about the effects of the program.

Second, sometimes there is fuzziness in terms of the selection mechanism for which youth enter the program and which do not, and the Regression Discontinuity design can accommodate that. For example, fuzziness might be introduced by the possibility of over-rides or changes in the cut-point itself. In such cases, some sample members below the cut-point might be deemed eligible and some above the

cut-point might be deemed not-eligible. This is, in fact, the situation in the GRYD program. For example, we previously mentioned challenge cases where Not-Eligible youth may be admitted to the program if a strong case is presented for doing so.

Third, as was noted above, the Regression Discontinuity design is an analytical strategy that produces estimates of the difference around the point of discontinuity by using data on the entire sample, including cases that score 0 and those that score 50. Despite these benefits, there are some drawbacks and assumptions that must be satisfied for the design to produce credible estimates. First, there must actually be a discontinuity around the cut-point (and therefore program participation). For example, if the hypothetical cut-point of 25 is frequently compromised there might not be an observable discontinuity in the selection process. Further, the Regression Discontinuity design could still be compromised if there are other relevant factors that also exhibit discontinuity at the cut-point of 25. For example, if the age of the youth also exhibits a jump at a score of 25 (meaning older youth have higher scores and younger youth have lower scores), then it would be unclear if the hypothetical drop in gang-joining is because of the program or the change in age at the point of discontinuity.

Fourth, the design relies on the modeled links between the eligibility score and the outcome of interest. This poses two concerns. There should clearly be sufficient range in the score to allow us to estimate the relationship. At a minimum, there should be four distinct points to the left and four to the right of the cut-point (see methodological Appendix D). But more importantly, the Regression Discontinuity results can be sensitive to the functional form of the relationship between the score and the outcome. For example, should the relationship between the variables of interest be linear, quadratic, or some flexible form? In practice, a flexible functional form is usually preferred as it provides the most conservative estimates. Given these potential drawbacks, it is always advisable to conduct robustness checks to ensure that these assumptions are not violated. We do this at the end of this section.

A final limitation of the Regression Discontinuity design is its generalizability. The Regression Discontinuity design is what is termed a localized design. There are two aspects of this limitation that should be highlighted. First, it provides estimates of the program's effect on the outcome only under the current program admission standards. For example, an analysis of the plot in Figure V.8 would lead researchers to conclude that the hypothetical program reduces gang joining. However, if, in a future year, the hypothetical program were to revise its eligibility cut-point to 35, the Regression Discontinuity results from using 25 as the cut-point would not be a credible basis for concluding the same or similar effectiveness. However, for an assessment of the program as it is currently implemented, the Regression Discontinuity design is aptly suited. The second aspect of this limitation relates to the variations in the effectiveness of the program at different points. If the Regression Discontinuity design shows no effect of the program at the current cut-point, this in no way suggests that the program is ineffective for all members being treated. For example, even if the Regression Discontinuity has an insignificant effect around the cut-point of 25, it is still possible that the program could be working effectively among sample members who have very high at-risk levels (for example, those who score 40 or above in our hypothetical example).

### V.5.3 Comparison of Eligible and Not-Eligible Youth

Moving to the actual data derived from the GRYD prevention program, we begin with an assessment of 1,685 youth referred to the program. Table V.7 presents the risk factor scores for this sample, and the Eligible/Not-Eligible determination that was made on the basis of their YSET scores. Youth in the Eligible sample were all actually enrolled in the program and received services.<sup>56</sup>

Number of High Risk Factors	Number of Youth in Category	Number Enrolled in GRYD	% Enrolled in GRYD	Number Not-Eligible	% Not-Eligible
0	112	0	0%	112	100%
1	94	1	1%	93	99%
2	115	8	7%	107	93%
3	116	46	40%	70	60%
4	189	180	95%	9	5%
5	241	239	99%	2	1%
6	285	283	99%	2	1%
7	268	267	100%	1	0%
8	178	177	99%	1	1%
9	87	87	100%	0	0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,685</b>	<b>1,288</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>24%</b>

Irrespective of the source from which youth are referred to the GRYD prevention program, they are first assessed for their risk of gang-joining and criminal or delinquent behavior. This assessment is done via the initial administration of the YSET (designated YSET-I). Based on algorithmic rules, youth are either deemed eligible or not-eligible for prevention services. The rules are summarized as follows:

- Youth who report being active in a gang are referred to the GRYD intervention program and are not eligible.
- Before November 9, 2009, youth who were not in a gang and had three or fewer risk factors were deemed not-eligible. Youth who had four risk factors were considered for further screening. Youth with five or more risk factors and not in a gang were considered eligible.
- After November 9, 2009, the threshold for eligibility was lowered to four risk factors and modest changes were made in some of the items for some of the risk factor scales.

<sup>56</sup> Two hundred and fifty-four prevention program youth for whom enrollment could not be determined have been excluded from the regression discontinuity analysis.

There have been a few exceptions to these rules. As Table V.7 shows, some youth with risk factor scores less than four are reported as being enrolled and some youth scoring at or above five are recorded as being not-eligible. However, these crossovers are not sufficient in number to compromise the findings.

Given that the YSET-R has become a systematic part of the periodic reassessment process to which every enrolled youth is subject, with youth being retested every six months, some Enrolled Youth have had multiple retests. As was the case in previous analyses, we have used their most recent retest. A sample of 1,200 Not-Eligible youth (100 from each GRYD Zone) was randomly selected by the evaluation team, and GRYD's service providers were asked to locate these youth and retest them as part of the evaluation process. This was a difficult task due to the fact that some Not-Eligible youth have moved and others declined to participate. In the aggregate, providers were able to locate and retest 397 Not-Eligible youth.

Since, for all intents and purposes, the youth in our dataset who scored "at-risk" on three or fewer risk factors were considered Not-Eligible while those who scored "at-risk" on four or more were considered Eligible, we define the point of discontinuity as the break between three and four factors.

As noted in the introductory section, the Regression Discontinuity design is capable of handling over-rides or small changes in eligibility criteria that result in overlap between the two groups. This design is termed the Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design (as opposed to the Sharp Regression Discontinuity design). In our analysis, we have relied on this variant of the standard regression discontinuity design to assess the effectiveness of GRYD at improving attitudes and behavior for Enrolled youth compared to Not-Eligible youth.

#### V.5.4 Findings

The effects of GRYD on a total of seven attitudinal scales and twenty behavioral items, which were grouped into four delinquency measures, were analyzed:

Attitudinal scales: Antisocial, Parental Supervision, Critical Life Events, Impulsive Risk Taking, Neutralization, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency.

Behavioral Measures: Self-reported delinquency measures were computed separately for Substance Abuse/Use, Gang-Related Behavior, Violent Criminal Behavior, and Non-Violent Criminal Behavior.

The outcome measures of interest were changes in these scales and measures between the YSET-I and YSET-R. If GRYD prevention services have had a positive effect, we should find that scores on the scales reduce between the initial YSET and the retest YSET. To assess whether any changes are more likely to be a result of GRYD than any other factors (e.g., aging of the youth), the reduction, if any, should be larger for youth who received services – the Enrolled group – than for the youth who did not – the Not-Eligible youth. In other words, if the difference between the YSET-I and YSET-R for the Enrolled youth were found to be no greater than for the Not-Eligible youth, the GRYD program could not be assumed to have an effect.

Because the assignment of youth to the Enrolled and Not-Eligible groups is based, in part, on these risk measures (i.e., the attitudinal and behavioral scales), and because there is a substantial variation in the degree of risk observed across youth (some are just above or just below the cut-point representing low to moderate levels of risk while others manifest a much greater distance from the cut-point or a high level of risk), a simple comparison of their scale scores (i.e., what the youth's score was on the Antisocial Scale) could be misleading. However, as noted in the introductory section, the Regression Discontinuity design permits us to use the full sample to estimate the change in outcome at the point of discontinuity, thereby allowing us to derive credible inferences about the effectiveness of GRYD services—at least in improving the outcomes of the marginal youth (on or about the cut-point).

For each of the outcomes considered, two different versions of change between the initial YSET (denoted with 'I' in formulas hereafter as YSET-I) and the retest (denoted with 'R' in formulas hereafter as YSET-R) were constructed—calculating a difference and a ratio. Because the scales are an additive sum of underlying responses, in other words a combination of several questions on the survey with the higher the score meaning higher risk, there is a natural range for each scale. The lowest possible value for any scale is 0. This means that individuals who score low on the initial assessment cannot score much lower on the reassessment because they started out with a low score that bottoms out at 0 and cannot become negative. As a result, simply computing the difference between the I and R scores tends to bias the analysis towards finding larger differences among those who are at higher risk (as reflected by higher scores on their initial assessment), than those at lower risk. As a robustness check, therefore, we also created ratio measures of the percent change in the reassessment risk scale (relative to the initial assessment). Ratio measures of change are less susceptible to the bias introduced by the variation in the initial risk scores of the two groups. Specifically, the difference measures are computed as  $\text{Difference} = R - I$ , whereas ratio measures are computed as  $\text{Ratio} = R/I$ . Because the scales can have a value of 0 and the denominator of the ratio ('I') cannot be equal to 0, the ratio versions were operationalized as  $\text{Ratio} = (1+R)/(1+I)$  to avoid getting missing values as a result of dividing by 0. These computations were performed for the Enrolled youth and the Not-Eligible youth, and the difference between the two groups was calculated.

Table V.8 presents the results from the analysis of the difference and ratio measures. The table contains two types of analysis: Average Change and Modeled Change. The Average Change analysis compares the attitudinal and behavioral changes for Enrolled youth with the same level of change among Not-Eligible youth. The Modeled Change compares the same outcomes for youth scoring below and above the cut-point of four. There are three sets of modeled changes. The Unconditional estimate provides a simple comparison of the outcome in these two groups, the difference between youth above and below the cut-point (while accounting for the fact that some youth with scores of four or above were Not-Eligible and some with scores below four were Enrolled). The two 'RegDisc' estimates following that are from the Regression Discontinuity design analysis. As a robustness check, the table presents the estimates using a linear functional form (referred to as linear in the table) as well as a flexible functional form (referred to as flexible in the table).

Table V.8 provides estimates of what is called a Fuzzy RDD analysis<sup>57</sup> for changes in seven attitudinal scales. YSET-I and YSET-R data were available for a total of 1,684 youth<sup>58</sup> - 1,288 Enrolled and 397 Not-Eligible. The point of discontinuity is set at the break between 3 and 4 (e.g., all scores equal to or above four are considered in the same eligible category). A cut-point of four is appropriate because, as Table V.8 shows, the probability of enrollment was almost 100 percent at a total risk score of four or more.

Of the 1,684 youth in the sample, 76 percent were Enrolled in GRYD and 24 percent were Not-Eligible. As noted, the sample includes a few youth who scored above the cut-point but were not enrolled and a few who scored below the cut-point and were enrolled.

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<sup>57</sup> The term 'Fuzzy' RDD analysis is used to reflect the fact that some youth who scored below the cut-point are nevertheless enrolled in GRYD, while some other youth who scored above the cut-point are not. See Appendix D on the Regression Discontinuity Methodology for a more complete explanation of the analytic adjustments being made to accommodate such cross-overs.

<sup>58</sup> Two youth were missing comparable information on the Antisocial and Peer Delinquency scales and were dropped from the analysis.

