

MIKE BONIN
Getting Things Done for Our Neighborhoods
Councilmember, 11th District

Back to Basic Car


A Comprehensive Neighborhood Patrol Strategy

White Paper

November 2018

Mike's Vision: Back to Basics

Increased Neighborhood Patrols – Expanded Community Policing – Reduced Response Times



Too often, I hear from constituents that they rarely see a patrol car in their neighborhood, or that it takes the LAPD too long to respond to a call for service. Our neighborhoods deserve better. We need more patrol officers – in Westside neighborhoods, and in neighborhoods throughout the City. In January 2017, I launched *Back to Basic Car* in an effort to address the underlying issues that deprive our neighborhoods of sorely needed police resources. Following the launch, the LAPD conducted an efficiency exercise that resulted in more than 300 sworn officers being moved from specialized units and desk duty, back to neighborhood patrol. Now, under the leadership of our new Chief of Police Michel Moore, the LAPD has made a further commitment to improving how they allocate and prioritize resources, which includes moving an additional 200 sworn officers to the field by the first quarter of 2019. This is the only way the department can serve and protect our residents and our neighborhoods in the way that we all deserve. However, we still have more work to do in order to fully reinvigorate the LAPD's neighborhood patrol, community policing and response practices.

For decades, the LAPD has focused on community policing and looked to it as the solution to scandals, civil unrest and rising crime. Community policing depends on having regularly assigned patrol officers in neighborhoods so that they are able to build proactive relationships with local residents and stakeholders. This type of policing is implemented largely through a system of Basic Cars, organized under the LAPD's Basic Car Plan. The Plan was created and launched in 1969 by then Chief of Police Ed Davis, who initially divided the City into 83 smaller neighborhood areas and assigned dedicated patrol cars to each one. This number was gradually increased to the current 168 areas about 22 years ago, but without a commitment to maintaining the requisite number of patrol officers, or to ensuring that these additional areas conform to identifiable neighborhood boundaries.

The City has changed considerably over the last 22 years and it is time to take a fresh look at how the LAPD allocates neighborhood patrol resources and deploys its officers. This is why I secured funding in the City budget for a third party to take a fresh look at LAPD patrol practices, while also redrawing the current Basic Car Maps and recommending where to add new Basic Car Areas. In August 2018, the contract for this effort was successfully awarded to the Matrix Consulting Group through a competitive bidding process. Over the next several months, Matrix will be working in close collaboration with my office, the LAPD, the City Administrative Officer, and the LA Police Protective League to advance the mutual goal of increased patrols, expanded community policing and reduced response times. As part of the contract, Matrix will be seeking the input of residents and neighborhood councils on the current state of local police services, and how they can be improved. This input will be vital to developing new Basic Car Maps that better conform to the police service needs in each of LA's unique neighborhoods.

As we approach the 50th Anniversary of the Basic Car Plan, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at the present day situation. As will be evidenced through this document, the seeds for many of our current neighborhood policing challenges were planted many decades ago, and there have been many attempts to address the underlying issues. It is only now through new LAPD leadership – with a more progressive view towards neighborhood policing – that we have a genuine opportunity to resolve these long-standing issues on a unified front. To this day, the Basic Car Plan is regarded as the birth of the modern-day community policing movement in the United States, and we need to bring the focus back to how it was originally conceived and implemented, while also making updates to meet our contemporary policing needs.

I look forward to our continued partnership in this important effort.

Mike

How We Got Here: Basic Car Timeline

The History of LAPD Neighborhood Patrol, Community Policing and Response Times

STRESS ON PREVENTION

New Look for Police: Neighborhood Patrol



PROMOTING A PLAN—Police Chief Edward M. Davis holds news conference in front of one of

150 billboard posters on department's Basic Car Plan, which deals with policemen-citizen meetings. Times photo by Frank Q. Bruen

POLICE MEET CITIZENRY

Basic Car Plan Gets Officer's Accolade

1973 LAPD ANNUAL REPORT

"All officers, from the raw recruit on up, have been made to realize that they cannot begin to function adequately without winning and deserving the confidence and friendship of the people. That's why we started the Basic Car Plan four years ago. We divided the City into more than a hundred individual neighborhoods and turned each of those neighborhoods over to a team of nine uniformed officers. In effect, we told these officers: 'This territory no longer belongs to some administrator sitting behind a headquarters desk. From now on it belongs to you, and you belong to the people who live here.' The Plan has worked as nothing else has worked before. The patrol officer now knows the people living and working within the boundaries of his own 'piece of turf,' what their crime problems are and how they can be controlled."