Table V.8 Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Attitudinal Scales								
	Attitudinal Scales							
	Antisocial	Parental Supervision	Critical Life Events	Impulsive Risk Taking	Neutralization	Peer Influence	Peer Delinquency	
Sample Size Used	1,682	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,682	
Percent Enrolled	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%	76%	
Percent Not-eligible	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%	
Average Difference Between Enrolled and Not-Eligible Groups								
Difference (R-I)	-3.76 **	-2.31 **	-1.27 **	-2.99 **	-4.21 **	-2.45 **	-2.05 **	
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	-0.20 **	-0.23 **	-0.28 **	-0.23 **	-0.23 **	-0.28 **	-0.17 **	
Modeled Difference Between Youth Below and Above the Point of Discontinuity								
Difference (R-I)								
Unconditional	-4.65 **	-2.92 **	-1.47 **	-3.55 **	-4.77 **	-2.88 **	-2.42 **	
RegDisc (Linear)	-2.02 **	0.78 **	-0.59 **	-2.10 **	-1.89 **	0.77 *	1.96 **	
RegDisc (Flexible)	-1.52 **	1.04 **	-0.28	-1.02 **	-0.68	1.21 **	1.47 **	
Difference as Ratio (R/I)								
Unconditional	-0.25 **	-0.30 **	-0.32 **	-0.27 **	-0.26 **	-0.34 **	-0.20 **	
RegDisc (Linear)	-0.14 **	0.09 *	-0.14 **	-0.19 **	-0.14 **	0.00	0.09 **	
RegDisc (Flexible)	-0.10 **	0.14 **	-0.01	-0.08 **	-0.04 *	0.08	0.08 **	

NOTE: \*\* indicates a statistical significance level of  $p < .05$  and \* indicates a level of  $p < .10$

The entries in the table can be interpreted as follows. The number -3.76 in the Antisocial column indicates that, for this scale, the decrease in risk from I-R for the Enrolled youth was greater than the decrease in the same scale for Not-Eligible youth by an average 3.76 units. This number is calculated from data not included in the table as follows: the mean of the Antisocial scale for the Not-Eligible youth dropped 0.73 (from 12.93 at YSET-I to 12.20 at YSET-R) but the mean of the Antisocial scale for the youth Enrolled in GRYD dropped 4.49 (from 18.15 at YSET-I to 13.66 at YSET-R). Subtracting 0.73 from 4.49 results in a difference of 3.76. This indicates that Enrolled youth improved much more than Not-Eligible youth during the time services were provided.

The ratio version of the outcome is compared in a similar manner. The average ratio change for youth enrolled in GRYD was 0.79 and for the Not-Eligible youth was 0.99 (these background numbers are not included in Table V.8). This yields a difference of 0.20, as indicated in the Table V.8. Note that the ratio version computes the change between YSET-I and YSET-R as a percent change. Therefore, on average, the YSET-R scores for GRYD Enrolled youth were 79 percent of the YSET-I scores. For the Not-Eligible youth, the YSET-R scores were about 99 percent of the YSET-I scores (reflecting almost no change; scores were very similar between the two waves of the survey). The two versions are thus mutually supportive in that both provide evidence of GRYD's positive effects on youth receiving services.

The modeled estimates use the discontinuity point for making comparisons (as opposed to the actual enrollment status of the youth). The unconditional estimates are similar to the average difference calculations explained above with two caveats. First, rather than use the enrollment status (Enrolled versus Not-Eligible), these numbers are computed by comparing youth below and above the point of discontinuity. Second, they account for the fact that there is a discrepancy between the eligibility criteria or cut-point of four, and actual enrollment status. As a result, because it is based on a parameter estimate from a regression model, there is no simple way to interpret the calculations of an estimate like -4.65 under the Antisocial scale (which is possible for the average calculation above). However, this number is still an estimate of the difference between youth below or above the point of discontinuity. The two estimates labeled 'RegDisc' provide the same calculation but *at the point of discontinuity*.

Figure V.8 provided a graphical depiction of the regression discontinuity design. As was explained earlier, the effect of the program (GRYD services in this case) is computed as the drop in the outcome at the point of discontinuity. In the hypothetical example in Figure V.8, this drop is shown at the score of 25 (from almost 68 percent to about 45 percent). This would constitute a drop of 23 percent points. The number -1.52 under the Antisocial scale is the estimate of the actual drop in the outcome (change between YSET-I and YSET-R) at the point of discontinuity, when utilizing a flexible functional form. In other words, the reduction in the Antisocial scale between YSET-I and YSET-R was 1.52 units more for GRYD Enrolled youth than among the Not-Eligible youth. The number -2.02 is the same estimate using a linear functional form. The row presented in bold face (the flexible model) provides the most conservative estimates and is what we use to derive inferences about the performance of GRYD. This helps to guard against overstating GRYD effects. The main findings are summarized below:

- First, on the Antisocial and Impulsive Risk Taking scales, enrollment in the GRYD program significantly reduced the attitudinal scales between YSET-I and YSET-R by a larger magnitude than the change for similar youth who did not receive GRYD services. For Critical Life Events and Neutralization scales, the reductions for GRYD Enrolled youth are larger than the Not-Eligible youth, but the differences are not statistically significant at the  $p < .05$  level.
- Second, for the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence and Peer-Delinquency attitudinal scales, the effects are statistically significant but in the wrong direction (the reductions are smaller among the GRYD Enrolled youth than the Not-Eligible youth, at the margin).
- Third, the difference and ratio versions of the change between the YSET-R and YSET-I scales generally depict similar results. Typically, when one is statistically and substantively significant, the other is as well (the sole exception is the Peer Influence scale).
- Fourth, though the flexible functional form versions of the models provide more conservative estimates of the effects of GRYD program than the linear versions, the effects reported through both are always in the same direction (positive or negative).

In order to assess the substantive significance of the estimates reported in Table V.8, Table V.9 provides the estimated standard deviations (variation from the average) of the changes in the various attitudinal scales for the entire sample. For example, on average, deviation of the change in the

Antisocial scale (between YSET-I and YSET-R) is 4.77. This puts the estimated reduction (provided in Table V.8 as -1.52) in correct perspective. It suggests that the effect of GRYD is about 30 percent of the average deviation in the sample as a whole ( $1.52/4.77 = 0.31$ ). There is no hard rule to interpreting this as substantively significant or otherwise. However, as is evident, the most conservative estimates from the flexible functional forms range between 10 and 30 percent of the standard deviation in the sample. This suggests that some of the effects are more substantial than others. For example, it would appear that the effect of GRYD on the Antisocial scale is fairly substantive (as it reflects a reduction that is over 30 percent of the standard deviation in the sample). On the other hand, although statistically significant, the effect of GRYD on Neutralization scales is considerably smaller (reflecting a reduction that is only 13 percent of the standard deviation in the sample).

Table V.9 Standard Deviations of the Attitudinal Scale Changes (from YSET-I to YSET-R) for the Full Sample							
	Attitudinal Scales						
	Antisocial	Parental Supervision	Critical Life Events	Impulsive Risk Taking	Neutralization	Peer Influence	Peer Delinquency
Difference (R-I)	4.77	3.90	2.08	4.15	5.21	4.41	4.37
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	0.27	0.47	0.53	0.31	0.28	0.54	0.37

It is difficult to interpret the effects of GRYD on the Parental Supervision, Peer Influence, and Peer Delinquency scales. Findings from Table V.8 suggest that GRYD participants showed less improvement in these domains, compared to non-participants. Though parents/guardians and peers may experience little personal attitudinal change simply because GRYD is providing services to the youth it is unclear why participant scores on these scales should deteriorate.

Table V.10 presents the same results for the self-report delinquency and substance abuse scales and Table V.11 presents the standard deviations of the outcome measures. The notations in these tables are the same as in Tables V.8 and V.9. The regression discontinuity analysis suggests that the GRYD Enrolled youth do not, in general, manifest larger and statistically significant changes in their self-reported delinquent behavior than similar Not-Eligible youth. The one exception is a reduction in non-violent criminal behavior using the ratio measure with the flexible functional form specification. However, even this reduction is only statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence level.

<b>Table V.10 Regression Discontinuity Results Comparing GRYD Enrolled Youth and Not-Eligible Youth on Changes in their Self-Report Delinquency Scales</b>				
	Self-report Delinquency Scales			
	Substance Abuse/Use	Gang-related Behavior	Violent Criminal Behavior	Non-violent Criminal Behavior
Sample Size Used	1,684	1,684	1,684	1,684
Percent Enrolled	76%	76%	76%	76%
Percent Not-eligible	24%	24%	24%	24%
Average Difference Between Enrolled and Not-Eligible Groups				
Difference (R-I)	-0.25 **	-0.35 **	-0.33 **	-1.21 **
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	-0.03	-0.17 **	-0.15 **	-0.37 **
Modeled Difference Between Youth Below and Above the Point of Discontinuity				
Difference (R-I)				
Unconditional	-0.28 **	-0.38 **	-0.38 **	-1.45 **
RegDisc (Linear)	0.22 **	0.01	0.06	0.21
<b>RegDisc (Flexible)</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.00</b>
Difference as Ratio (R/I)				
Unconditional	-0.04	-0.17 **	-0.17 **	-0.47 **
RegDisc (Linear)	0.21 **	0.01	0.00	-0.17 *
<b>RegDisc (Flexible)</b>	<b>0.13 *</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>-0.18 *</b>

NOTE: \*\* indicates a statistical significance level of  $p < .05$  and \* indicates a level of  $p < .10$

<b>Table V.11 Standard Deviations of the Self-Report Delinquency Scale Changes (from YSET-I to YSET-R) for the Full Sample</b>				
	Self-report Delinquency Scales			
	Substance Abuse/Use	Gang-related Behavior	Violent Criminal Behavior	Non-violent Criminal Behavior
Difference (R-I)	0.99	1.00	0.92	2.24
Difference as Ratio (R/I)	0.65	0.60	0.55	0.93

## V.5.5 Robustness Checks

As noted earlier in this section, the robustness of the Regression Discontinuity design method rests on assumptions that need to be checked. In Figure V.9, we present robustness checks in two critical areas. First, we consider whether the probability of enrollment does in fact display a discontinuity at or about the YSET cut-point. Second, we examine five other characteristics of the youth to see if they also possess a discontinuity at that point. Violation of either of these conditions would render the reported findings suspect.

Figure V.9: Variation in the Percent GRYD Enrolled and Demographic Factors Across the Range of Values of the Number of Risk Factors




Figure V.9<sup>59</sup> plots the average of several series over the range of possible values for the number of risk factors. The percent-GRYD Enrolled series (using data from Table V.7) is the only one that displays a marked discontinuity or shift in the pattern that the line follows. The discontinuity is at the YSET cut point (between 3 and 4 risk factors). The other five series—percent male, percent Black, percent Latino,

<sup>59</sup> The percentage series (GRYD Enrolled, Male, Black, and Latino) are measured on the left axis. Average Age and Average Grade are measure on the right axis.

average age, and average grade of the youth—all vary little across the range of risk levels and none exhibit a discontinuity at the YSET cut point.<sup>60</sup> This indicates that the results presented in Tables V.8 and V.9 are not the result of changes in the five factors from one risk level to another.

## V.6 CONCLUSIONS

### *Attitudinal and Behavioral Change in Prevention Program Youth*

Changes between initial assessments of at-risk levels at the time of referral, and retest assessments at six month intervals thereafter were analyzed for a sample of 1,288 youth in the prevention program. These youth were compared to 397 others who had been deemed not-eligible at referral due to low scores on the Youth Services Evaluation Tool.