EDWARD M. DAVIS
Chief of Police

1960s

1965 – A special commission headed by former CIA Director John McCone to investigate the 1965 Watts Riots provides several recommendations – most notably to expand police-community relations programs.

1969 – Newly appointed Chief of Police Ed Davis initiates the Basic Car Plan as a six-month pilot with an LAPD force of 6,194 officers – 3,127 of whom are assigned to patrol, with an average of 325 officers on the street at any given time.

1970s

1970 – Basic Car Plan is formally adopted and expanded citywide.

1971 – The rank of Senior Lead Officer (SLO) is created to lead each of the Basic Car Teams and serve as the principal point of contact for each neighborhood.

1971 – Chief Davis launches the Neighborhood Watch Program.

1973 – In order to move the LAPD even closer to the communities it serves, Chief Davis decentralizes the department by creating four geographic bureaus, each headed by a Deputy Chief.

Basic Car Meetings Set

WEST LOS ANGELES—Vacation — prevention against crime will be the subject of this month's West Los Angeles Police Division's basic car plan meetings for West Side residents.

Meetings are:
Areas 8A4 and 8A12— Wednesday, June 21, 7:30 p.m., Paul Revere Junior High School, 1540 Allenford Ave.
Area 8A22 — Monday, June 19, 7:30 p.m., Emerson Junior High School, 1650 Selby Ave.
Area 8A68 — Monday, June 26, 7:30 p.m., Castle Heights School, 9755 Catalauegus Ave.
Area 8A36—Wednesday, June 28, 7:30 p.m., Nora Sterry School, 1730 Corinth Ave.

Basic Good Sense

The Los Angeles Police Department's innovative Basic Car Plan has survived its first year of actual operation in the field.

During that period, nine-man officer teams patrolled assigned areas on a daily basis and held monthly question-and-answer sessions with interested residents.

It is now time to assess the successes and failures of the project in terms of its purpose. Has it helped in curbing a rising crime rate throughout the city? And, equally important, has it succeeded in establishing a desired rapport between the police and the citizens they are hired to protect?

Officer participants, especially many of the younger ones, feel the Basic Car Plan has made them more aware of their responsibilities to the neighborhoods they patrol. And they report a growing awareness on the part of the citizenry as to the role it can play in helping curb crime.

It is true that attendance at monthly meetings has been disappointing. This is especially so in the minority areas where there is greatest suspicion of police and greatest need for their protective services.

But on the whole, in our opinion, the pluses far outweigh the minus factors.

The city's police are asking us all for our assistance and understanding. As Officer Siemans of the 77th St. Division explains:

"At least we are making an effort. We're trying. We're willing to listen . . ."

That kind of honest appeal deserves a sympathetic response from each resident of this city. The war on crime cannot be waged or won by the police on their own. They deserve our help.

“Davis tried to bring the community into the department. Gates shut it out.”

1978 – Chief Davis retires, and newly appointed Chief Daryl Gates moves a significant number of the LAPD’s 7,016 officers away from Basic Car patrol duties in favor of increasing specialized units. As the LA Times later put it, “Many of Davis’ innovations were deemphasized or dismantled when Daryl F. Gates took over as chief... Davis tried to bring the community into the department. Gates shut it out.”

Stamps on Management Study

Gates Angrily Criticizes Report as ‘Harassment’

By DAVID JOHNSTON, Times Staff Writer

Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates angrily attacked as “utterly ridiculous” Monday a management audit that characterized his department as being top heavy with brass and with too few civilian employees. To dramatize his sentiments, Gates opened a news conference by flinging to the floor the 200-page study by the city administrative office and stamping on it three times with his right foot. Gates grinned as he stamped on the audit report, but he became visibly angry as he discussed it, suggesting it was part of a campaign of “harassment” against the department. The audit, released Friday, said that by eliminating 22% of the Police Department brass through attrition and replacing 256 desk offi-


cers with lower paid civilians, the department could hire nearly 250 more police to patrol the streets at no additional cost to taxpayers. Gates accused City Administrative Officer Keith Comrie of deliberately delaying release of the report several months to coincide with an expected City Council debate over Gates’ proposal for a special tax to expand the force by 1,354 officers to 8,500 officers. Comrie has recommended against Gates’ plan at this time. Asked if he was accusing Comrie of trying to sabotage the plan, Gates said he is “very suspicious” of Comrie’s timing on release of the audit. Under questioning by reporters, however, Gates acknowledged that it was not until Dec. 22 of last year that he responded to a draft of the

Please see GATES, Page 3

1980s

1981 – An audit conducted by the City Administrative Officer is critical of the LAPD’s top-heavy management structure, inefficient use of sworn personnel and over-emphasis on specialized units. At a news conference, Chief Gates throws the report to the ground and stomps on it.

1985 – Citizen groups grow concerned about police response times, prompting the City Council to approve an outside study and the Police Commission to




eventually hire an outside consultant to study the issue.

1988 – An outside consultant concludes that with a force of 7,250 officers, the LAPD does not commit enough of its officers to actually patrolling the City, does not respond quickly enough to calls for help, and diverts too many of its patrol officers to special assignments. The LAPD subsequently implements a new deployment system known as “Patrol Plan”, and adopts the “7/40 Standard” that requires officers to respond to calls within 7 minutes and to devote 40% of their available time to proactive policing.

1988 – The LAPD estimates that a 9,000 officer force is needed to be able to respond to emergency calls in five minutes or less and still have enough personnel for adequate routine patrol. In an effort to increase the size of the existing patrol force, the City Council requests a “departmentwide systematic review of all sworn, non-patrol functions.” The LAPD ignores this request.

LAPD Responses ‘Unacceptably Slow,’ Study Says; Deployment Changes Urged

LAPD’s Response Time Now Reported as ‘Uniformly Long’



1990s



RANDY LEFFINGWELL / Los Angeles Times
Operators Celine Castrop, left, and Leslie Wiley take 911 calls.

SNAPSHOT A NIGHT ON 911 DUTY

Backed-Up Calls, Few Units: 'It Scares Me Many Nights'

In a bomb shelter under City Hall East, a 911 switchboard operator took an emergency call that underscored the importance of having enough patrol cars on the streets of Los Angeles. A young man in the Harbor area was reported wounded in the leg, the victim of a drive-by shooting. It was 11:20 p.m. on a recent Friday night. The operator issued a high priority "hotshot" call for any available unit to respond immediately. But there were no available units. All seven police cars in the Harbor area were handling other high-priority calls. "It scares me many nights when I know how few units I have out there," said Joe DeLadurantey, who until recently was the Harbor Division captain. Ten minutes passed before a unit broadcast an acknowledgment that it could take this one. Meanwhile, six other calls backed up in the Harbor Division—one classified as urgent and the rest as "routine" disturbances and disputes. Citywide, the picture was the same. There were 40 backed-up calls. And this, said the 911 operators, was a slow Friday night. On some nights, records show, there are more than 80 backed-up calls.



'A woman in her house reports someone is breaking in at 2 a.m. and we have no one to send. Or shots are being fired into the house right now. We look for units and there is no one available.'

POLICE LT. DAVID MUSIL
LAPD watch commander

1991 – A special commission headed by Warren Christopher in response to the Rodney King Beating calls for community-based policing and indicates that the department can do more with the officers it already has on the force. The commission also indicates that police officers see patrol duty as a dead end for career advancement, and that officers try to get out of patrol work as quickly as possible.

Proposals for Changing the LAPD

These are some key recommendations issued Wednesday by the special panel charged with investigating police and city response to the riots:

PREVENTION

- Adopt a proactive problem-solving model of policing in partnership with the community and affected city agencies.
- Reduce the number of officers assigned to special units and staff positions, and redeploy officers to patrol assignments.
- Make field command experience a primary criterion for advancement through the ranks.
- Reassign to patrol duty as many as possible of the more than 1,600 unmarked sedans in its fleet.
- Implement a training program to increase the level of understanding of Los Angeles' diverse population.

WEBSTER: Study Urges Reassignment to Street Duty

1992 – A special commission headed by former FBI Director William H. Webster to investigate the LAPD's response to the 1992 Civil Unrest determines that only about 350 (4%) of the Police Department's 7,800 officers are on patrol duty at any given time. The commission's first recommendation: "adopt new priorities that place renewed emphasis on basic patrol duties."

Deployment of Officers by LAPD Questioned

- **Police:** More than 400 have clerical or other duties. Critics say these tasks could be handled by civilians.

1993 – Recently appointed Chief of Police Willie Williams describes patrol as "the last place where resources are invested and the first place from which they are taken." Chief Williams vows to put more of the LAPD's 7,618 officers on the streets by redeploying personnel from specialized units and increasing hiring.