We examined the seven attitudinal scales that comprise the YSET test, comparing changes from initial YSET to the most recent retest YSET for enrolled youth, and concluded that substantial and statistically significant improvements had taken place on all the scales. Improvements also took place with respect to self-reported delinquent and gang-related behaviors, though at somewhat lower levels. Overall, by the time of the last retest, 55 percent of the youth would no longer have qualified for entry into the program because their at-risk levels had dropped below the cut-point established by GRYP as the threshold for service eligibility.

The comparisons to the not-eligible sample, using the same measures, indicated that, on average, the not-eligible youth had some improvements on most of the attitudinal scales but at lower proportions than the enrolled youth, and at lower levels of improvement. The not-eligible youth had little change in gang-related behaviors.

Because of the fact that enrolled youth and not-eligible youth were not equivalent groups at the time of referral, drawing firm conclusions from the descriptive comparisons between the two groups is problematic. It is probable that a low risk group will have had fewer problems and had less chance to improve their at-risk levels since they were already low to begin with. We conducted a Regression Discontinuity analysis to obtain other estimates of the comparative change between the enrolled and not-eligible groups. The results affirmed that the enrolled youth had reduced their risk levels and gang-related behavior to a greater extent than the not-eligible youth, after controlling as much as possible for the difference in at-risk levels that the initial YSET disclosed. Our view is that these reductions have been brought about by the GRYP program.

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<sup>60</sup> Percent male, percent Black, percent Latino, and the enrollment rate are measured on the left y-axis while the average age and average grade variables are measured on the right y-axis of Figure V.9.

## CHAPTER VI

# INTERVENTION

This chapter addresses the GRYD program's intervention strategy, which seeks to encourage youth desistance from gang activity and facilitate proactive peace-making responses to incidents of gang violence. The GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy* outlines a two-pronged approach to guide intervention programming: crisis response and proactive peace-making in the community; and family-based case management activities for gang-involved youth.<sup>61</sup> Crisis response is a coordinated reaction to violent incidents in the community and is intended to directly interrupt gang violence. In order to encourage and facilitate joint responsibility in the handling of violent incidents, a tripartite system involving law enforcement, GRYD staff, and Community Intervention Workers (CIWs) comprise the Triangle team that responds to violent incidents when they occur. Family-based case management provides a variety of services to gang members in order to encourage them to desist from engaging in violent acts and facilitate their departure from gang membership.

The first section of this chapter includes a description of the case management component. However, because only a limited amount of data on GRYD case management activities is currently available, that topic is not examined in detail in this Y3 evaluation report. The second section of this chapter examines crisis response from several perspectives to assess the impact that GRYD intervention strategies are having on violent gang crime. To do so, the section reports on results of surveys and focus group discussions conducted with participants of the Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA), a GRYD Office-sponsored training program for CIWs. The chapter then examines a subset of violent incidents from 2012 to which members of a Triangle team responded. Next, survey responses capturing the experiences of individuals in the three Triangle response groups during a sample of violent incidents are reported and reviewed.

The chapter then provides a summary of views from a random sample of LAPD personnel who work in LAPD areas that contain GRYD Zones and/or Summer Night Lights recreation areas. Some questions from this survey touch upon intervention activities; others focus on topics such as the GRYD program overall, its key components, and LAPD personnel's views on changes in gang crime and violence since the program's inception. Finally, the chapter offers summary conclusions on GRYD intervention programming.

### VI.1 FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT

The family-based case management component of the GRYD program is intended to serve 14-25 year olds who are gang-involved. In order to be eligible for services, youth must meet two or more criteria that indicate gang involvement, such as personal identification as a gang member, identification as a gang member by a Los Angeles Police Department Gang Unit officer, the presence of gang tattoos, and gang-activity related arrests, among other criteria. The program also intentionally targets gang-

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<sup>61</sup> *Comprehensive Strategy*, op. cit.

involved individuals reentering the community from a correctional institution, and the GRYD Office states that at least 10 percent of clients are considered reentry status.

According to the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy*, case management links clients to resources within the client's community to meet his or her service needs. Each client is assigned a family-based case management team, which includes both a case manager and a CIW. Programming spans six phases from referral and assessment (Phase 1) through to reassessment (Phase 6). Services are provided to clients on a six-month cycle following the assessment period, during which case management connects youth with a wide range of services, varying based on the individual client's specific needs. Examples of services span from vocational training and job placement to tattoo removal and assistance with record expungement. At reassessment during the sixth month of programming, the client's family-based case management team determines whether the youth has made sufficient progress to exit the program, or if the youth should remain in the program for an additional six-month cycle of case management services.

The GRYD Office began a systematic data collection procedure for family case management during the spring of 2012. Information on referrals and clients' characteristics, as well as the meetings, referrals, and activities clients received as part of family case management services, is now collected by intervention providers on a regular basis. The GRYD Office anticipates these data will be ready for analysis in the Year 4 evaluation.

## **VI.2 LOS ANGELES VIOLENCE INTERVENTION TRAINING ACADEMY**

The Los Angeles Violence Intervention Training Academy (LAVITA) is a component of the Advancement Project's Urban Peace Academy.<sup>62</sup> LAVITA provides training designed to professionalize CIWs and to provide them with the necessary skills to communicate effectively with other responders, gang members, victims, victims' families, and the community. In addition, LAVITA seeks to encourage the ongoing education of CIWs through the provision of continuing education courses.

### **VI.2.1 Background and Course Certification**

The LAVITA Basic 101 Certification course is a 140-hour lecture-based program. Standards of Practice and Conduct, developed by the Professional Standards Committee (PSC) of the Urban Peace Academy, are used for assessing and certifying Academy participants on the basis of pre/post interviews, pre/post written exams, and a classroom-based conduct and participation point system. Intervention workers who do not have contracts with the GRYD program may also attend this training through self-referral, former graduates' nomination, or referrals from PSC members. LAVITA course material is structured around five core competencies: direct practice, personal development, applied theory, concrete tasks, and broader policy initiatives. In addition to the Basic 101 course, an accelerated training is also offered. While the accelerated course addresses similar topics to the Basic 101 course, its instructional methodology utilizes a seminar format rather than a lecture-based approach.

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<sup>62</sup> For information on the Advancement Project (AP), go to [www.advancementprojectca.org](http://www.advancementprojectca.org). The Urban Peace Academy is one of AP's centers.

The entry and accelerated curriculums share the same broad training objectives:

- To appreciate the contribution to effective intervention at the street level of LAVITA training components at all levels (Entry level, Continuing Education, SNL, and Accelerated);
- To understand the use of a license to operate,<sup>63</sup> mediation, and conflict resolution in creating a safe community;
- To understand ethnic dynamics in relation to the field of gang intervention;
- To understand the public health approach to violence reduction;
- To understand the role of gang intervention within the public health model; and
- To understand the importance of succession planning for sustaining violence reduction efforts.

The Advancement Project launched its first training program in March of 2010. Since the program's inception, 126 participants have received certification through the LAVITA course. Seventy-eight of the participating CIWs have worked in GRYD Zones. Five CIWs participating in Summer Night Lights programming were certified, and forty-three others also received certification.

## VI.2.2 Stakeholder Perceptions

In order to gather stakeholder perceptions of the LAVITA course, surveys and focus groups were conducted with LAVITA students and instructors who participated in the LAVITA program during the fall of 2011. Nine instructors and eight students submitted survey responses. One additional instructor provided focus group input but declined to submit survey responses to the evaluation team. Both the survey and focus groups addressed the overview component of the training – which offers participants exposure to the basics of the program such as its expectations and requirements – and each of its five core components. Respondents were asked to rate the quality of each of the five core training topics as well as each subtopic that the LAVITA curriculum was intended to cover within the five themes. The focus group discussion closely followed the content of the survey, and was intended to elicit more detailed information on stakeholder perceptions. The results are summarized by topic below.

### *Training Overview*

LAVITA training begins with an initial overview component to introduce course participants to program expectations, requirements, standards of conduct, and group agreements. Group activities are also conducted to introduce students, instructors, and administrators.

Both instructors and participants responded positively about the overview component of the training. In particular, survey responses indicated that the discussion of training expectations was effective. In the focus groups, entry level participants suggested that the overview component provided helpful ground rules, basic logistical information, and guidance to support a respectful course environment among participants. Participants in both the entry level and accelerated courses noted that the ground rules introduced by the overview component encouraged honesty and professionalism throughout LAVITA course participation.

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<sup>63</sup> Defined as the gaining and sustaining of street credibility with gangs in the community.

### *Direct Practice*

The direct practice component of LAVITA emphasizes the development of basic skills and knowledge for entry level gang intervention and introduces intervention workers to the basic “dos and don’ts” of gang intervention work. Topics covered in the theme include females in gangs, victims’ services, license to operate, mediation/conflict resolution, community crisis intervention, intervention organizing, creating ceasefires, school-based intervention, hospital intervention, reentry to the community from jail or prison, fire department dynamics, and law enforcement.

Within the direct practice component, the quality of the license to operate training received the most positive survey feedback; most instructors and participants indicated that the training was very helpful. Other topics receiving positive responses (measured by helpful or very helpful responses) from the majority of both instructor and participant survey respondents included victims’ services, community crisis intervention, creating ceasefires, school-based intervention, hospital intervention, and reentry/prison nexus. The quality of the law enforcement dynamics training received the most negative responses, with a third of participants reporting that the training was not helpful.

Three direct practice topics were highlighted during the focus groups: females in gangs, mediation/conflict resolution, and license to operate. Participants felt that the curriculum on females in gangs was insufficient, in both the entry and advanced course. Program participants also noted that the mediation/conflict resolution topic was particularly important to them. But, the difficulty of teaching mediation was also emphasized – a skill that participants believed must be learned through practical experience. In addition, some participants suggested that the mediation role-playing exercise was not helpful because mediation could not be clearly communicated by an individual prior to having experience mediating an actual conflict. Participants disagreed on the effectiveness of the license to operate training. While some participants suggested that the training deserved greater curricular attention, others felt that it was not a teachable skill, but rather one that is closely related to individual intervention worker capabilities and community connections. Instructors also highlighted that training should provide clarification on the role of intervention activities and workers’ and victims’ services as well as the need for additional time dedicated to the topic of females in gangs.

### *Personal Development*

The personal development component of LAVITA aims to cultivate a code of conduct and understanding of professionalism among entry level gang intervention workers. Course instruction seeks to encourage personal insight, self-reflection, and individual growth. Topics covered in this theme include recent cases, CIWs’ roles and responsibilities, ethics, professionalism, leadership, handling individuals with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and healing/reflection.

The ethics, CIWs’ roles and responsibilities training, professionalism, and leadership training were reported as the most helpful by both instructors and participants. The majority of instructors thought all of the topics were either helpful or very helpful. More than half the participants also reported that the CIWs’ roles and responsibilities training was either helpful or very helpful, and nearly half of the participants indicated that the ethics training was very helpful. The majority of participants found both the professionalism and leadership training very helpful as well. Most participants and

instructors expressed either neutral or negative views of the helpfulness of the spirituality, healing and reflection components.

In the focus groups, some students also emphasized the value of the ethics training within the personal development core. It was also suggested that the healing and reflection training stirred bad memories and deep emotions, and that the healing and reflection training was unnecessary or irrelevant to their work as CIWs. Instructors were somewhat more critical in the focus groups than were the surveyed students. In particular, they emphasized the difficulty of leading an effective course on spirituality under the tight five-hour time limit provided in the curriculum. Instructors also agreed that spirituality should not be a priority in the training.