1992 – An LA Times deployment analysis determines that the LAPD patrol force has been reduced to just 279 officers in radio cars on an average shift, while more than 400 officers are assigned to jobs that do not require sworn police skills, including painting freeway murals, and teaching physical fitness and Spanish.

LAPD Staffing Breakdown

Of the 8,190 officers in the Los Angeles Police Department, 6,784 are assigned to the Office of Operations, which is responsible for patrol and most detective functions. Operations has 994 detectives, 695 sergeants and 222 officers of higher rank. It has 4,873 regular police officers whose functions are illustrated in the chart below.

Function	Count	Percentage
Patrol Car Force	1,964	40%
Traffic	598	12%
Foot Beats	223	6%
Detective Trainees	490	10%
Special Task Forces	837	17%
Desk, Station Operations and Administration	401	8%
Other	350	8%

Note: The remaining 1,406 officers in the department are assigned to a variety of other functions, including training, personnel, communications, narcotics, internal affairs, DARE and organized crime.

Source: LAPD Office of Operations

How Thin Is The Blue Line?

To determine roughly how many of Los Angeles' nearly 8,200 police officers are in patrol cars assigned to respond to calls for help, The Times used figures supplied by the Police Department. Officials said they deploy 525 cars citywide to answer radio calls during each 24-hour period and about four out of five cars carry two officers. This translates into 945 officers per day—or 315 per eight-hour shift. Actual staffing varies from shift to shift to reflect workload. For example, more officers work night than work day or graveyard shifts, and more officers work Fridays and Saturdays than Mondays and Tuesdays.

1995 – The LA Times determines that while the LAPD increased the sworn ranks by 900 in a matter of two years – to 8,391 officers, the patrol force has only grown by 27. In response, Mayor Richard Riordan states: *“The chief has to find a better way to deploy troops... I think the people of Los Angeles have a right to know why these numbers are so low and where the officers have been placed if not in the field.”*

Despite Hiring Burst, LAPD Adding Few Officers to Patrols, Report Says

■ **Law enforcement:** With 900 added to ranks, only 27 more are on streets in uniform. Mayor wants faster progress.

Where Are the Officers?

A new report shows that despite a flurry of hiring that has added 900 officers to the Los Angeles Police Department, most have not found their way to the field. Fewer than a third are patrolling city streets and the LAPD has grown by just 27 patrol officers—a performance that has led to criticism from the mayor’s office and others.

	July 1993	Sept. 1995	Change
Patrol Operations			
Patrol officers	4,012	4,039	+27
Sergeants	567	641	+74
Lieutenants	72	87	+15
Investigations			
Senior officers	172	143	-29
Detectives	629	804	+175
Lieutenants	36	36	0
TOTALS	5,488	5,750	+262

Source: Los Angeles Police Department

1997 – Newly appointed Chief of Police Bernard Parks writes the following in an LA Times editorial: *“...responsibility for Community Policing is vested in about 191 members of this 12,000 member organization - 168 Senior Lead Officers, 18 Area captains, 4 geographic bureau commanding officers, and the Chief of Police. Supervisors, detectives, and even most officers assigned to the Basic Car Plan themselves feel little responsibility for the success of Community Policing... Community Policing simply cannot be contained in a small room within each Area for which the SLOs work each day.”*

2000s

2000 – The Report of the Rampart Independent Review Panel cites a *“continued failure by the Department’s management to treat the communities it polices as full partners in its mission.”* The review panel further indicates that *“...officers and citizens repeatedly told us that officers frequently ‘rotate’ out of patrol at the earliest opportunity... In part, this is due to a widespread perception among officers that patrol work is not valued and is not an avenue for promotion... As a result, community members complain throughout the City that they rarely see the same officer twice in relation to any particular problem...”*

Across L.A., Fewer Officers Patrol Streets


2003 – The LA Times reports that the number of police officers patrolling LA streets hit a near five-year low, stating: *“Even as the number of LAPD officers has grown slightly, the number of police assigned to patrol has dropped.”* The staff of recently appointed Chief of Police William Bratton

indicates that the 9,200 officer force would need to increase by at least 600 sworn personnel in order to reduce emergency response times to seven minutes.

2006 – Chief Bratton creates the Entertainment Trademark Unit *“to restore and protect the Department’s image.”* This specialized unit focuses on investigating and regulating works that include LAPD references, such as the *‘To Serve and to Protect’* motto. Meanwhile, neighborhoods continue to be shortchanged on patrol resources.

2007 – The LAPD releases the Optimal Area Staffing Reengineering Proposal that is intended to establish an ideal staffing model at all area police stations. The proposal acknowledges that the patrol force *“bears the brunt of harvesting practices that strip divisions of resources and expertise.”*

2008 – An audit conducted by City Controller Laura Chick identifies 565 sworn positions that could potentially be filled by civilians. The audit also finds that *“in one Area station, of the 154 authorized patrol positions, only about 100 officers were actually deployed to patrol in a particular deployment period.”*



2008 – The LAPD announces that it will move 26 officers out of the West LA Division in order to provide a sufficient number of officers to open two new police stations – Olympic Division in Mid City and Topanga Division in the West Valley. Councilmember Bill Rosendahl, local residents and Senior Lead Officers express strong concerns regarding the impact this will have on crime and response times on LA’s Westside. This staffing shift occurs despite the City’s hiring of hundreds of net new officers within just the last two years.

STREET COPS TO BECOME JAILERS

Transfers will allow use of an LAPD site long empty because of staffing shortages.

2010s

2010 – Recently appointed Chief of Police Charlie Beck announces plans to reassign 83 officers from street patrol to jail duties in an effort to open the LAPD’s new Metropolitan Detention Center, which has been unable to open for more than a year due to a citywide hiring freeze and staffing shortage affecting civilian detention officers.

2011 – The LA Times reports that “700 police officers work in the LAPD’s Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau... That’s more than twice as many officers as are assigned to any police station in the city, even those in the highest-crime areas.”

2014 – An LAPD Inspector General investigation confirms that police supervisors falsified deployment numbers to give the appearance that more patrol units were on the streets, while officers were actually performing desk duties and other administrative tasks within at least five police stations.

Crime rise puts LAPD in hard spot

Some worry that sending elite officers to hard-hit areas will undermine gains in community policing.

2015 – In response to a rise in crime, Chief Beck increases the size of the elite Metro Division by 229 officers – a 92 percent personnel increase to this specialized paramilitary unit. This is accomplished by redeploying many officers directly from neighborhood patrol. Some worry this shift will undermine community policing.

2016 – In February, Chief Beck tells the City Council’s Public Safety Committee that the 9,900 officer force needs to increase to 12,500 officers in order to bolster the size of patrol.

2016 – In March, the LAPD command staff confirms through an audit conducted by City Controller Ron Galperin that nearly all of the positions and/or functions previously recommended for civilianization in City Controller Chick’s 2008 audit are still being performed by sworn personnel.

2016 – In July, the LAPD formally transfers 52 regular sworn positions to the recently established Community Relationship Division — a centrally located special unit that makes sporadic appearances throughout the City and heavily utilizes social media, while having no familiarity or ties with any particular community.

2016 – A December 8th LAPD “Logged On Units Report” reveals that only 311 officers are on patrol citywide at 12:00 p.m.

Police plan raises fears on Westside

Residents worry that fewer patrols and the shift of LAPD officers elsewhere could mean a rise in burglaries.

228,000
Population served by the LAPD West L.A. Division.

241
Current number of officers in division.

215
Number of officers after proposed redeployment.
Source: Los Angeles Police Department

L.A. police falsified staff levels

Inspector general finds officers were listed as being on patrol when they were doing other tasks.

Mike's Solution: *Back to Basic Car*

2017

Mike Launches the Back to Basic Car Initiative 10-Point Plan

- 1. Reinvalidate Patrol** - currently undervalued, underprioritized and understaffed - provide increased promotional paths and incentives for officers assigned to this core function.
- 2. Establish Minimum Patrol Staffing Levels** - revisit the LAPD's "Patrol Plan" deployment formula and establish a more realistic Citywide minimum staffing level to meet daily workload demands and improve response times.
- 3. Decentralize Personnel** - redeploy sworn officers from headquarters, administrative assignments, less-essential specialized units and details back to our neighborhoods.
- 4. Establish "Constant Staffing" Overtime** - similar to the Fire Department, utilize an overtime system or staffing pool to fill all temporarily vacant basic car positions, ensuring that no neighborhood is left without a patrol car when an officer is unable to report to work.
- 5. Add Basic Car Districts and Senior Lead Officers** - initiate a study to re-boundary basic car districts to create smaller patrol areas that better conform to identifiable neighborhood boundaries, with the goal of tailoring police services to better meet the needs of individual neighborhoods.
- 6. Add Redundant Radio Cars** - the original Basic Car Plan deployed an additional radio car within each basic car district for redundancy and ensured that officers were not pulled out of their primary area of responsibility, unless absolutely necessary.
- 7. Improve Operational Flexibility** - no uniformed officer on the streets should be exempt from responding to urgent radio calls and backing up fellow officers simply due to their unique mission or area of specialty (i.e. Metro Division Officers).
- 8. Develop Geographic Coverage Protocols** - similar to the Fire Department, during unusual incident activity, heavy call-load, or significant personnel shortages, systematically and proactively move-up resources from outside divisions to balance Citywide geographic patrol coverage and maintain adequate response times in voided areas.
- 9. Enhance Community Policing** - restore the Basic Car as the primary community and proactive policing delivery mechanism, with sufficient divisional deployment levels to enable officers to walk beats and directly interact with the neighborhoods they serve.
- 10. Improve Non-Emergency Responsiveness** - assign officers to radio cars specifically designated to respond to lower-level calls for service.