### *Applied Theory*

The applied theory portion of the LAVITA training is intended to promote understanding among CIWs of the ideas supporting proactive peace building and the collaboration-oriented practice of gang intervention. The theme seeks to relate theory to the challenges created by larger community dynamics that crisis intervention work encounters. Topics covered include a basic overview of the public health model of violence reduction, history of gangs and gang intervention, immigration, ethnic dynamics, and application of gang intervention standards.

Survey respondents reported that the public health model overview, ethnic dynamics, and application of gang intervention standards trainings were the most helpful of the applied theory component topics. Most participants and instructors found both topics either helpful or very helpful. Focus group participants felt that the history of gangs and gang intervention topic was helpful, but noted concerns regarding the credibility and veracity of the information presented in the Latino gangs training. They suggested that more personal life experience was necessary to inform teaching about gangs. Several participants agreed that the immigration topic was not fully covered, and also suggested that the training should better address how to obtain tangible resources, such as information on qualified pro bono lawyers and organizations that can assist with green cards, employment, and citizenship.

Some instructors echoed the participants' sentiment that life experience is useful for teaching coursework on gangs. Instructors also suggested that a panel approach would be useful in teaching about gangs and would provide a better opportunity to compare different histories and introduce new perspectives.

### *Concrete Tasks*

The concrete tasks component of the LAVITA training is intended to increase CIWs' concrete skills required to satisfactorily complete the administrative tasks that are associated with gang intervention work. To that end, topics included in the curriculum are basic organization administration concepts, budget and finance tools, program evaluation, proper documentation, and communication protocols.

Most instructors indicated through survey responses that nearly all component trainings for concrete tasks were either helpful or very helpful. Program participants reported less positive perceptions of the concrete task topics. Some student respondents found the budget and finance tools topic not at all helpful and less than a third of respondents found the topic helpful or very helpful. The organizational management concepts, proper documentation and program evaluation topics received the most positive feedback from participants; most participants reported that the three topics were either helpful or very helpful.

Concerns voiced during the focus group regarding the concrete tasks instruction included opinions that it was poorly led, or simply not taught at all in the case of the accelerated course. However, instructors noted that the time limits imposed by the curriculum constricted their ability to effectively teach concrete tasks, though they also did highlight management as being a useful topic.

### *Broader Policy Initiatives*

The broader policy initiatives component is meant to enhance CIWs' understanding of both the local and state policy-making and legal context of gang intervention. Accordingly, topics covered in the training component include legal liability and violence prevention policy at the local and state level.

The broader policy initiatives component received mixed survey responses about all three of its topic areas. Some respondents noted that these topics were simply not covered during their training. However, the majority of students indicated that the legal liability training was helpful or very helpful, while just under half of instructors indicated the same. The focus groups again noted that curriculum time constraints weakened the broader policy initiatives component. While participants noted that the topics provided useful information, they suffered under tight time allotments. Instructors shared this sentiment; while they felt that the legal liability training was helpful, they suggested that handouts and more time for detailed discussion would strengthen the training.

### *Overall Training Perspectives*

Participants at both the entry and accelerated level emphasized the need for increased discussion of immigration as a topical focus. Participants additionally suggested that the curriculum address single parents and family dynamics, poverty dynamics and effects, and community resources. Instructors recommended that additional information on sexuality, school intervention, and reentry all be provided to participants.

Instructors felt that much of the material taught in LAVITA was being utilized by participants in some form or another, particularly mediation and conflict guidance, license to operate, professionalism, and general rubrics and procedures that were discussed throughout the course. Instructors also noted that LAVITA provides an opportunity to build relationships across organizations, equips staff with a standard, helps increase participant self-esteem, and offers a particularly essential training to work with multi-service agencies conducting gang work. Participants agreed on the value of the relationships developed through LAVITA, and said that they shared information regarding license to operate, law enforcement, and how systems work with their colleagues. However, some participants explained that

they were less likely to share information learned in LAVITA with colleagues with extensive field experience because they already had a depth of knowledge regarding intervention work.

Finally, participants recommended that instructors needed to prepare more for their course presentations and emphasized the importance of prior experience working in gang intervention as a prerequisite to serve as an effective instructor. Instructor suggestions reiterated the need for additional materials and handouts to strengthen the training overall.

### VI.3 CRISIS RESPONSE

The crisis response Triangle, made up of individuals from law enforcement (LAPD), GRYD Office Regional Managers (RMs), and Community Intervention Workers (CIWs), was established by the GRYD Office to minimize the effects on communities of serious violent crimes. An incident that is considered to need a crisis response does not have to occur in a GRYD Zone or SNL recreation Area, and it does not have to be gang-related. If it is considered sufficiently serious to disrupt the community, Triangle members will respond. Notification that a critical incident has occurred in a community comes to Triangle members in a number of ways. LAPD may receive a call for service for such an incident and will then notify other Triangle members. Alternatively, CIWs or RMs may get critical incident reports from community members or from other sources. They will then alert LAPD. Once notified, CIWs and RMs determine whether the incident is sufficiently critical for them to go on scene. At the scene, the three Triangle entities seek to coordinate their activities.

The Crisis Response System has a multifaceted approach. Family systems theory, which informs the *Comprehensive Strategy*, suggests that a relational Triangle serves as a source of stability and collective competence when the interaction between the three entities within the Triangle affirms the roles and boundaries of each. This notion is instrumental to the design of the crisis intervention model, and law enforcement, GRYD RMs, and CIWs are expected to systematically engage one another in each of their gang-related incident responses.

The objectives of the Triangle response system include: reducing the likelihood of gang retaliation after gang-involved incidents; providing services and assistance to crime victims and their families; helping to calm community residents through rumor control at the scene; and meeting with community members and personal contacts after the event. In addition, all three parties are to meet on a bi-weekly basis to assess the needs of both victims and their families, and to monitor hot spots with potential for future violence.

The GRYD Office provided the evaluation team with data describing a list of 90 crisis response incidents that occurred from May 1 to June 30, 2012. Prior to this period, GRYD data on incidents were not considered sufficiently dependable or complete to comprise a valid basis for review.<sup>64</sup>

Included in the data were RM and CIW activity log summaries describing these incidents, including location, time of day, number of participants, and actions taken.<sup>65</sup> A brief narrative describing

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<sup>64</sup> Not all report items are included but the complete Quarterly Report is available from the GRYD Office.

the incident is included in the logs. Using this data, three separate topics are examined: 1) how RMs and CIWs were notified about a crisis incident for response, 2) characteristics of those incidents, and 3) actions taken by RMs and CIWs both during and following the incident. A summary of specific activities concerning the incidents that were logged by CIWs is also provided below.<sup>66</sup>

### VI.3.1 Crisis Incident Notification

The crisis intervention response begins when the police are notified of a homicide, shooting, stabbing, or other violent crime considered sufficiently serious to disrupt the community (herein, these are referred to as violent crisis incidents). Through a number of different methods, the other members of the Triangle team are then notified for response. The most common method, as is presented in Table VI.1 below, is through LAPD's Real Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR) system, whereby alerts are transmitted to on-call RMs and CIWs electronically through Blackberry© devices; 60 percent of the RMs and 28.9 percent of the CIWs reported being notified through this method. Among RMs, the next most common method of receiving this information was through personal contact with LAPD officers (23.3 percent), while 7.8 percent also report finding out directly from CIWs. CIWs, in turn, are often notified by RMs or other GRYD staff (26.7 percent) or other CIWs (13.3 percent). They also hear from the community (11.1 percent) and from the police directly (7.8 percent).

	<b>RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>
GRYD Staff	2 (2.2%)	24 (26.7%)
RACR	54 (60.0%)	26 (28.9%)
Community contact	0 (0.0%)	10 (11.1%)
LAPD contact	21 (23.3%)	7 (7.8%)
CIWs	7 (7.8%)	12 (13.3%)
State of City Report	4 (4.4%)	2 (2.2%)
On Site	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.1%)
Other	1 (1.1%)	4 (4.4%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>90</b>

Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012

<sup>65</sup> LAPD reports summarizing the same incidents were not collected by the GRYD Office.

<sup>66</sup> Too few specific RM activities were recorded for analysis. Not all individual report items are included, but the complete Quarterly Report is available from the GRYD Office.

### VI.3.2 Characteristics of Crisis Incidents

Crisis response is not constricted by GRYD or SNL Area boundaries. As is seen in Table VI.2, RMs reported that 58.9 percent of the incidents were located outside the GRYD Zones and about 95 percent were outside of the SNL parks.

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Total</b>
Inside GRYD	37 (41.1%)	53 (58.9%)	90
In or Around an SNL Park	4 (4.4%)	86 (95.5%)	90
On School Grounds	2 (2.2%)	88 (97.8%)	90
In Public Housing	0 (0.0%)	90 (100%)	90

Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012

As can be seen in Table VI.3, while most incidents were outside of GRYD program areas, the vast majority were nevertheless reported to be gang-related (91.1 percent according to RMs, and 95.6 percent according to CIWs).<sup>67</sup> The large majority of violent incident victims were reported to have been shot, and both the RMs and CIWs indicated that nearly 17 percent were homicide victims. Compared to the number of homicides reported in Los Angeles during the period covered by the reports we reviewed, it seems evident that crisis responses were made in the majority of cases. Similarly, assuming that the all reported incidents match actual incidents, the reported data indicate that a large majority of shooting incidents received a Triangle response. An average of 70<sup>68</sup> shootings were reported per month in the first six months of 2012.

Both the GRYD RMs and CIWs also report that the majority of victims were in the age range of 16 to 25 (53.1 percent and 58.6 percent, respectively). The next largest age group of crisis incident victims was over 25 years of age. Only one victim was reported to be less than nine years of age, and none were reported to be in the 10 to 15 year old category.

<sup>67</sup> The difference between CIW and RM classifications may be because the two reports are completed at different times and reflect the (possibly incomplete) information available to the respondent at the time the report is made.

<sup>68</sup> Los Angeles Police Department, 2012 Mid-Year Crime Snapshot, [www.lapd.org](http://www.lapd.org).

Table VI.3 Crisis Incident Characteristics		
	RMs - Number of Incidents Reported	CIWs - Number of Incidents Reported
Gang-Related	82 (91.1%)	86 (95.6%)
	RMs – Number of Victims	CIWs – Number of Victims
Homicide	19 (16.5%)	21 (17.2%)
Shooting	91 (79.1%)	90 (73.8%)
Stabbing, other	5 (4.3%)	11 (9.0%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>122</b>
	RMs – Age of Victims	CIWs – Age of Victims
0-9	1 (.9%)	1 (.9%)
10-15	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
16-25	60 (53.1%)	65 (58.6%)
25+	52 (46.0%)	45 (40.5%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>111</b>

Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012

### VI.3.3 Actions Taken

The kinds of potential actions taken during crisis response incidents by RMs and CIWs vary, depending on their different roles during a crisis. Table VI.4 highlights the types of responses for each group. Note that the number of actions exceeds the number of incidents, as a responder could initiate multiple actions. However, the percentages are calculated on the basis of the 90 incidents in order to describe the likelihood that RMs or CIWs would engage in certain actions for incidents.

According to their reports, actually arriving at the scene of a crisis location is not always required. This is particularly the case for RMs, who only go to the crime scene 21.1 percent of the time and to hospitals to visit victims (if relevant) only 4.4 percent of the time. Instead, RMs' most common immediate action is the collection and dissemination of information with others about the incident by telephone or e-mail.

In contrast, CIWs are more likely to proceed to the location of an incident. They reported responding to the crime scene 68.9 percent of the time, to the community where the incident took place 52.2 percent of the time, and to the hospital 35.6 percent of the time. Like RMs, CIWs often engaged in communication activities; they reportedly canvassed the neighborhood around the crisis incident (77.7 percent) and just over half of the time helped with rumor control in the community. Less frequently (24.4 percent), CIWs reported connecting the victim or victims' families to support services, such as counseling and medical assistance. Among CIWs, crowd control and peacekeeping negotiations were much less frequently performed.


<b>Table VI.4</b>		
<b>Number of Incidents in Which Actions Were Taken</b>		
	<b>RMs – Number of Actions Reported</b>	<b>CIWs – Number of Actions Reported</b>
Nothing, not gang-related	0 (0.0%)	7 (7.8%)
Responded to crime scene	19 (21.1%)	62 (68.9%)
Responded to hospital	4 (4.4%)	32 (35.6%)
Responded to place in community	2 (2.2%)	47 (52.2%)
Made phone calls/e-mails to collect information	80 (88.9%)	66 (73.3%)
Canvassed the community/outreach	N/A	70 (77.8%)
Controlled rumor diffusion	N/A	46 (51.1%)
Connected victim or victim's family to services	N/A	22 (24.4%)
Crowd control	N/A	5 (5.6%)
Ceasefire/re negotiate agreements	N/A	0 (0.0%)
Ceasefire/negotiate new agreement	N/A	3 (3.3%)
Other	7 (7.8%)	4 (4.4%)
<b>Totals (more than one action could be taken per incident)</b>	<b>90 incidents 112 reported actions</b>	<b>90 incidents 364 reported actions</b>
Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012		
Note: N/A indicates an activity that is not a RM responsibility		

As discussed earlier, the role of the crisis response Triangle team is not meant to terminate when they leave the scene. Triangle members are also responsible for a variety of follow-up activities in the days following a violent situation. RMs report that the most common follow-up action in which they engaged was contacting LAPD, including the detective investigating the incident. They also reported contacting victims' families, although this was rare, as only 4.4 percent of the incidents involved family follow-up. On the other hand, CIWs appeared to be active in post-incident outreach activities: in 27.8 percent of the incidents, they made contact with the victim's family; in 18.9 percent of the incidents, they followed up with groups affiliated with the victims; and in 22.2 percent of the situations, they had further contact with LAPD detectives.

<b>Table VI.5</b>		
<b>Follow-Up Contacts After Crisis Response</b>		
	<b>RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>
	<b>Number of Actions Reported</b>	<b>Number of Actions Reported</b>
Contact victim's family	4 (4.4%)	25 (27.8%)
Contact Council office	1 (1.1%)	6 (6.7%)
Contact LAUSD	1 (1.1%)	13 (14.4%)
Contact LAPD/Detective	75 (83.3%)	20 (22.2%)
Contact with victim or perpetrator's affiliated groups	N/A	17 (18.9%)
Other	9 (10.0%)	20 (22.2%)
N/A	5 (5.6%)	0 (0.0%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>90 Incidents</b> <b>95 reported actions</b>	<b>90 incidents</b> <b>101 reported actions</b>
Source: GRYD Office Quarterly Report (Harder+Company) – May 1 to June 30, 2012		

As noted earlier, CIWs are also required to maintain individual activity logs. The activities reported in these logs are aggregated across all incidents, and the most prevalent activities reported are illustrated in Figure VI.1. The most common intervention activity reported by CIWs was street outreach (18 percent of reported activities), followed by school outreach (16 percent), monitoring potential street hotspots (9 percent), and providing safe passages to local residents (9 percent). Participating in local activities and contact with victims support groups were less common. The large “other” category combines a wide variety of additional reported activities, none of which accounted for more than 4 percent of the total reported.

**Figure VI.1**  
**Summary of CIW Crisis Incident Activities**  
(Source: CIW Activity Logs)



## VI.4 TRIANGLE GROUP MEMBER SURVEYS

To assess the effectiveness of the Triangle response, web-based surveys were conducted of the lead crisis response Triangle members for thirty-four randomly selected violent incidents that took place from January to May 2012.<sup>69</sup> The surveys were anonymous. A brief summary of the incident was provided to each respondent based upon GRYD Office incident documentation, and each respondent was asked to provide their perceptions about Triangle roles and collaboration, short term response outcomes, and longer term outcomes for that particular incident alone. Thus, the responses are aggregations of incident-specific perceptions, not general views of the Triangle Crisis Response System.

Across the thirty-four incidents, there were twenty-nine responses from RMs, twenty-eight responses from CIWs, and thirteen responses from LAPD officers or commanders. In other words, there were some incidents for which not all three groups responded. In fact, responses from each of the three Triangle members were gathered with respect to only seven of the incidents, although only one incident did not receive a response from any member of the Triangle team. The survey results across all of the incidents are presented in the following tables.

### VI.4.1 On Scene Roles and Collaboration

Table VI.6 presents Triangle member responses concerning their perceptions of the clarity of other team members' roles during the violent incidents to which the team responded. All of the GRYD RMs reported that the role of LAPD was clear to them during the crisis response in question, and they thought the GRYD RMs' role was also clear to other team members. Slightly less (96.4 percent) were clear about the role of the CIWs. CIWs also reported that they understood the GRYD staff members' role (100 percent). Ninety-three percent of CIWs felt that they were clear about the role of LAPD and that other team members were clear about the CIWs' role in the incident. LAPD respondents were not as positive about roles, however, although a majority (75 percent) felt that the roles of the GRYD Office and CIWs were clear. Seventy-five percent of LAPD also felt that other team members understood the role of the police in the incident.

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<sup>69</sup> A copy of the surveys can be found in **Appendices E and F**.

<b>Respondents Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing to the Following Statements</b>	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. It was clear to me what the role of the GRYD staff was during this incident.	N/A	28 (100%)	9 (75.0%)
2. It was clear to me what the role of the LAPD was during this incident.	28 (100%)	26 (93.0%)	N/A
3. It was clear to me what the role of CIWs was during this incident.	27 (96.4%)	N/A	9 (75.0%)
4. It appeared to be clear to the GRYD staff and the LAPD what the role of the CIWs was during this incident.	N/A	26 (93.0%)	N/A
5. It appeared to be clear to the CIWs and the LAPD what the role of the GRYD Office was during this incident.	28 (100%)	N/A	N/A
6. It appeared to be clear to the GRYD staff and CIWs what the role of the LAPD was during this incident.	N/A	N/A	9 (75.0%)
7. The three Triangle partners were able to do their jobs without stepping on each other's toes.	28 (100%)	27 (96.4%)	9 (75.0%)

When asked about being able to do their jobs without stepping on other Triangle team members' toes, all of the RMs agreed, as did 96.4 percent of the CIWs. The majority of LAPD respondents also agreed with this statement, although the percentage (75 percent) was substantially lower than the other two groups.

Table VI.7 presents the perceptions of crisis response teams regarding the extent of communication between the team members and first responders. Once again, GRYD RMs were positive in their opinions of team communications. All surveyed RMs felt that information was shared by LAPD with them, and 96.4 percent were similarly positive about CIW information sharing. CIWs were somewhat less positive, with 82.1 percent indicating there was some or extensive communication from LAPD and the GRYD Office with them. LAPD officers were the least positive, with 75 percent reporting communication by RMs and CIWs with them.

There was substantial variation when asked about communications by other first respondents, such as the County Sheriff's department, or the Fire Department. Only 10 percent of GRYD RMs, and 35.7 percent of CIWs, reported having communication with other crisis responders. Eighty-three percent of LAPD officers reported some or extensive communication with other first responders, which is likely consistent with their primary public safety role on scene.

<b>Respondents Saying Extensive or Some to the Following Questions</b>	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. The extent to which information was shared with me by GRYD staff	N/A	23 (82.1%)	9 (75.0%)
2. The extent to which information was shared with me by LAPD	28 (100%)	23 (82.1%)	N/A
3. The extent to which information was shared with me by CIWs	27 (96.4%)	N/A	9 (75.0%)
4. The extent to which information was shared with me by other responders (such as fire and rescue)	3 (10.7%)	10 (35.7%)	10 (83.3%)

Triangle members' perceptions of their own communication with members of the team and with other first responders are presented in Table VI.8. The perception of GRYD RMs regarding their own communication with others was the same as communications by others with them; all of the RMs indicated that they communicated extensively or somewhat with LAPD and 96.4 percent said the same about communication with CIWs. Only 10.7 percent said they communicated with other first responders. Eighty-two percent of the CIWs reported communicating with GRYD staff, but only 64.3 percent said the same about communicating with LAPD. Equal majorities (75 percent) of LAPD officers reported communicating with GRYD RMs and CIWs. The large majority (83.3 percent) of officers also said they communicated with other first responders, while about a third of CIWs reported communication with this group and just 10.7 percent of GRYD RMs responded similarly.

<b>Respondents Saying Extensive or Some to the Following Questions</b>	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. The extent to which information was shared by me with GRYD staff	N/A	23 (82.1%)	9 (75.0%)
2. The extent to which information was shared by me with LAPD	28 (100%)	18 (64.3%)	N/A
3. The extent to which information was shared by me with CIWs	27 (96.4%)	N/A	9 (75.0%)
4. The extent to which information was shared by me with other responders (such as fire and rescue)	3 (10.7%)	9 (32.1%)	10 (83.3%)

As can be seen in Table VI.9, a minority of the Triangle response teams (25.0 percent of LAPD officers, 21.4 percent of CIWs, and 17.9 percent of RMs) felt that on-scene coordination and communication could have been improved for the particular incident in question. The most common observation was that more specific details on the incident, and receiving accurate information in a timelier manner, would have been helpful.

	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
<b>Yes</b>	5 (17.9%)	6 (21.4%)	3 (25.0%)
<b>No</b>	23 (82.1%)	22 (78.6%)	9 (75.0%)

#### **VI.4.2 Short Term Incident Outcomes**

Table VI.10 summarizes the perceptions of Triangle members about the short term (same day or night) outcomes resulting from their crisis responses to incidents. Majorities of all three groups agreed that the incident in question was quickly controlled, that timely information was provided to the community, and that rumors and fears in the community were effectively suppressed. There was less agreement about short term conflict resolution, however; while 75 percent of CIWs felt that tensions among incident participants were reduced in the short term, only 58.3 percent of LAPD respondents and 42.9 percent of GRYD RMs agreed. Similarly, 44.4 percent of CIWs said that conflicts were mediated on scene, but only about a quarter of LAPD officers and GRYD RMs agreed. Majorities of all three groups responded that they agreed that short term retaliation was prevented, and that timely medical and social services were provided.