2018

Mike Initiates the Basic Car Area Boundary Study

Mike secures a third-party to review and update the Basic Car neighborhood patrol and community policing boundary maps for the first time in more than 22 years. In close consultation with community stakeholders, this effort involves determining where the maps need to be adjusted and where more Basic Car Areas need to be added – including the associated Senior Lead Officers.

Additional components of this study:

- Assess population increases resulting from new development and new communities
- Evaluate current emergency and non-emergency response times by neighborhood
- Review the current sworn officer deployment practices throughout the LAPD
- Benchmark the patrol levels and staffing practices of other police agencies
- Identify geographic and traffic related LAPD response time challenges
- Recommend minimum baseline patrol coverage standards for all neighborhoods



Back to Basic Car Progress Report

LAPD Basic Car Plan Inception

Before "Back to Basic Car"

After "Back to Basic Car"

December 1969			December 8, 2016			March 29, 2018		
Avg. Day Shift 8:00 AM - 4:00 PM			Snapshot at 12:00 PM			Snapshot at 1:00 PM		
Division	Patrol Cars	Patrol Officers	Division	Patrol Cars	Patrol Officers	Division	Patrol Cars	Patrol Officers
Central	9	18	Central	8	16	Central	9	18
Rampart	13	23	Rampart	7	14	Rampart	8	16
University	12	23	Southwest	12	24	Southwest	11	22
Hollenbeck	10	20	Hollenbeck	8	16	Hollenbeck	10	20
Harbor	6	12	Harbor	8	14	Harbor	7	14
Hollywood	13	26	Hollywood	8	16	Hollywood	12	22
Wilshire	9	18	Wilshire	6	12	Wilshire	9	18
West LA	14	28	West LA	6	12	West LA	7	14
Van Nuys	15	30	Van Nuys	7	14	Van Nuys	8	16
West Valley	11	11	West Valley	8	16	West Valley	8	16
Highland Park	9	18	Northeast	7	13	Northeast	13	26
77th Street	14	28	77th Street	10	20	77th Street	12	24
Newton Street	9	16	Newton	6	12	Newton	10	20
Venice	10	20	Pacific	5	10	Pacific	8	16
N. Hollywood	9	12	N. Hollywood	8	16	N. Hollywood	8	16
Foothill	10	20	Foothill	8	16	Foothill	8	16
Devonshire	8	14	Devonshire	9	16	Devonshire	10	20
Southeast	<i>Established in 1978</i>		Southeast	6	12	Southeast	8	16
Mission	<i>Established in 2005</i>		Mission	8	16	Mission	9	18
Olympic	<i>Established in 2009</i>		Olympic	9	16	Olympic	10	18
Topanga	<i>Established in 2009</i>		Topanga	5	10	Topanga	8	16
TOTAL	181	337	TOTAL	159	311	TOTAL	193	382

1969		2016		2018	
Total Sworn Officers	6,194	Total Sworn Officers	9,892	Total Sworn Officers	10,024
Patrol Cars on the Street	181	Patrol Cars on the Street	159	Patrol Cars on the Street	193
Patrol Officers Deployed	337	Patrol Officers Deployed	311	Patrol Officers Deployed	382
Patrol Divisions	17	Patrol Divisions	21	Patrol Divisions	21
Basic Car Areas	83	Basic Car Areas	168	Basic Car Areas	168
City Population	2,935,300	City Population	4,031,000	City Population	4,031,000

MIKE BONIN

Getting Things Done for Our Neighborhoods

Councilmember, 11th District



100%
post-consumer