<b>Respondents Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing to the Following Statements</b>	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. This incident was quickly controlled.	20 (71.4%)	24 (88.9%)	11 (91.7%)
2. Tensions among incident participants were reduced.	12 (42.9%)	21 (75.0%)	7 (58.3%)
3. Conflicts were mediated on scene.	8 (28.6%)	12 (44.4%)	3 (25.0%)
4. Others at the incident were calmed down (bystanders, relatives, passerby, etc.).	12 (42.9%)	17 (60.7%)	7 (58.3%)
5. Short term retaliation was prevented.	17 (60.7%)	23 (82.1%)	8 (66.7%)
6. Timely emergency medical services were provided.	20 (74.1%)	19 (67.9%)	11 (91.7%)
7. Other timely social services for victims and their families were provided (counseling, etc.).	18 (64.3%)	16 (57.1%)	7 (58.3%)
8. Timely and effective information about the incident was provided to the community.	27 (96.4%)	25 (89.3%)	9 (75.0%)
9. Rumors and fears in the community about this incident were effectively controlled.	27 (96.4%)	26 (96.3%)	9 (75.0%)

### VI.4.3 Longer Term Incident Outcomes

The extent to which the different Triangle member groups engaged in longer term (during the days following the incident) follow-up activities varied. As shown in Table VI.11, majorities of both the GYRD RMs and LAPD officers reported that they were involved in follow-up criminal investigations. A majority (64.3 percent) of the CIWs noted that they held follow-up meetings with victims' families, and majorities of both LAPD respondents and CIWs said they continued to monitor potential hot spots afterwards. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the RMs cited debriefings with other Triangle members as something they engaged in after the incident was over. Most of the other activities associated with the crisis incident model were not reportedly undertaken by majorities of any of the three groups.

<b>Respondents Saying They Engaged in Activities Following an Incident</b>	<b>GYRD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. Follow-up criminal investigation	14 (50.0%)	8 (28.6%)	8 (66.7%)
2. Community meetings	--	11 (39.3%)	3 (25.0%)
3. Follow-up meetings with victim(s)	4 (14.3%)	10 (35.7%)	3 (25.0%)
4. Follow-up meetings with victims family	4 (14.3%)	18 (64.3%)	8 (66.7%)
5. Outreach to victims gang/fellow gang members	4 (14.3%)	17 (60.7%)	--
6. Outreach to rival gangs/gang members	2 (7.1%)	9 (32.1%)	1 (8.3%)
7. Debriefing meetings with other Triangle member	19 (67.9%)	11 (39.3%)	2 (16.7%)
8. Interviews/communication with media	--	1 (3.6%)	--
9. Monitored potential hot spots	8 (28.6%)	27 (96.4%)	8 (66.7%)

As demonstrated below in Table VI.12, respondents generally believed that there were no directly related violent incidents in the days following the incident in question, with roughly two-thirds of each group responding “no” to the survey question. LAPD personnel were most likely to state that a related violent incident did occur, but only 16.7 percent answered affirmatively. Nearly 30 percent of the CIWs said that they did not know if there were any related violent incidents afterwards, as did a quarter of the RMs and 16.7 percent of the LAPD officers.

<b>Table VI.12</b>			
<b>Triangle Members Perceptions of Whether There Were Any Violent Incidents Related to This One in the Days Following</b>			
	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. Yes	2 (7.1%)	1 (3.7%)	2 (16.7%)
2. No	19 (67.9%)	18 (66.7%)	8 (66.7%)
3. Don't Know	7 (25.0%)	8 (29.6%)	2 (16.7%)

Respondents were also asked to consider violence levels in the vicinity of each crisis response incident in the days following its occurrence. Table VI.13 shows that CIWs were overwhelmingly (70.4 percent) of the opinion that violence levels did not change in the days following the incident, while only one quarter of the responding RMs and LAPD officers agreed that violence levels were left unchanged. Half of the LAPD officers responded that they felt violent crimes in the vicinity of the incident decreased in the days following the incident, as did 39.3 percent of the RMs. Few respondents suggested that crime increased in the area after the incident and crisis response occurred, though 35.7 percent of RMs and 8.3 percent of LAPD indicated that they did not know whether violence had changed or not in the following days.

	<b>GRYD RMs</b>	<b>CIWs</b>	<b>LAPD</b>
1. No, it was the same as before	7 (25.0%)	19 (70.4%)	3 (25.0%)
2. Yes, violent crimes such as this one declined	11 (39.3%)	6 (22.2%)	6 (50.0%)
3. Yes, violent crimes such as this one increased	--	2 (7.4%)	2 (16.7%)
4. Don't Know	10 (35.7%)	--	1 (8.3%)

#### **VI.4.4 Summary**

The Triangle survey responses and additional respondent comments revealed a general consensus among the members of the three respondent groups that their individual roles were clear and understood by other members responding to violent crisis incidents. Majorities of all three groups also reportedly shared information with other team members and felt that information was shared with them. Most also indicated that they did not think coordination and communication could have been improved. There was less agreement about the short term incident outcomes, although most felt that the incident in question was effectively controlled, that timely services were provided, that information was effectively shared with the community, and that rumors and fears were controlled. Longer term follow-up activities by members of the Triangle appeared mixed in the days after the violent incident response, and participation in these activities varied across the groups. There was general consensus that related violent incidents did not take place following the team's crisis response, but views of the effects of the incident on nearby violence in the days following were again more mixed.

## VI.5 LAPD PERSONNEL VIEWS OF GRYD

In order to gather views on gang activity in Los Angeles and the operation and effectiveness of the GRYD program in GRYD Zones and SNL Areas, web-based surveys were submitted to a representative stratified random sample of 449 LAPD personnel who worked in LAPD areas that contained a GRYD Zone and/or SNL recreation center.<sup>70</sup> The sample included patrol officers, detectives, supervisors and senior management. The survey was anonymous. Respondent identifiers were not included in survey responses, and neither LAPD nor the Los Angeles Mayor's Office was given access to sample identifiers.

The survey response rate was disappointingly low. Only 68 of the 449 personnel sample returned a survey --too few to be considered representative of the LAPD staff working in the LAPD areas from which the sampling frame was drawn. The results reported below should therefore be considered to have come from a convenience sample rather than a randomized sample.

The survey sought information on the respondents' background characteristics, employment, familiarity with GRYD and SNL programs and activities, interactions and perspectives about GRYD Zones and SNL Areas, including perceptions of community changes in the past year. The survey questions were structured to gather information regarding LAPD personnel's experience over the past year, in order to focus on the year 3 evaluation period. Survey responses are thus based on LAPD experience from the summer of 2011 until the summer of 2012 (when surveys were conducted).

### VI.5.1 Characteristics of Respondents

The majority of respondents were patrol officers (63.2 percent). A sizable percentage was comprised of first line supervisors (16.2 percent), followed by mid-level commanders (10.3 percent), detectives (7.4 percent), and senior-level managers (2.9 percent). Tenure with LAPD ranged from less than 1 year to 31 years, with a mean of 13.13 years. The most common duty locations were Seventy-Seventh Street II, Southwest, Mission, and Foothill. Areas in which the lowest numbers of respondents reported working included Topanga, Harbor, Hollywood, West Valley, Pacific, North Hollywood, and Olympic.

### VI.5.2 Familiarity with GRYD and SNL

The first topic explored in this survey was LAPD personnel's familiarity with GRYD and SNL components, including Community Action Teams, Community Education Campaigns, the Crisis Response System, the Gun Buy-Back program, Gang Joining Prevention Services, Intervention Case Management with Gang Members, and the Watts Region Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) Task Force.<sup>71</sup> As presented in Table V.14, a majority of respondents reported some level of familiarity with

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<sup>70</sup> We appreciate the support and co-operation of LAPD Deputy Chief Robert Green and the Police Protective League. The survey would not have been possible without their assistance in approving the survey protocol and developing the sampling frame of more than 2500 officers from which the Urban Institute evaluation team independently and confidentially drew the sample.

<sup>71</sup> Initiated in late 2011, the Watts Region HACLA Task Force is a special public housing oriented effort in Watts targeting gang violence in collaboration with the GRYD program.

the Community Action Teams (56.7 percent), the Crisis Response System (62.9 percent), the Gun Buy-Back program (91.9 percent), Gang Joining Prevention Services (60.3 percent), Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (58.3 percent), and the Summer Night Lights program (88.9 percent). The Watts Regional HACLA Task Force and the Community Education Campaign were not familiar at all to a majority of the respondents (51.7 percent and 55 percent, respectively).

<b>GRYD Program Components</b>	<b>Very familiar</b>	<b>Somewhat familiar</b>	<b>Not familiar at all</b>
Community Action Teams (N=60)	13 (21.7%)	21 (35.0%)	26 (43.3%)
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD Schools (N=60)	7 (11.7%)	20 (33.3%)	33 (55%)
Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs (N=62)	20 (32.3%)	19 (30.6%)	23 (37.1%)
Gun Buy-Back Program (N=62)	26 (41.9%)	31 (50%)	5 (8.1%)
Gang Joining Prevention Services (N=58)	14 (24.1%)	21 (36.2%)	23 (39.7%)
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (N=60)	18 (30%)	17 (28.3%)	25 (41.7%)
Summer Night Lights (N=63)	34 (54%)	22 (34.9%)	7 (11.1%)
Watts Region HACLA Task Force (N=60)	9 (15%)	20 (33.3%)	31 (51.7%)

LAPD staff members were also asked about the extent to which they have actually spent time working with different GRYD programs. Table VI.15 shows that, with the exception of the Summer Night Lights component – on which 59.7 percent reportedly spent some or a lot of time working – the majority of respondents reported spending no time with each of the GRYD program components listed. The components with which LAPD staff reported spending no time were the Community Education Campaign with LAUSD schools (80 percent) and Watts Region HACLA Task Force (83.3 percent) components.

<b>GRYD Program Components</b>	<b>A lot of my time was spent with this component</b>	<b>Some of my time was spent with this component</b>	<b>None of my time was spent with this component</b>
Community Action Teams (N=60)	3 (5%)	14 (23.3%)	43 (71.7%)
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD Schools (N=60)	--	12 (20%)	48 (80%)
Crisis Response System with GRYD and CIWs (N=61)	4 (6.6%)	22 (36.1%)	35 (57.4%)
Gun Buy-Back Program (N=61)	4 (6.6%)	20 (32.8%)	37 (60.7%)
Gang Joining Prevention Services (N=60)	2 (3.3%)	17 (28.3%)	41 (68.3%)
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (N=62)	1 (1.6%)	15 (24.2%)	46 (74.2%)
Summer Night Lights (N=62)	10 (16.1%)	27 (43.5%)	25 (40.3%)
Watts Region HACLA Task Force (N=60)	1 (1.7%)	9 (15%)	50 (83.3%)

### VI.5.3 Interaction with GRYD Zones

#### *Contribution of GRYD Components to LAPD Personnel's Work*

Surveying LAPD personnel allowed for some understanding of the respondents' work in GRYD Zones and their perceptions of the degree to which the GRYD components were helpful to their work. As is presented in Table VI.16, most GRYD programs were viewed as neither helpful nor unhelpful by the respondents. The components deemed to be the most helpful were the Gun Buy-Back program (which 42.3 percent felt was helpful) and SNL (which 45 percent felt was helpful). The most negative responses surrounded the intervention case management component, with nearly 14 percent reporting that GRYD intervention case management with gang members was very unhelpful.

<b>GRYD Program Components</b>	<b>Very helpful</b>	<b>Somewhat helpful</b>	<b>Neither helpful nor unhelpful</b>	<b>Somewhat unhelpful</b>	<b>Very unhelpful</b>
Community Action Teams (N=57)	3 (5.3%)	12 (21.1%)	36 (63.2%)	--	6 (10.5%)
Community Education Campaign with LAUSD Schools (N=56)	3 (5.4%)	9 (16.1%)	38 (67.9%)	--	6 (10.7%)
Crisis Response System with GRYD staff and Community Intervention Workers (N=59)	4 (6.8%)	15 (25.4%)	30 (50.8%)	3 (5.1%)	7 (11.9%)
Gun Buy-Back Program (N=59)	14 (23.7%)	11 (18.6%)	25 (42.4%)	2 (3.4%)	7 (11.9%)
Gang Joining Prevention Services (N=56)	5 (8.9%)	11 (19.6%)	30 (53.6%)	3 (5.4%)	7 (12.5%)
Intervention Case Management with Gang Members (N=58)	5 (8.6%)	10 (17.2%)	32 (55.2%)	3 (5.2%)	8 (13.8%)
Summer Night Lights (N=60)	10 (16.7%)	17 (28.3%)	21 (35%)	4 (6.7%)	8 (13.3%)
Watts Region HACLA Task Force (N=56)	5 (8.9%)	12 (21.4%)	32 (57.1%)	1 (1.8%)	6 (10.7%)

### *Work in the GRYD Zones and Perception of Community Changes in Past Year*

All respondents worked in LAPD areas where GRYD Zones or SNL parks are located. However, only two-thirds of the LAPD respondents said that they had actually worked in a GRYD Zone over the past year. These zones included Watts-Southeast (16.7 percent), 77<sup>th</sup> II (14.3 percent), Panorama City (11.9 percent), and Southwest II (11.9 percent). They also mentioned working in Boyle Heights, Florence Graham, and Ramona Gardens (each with 1 respondent, or 2.4 percent of the sample), although to a much lesser extent.

Those who actually worked in one or more of the 12 GRYD Zones in the previous year were asked to compare gang violence, gang visibility, community senses of safety, and community sense of trust in police at the time of the survey to the previous year. As is seen in Table VI.17 below, most respondents felt that the visibility of gangs did not change in the past year, although just over a third suggested that the visibility was somewhat lower. Further, respondents' views were very mixed on the level of gang violence in the past year. Some respondents believed levels were somewhat higher (17.1 percent), while a sizable group (34.1 percent) felt that there was no change, and a larger group (36.6 percent) believed that levels of gang violence were somewhat lower. In addition, more of the respondents felt that either the community's sense of safety was somewhat higher than about a year ago (36.6 percent) or that there was no change in the community's sense of safety as compared to a year ago (39 percent). And finally, a majority of respondents felt that community trust of the police was somewhat higher than a year ago (53.7 percent), while 36.6 percent felt that there was no change in community trust of the police.

	<b>Much higher</b>	<b>Somewhat higher</b>	<b>No change</b>	<b>Somewhat lower</b>	<b>Much lower</b>	<b>Don't know/no opinion</b>
Visibility of gangs (N=41)	--	5 (12.2%)	21 (51.2%)	11 (26.8%)	4 (9.8%)	--
The level of gang violence (N=41)	1 (2.4%)	7 (17.1%)	14 (34.1%)	15 (36.6%)	4 (9.8%)	--
The community's sense of safety (N=41)	1 (2.4%)	15 (36.6%)	16 (39%)	5 (12.2%)	3 (7.3%)	1 (2.4%)
Community trust of the police (N=41)	2 (4.9%)	22 (53.7%)	15 (36.6%)	1 (2.4%)	--	1 (2.4%)

### *Opinions on GRYD's Crisis Response System*

As was discussed in the earlier section, LAPD personnel play a central role in the GRYD Crisis Response System, alongside CIWs and GRYD Office RMs. However, only a small proportion of LAPD respondents to the general survey (22.5 percent) were personally involved in a Triangle response to a

crisis incident during 2011. Their responses are presented below. None of them were included in the Triangle survey discussed above.

As Table VI.18 reveals, responses varied greatly for each of the five measures of effectiveness. Notably, a consistent 22 to 26.8 percent of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that each of the components was effective. However, on balance, more respondents agreed that the teams were effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident (49.3 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion regarding this matter; more respondents agreed that the teams helped to dispel/manage rumors following a gang-related incident (41.5 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion regarding this matter; more respondents did not agree that/didn't know/had no opinion regarding whether the teams reduced the likelihood of retaliation among gang members (41.4 percent) than those who did agree; more respondents agreed that LAPD is able to effectively communicate/work with intervention workers in response to crisis incidents (41.5 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion regarding this matter; and more respondents agreed that LAPD is able to effectively communicate/work with GRYD staff in response to crisis incidents (51.3 percent) than those who did not agree/didn't know/had no opinion.

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree or disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know/no opinion</b>
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has been effective in reducing tensions in the community following a crisis incident. (N=41)	5 (12.2%)	13 (37.1%)	9 (22%)	6 (14.6%)	4 (9.8%)	4 (9.8%)
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and community intervention workers has helped to dispel or manage rumors following a gang-related violent incident. (N=41)	7 (17.1%)	10 (24.4%)	10 (24.4%)	5 (12.2%)	5 (12.2%)	4 (9.8%)
The interaction between LAPD, GRYD staff and intervention workers has reduced the likelihood of retaliation among gang members. (N=41)	6 (14.6%)	9 (22%)	9 (22%)	6 (14.6%)	5 (12.2%)	6 (14.6%)
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with intervention workers in response to crisis incidents. (N=41)	5 (12.2%)	12 (9.3%)	11 (26.8%)	6 (14.6%)	4 (9.8%)	3 (7.3%)
LAPD is able to effectively communicate and work with GRYD staff in response to crisis incidents. (N=41)	4 (9.8%)	17 (41.5%)	11 (26.8%)	4 (9.8%)	2 (4.9%)	3 (7.3%)

## VI.5.4 Interaction with Summer Night Lights

Twenty-three LAPD survey respondents reported working in eleven Summer Night Lights parks during the summer of 2011.<sup>72</sup> Respondents were asked to describe the impacts of SNL in the community *during* the summer of 2011 and then *following* the 2011 SNL program. The survey asked respondents to rate the impacts of the program in the following areas: improved public safety, reduced gang conflicts, presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs, reduced inter-gang violence, improved relations between the police and the community, improved quality of life in the community, and increased access to positive alternative activities for youth. The respondents' perceptions are presented in Table VI.19.

### *Perceptions of Impacts of SNL*

While the majority of respondents (56.5 percent) reported a high level of impact of SNL on safety during the 2011 SNL, views on the impacts following its completion were less positive. The majority of respondents (63.6 percent) reported that the SNL program would have no effect on community safety after the 2011 SNL ended. Responses were mixed about the effects of SNL on gang violence; while 52 percent of respondents reported that the SNL program had some impact on reducing gang violence (ranging from very low to very high), 47.8 percent reported the SNL program had no effect at all on reducing gang violence during the 2011 program. Positive responses declined when asked about when SNL 2011 ends; the majority of respondents (63.6 percent) reported that the SNL program would have no impact on gang conflict reduction once SNL 2011 ended.

LAPD personnel also provided mixed responses about opportunities for peaceful engagement resulting from the SNL program season. While 39.1 percent of respondents believed that the program impact was high during the 2011 SNL, 34.8 percent of respondents saw no effect at all during the same time period. The remaining respondents reported a low program impact. Perceptions captured by the survey suggest that the impact of the 2011 SNL on peaceful opportunities would decline after programming ceased. Exactly half of respondents saw no effect at all on opportunities for peaceful engagement following the end of the 2011 SNL.

During the 2011 SNL season, 39.1 percent of LAPD staff saw no program effect on inter-gang violence. Fewer respondents saw a likely positive impact following the 2011 SNL program's end, with 63.6 percent reporting that the SNL program would have no effect on inter-gang violence after summer programming ended. LAPD respondents also reported high program impact on improving relations (47.8 percent) while the 2011 SNL season was active. Just over 30 percent of respondents saw no effect during the same time period. Fewer officers reported positive feedback for after SNL 2011 ended.

Perceptions of LAPD staff regarding the SNL 2011 impact on quality of life in the community revealed that the majority of respondents (61.9 percent) reported a high impact on the quality of life in

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<sup>72</sup> SNL parks where LAPD survey respondents reported working included: Cypress Park Recreation Center, Jordan Downs, Jim Gilliam Park, Jackie Tatum Harvard Park, Van Ness Recreation Center, Sepulveda Park, Lafayette Recreation Center, El Sereno Recreation Center, South Park Recreation Center, Imperial Courts, and Martin Luther King Jr. Recreation Center.

the community during SNL. As with other questions, perceptions of the impact of the program after the 2011 SNL season declined. While 36.4 percent of respondents still reported a high or very high impact, 45.5 percent of respondents perceived no impact at all after SNL ended.

LAPD staff also shared their perceptions on whether the SNL program increased youth access to positive alternative activities to gang membership, and the majority of respondents provided positive feedback regarding the periods both during and after the 2011 SNL. A high majority of respondents (82.6 percent) reported that the 2011 SNL program had, to different degrees, a high impact on increasing youth access to alternatives while programming was active, while a majority (54.6 percent) reported that the impact would be sustained at high levels after the 2011 SNL ended.

Table VI.19 – Perceived Impacts of SNL					
	Very low	Low	No effect	High	Very high
<b>Community Safety</b>					
Improved community safety during 2011 SNL (N=23)	2 (8.7%)	1 (4.3%)	7 (30.4%)	9 (39.1%)	4 (17.4%)
Improved community safety after 2011 SNL (N=22)	2 (9.1%)	1 (4.5%)	14 (63.6%)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)
<b>Reduced Gang Conflicts</b>					
Reduced gang conflicts during 2011 SNL (N=23)	3 (13.0%)	3 (13.0%)	11 (47.8%)	5 (21.7%)	1 (4.3%)
Reduced gang conflicts after 2011 SNL (N=22)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)	14 (63.6%)	3 (13.6%)	—
<b>Opportunities for Peaceful Engagement</b>					
Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs during 2011 SNL (N=23)	6 (26.1%)	--	8 (34.8%)	5 (21.7%)	4 (17.4%)
Presenting opportunities for peaceful engagement across gangs after 2011 SNL (N=22)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)	11 (50.0%)	5 (22.7%)	1 (4.5%)
<b>Reduced Gang Violence</b>					
Reduced inter-gang violence during 2011 SNL (N=23)	3 (13.0%)	4 (17.4%)	9 (39.1%)	4 (17.4%)	3 (13.0%)
Reduced inter-gang violence after 2011 SNL (N=22)	3 (13.6%)	2 (9.1%)	14 (63.6%)	2 (9.1%)	1 (4.5%)

Table VI.19 – Perceived Impacts of SNL (cont.)					
	Very low	Low	No effect	High	Very high
<b>Relationships with the Police</b>					
Improved relations between the police and the community during 2011 SNL (N=23)	1 (4.3%)	4 (17.4%)	7 (30.4%)	7 (30.4%)	4 (17.4%)
Improved relations between the police and the community after 2011 SNL (N=22)	2 (9.1%)	4 (18.2%)	7 (31.8%)	7 (31.8%)	2 (9.1%)
<b>Quality of Life</b>					
Improved quality of life in the community during 2011 SNL (N=21)	--	3 (14.3%)	5 (23.8%)	10 (47.6%)	3 (14.3%)
Improved quality of life in the community after 2011 SNL (N=22)	1 (4.5%)	3 (13.6%)	10 (45.5%)	6 (27.3%)	2 (9.1%)
<b>Access to Positive Alternatives for Youth</b>					
Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth during 2011 SNL (N=23)	1 (4.3%)	2 (8.7%)	1 (4.3%)	13 (56.5%)	6 (26.1%)
Increased access to positive alternative activities for youth after 2011 SNL (N=22)	1 (4.5%)	3 (13.6%)	6 (27.3%)	10 (45.5%)	2 (9.1%)

## VI.6 CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this chapter is generally supportive of the conclusion that activities supported by the GRYD Office are being implemented and are having desired outcomes consistent with the GRYD *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, it should be noted that the sample sizes from which the findings have been derived are limited, and caution should be exercised when making generalizations.

Nonetheless, in the area of gang violence intervention training, participants and instructors are positive about the content and delivery of training for new and experienced CIWs. Some suggestions have been offered for training improvement, including eliminating topics about spirituality and strengthening the instruction on immigration issues. Allotting more time to topics, and improving handouts and other materials were also suggested.

The findings from the snapshot of crisis incident responses showed that a large proportion of these incidents took place outside GRYD Zones and SNL Areas, and that some were gang-related and some were not. Though the mission of the GRYD program is to ameliorate gang-related violent crime in the GRYD Zones, the Triangle teams respond to an

incident without necessarily knowing, at the time notification is received, whether the incident is inside a GRYD Zone or is gang-related. Subsequently, more exact categorization can be made. But, at the time the notification comes in, the important objective, especially for CIWs, is to get on the scene as quickly as possible. The result, during the period we evaluated, is that most shootings and homicides in Los Angeles became Triangle incidents. From a public safety point of view, this kind of coverage is obviously a good thing.

Survey results of Triangle members also point to success in achieving stated goals for the Crisis Response System. GRYD's Triangle members reported substantial communication amongst themselves, including informal notifications to each other of crisis incidents that had not yet been broadcast through the RACR system. Immediate responses are more common by CIWs than RMs, and the LAPD component of the Triangle is always present. This is consistent with their relative roles in the Crisis Response System, and with their responsibilities as defined by the GRYD Office; a variety of on-scene and post-incident activities are undertaken, in line with the separate roles of CIWs and RMs in the response system. The follow-up actions by CIWs tended to emphasize community outreach.

All of these observations are consistent with the expectations stated in the *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, there was less agreement among the three groups about short term, immediate outcomes as well as about longer term effects of crisis response, although most views were again positive.

In general, LAPD staff views on the Crisis Response System and other GRYD programs and activities were somewhat positive, but to a lesser degree than those expressed by RMs and CIWs. For instance, most LAPD respondents tended to indicate no perceived community changes in public safety and gang-related incidents due to the System, while others expressed no opinion. However, LAPD respondents tended to report that SNL programs had positive effects on the community, and were valuable in providing alternative programming for youth.

Thus, on balance, the responses we have obtained from the self-reported surveys convey positive views about GRYD-sponsored activities. However, at this point in the evaluation, we are not able to confirm these views from independent sources. We do not know, for instance, whether the Crisis Response System does reduce retaliation when the incident is gang-related. We also do not know how community residents and victims view the System. These are unanswered questions that, in our view, the GRYD Office should explore as soon as feasible.

# CHAPTER VII

## CONCLUSIONS

### VII.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter briefly summarizes the conclusions reached from the results of the third year of the evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD). It includes program implementation highlights, key findings relating to GRYD outcomes and effects, and stakeholder perceptions about the GRYD and Summer Night Lights (SNL) programs.

### VII.2 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Past evaluation reports by the Urban Institute/Harder+Company have highlighted the challenges that the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development has faced in implementing its highly ambitious and complex set of programs. Year three of the program has seen significant progress in addressing those challenges.

The most notable program implementation improvement by the GRYD Office this year was its development and dissemination of a *Comprehensive Strategy*<sup>73</sup> in December 2011. This plan was the result of an on-going dialogue with those most affected by and knowledgeable about gang violence in the City of Los Angeles. The GRYD Office obtained input from a variety of groups and individuals: prominent gang researchers; service providers working with at-risk youth; gang intervention specialists; and many people within the GRYD program itself. The result is a well-thought-out and far-reaching strategy for achieving reductions in gang and gun violence, and gang joining by Los Angeles youth. It not only provides theoretical justifications for program structures and objectives, but also establishes the management and organizational principles and procedures that are essential for a complex program such as GRYD. Program benefits are already observable, and we expect these to continue and expand during the coming year.

One benefit has been GRYD's ability to increase the accountability of service providers and prepare the way for performance measurement. These steps have included renewed efforts toward documentation of program progress and of individual prevention and intervention provider activities. Capturing these important pieces of information, and subsequently compiling them in searchable databases is noteworthy, given the problems that impeded earlier efforts to do so. A key component of this is that systematic information is being developed on GRYD's Crisis Response System and the incidents to which responses are made. This is not yet at the point where it can be considered fully operational at a level that will support evaluation, but all indications are that these shortcomings will be rectified during the coming year.

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<sup>73</sup> Cespedes, G. and Herz, D. December 2011. "The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD): Comprehensive Strategy."

In addition, the Summer Night Lights program has been expanded from 24 to 32 parks and recreation centers across the city. There were many thousands of attendees during the two months SNL operated in 2011 and, as is noted below, community residents' reactions to SNL have been very positive.

### VII.3 KEY OUTCOME FINDINGS

Program outcome changes were examined at both the community and individual levels. Analysis of violent gang-related crime was undertaken at the community level; youth in GRYD's prevention programs were the focus of the individual-level outcome assessment.

#### *Gang Violence*

At the community level, this year's evaluation focused on gang-related violent crimes. Gang-related homicide, robbery and aggravated assault incidents were used to map violence trends across the areas in the city where GRYD devoted the largest amount of resources to support its program activities from January 2005 to December 2011. Year-to-year changes were also examined for other locations in the city where GRYD has operated, although to a substantially lower degree, and in areas of the city where GRYD was not implemented.

Since violent gang crimes were far more concentrated in the Primary GRYD locations than in other areas of the city, a more representative comparison area was selected from Los Angeles County. This area had high numbers of violent gang-related crimes that more closely approximated those in the Primary GRYD target locations in the city. Comparisons were made using three different but complementary methodologies: segmented regression, which was used to describe the trends; interrupted time series analysis, which was used to make projections based on the trends from 2005-2008 in order to see whether actual incident levels were higher or lower than predicted; and difference-in-differences analysis, which assists in compensating for differences between the Primary GRYD locations and the County Comparison locations.

Gang violence has substantially declined throughout the city of Los Angeles since 2007. Declines were observed in areas where the GRYD program is operating and in areas where it is not. This suggests that there are factors beyond the GRYD program affecting violent gang crime. Somewhat smaller year-to-year declines were observed in Primary GRYD locations compared to where programs are not present. However, these differences appear largely due to the high concentration of violent gang crime in the targeted areas and a much lower incidence of gang violence elsewhere in the city. Moreover, following implementation of GRYD programs in 2009, year-to-year declines occurred in the Primary Locations at increasing rates

Comparisons of gang violence levels in the Primary GRYD locations and those in similar areas in Los Angeles County showed that both areas had similar declining trends since 2007. However, the declines in violent gang crimes were modestly larger in the GRYD areas than in the County Comparison locations following GRYD implementation in 2009. This finding was confirmed through linear regression trend estimates and comparisons of actual monthly frequencies of gang crimes to forecast models based upon past crime. A differences-in-differences comparison showed a somewhat slower decline in the city during the first year of GRYD, but faster rates of decline thereafter in comparison to the county.

### *Attitudinal and Behavioral Change in Prevention Program Youth*

At the individual level, this year's evaluation focused on attitudinal and behavioral risk levels among youth in the GRYD program. Changes between initial assessments of at-risk levels at the time of referral, and retest assessments at six month intervals thereafter, were analyzed for a sample of 1,288 youth in the prevention program. These youth were compared to 397 others who had been deemed not-eligible at referral after scoring below the eligibility threshold on the Youth Services Evaluation Tool (YSET):

We examined the seven attitudinal scales that comprise the YSET test, comparing changes from initial YSET to the most recent retest YSET for enrolled youth, and concluded that substantial and statistically significant improvements had taken place among prevention program youth on all the scales. Improvements also took place with respect to self-reported delinquent and gang-related behaviors though at somewhat lower levels. Overall, by the time of the latest retest, 55 percent of the youth would no longer have qualified for entry into the program because their at-risk levels had dropped below the cut-point established by GRYD as the threshold for service eligibility.

The comparisons to the not-eligible sample, using the same measures, indicated that, on average, the not-eligible youth had some improvements on most of the attitudinal scales but at lower proportions than the enrolled youth, and at lower levels of improvement. The not-eligible youth were found to have had little change in gang-related behaviors.

Because of the fact that enrolled youth and not-eligible youth were not equivalent groups at the time of referral, drawing firm conclusions from the descriptive comparisons between the two groups is problematic. It is probable that a low risk group will have had fewer problems at the initial testing stage, and therefore were less likely to improve their already low at-risk levels. We conducted a Regression Discontinuity analysis to obtain other estimates of the comparative change between the enrolled and not-eligible groups. The results affirmed that the enrolled youth had improved to a greater extent than the not-eligible youth, after controlling as much as possible for the difference in at-risk levels that the initial YSET disclosed.

## **VII.4 STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS**

In addition to empirical evidence concerning program outcomes, the Year 3 evaluation captured stakeholder perceptions of GRYD program effectiveness. Data were collected from a wide variety of groups and individuals most familiar with GRYD programs. These included members of the GRYD Office staff, service providers (most notably Community Intervention Workers and SNL Youth Squad members), leadership, detectives and line officers from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and residents of the SNL communities served by GRYD. These perceptual data were collected through surveys, interviews and focus group meetings.

The views of the stakeholders surveyed or spoken with were largely supportive of the conclusion that the GRYD program is achieving the goals outlined under the *Comprehensive Strategy*. However, the results of the LAPD survey were less positive than those obtained from GRYD staff, intervention workers, and members of served communities. Community members that attended SNL programs during the summer of 2011 were overwhelmingly positive about program activities and staff

reported enhanced feelings of safety during SNL programming, felt comfortable calling the police, and were positive about relationships within their communities. GRYD staff and intervention workers were also quite positive about relationships with other agencies, and felt that GRYD programs were having a positive impact on crime and violence. LAPD personnel, on the other hand, tended to feel that GRYD was not having much of an effect on crime, but did indicate positive views about GRYD and SNL program effects on the community, and on youth in particular, by providing alternatives to street and gang life.

## VII.5 SUMMARY

The Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program operates within targeted communities in the city with high levels of gang violence and prevalence. As a community-based program, it cannot be evaluated with the rigor of a true experimental evaluation design, in which gang violence levels in selected communities randomly assigned to receive GRYD program services would be compared to levels in communities not receiving such services. As a result, absolute assertions of cause and effect relationships of the GRYD program on observed outcomes cannot be made. However, in the aggregate, the preponderance of the outcome evidence documented in this year's evaluation provides support to the hypothesis that the GRYD program is having effects consistent with the *Comprehensive Strategy's* goals. Violent gang-related crimes have declined modestly more since implementation than in comparable areas in the county, and individuals participating in GRYD prevention programs have shown substantial improvements in attitudinal and behavioral risk factors associated with potential and future gang involvement. In addition, program partners and participants have very positive perceptions about GRYD program implementation and its effects. Finally, large majorities of community residents report satisfaction with GRYD programs in their neighborhoods and report feeling safer because of GRYD.